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FOREWORD

This volume contains the chief contributions of those who took part in the Fourth Congress of Philosophy held at Madras, in December, 1928. The success of the Madras meeting is due chiefly to the energy and enterprise of the local secretaries.

Dr. Saroj K. Das and his talented wife Mrs. Tatini Das, M.A. are responsible for the editing of this volume and the Congress Executive takes this opportunity of offering to them its deepest thanks for their labour of love. The University of Calcutta well-known for its interest in all progressive academic enterprises helped the Congress most substantially in the printing and publication of this volume and the Congress is greatly indebted to its authorities for their generous assistance.

S. RADHAKRISHNAN.

7th September, 1930.

OPENING ADDRESS.

BY

H. H. THE MAHARAJA OF BARODA

GENTLEMEN,

I have to thank you for the cordial reception you have given me. When I received the kind invitation of your committee to give the inaugural address of your Congress, I felt, as I still feel, that this honour and this task should rightly fall upon some one eminent in the world of academic scholarship. But, having throughout my adult life taken such opportunities that have offered themselves to me to acquaint myself with the rudiments of philosophy, I thought that on this occasion you might be willing to forego a technical discourse, and to consider the philosophical reflections of one whose main duties in life have been closely associated with social administration and social advance.

Further reflection made me welcome such an occasion as this to draw your attention, and that of thinking Indians generally, to some urgent demands of the life of our race and of our time. It has all too frequently been said : Philosophy bakes no bread. It has all too frequently been charged against philosophers that their reflections are remote from the facts of ordinary life and have little or no bearing upon it. I wish to challenge the necessity of such a view. I maintain that philosophy, rightly understood, may have very important effects on practical social advance. I maintain that philosophy, rightly understood, is a vital and fundamental factor in social progress. And, Gentlemen, speaking from

this chair, I trust that I may be voicing your convictions also concerning the significance of philosophy. Our deliberations should not simply be intellectually interesting: they should be of value to our fellow men beyond this small circle; they should have genuine practical importance.

The history of philosophy, in the East as in the West, contains many examples of its influence on the development of civilisation. Sometimes it is suggested that that was when philosophy had not the severely technical character which it claims to have to-day. But, surely, the increased care, the greater regard to method, the undogmatic spirit, with which philosophy is now studied, should make it more not less valuable for human life. Many great philosophers in the past did bring philosophical reflection to the solution of practical problems, and thinkers to-day are called upon to consider such problems in the light of philosophy. But before indicating the directions in which, in India, philosophy ought to have an influence on social progress at the present time, I would ask your attention to some preliminary considerations.

Let us turn our attention to the study of philosophy in Indian Universities as it is, and as it might be. What has been the nature of the requirements during the last forty or fifty years from our students who have wished to qualify for a degree in philosophy? Is it not true that in the past, and even now, more often than not a student might obtain a degree in philosophy without showing any knowledge of the philosophy which has originated and developed in his own country among his own people? Is there any other civilised country with a philosophical heritage in which such a condition exists? We all know the cause of this condition in India. Our Universities were for long dominated by Europeans, who, drawing up courses of study, kept to the philosophy of the West which was the only philosophy most of them knew anything about. We need not suppose that they deliberately aimed at the substitution of Western systems for the systems of India. It is probable that even the idea of Indian philosophy did not occur to most of them when they were occupied in drafting University requirements on lines parallel with those in Britain. Gentlemen, if we are to get a proper understanding

of our historical tradition and of the underlying principles of our civilisation this state of affairs must be definitely changed. Some of our Universities are introducing changes in the right direction, and I hope and believe that this Philosophical Congress represents also a movement towards remedying this defect.

Two main reasons have been urged for the limitation of the study for philosophical degrees in India chiefly or entirely to Western philosophy. They merit a brief reference here. It is pointed out that the classical expositions of Indian philosophical thought, Vedantic, Jaina, and Buddhistic, are in Sanskrit, Pali, or some form of Prakrit. It is then maintained that few students in the Universities have that sound knowledge of these languages necessary for efficient study. The reply to this contention is clear and definite. It is through English that the Indian student is called upon to study philosophical classics originally written in German, French, and Greek, of which languages he usually knows nothing. His general intellectual environment and tradition ought to enable the Indian student to acquire, even through English, a more intimate understanding and knowledge of Indian thought than of that of the West. In view of the linguistic difficulties and the differences among Sanskrit scholars as to the interpretation of Indian philosophical classics, it may be better for most students to use translations by efficient scholars than to trust to the sort of elementary knowledge of Sanskrit they may personally acquire. Those who can qualify themselves linguistically should study the original texts and interpret them for their less well equipped fellows.

There is another reason why attention is directed to Western thought and away from that of India. It is claimed that the study of Western systems gives a more thorough philosophical training. Western thought is essentially critical, systematic, logical; marked by the rigour of its method, by its effort for accuracy and clearness. Though it may not always reach the standard demanded by Descartes, the Father of Modern Philosophy in the West: "Define all terms and prove all propositions"—it aims at absolute freedom of thought and the utmost clarity of expression. There is no need for me to bring forward evidence of the great achievements of Western thinkers inspired by these

aims. Contrasted with them, it is undeniable that the thought of the East manifests much dogmatism, is very largely lacking in system, and often indefinite in its method. Unfortunately, to the want of sound logical sequence of ideas, must be added all too frequent obscurity of expression. Sometimes it seems as though such obscurity was cultivated in order to produce a greater impression of mystery.

Yet criticisms of this kind by no means justify the neglect of Indian philosophy. They do not involve that the ideas contained in it are of little or no value. There are good grounds for maintaining that both in its ideas and in its methods Indian philosophy contains much that is of importance and genuine worth. These criticisms indicate the need for its study rather than justify its neglect. What is really required, is that Indian students shall train their minds in accordance with the high standard of accuracy and logical precision found in the West, and study and systematise those contents of Indian classical literature which are worth preserving. In short, we should aim at a combination of Western clarity and logic with Eastern comprehensiveness and profundity.

This aim leads to important considerations of detail as to the study of philosophy in India. Here it is possible to indicate only the main directions of these. In the first place in our Universities and among educated people generally there should be definite attention to the history of Indian philosophy. It is a happy sign of the beginning of a movement in this direction that within recent years a few important books on this subject have been published. I need only mention the *History of Indian Philosophy* by Dr. Das Gupta, eminent for its accurate scholarship; that of Professor Radhakrishnan, impressive by its broad sweep, and the systematic study of *Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy* by Dr. Barua.

The history of Indian philosophical thought is not only interesting in itself. The vigour of its best periods in the past should provide us with an inspiring lesson in opposition to the stagnant acquiescence in tradition which has characterised our intellectual life for centuries. The *Vedas*, though they contain the beginnings of Indian philosophical reflection, were, after all, mainly compilations for use in connection with religious worship. In the

Āraṇyakas there is a slight step forward ; in them philosophical reflections are gathered together with some freedom from the symbolism and ritual that dulled thought in the times both of the *Vedas* and the *Brāhmaṇas*. This movement towards independence and freedom of thought involves a great and important principle, which has striven for recognition at various times in our history, and is in great need of recognition and expression to-day.

The transition to the *Upanishads* was a truly remarkable advance in this direction. They reveal an independence in the raising of problems and of freedom in the search for solutions, which can be paralleled only in the early philosophy of Greece. The *Upanishads* may not have so direct a practical bearing as the writings of Plato and Aristotle, with their interest in the life of man as an individual and a social being ; none the less they have more than a theoretical interest. They include a variety of views. With an appreciation of the fundamental problems of existence, they discuss questions concerning the self, the world of nature, and God. What is chiefly important for us to notice here is the fact that dogmatism of a later orthodox type is absent. The appeal is to the intelligence of man, not to the authority of sacred texts. Time is too short for us to linger on the contents of these genuine efforts of our early thinkers. They have long awaited exposition by an Indian inspired by the Indian spirit, equipped with knowledge of Sanskrit, and a mind disciplined by Western methods of research. I am glad to welcome in Professor Ranade's recent masterly work on the *Upanishads* what we have so long awaited.

Nevertheless, as Professor Ranade's work amply reveals, the Upanishadic thinkers had not yet learnt to think very systematically. They jump from facts to symbols, from the rational consideration of ideas to poetic interpretations of religious rites. But more systematic thought, inspired no doubt by the intellectual freedom of the *Upanishads*, began to spring up in many directions. Some of these movements associated themselves with particular religious cults which may have been of older standing. We see, for example, the rise to greater clearness of view of the more theistic tendencies which may be grouped as Vaishnavism. Then, in quite a different direction, Jainism, whatever its origin may

have been, championed a philosophic movement which tended to purify life from much of its brutality, and vigorously opposed the destruction of life too often associated with religious rites, maintaining that by his own inner personal effort the individual must strive for the attainment of the ideal. From its opposition to Brahmanical ceremonialism and social oppression, and from its criticisms in general, much may be learnt of the conditions of India at the time of its rise into prominence. Later, Buddhism arose and spread over a great part of India, striving to free the life of men from mistaken endeavours and false hopes. Intellect, which had manifested its freedom in the *Upanishads*, had tended to become its own idol; it seemed to set up powerless and futile abstractions and to distract attention from the pressing problems of suffering and evil. With much intellectual insight and psychological knowledge on its own part, Buddhism wished to turn the attention of men from metaphysical abstractions to the ethical. It opposed socially useless ritual, irrational, ascetic self-torture, and the cruelty of animal sacrifices. In principle, it virtually undermined the idea of caste. Buddhism not only placed ethics in the forefront as opposed to intellectualism and ceremonialism; it also inspired a great and marvellous artistic activity. Jainism suffered enormously by political opposition and persecution. Buddhism became swamped and in part absorbed by the surrounding cults. Its tendency to promote an excessive number of monks and nuns led to a divorce from ordinary social activities, with the consequence of rapid decay in face of the political disturbances which began through widespread and repeated invasions. The emphasis placed both by Jainism and Buddhism upon the ideas of *karma* and *samsāra* has given these a decided prominence in later Indian thought.

It is not possible for me here to describe the important intellectual analysis and speculation in the philosophical system of *Sāṅkhya*. Both it and the practical system of *Yoga* had marked effects on Jainism and Buddhism, and their influence has continued on Indian life and thought right up to our own times. The *Yoga* system in its essence is a series of practical means to be adopted as a preliminary to the attainment of the highest knowledge. Its later forms have degenerated and become mixed with

superstition, associated with claims to supernatural powers, claims usually assumed in order to impress the ignorant. Here there seems a great need of purging, of purification by renewed philosophical criticism. What the Yoga system may have to teach us as to the preparation for the attainment of true philosophic insight needs to be dissociated from the fantastic and the magical.

Advance in intellectual systematisation had led to the compilation of a sort of epitome of Upanishadic teaching in the so-called *Brahma-sūtras* ascribed to Vyāsa and Bādarāyaṇa. Much other material, systematic and unsystematic, often of an ethical kind, eventually became grouped together in the epics, especially the Mahābhārata. One line of thought reached a definitive statement in the philosophy of Śaṅkarāchārya, especially in his commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Bhagaradgītā*. Other varying expressions took shape in the works of Rāmānujāchārya and Mādhavāchārya. I venture to believe that there was much that was reactionary in the work of Śaṅkara. Be that as it may be, this at least seems true, that the philosophy associated with his name has become a form of Indian scholasticism which still continues. Since the time of Śaṅkarāchārya and that of his great opponents, philosophy in India has rarely been able to free itself from the limitations of a merely deductive method. This characteristic of the Indian mental life of the past—and incidentally of much of our mental life to-day—merits closer consideration and exemplification.

It is not here a question of the methods that were adopted by the great leaders of Indian philosophical and religious thought. They used methods of independent investigation, to a large extent introspective, and always with a large amount of unfettered reflection. Not so their disciples and successors. They have accepted teaching from the guru, and more often than not have treated it dogmatically. Their own reflection has been a form of deductive inference of what they supposed the received teaching to imply. In later times the Indian systems of philosophy have thus been elaborated with an increasing divorce from real problems, from the world of facts and from the demands of social

advance. To express the situation briefly : Indian philosophy is still scholastic ; it has not yet had its Descartes or its Bacon.

The movements which have arisen in later centuries have been of various kinds, revolts from mere formalism, intellectual and religious, and from caste prejudices and oppression. They have rarely if ever risen to eminence with regard to their philosophical productivity ; they can hardly be said to have directed themselves to philosophical reflection. The vast masses of the population of India, including to a very large extent the so-called educated, have continued and continue in a condition of intellectual inertia. It is this intellectual stagnation which permits them to acquiesce in doctrines and practices from which they should be free.

There have been influences at work in later thought in India which it is well we should recognise. For example, the influence of Islam has probably been felt in those movements such as the rise of Sikhism and of the Kabir-Panth, in emphasising a monotheistic attitude. On the other hand it is probable that in some directions forms of Hindu thought have tended to strengthen mystic strains in Islam. An actual study of the sources reveals ~~that~~ both Islam and Christianity had a share in leading to the type of thought found in the Brahmo Samāj. These are merely suggestive examples of the different forces at work moulding our intellectual life.

The student of philosophy in India most definitely requires to make an adequate study of the philosophy of the West. While he may not embark upon it with the object of systematic comparison of East and West, as is suggested by M. Masson-Oursel in his *Comparative Philosophy*, the main steps of the history of philosophy should be compared. If that is done, I think we shall see ample justification for our view that strictly Indian philosophy still remains somewhat in the same sort of position as Western scholasticism. If that is so, then we have especially to learn from those later stages of Western thought which have enabled it to escape from scholastic formalism and stagnation. We have to learn the nature of its critical, analytical, and inductive methods and train ourselves to apply them.

The study of Western philosophy in these later centuries will reveal to us to how great an extent it has used inductive methods. This constitutes a distinct contrast with what has been described as the essentially deductive character of prevailing Indian philosophical thought. As a consequence of this inductive method—according to which facts are studied in search for any principles which may describe them or their relations—philosophy in the West calls for attention to that wide and varied knowledge which is systematised in the sciences. Indian philosophical thinkers, instead of occupying themselves merely with the interpretation of ancient *śāstras*, need to embark upon study of these natural sciences as a part of their instruction and training.

What we have to look for, therefore, in the study of philosophy in India to-day is a broad acquaintance and knowledge of both Indian and Western philosophy, and some understanding of their methods with some ability to apply them. From such two-sided education we should hope for genuine philosophical advance in India. There are different ways in which this may be promoted. On the basis of such training Indian scholars may restate the problems of philosophy and endeavour to solve them in modern terms. This has one disadvantage : apparently it does not preserve a continuity of Indian philosophical thought. It cannot have that close association with life in India which is so much needed. A more satisfactory way for Indians on Indian soil is to investigate the real meaning and value of those ideas from India's philosophic past which still form the intellectual heritage of Indians in general.

Gentlemen, this is the call which I would make to-day to those assembled in this Congress, and to the great multitude of students scattered among the teeming masses of India : standing in line with Indian tradition, with Indian sentiments in your hearts, with the love of India in the present and an ardent desire for its future, with a knowledge of its past, on this basis with all the acumen and logical precision that you may learn from the West investigate philosophically the problems of your own culture and civilisation, and the problems of wider humanity as related to the conditions in which we in this generation live in India.

Let us turn for a short time to that important side of philosophical reflection which concerns itself with morality. Within recent years several books have been published on Hindu ethics and the ethics of India, mainly historical. A systematic critical and constructive study is still awaited. I shall not occupy your time with detailed replies to the contentions that Indian philosophy gives no bases for ethics, or that Indian ethics logically gives no place for genuine social morality. Every educated Indian knows that there is a moral sense of *dharma*, that there is a *nīti-śāstra*. Every educated Indian knows that in traditional Indian systems of thought there are important ideas relating to moral life, such as those of *pravṛtti* and *ni-vṛtti*, the *āśramas*, and the various paths to *moksha*. Every educated Indian knows that the end or ideal of human life, *puruṣārtha*, includes what is discussed in *artha-śāstra*, in *dharmā-śāstra*, and in *kāmasāstra*. In *artha-śāstra* social and political organisation with its rights and duties receives due consideration. *Dharma-śāstra* includes both moral and religious requirements. *Kāma-śāstra* is concerned not simply with sex, as is all too often imagined by irresponsible youth, but with the life of desire in a wide sense, especially that which finds satisfaction in the Arts.

In the consideration of the moral life philosophy is concerned with what is intimately related with social advance ; here the influence of philosophy on practical life may and should be real. An Indian philosopher should ask : What is the true meaning of these ideas of Indian ethics ? Upon what does their authority depend ? These questions must inevitably lead to the others : Are these ideas at present misunderstood and misrepresented with bad effects on social life ? If so, in what manner ought they to be interpreted and expressed in order to promote social advance ? By all means let us learn what earlier philosophical thinkers have said, but before all let us cultivate a genuine philosophic attitude towards these ideas, and not be satisfied with mere dogmatic repetition.

To what conclusions must we come, for example, if with a truly philosophical independence and acumen, if with sound logic, we examine the ideas associated with *varṇāśrama* ? The ways in which the Indian doctrine of the division of social activities has been and still is interpreted, the prejudices and false sentiments

which have gathered around it, have been the greatest obstacle to social advance in India for decades and for centuries. Widespread enlightenment from genuine philosophical reflection on this subject would bring a liberation, a freedom to Indian social life which to-day is in fetters. I ask : Is there a more important task at the present time than to free men's minds from the false ideas which bind them body and soul? Whose duty is it to guide those striving for liberation, if it is not essentially that of the philosophers of our day and generation? You have here a task which, in my opinion, is of far greater importance, of far greater social significance, than the majority of those upon which I fear most of you are actually engaged.

Gentlemen, let us keep in mind the important practical truth, that mere negation has little force in face of error. A false interpretation is most effectively overcome by the statement and defence of a correct one. Philosophically I think we must admit that it is incredible that the principle of social groups should have been so widely accepted for so long, if there were not something true and valuable in it. The belief that social groups have their source in God contains the truth that some are by nature, that is in part by their original endowments, fit to perform certain functions in society, while others are fit to perform other functions. If one wishes one may call this an aspect of the divine organisation in life. It is an entire misinterpretation and misrepresentation of this to maintain that the place a person is to take in society is to be decided once for all by the circumstances of birth. To say that there is a division of labour among the members of a society is a reasonable statement of a fact and a necessity, but to say that this must conform with physiological and ethnological divisions, is to expound a quite unjustifiable dogma. Such an arbitrary and artificial method is detrimental to society and a hindrance to social advance, which requires that a man should do that work, perform that function, for which he is most fit. It may be true that owing to conditions of heredity and of environment the members of a family through successive generations manifest a fitness for the same social function. That, however, is no justification for the establishment of artificial barriers; the fitness of each generation must be tested and proved for itself. I will not

attempt to point out here the multifarious ways in which group privileges have been artificially bolstered up. To the critical eye of philosophical reflection all these must eventually reveal their irrationality and their want of any satisfactory basis. In the performance of this task of social liberation, philosophy has the assistance of changing economic conditions. On grounds of philosophical reflection and in view of economic forces artificial communal distinctions ought to be broken down for the general social advantage. Philosophical reflection may lead us to the view that Government might be most efficiently carried on by representation of the various interests and activities of the people, rather than by communal representation.

Even when we pass to some of the wider ethical ideas of Indian thought, we find a great need for independent philosophical consideration. Think, for example, of the various ways in which the doctrines concerning the paths to *moksha*, redemption or enlightenment, are interpreted. It should be seen that this is not a matter simply of one's own individual development but is also bound up with social advance. There seem to be at least three ways in which the doctrine of *karma-mārga* may be interpreted, with different social effects. It is for philosophy to estimate the rationality of these interpretations and to evaluate their effects. By *karma-mārga* one might understand the way to achievement through the ritual acts of religion. That view has all too often led to mere formal practice of religious rites, to self-satisfaction therein, and a consequent neglect of an active and intelligent participation in social duties. Again, *karma-mārga* is sometimes represented as adherence to the functions and duties of our particular caste, as prescribed in traditionally accepted *śāstras*. The alliance of this view with one in which *karma-mārga* is also given an implication of political nationalism has become well known through the work of a prominent political leader who died only a few years ago. As distinct from these two interpretations philosophy may be able to develop a view according to which activity devoted to *each* and *every* good social and individual end is both a part of duty and a means of attainment of equanimity of mind. Such a conception of *karma-mārga* would lead to a strenuous life conforming to social advance in all directions of human culture.

Jñāna-mārga may be interpreted with an orthodox limitation, as a way by knowledge of the scriptures, or more profoundly as the way of a mystical vision of God. Whatever philosophy may have to say to this—and it will beware of superficial rejection—it must in our day raise the question as to the importance of that form of knowledge which we have come to call “modern science.” If we reflect on the alleviation of human misery, on the promotion of human health and joy in living, which we owe already to modern science, we shall see at once how important it is that *jñāna-mārga* shall include this, that in short it should be so interpreted as to refer to knowledge in its fullest sense.

Even the doctrine of the path of devotion, *bhakti-mārga*, is capable of a narrower and of a wider interpretation. It may be represented as a purely individualistic ecstasy of the soul in relation to God, or it may be made the form of an enthusiasm of universal love, which, adopted as an ideal, may help in overcoming those antagonisms between different communities which are the greatest hindrance to social progress.

If we think of the root meaning of the term *yoga*, to join, unite, we may suggest that for complete realisation we must join all the paths. There must be many-sided activity, inspired by love and enthusiasm, and guided by knowledge; activity, devotion, knowledge, are all at all times necessary in their right proportion. So, again, the individual should duly perform the requirements of the different *āśramas*. If a man is fully to perform his duty as a householder he must find that he has much to do for the general social welfare. The hermit and the ascetic tend to become merely egoistic, neglecting those social activities essential to social progress. Our existence in this world may be taken to imply that the affairs of this world require and deserve to be adequately attended to.

One aim of philosophy is to seek for comprehensiveness and consistency. An examination of Indian ethical ideas from this point of view should help us to eradicate misconceptions hindering social advance. I think, for example, of the different ways in which, with a modern philosophical attitude, we might work out the implications of the doctrines of the *gūṇas*. On the one hand we might treat these as representing moods and dispositions, con-

trasting the joy of selfless, *sāttvik*, action with the *tāmasik* pain and gloom associated with selfishness. Or we may look at these in another way, and ask: Is not the condition of society, permeated with and moulded on unreasonable ideas of caste, lacking in rational organisation? Is it not essentially chaotic from the point of view of what is required for social advance? In short, is it not fundamentally *tāmasik*? May we not find in a political order imposed upon India—an order which as being order is so far beneficial—something of the *rājasik*? Can we escape from admission of the amount of selfishness with which it is too often associated? Order, peace, efficient administration, these are all of very great value, and should be fully appreciated. But true social advance is concerned with the ideals which are to be attained, and these should be free from any taint of exploitation whether of individual by individual, caste by caste, or nation by nation. In short, again, may we not find in the idea of the *sāttvik*, philosophically interpreted, a fundamental principle of social advance?

What I have so far said, Gentlemen, is by way of suggestion and illustration. I would show that Indian thought has ideas of its own which have grown up among us and have a living hold upon us. It is through these ideas that one most easily and most intimately comes into touch with Indian social life. It is these ideas, therefore, which call for consideration by Indian thinkers of to-day. You have to train yourselves to disciplined thought with the methods of the East and the West, and you have to interpret these ideas in a truly modern philosophic spirit. I need hardly remind a gathering such as this, that *yoga* as equanimity of mind is fundamentally different from an attitude of indifference with which it is too often confused. I need hardly remind you that if the doctrine of *āśramas* were fully appreciated and the duties of each social function and period of life sincerely undertaken, the people of India would not suffer that intolerable drag upon its social advance which exists in its vast army of so-called ascetics. I need hardly remind you that if the principle of true charity were carefully and widely expounded that indiscriminate charity—upon which these beggars depend—would largely cease.

In the West in our generation the science of psychology has made vast strides, and is becoming a subject of study absorbing

almost all the attention of those devoted to it. In India I imagine that for long psychology will have to be but one of that group of subjects which our Professors of Philosophy are called upon to study and to teach. I mention it here, because I believe that in our ancient literature we have a wealth of observation on the springs of conduct. Much of this is spasmodic and disconnected and not apparently arrived at by experimental methods such as are common to-day in the West. But it seems more than probable that they have been arrived at by long-practised methods of concentrated introspection which in this field may be of greater value than the mechanical means the West strives to apply. The field of psychology is already in the West, and for some time has been, a battle ground between introspective and externally experimental methods. The latter tend there to attract the greater support. But do not allow yourselves to be unduly influenced by what is done or thought in the West, just because it is Western. And to others it is also necessary to say : do not cling to anything simply because it is Eastern. In the present connection, however, I do think that it is worth while urging you to study the Indian tradition, which in regard to the psychological is introspective. The Indian mind may be peculiarly adept at this type of investigation, and by it may make genuine contributions to knowledge. I am glad to observe that Mr. S. K. Maitra in his book on the *Ethics of the Hindus* has given much space to the discussion of the springs of conduct as understood in Hindu thought. Psychological and philosophical discussions of this kind should eventually do much to correct the socially harmful impression which still lingers in some quarters, that the so-called law of *karma* is a form of fatalism and of pessimism. Social advance depends on the ever present conviction that man has the capacity to mould social life to greater conformity with our ideals, and upon a rational belief in the triumph of the good.

What, however, is the good? What are or should be our ideals? These are the questions which I know you must at some time have asked yourselves, and which your students time and again ask you. These are questions which also in one form or another present themselves to all. These, indeed, may be said to express the fundamental problem. And at once it may be main-

tained by some, as it has often been maintained, that the solution proposed and the attitude adopted by the West is quite different from that taught by the East. If we may say so, in general terms, it is suggested that the ideal of the Western philosopher is a luxurious study, a stable income of no mean proportions, and perchance also access to elaborately equipped laboratories for investigations into the constitution and qualities of matter. And the ideal Indian philosopher is by contrast mistakenly conceived as a recluse living in the forest as free as possible from physical distractions and social enjoyments, contemplating the ineffable being of Spirit, with purely individualistic aim. Paying no attention to a 'due proportion to individual and social claims, such a one asks what philosophy, occupied with this ideal of divine contemplation, has to do with social advance. Here, Gentlemen, in this question as to the nature of the "good," we have the question of questions. What answer or answers can we give, we whose task and privilege it is to find and to teach to others the nature of the ideal at which we should aim?

Let us divest ourselves of the idea, not infrequently spread abroad in India, that Western philosophy is fundamentally materialistic. The reality of the spiritual nature of man is recognised in manifold ways and is constantly asserting itself. The supposed differences between Indian and Western philosophy are ultimately not so great as they at first appear, but they are often misunderstood. It is for you, Gentlemen, many of whom have had the advantages of a study of Western philosophy and combined with this a contact with Indian ideals in this land of ours, it is for you to study this subject and to guide public opinion. The time that is available for me here is too short to enter into detail, but I would like to indicate my own way of meeting this apparent opposition of ideals.

In the end, Gentlemen, this problem resolves itself into a consideration on the one hand of the facts and things of the actual world in which we live and on the other of that world of ideas which constitutes for us a realm of ideals with which we would like this world of things to conform, or in which we feel more satisfied and at peace. Now, I ask: What has Indian philosophy said concerning this world of things? Has it not said

that it is *māyā*, illusion? It is a world of appearances, a world of finites as distinguished from the infinity of the ultimately real. Does this involve that there is a short path to the real and the infinite, from *jīvātman* to *paramātman*, by the negation of this world of appearances? Is that a truly philosophical interpretation of the Indian standpoint? I venture to think that it is not. The ultimate is not described simply by *neti, neti*, but, in addition, by the twofold implication of the saying: *Tat tram asi*. The ultimately real does not shut out any of its appearances, but it must not be thought of as solely any one of them. And ought we not to seek the philosophical significance of that other term, *līlā*? Ought we not to try to see in the richness of the details of this world varied expressions of the joy of existence? It is thus that I would treat this problem. I would say that there is no short path to reality by the neglect of the things of this world. But I would say that in intellectual research, in the various forms of art, in the diversity of social relationship, in fact in all that we may call culture and civilisation, man is coming into a wider and more comprehensive contact with reality, with the ideal, through these different forms of expression of itself.

Social advance, in its widest sense, therefore, as I look upon it, is essentially bound up with the broadening and deepening of our spiritual life. Some of the tasks that are involved are irksome tasks of technical knowledge and mechanical labour, which call for great patience and great effort. With these the philosopher does not often concern himself. But the philosopher ought never to forget that upon him rests the task of making men conscious that these things are worth doing for the ideal which thereby may be achieved. The whole development of civilisation and culture is not materialistic, it is an increasing triumph of the spirit of man following the ideal in conquest over the physical and the conditions of nature of primitive man. The philosopher should endeavour so to grasp and to express ever new aspects of the ideal in order that men engaged in the practical affairs of social advance may be rightly guided.

It is true that religion has indeed been and is more constantly present to the Indian mind than to that of the ordinary European. This is in large measure due to the Indian's neglect of practical

affairs, to his want of continued and varied activity. If, however, we have to try to rectify this attitude of the people of India, it does not mean that we should be justified in neglecting to study the religious side of Indian life. Philosophy should have a purifying influence here as in other spheres. Further, if we may learn from the practical wisdom of the West, we may be able to repay our debt by contributions to the religious advance of mankind. Into the wealth of our religious literature I cannot here attempt to enter, but I would urge you to study that material with the critical philosophical methods of our generation.

In conclusion, while thanking you again for your kind invitation and your patient attention, I would say how inadequate I feel my scattered remarks to be to the vast problems and tasks which the study of philosophy and its relation to social advance opens up to us. I have wished to impress upon you the great need of the freedom of philosophical reflection in the social life of India in our generation. I have wished to impress upon you that your position and duty in society involve something more than to pursue what may appear to you to be simply intellectually interesting. You must be liberators of the minds of this generation. You must be its enlightened guides to prosperity and happiness. Bearing this in mind I cannot leave this subject without reference to the need of original works on philosophical and practical subjects in our Indian vernaculars. The vernacular literature which is being produced is in the main open to the criticism that it does not conform to the best of modern scholarship. Translations of classical Sanskrit works, and popular expositions by insufficiently educated men, are not what we are most in need of. This task of producing original works in the vernacular languages of India is one for genuine scholars, well equipped with knowledge and skill, with an education which combines the best of East and West. Gentlemen, until the fruits of your intellectual efforts are given for the nourishment of the great masses of our fellowmen, until their lives are permeated with the light that you more than others are expected to bring, your philosophy can have little effect upon social advance.

ADDRESS OF THE GENERAL PRESIDENT

BY

S. RADHAKRISHNAN, CALCUTTA UNIVERSITY

SIR CHIMANLAL SETALVAD, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I am deeply grateful to the Executive Committee of the All-India Philosophical Congress for their kindness in asking me to preside over this session of the Congress. When I remember that this office was held in the past by such illustrious representatives of our culture as Dr. Rabindranath Tagore and Dr. Gangadhar Jha, I realise what a great distinction it is that you have conferred on me. I should be delighted at any time to have the privilege of meeting with so many of my fellow students whose interests run in the same channel as my own; but my pleasure on this occasion is increased because of the privilege I esteem it to be to meet with you inside the portals of this great University. It is unfortunate that His Highness the Gaekwar of Baroda is prevented by illness from being here to-day to open the Congress. I am glad to find myself in agreement with the main note of his address which has just been read out to us. May I on behalf of this Congress express our sorrow at his illness and hope that he may soon return to us in normal health.

In a philosophical congress meeting in India, I will be readily excused for suspecting that the future of humanity depends more on those who live in the close companionship of ideas than on the achievements of men of action. Philosophy in the larger sense of the term is the unseen foundation on which the structure of a civilisation rests. The Indian tradition gives the first place to the pursuit of philosophy—*adhyātma-vidyā vidyānām*. It is the study which gives the impulse and direction to the general life of the community. Throughout the history of Indian thought, the quest for reality has engaged the mind of the country. The naive belief that the world is ruled by Indra, Varuṇa and such other deities, who watch from on high the conduct of men, whether it is straight or crooked; the faith that the gods who can be persuaded

by prayer or compelled by rites to grant our requests are only the forms of the one supreme being ; the firm conviction that the pure stainless spirit, to know whom is life eternal, is one with the innermost soul of man ; the rise of materialism, scepticism and fatalism and their supersession by the ethical systems of Buddhism and Jainism with their central doctrine that one can free oneself from all ill only by refraining from all evil, in thought, word and deed—God or no God— ; the liberal theism of the Bhagavadgītā which endows the all-soul with ethical in addition to metaphysical perfections ; the logical scheme of the nyāya which furnishes the principal categories of the world of knowledge which are in use even to-day ; the Vaiśeṣika interpretation of nature ; the Sāṃkhya speculations and psychology ; the Yoga scheme of the pathway to perfection ; the ethical and social regulations of the Mīmāṃsā ; and the religious interpretations of the supreme reality set forth by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha, Jīvagosyāmi—form a record of philosophic development of which any race could be proud.

But past glory does not confer present distinction. An explorer of recent philosophical literature in India finds little to report except a few sporadic attempts to reinterpret ancient doctrines. Tradition is still strong and authority is profoundly respected and in such an atmosphere philosophy cannot progress. Freedom of thought and fixity of belief are inconsistent with each other. To-day we are content to let things take their course. We are crouching behind the wall when the storm is passing by. We may offer an explanation for this unfortunate condition. A culture that has flowered and reached a high standard of beauty and excellence tends to grow conservative and decadent and our political misfortunes turned our minds into conservative moulds. But, explanations are no excuses.

If the philosophies of India are not to be regarded as mere mummies, enshrined corpses of once living ideas and dead very long since, we should rethink them in the light of the whole theoretical and practical experience through which we have passed. Truths, the most ancient, are endowed for us, as the result of new experience, with greater certainty. The philosophic impulse is not independent of the other factors of life. Science, philosophy

and religion are intimately connected. A reorientation of philosophical perspective is the task facing us to-day. We must make our philosophical views agree with the new dimensions of thought into which scientific extensions of our horizon have led us.

At the present day in the western world almost all the work in the field of philosophy centres round the problems in the borderland of science and philosophy as the foundations of science, the structure of the atom, the problem of continuity, vitalism and the laws of inheritance. The names of Russell and Whitehead, Broad and Alexander, Bergson and Driesch, Smuts and Lloyd Morgan leap to our mind. Recent disturbances in the world of thought caused by the evolutionary hypothesis have made it of surpassing interest to the general mind. The attempts to restrain the authorities from teaching evolution in public schools in some districts of the United States of America, the scene at St. Paul's Cathedral on the 16th of October when the Rector of the City Church denounced Dr. Barnes and left the service with some 400 members of the congregation, the letters exchanged between the Bishop of Birmingham and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Sir Arthur Keith's presidential address at the British Association at Leeds and the Bishop of Ripon's suggestion of a scientific holiday for about a period of ten years have made the subject of evolution of great popular interest. It may perhaps be of some use if I make a few observations on the philosophical implications of the theory of evolution avoiding abstruse discussions which are not suitable for a general audience.

When attacks are made on evolution from the camp of religion, it is not so much the scientific doctrine that is criticised as the naturalistic philosophy based on it. The scientific account is content with a statement of the facts observed while the philosophical hypothesis attempts to offer a metaphysical explanation. Within the limits of the phenomena observed, science may speculate and argue and abandon inadequate descriptions for more adequate ones. It may give up Ptolemy for Copernicus, Newton for Einstein, but it has little to do with final causes. While it may trace the operation of the laws of nature and determine the rise, growth and decay of phenomena, it cannot explain why nature is what it is, how it came to be, and whether it will ever cease to

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be. When the scientist attempts to tackle these problems, he becomes a philosopher and generally a bad one at that. The world is pictured as a vast mechanism where natural forces automatically bring about all the changes. Descartes was the first of modern European philosophers to seek an explanation of all things in purely mechanical terms. "Give me extension and motion" said he "and I will construct the universe." His ideas received elaboration in the development of mechanical physics in the next two centuries. All qualitative differences in the world were reduced to quantitative differences of size, shape and speed of the motion of the particles of matter. Biological evolution was interpreted in the terms of mechanism. The processes of living organisms were explained by means of physics and chemistry. The actual creation of life from non-living matter is regarded as something that can be accomplished in the laboratory. Benjannin Moore says, "Given the presence of matter and energy forms under the proper conditions, life must come inevitably." Consciousness is an inert spectator of life as ineffective and as ubiquitous as one's shadow. If we delete consciousness from the universe, nothing will be changed. Professor Watson, the leader of the behaviourist school, writes: "Psychology, as the behaviourist views it, is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science which needs consciousness as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics. This suggested elimination of states of consciousness as proper objects of investigation in themselves will remove the barrier which exists between psychology and the other sciences. The findings of psychology become the functional correlates of structure and lend themselves to explanation in physico-chemical terms" (*Behaviour* : p. 27). Psychology is a study of the physiological reactions of the human organism as a whole. As biology is a branch of chemistry, psychology is a branch of biology. Men are conscious automata and freedom is a delusion. Values as truth and beauty are mere byproducts of a universe whose reality is physical. Though some evolutionist philosophers like Herbert Spencer believe in an automatic law of progress, that the course of evolution is an upward one in spite of reversions, atavisms, loops and zigzags of reactions deflecting the straight line, others repudiate this view. There is no certainty that the human species is likely

to outlive many of the so-called lower forms of life such as the bacteria of the soil or the unicellular organisms which destroy mankind. There is more degeneration than advance and some even go to the extent of saying that degeneration is the rule and advance the exception. The religion of the mechanical scientist is best described in Bertrand Russell's *Essay on the Free Man's Worship*. Life is an incident in the cooling of the solar system. Man comes into being in the midst of unconscious forces which will eventually destroy him. His appearance on earth is as much an incident in the history of life on earth as his earthly abode is an incident in astronomical history. Humanity appeared on earth as inevitably as beetles on a dunghill. The cosmic fate of all values is to perish without trace. The end of it all is darkness, death.

While metaphysical theories of evolution were set forth by ancient thinkers of Greece and India, the scientific doctrine of evolution is the work of empirical investigators like Linnaeus, Buffon, Erasmus Darwin, Charles Darwin, Wallace and others. It is restricted to the world of living organisms. Darwin's work on the *Origin of Species* does not formulate a philosophy of evolution but furnishes evidence indicating that life on this planet has evolved by a gradual and yet continuous process from the earliest forms of living organisms to the latest product man. He mentions the factors by the operation of which new species arise out of other existing ones. His account is to be accepted or rejected not by a reference to the ultimate questions regarding the universe but by an appeal to the facts of Botany and Zoology.

Malthus's essay on the principle of population suggested to Darwin and Wallace the importance of natural selection. But natural selection cannot operate without the co-operative factors of variation and heredity. According to the former, no two individuals, plants or animals are quite alike. The offspring of the same parent or parents tend to vary in greater or less degree both from their parents and from one another. Otherwise, if all offspring entirely resembled their parents, the world would still be full of amoeba and jelly fish. The principle of heredity tells us that the peculiarities exhibited by the parents tend to be transmitted to the offspring in greater or less degree. The offspring are

never exactly like the parents—this is due to variation—and yet resemble the parents more than they resemble other members of the same species—this is due to heredity. If we have in addition the fact of multiplication, struggle for existence results. Those members which happen to possess variations which equip them better for the struggle tend to survive and others get eliminated. The offspring of the successful tend to resemble the parents in exhibiting the favoured variation to a greater degree than the parents and a new type becomes established by a gradual piling up of small accretions at each generation.

While Darwin accepted Lamarck's theory of the transmission of acquired characters, Wallace and other biologists are opposed to it. Weissmann distinguishes between germ-plasm or reproductive tissue and somato-plasm or bodily tissue and holds that changes induced in the organism can be transmitted only if the germ-plasm is affected. Mendel distinguishes between heritable and non-heritable variations and the latter, which are the reactions of the organism to the environment do not exert direct influence on the course of evolutionary change. Heritable variations represented in the germ-plasm are called mutations while the non-heritable ones are called fluctuations. We cannot, however, say which is which until the test of heredity is applied. The theory of de Vries that heritable variations must be large and sudden and slighter variations are not transmitted is generally accepted.

Darwin's idea of the rise of a new species by the gradual accumulation in successive generations of insensible differences is now abandoned in favour of sudden and considerable mutations. Evolution proceeds by a series of wholly inexplicable jumps and not by the accumulation of minute variations.

The scientific doctrine of evolution has established beyond doubt that the sun and stars in their courses, the forms of matter and the varied classes and orders of plants and animals, human beings with their power of choice are not created in their present forms but assume their present forms in slow obedience to a general law of change. But when a causal explanation of the factors operative in this process is urged we are entering on debatable ground. Darwin was a scientist and not a philosopher. He held that his account of the origin of species was incomplete for

"our ignorance of the laws of variations is profound" and "the laws governing inheritance are for the most part unknown" (Sixth Edition of the *Origin of the Species*).

As a philosophical interpretation of the observed facts, the theory of evolution is not satisfactory. Evolution presupposes an interaction between the organism and the environment, subjects with definite characters of their own and objects with determinate features. But the process of evolution cannot create the conditions of its own possibility. The hypothesis of evolution does not deal with origins but seeks to describe the changes which objects undergo in relation to the demands of the environment. While it describes the *how* of the process, it does not answer the *why* of it. We may trace the egg or the hen to a still earlier evolution but the process cannot go on to infinity. We ask,—“What being, what impulse provided the conditions and started the process?” We assume that somewhere behind all evolution, there is something which is not the product of evolution and yet is its ground and power. How is that principle to be conceived? Is it one or many? Is it blind or intelligent? Is it immanent in the process or transcendent to it or both?

The term ‘evolution’ implies a break with the mechanical method of explanation. When we endeavour to account for the world of objective nature by ‘evolution’ and employ such concepts as growth, natural selection, struggle for survival, self-preservation, etc., we are obviously interpreting the cosmic process on the analogy of human nature. A mechanical evolution is difficult to conceive even if it be not self-contradictory. If the changes of the world are completely mechanical, if they are merely an unpacking of the possibilities, then there is no *evolution*. The concept of evolution implies that changes cannot be explained on the purely mechanical hypothesis.

Variations, whether small or great, cannot be accounted for. While the changes within the world of living organisms are difficult to explain, the transitions from the non-living to the living, from life to mind, from mind to intelligence are absolutely inexplicable. The Taittiriya Upanishad mentions matter (anna),* life

* Compare Saitikara on B. S. II 3-13: “The word food signifies earth ‘Tasmāt prithivīyam anna śabdēti.’”

(prāṇa), consciousness (manas), intelligence (vijñāna) as the four crucial stages of the world's development. Physico-chemical explanations are inadequate for the characteristic activities of organic life. Reproduction, heredity and even such processes as respiration and circulation do not yield their secrets to physico-chemical analysis. The mechanical view that there is no breach of continuity between the living and the non-living does not face the facts. The neo-vitalists like Driesch contend that biological phenomena are not properly explicable as physico-chemical processes within the living matter of organisms but that a non-physical principle interferes to regulate and control the physical and chemical reactions. The admission of a mysterious, non-mechanical entity which is neither an energy nor a material substance but an agent *sui generis*, non-spatial though acting in space, non-material though acting on matter is hardly satisfactory. Biologists who are opposed to mechanism, admit that distinctively biological phenomena cannot be explained in physico-chemical terms. The living organism itself and not some directive principle is dominant in organic activity. The organic is distinct from the inorganic and it exists as such and its structure and activities are the expression of its nature. The organic exhibits a new character, though such an exhibition of new characters is more the rule than the exception. Highly differentiated physiological processes are accompanied by mental events. Without discussing the exact nature of the relation between the physiological and the psychological, we have to take the organism as a unit with its own specific characters. When we reach the human level, we have the new variation of reason, that which distinguishes the true from false, good from evil, beautiful from ugly. When Sir Arthur Keith quotes Professor Eliot Smith to the effect that the human brain shows no formation of any sort other than that of the brain of the chimpanzee, he is referring to the material structure of the brain. While we may admit that the body of man is a structure evolved through long ages and gradually improved from very early beginnings until the present frame is built, while its affinity to that of the ape may be conceded, we cannot get over the qualitative difference between the mentality of the ape and that of man. He is a conscious responsible soul, with a knowledge of good and evil.

When a certain level of bodily development is reached the human mind emerges, even as life appears when matter reaches a certain complexity of organisation. But has any biologist described the nature of the general change responsible for the rise of human reason? Can we explain any mental activity as the product of germinal alteration? Can it be said that "man under the action of biological forces which can be observed and measured, has been raised from a place among anthropoid apes to that which he now occupies?" Was not Darwin more modest when he confessed his ignorance of the working of the forces of variation and heredity? The evidence available does not offer a single hint of the working of these forces.

Evolution believes that it is able to account for the development in the sphere of organic or the inorganic, but strictly speaking even this is difficult of explanation. Evolutionary change, it is now admitted, proceeds by distinct leaps and not the slow accumulation of small steps. Every change is a jump. Discontinuity is the mark of the process. Novelty is a feature of all development. The product of evolution when it arises is genuinely new. We may make an exhaustive enumeration of the factors from which it has been developed, yet the thing itself is a unique entity, exhibiting a character which was not present in any of the earlier factors and could not have been foretold on the strength of the fullest knowledge of the factors. Development or evolution is something more than a mere rearrangement of pre-existent material. There is something genuinely novel about every individual. Nothing recurs in exact detail: no two leaves, no two events. Each individual is a new experiment. Only specially well-marked critical stages in the development are noticed by us. If every individual in the world varies from every other as the hypothesis of evolution assumes, then each is genuinely new. In other words, we cannot read its presence back into its pre-existent factors. Appearance of C is not accounted for by the characters of the factors A & B, for C is neither A, nor B, nor A & B. It is C. On the other hand, there must be some reason why the combination A & B is succeeded by C and why the event C has the particular character of C and not any other character. Some reason there must be and it certainly is not the combination of A & B. The conditions of

every development in the world include a good deal more than the constituent factors. A & B succeeded by C is a phase of the cosmic process but not a complete and self-contained phase. It is one phase of the general context of nature, not isolated from other phases. A & B are followed by C because the world process is what it is and its particular phase is open to countless other influences. It is a moment in the whole life of the universe and its setting in a particular context is one expression of the course of evolution. A product of evolution is not completely accounted for by a statement of the specific factors which have preceded it in a limited context. Its whole setting in the cosmic process conditions its rise though we cannot determine the precise manner of the conditioning. Though there are no empty gaps in time, every change is a new start. The new is said to be a continuation of the old, if it conforms to the normal and does not contradict what has gone before. It is said to be a new product if there is a change in the structure. When life supervenes on matter we have something new; when one organism succeeds another we have a continuation of the old. We may represent the former kind of change by a, b, c , and the latter by a^1, a^2, a^3 . But strictly speaking every change is new. It is literally true that we walk among mysteries. Instead of assuming a series of entelechies to account for the series of changes, it is more economical to posit a single supreme super-entelechy as responsible for the whole sweep of evolutionary advance with its marks of unity and continuity.

This supreme creative ground and driving power of the universe cannot be an unconscious force.* If the pageant of evolution passed before us as quickly as a moving picture from the hour when the solar system was in a gaseous condition up till the third session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, the vision will undoubtedly demand more explanation than the blind working of an unconscious force. The harmonious working of the different parts of the universe cannot be dismissed as a piece of good luck.

Besides, even within the limits open to our observation, we cannot be certain that evolution is due to blind mutations selected by a blind environment. Lamarck's theory of the transmission of acquired characters is repudiated at the present time on the ground that there is no mechanism by which the changes in the

organism could be represented by changes in the structure of the germ cell. It is also urged that there is no experimental evidence in support of the inheritability of the effects of use and disuse. Ignorance of the way in which the germ cell reacts to bodily changes does not commit us to the denial of any change in the germ cell as the result of bodily changes. Some experiments latterly have given positive results as those of Kammerer, Durkhen and Pavlov and those in which we fail to detect the inheritance of an acquired character may mean only that the effect is too small to be detected.

In his *Creative Evolution* (E.T., pp. 66 ff.) M. Bergson argues that if life manufactures like apparatus by unlike means or on divergent lines of evolution then a strictly mechanical explanation becomes impossible. The structural analogy between the eye of a vertebrate and that of a mollusc like the common pecten cannot be due to insensible accidental variations (Darwin) or sudden and simultaneous variations (De Vries) or the direct influence of the environment bringing about a kind of mechanical composition of the external with the internal forces. Bergson agrees with certain modern forms of Lamarckism and explains variations not as accidental or determined but as springing from the effort of the living being to adapt itself to the environment. Modifications of structure and function are achieved by more or less purposive efforts of individual organisms and are transmitted in however slight a degree from parent to offspring. The initiative of the organism and not germinal mutations or the influence of the environment is the main source of variations. Only such a view can account for the fact that modifications do not come singly but in complexes involving innumerable minor details. The change from the quadrupedal to the erect posture involves many profound alterations in almost every organ of the body and these numerous organic adaptations cannot be the result of random changes in the various structures. Evolution is not blind and mechanical but is the expression of a purposive force which creates living organisms and endows them with life and the striving to develop in pursuance of a definite end. As the lower organisms are not gifted with intelligent foresight, their changes as a result of which new species occur are said to be the expression of the unconscious will of the organism acting in

pursuance of the purpose of life. At the human level we possess creative freedom. The facts of evolution compel us to assume the reality of a single spirit inspiring the whole course of evolution and working in different ways at different stages. Saṅkara says : *Ekasyāpi kūṣṭhasya citta-tāra-tanyāt jñānaśvaryaṇām abhivyaktiḥ pareṇa pareṇa bhuyasī bhavati* (Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya 1.3.30). Almost all the philosophers who have reflected on the implications of evolution have come to a similar conclusion. Lloyd Morgan says : " For better or worse I acknowledge God as the Nisus through whose Activity emergents emerge and the whole course of emergent evolution is directed." Taylor repeats the scholastic maxim that no cause can contribute to the effect what it has not to give. The full and ultimate cause in a process of evolution cannot be found in the special character of its recognised antecedents but in the character of the Eternal which is at the back of all development and which must contain in a ' more eminent manner' all that it bestows, though it may contain much more. God is the perfect real from which all variations arise. 1547

What is the relation of the eternal spiritual background to the process of the world? This is the most difficult problem of all philosophy and has not been satisfactorily answered either in the West or in the East. That God is not external to the world is as much true as that God is not exhausted by the world. He is both in and out of the world. But a logical exposition of the relation between God and the world is yet a problem for philosophy. There are several other problems which are also perplexing the mind of man. If we are to help in their solution, it is very necessary that we should abandon philosophical orthodoxy. It is true that official solutions for all problems are handed down to us in our ancient scriptures. But we want to-day not so much Indian thought as Indian thinkers who, soaked in the wisdom of our country, are prepared to face the problems of the age with fresh eyes.



SECTION OF METAPHYSICS

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

KRISHNA CH. BHATTACHARYYA, BETHUNE COLLEGE, CALCUTTA

KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH

I. PLACE OF THE DOCTRINE OF TRUTH AND ERROR.

The present-day doctrine of truth and error may be regarded as a part of logic or epistemology but it is to be recognised as standing on a level of self-consciousness different from that on which these subjects, as ordinarily conceived, appear to stand. The level is indicated by the contrast between the concept of falsity and the concept of negation. There are two grades of negation from both of which falsity has to be distinguished. When we disbelieve a content, we may only exclude it from a particular context while believing it to exist in another context. Such exclusion may be regarded as negation of the first grade. In the second grade, there is exclusion from a context without inclusion in another, disbelief without a positive complementary belief. It is what is sometimes called pure negation, the content negated being only known to be non-existent. Negation in both the grades is said to be known in the sense that truth may be asserted of it. Disbelief here amounts to a kind of knowledge which however is not the case when we reject a content as false. The false is not simply the non-existent but the non-existent *as appearing existent*, to reject which is not logically to deny. We cannot say that we know the falsity, for then falsity would be regarded as a truth. We should only say that we are aware of the falsity: we only disbelieve the content without knowing its non-existence. The non-existence of the possible, as in the second grade of negation, is a tautology but the non-existence of the false is meaningless.

Objective Logic recognises only the first grade of negation. It takes note of existents only, disbelieving them only in the sense of believing them as outside or distinct from the context in question and knows nothing of pure non-existence, far less of falsity. Pure non-existence is admissible as a known content only in epistemology and in such logic as is undistinguished from it. The believed and the disbelieved are taken here as two classes of known content and what is common to them is the *possible* which is a *quasi-objective* or "subsistent" content from the epistemic standpoint. But epistemology confines or should confine itself to the known, the possible being known, in the disbelief in its existence, as a complete meaning. It should have nothing to do with what is only a problem in meaning as distinct from an accomplished meaning, with the consciously unknown or the unknowable, and with the false. We have no knowledge of the absence of knownness; we speak of it and are aware of it variously in respect of the abstractly possible, of the impossible or the unnameable, or of what is only willed or felt but such awareness is not knowledge. Half-thoughts like these should find place in a new philosophical subject though they are as a matter of fact admitted in epistemology or logic. The doctrine of truth and error would really belong to this subject.

Epistemology is founded on a species of introspection different from what is called psychological introspection. The latter, if it knows knowing at all, knows it as indistinguishable in quality from mere believing. A qualitative distinction between knowing and believing is however known, being just what is called the logical character which is apprehended by a new quality of introspection. It is a confusion to speak of the function of knowing or the logical character being known by a logical procedure again. Kantian criticism is sometimes distinguished as logical from the criticism of Locke which is taken to be psychological. But the particular logical method by which Kant obtained his transcendental constants has never been identified or named in logic. There is indeed a quasi-logical transition from the logical forms to the *a-priori* functions but it is not transition from one objective content to another, as one would expect in logic. The transcendental method is a self-evident transition, a process in self-consciousness

and not in consciousness and as such should be taken as a kind of introspection which is neither logical mediation nor mere internal perception. To be necessarily implied or presupposed by the logical content is no logical relation at all nor is it a name for the mere psychological mode of knowing the content.

Epistemological introspection knows only this presupposition, the functional character that distinguishes the known content from the merely believed content. It claims a special quality of certitude, deeper than that claimed by mere objective or logical cognition, cognition through what Kant would call the uncritical employment of reason. Kant in fact hoped that critical reflection, as he understood it, would establish a final science of knowledge above the reach of philosophical controversy. The hope has not been realised and rival epistemologies have been put forward since his time, each claiming the same degree of certainty as that set up by him. The conflict of these assured theories of knowledge has brought to the fore the importance of a doctrine of truth and error competent to adjudicate between them and therefore based on a still deeper assurance of finality. The possible falsity of a theory based on epistemological introspection suggests the unique character of the general concept of falsity which, as we have indicated, belongs neither to logic nor to epistemology, as these subjects are ordinarily conceived.

The assurance of critical reflection does not in itself constitute the subjective criterion for distinguishing truth from error and cannot be the level of self-consciousness from which one can sit in judgment on an epistemology. A criticism of epistemology is demanded to-day, of the very subject that emerged as the criticism of the logical or dogmatic procedure of reason. The doctrine of truth and error, if it could be systematised according to a principle, would furnish such a criticism of criticism. The two degrees of criticism are not distinguished and there is so far no principle on which we may decide between rival epistemologies. In the Kantian critiques, there is the hint of a transcendental Psychology behind the general theory of knowledge, with an occasional recognition of the necessity of distinguishing between them. Kant speaks, for example, of error being due to the 'subjective use' of reason as distinct from its intrinsically logical function

and of certain principles being real to reason as employed in an extra-theoretic 'interest.' His theory of knowledge is properly concerned with the general logical function which is common to true knowing and error. His references to reason as a subjective faculty capable of perverse or extra-logical use are accordingly to be looked upon as mere *obiter dicta* within his epistemology and as really belonging to transcendental Psychology which was always assumed but never sufficiently distinguished by him.

The systematic doctrine of truth and error would be the same as or a part of this transcendental Psychology. To empirical psychology, the logical function going astray and yielding a false *content* conveys no meaning at all. Logic can recognise error only as a blind fact and epistemology should regard it as a miracle : the question of explaining its possibility does not arise at all in these subjects. Yet a theory of truth and error is ordinarily claimed to be established by a conscious or self-conscious logical method and there is no recognition so far of any mystery of cognitive level about it. One tendency however is noticeable in theories thus established—*viz.*, to slur over the absolute distinction that is recognised in commonsense between truth and error. The suggestion is put forward in different forms that error is a partial truth, truth within a limited context ; and it is sometimes proposed in a manner to drop the conception of truth itself, a content being taken to be true only in the sense that is known or 'asserted.' Such flagrant opposition to commonsense requires to be justified by something more than the consideration that it is conceivable and logically irrefutable. It is necessary to show on the one hand that a doctrine of this kind is itself knowledge and not a mere hypothesis and on the other that a theory admitting the absolute distinction of truth and error cannot be maintained.

Here we have the hint of a principle or criterion for deciding between rival theories of knowledge. *An epistemology must itself be a body of knowledge* ; there is no room for a hypothesis or a mere conceivability in this region where finality is claimed for every assertion. With regard, for example, to a voluntarist theory of knowledge, the preliminary question must be asked in what sense, if at all, willing is *known*, if psychological introspection yields *knowledge* of it, and whether some spiritual conscious-

ness of the practical kind amounts to the knowledge of the impossibility of pure knowing. There is the connected negative demand that *theoretic* reasons have to be adduced for the rejection of a theory that keeps within the commonsense distinction of truth and error. Such a theory in fact has a prior claim to consideration, even if other theories can interpret knowing all the way without stumbling. The interpretation of the cognitive by the non-cognitive—by willing or feeling or any superior spiritual process—is *prima facie* suspect and can be accepted only if a purely cognitive interpretation is shown to be impossible.

II. MUTUAL IMPLICATION OF KNOWLEDGE AND TRUTH.

Two propositions may be stated about knowledge—that knowing is known only as implied in the explicit awareness of truth and that truth is asserted only of a content that is known. Knowledge and truth have to be defined in terms of each other, the former as what alone is true and the latter as what alone is known. It is only metaphorically that we speak of the truth of a feeling or willing; and values in the non-cognitive sphere are what we only believe but do not know. We may examine in this connexion two positions that appear to be fundamentally opposed to our view;—*viz.*, (i) that knowing is known by psychological introspection and (ii) that truth is a relation, not to a known, but to a suggested possible content, an idea or mere meaning.

(i) *Knowing is not known by Psychological Introspection.*

We may know an object without knowing it explicitly to be true but do we ever know the psychic fact of knowing except as implied in the assertion of truth about its content? It may be contended that knowing is known by memory or internal perception, like any other psychic fact. The past perception of an object, for example, may be taken to be remembered in the remembering of the object without any conscious reference to the truth of it. When we remember an objective event, we do not at once reproduce every detail of it and need not know that it was perceived. But just as omitted objective details are gradually rein-

stated, so also, it may be said, does the subjective fact of perception come to be known in the course of the mere fulfilment of the memory without any question arising as to the truth of the memory. Is such a contention tenable?

There is in the first place the obvious difficulty that the past perception was not perceived in the past and so cannot be said to be now remembered, unless we admit either that all perception is implicitly perception of perception or that we can remember without having perceived. Nor can the past perception be said to be now internally or introspectively perceived, for the object of perception is ordinarily understood to be synchronous with the perception. There cannot be also any question of inferring the past perception from the remembered object of it, for that presupposes, what we never had previously, knowledge of other objects and their cognition as together. To know the cognition of object is not to know the cognition and the object to be together.

The past perception is indeed known but it is not known by memory, perception or inference, by any method in fact by which an object is known. There is occasion to know the past psychic fact if the object or content of it is challenged or confirmed. If any grounds now present themselves for doubting the reality of the past objective event, the doubt is laid by the assurance that we actually perceived it. Or again if any facts or inferences now yield an explicit confirmation of the reality of the event, the sense of confirmation implies the awareness of the past perception of the event. We cannot imagine any other occasion for such awareness. Not that we can say why the awareness of the past cognition emerges: we know only that this awareness is at the same time awareness of the confirmation or the rejected doubt that is involved in the explicit assertion of the objective content as true. Properly speaking, the knowledge of cognition does not emerge in time as the cognition itself emerges and so does not demand explanation. We start with this knowledge which is the same as the knowledge of the truth of the objective content. The time-position of the content determines, not the time-position, but only a differential quality of its cognition, a quality however which does not appear to affect the knowledge of the cognition at all.

There is apparently then no memory of a cognition in the mere interest in fact as distinct from interest in the truth of the fact. Is there an introspective perception of knowing at the time of the knowing? The question is really illegitimate, for as just shown there is no possibility of knowing the synchronousness of a content and the perception of it. A content and its perception are never known independently to be taken as together or successive: the content is never distinguished from its perception, though the perception distinguishes, manifests or reveals the content. If this holds good when the content is objective, it holds good with greater reason when the content is cognition itself. The cognition as we have said has no time-position but only a quality due to the position of its objective content: and the knowledge of the cognition has not even this quality, so that there is no question at all of the cognition and the knowledge of it being temporarily related. We conclude then that neither a past nor a present cognition can be said to be known as such for the purposes of psychology.

Cognition is indeed known but not by the so-called psychological introspection, conceived either as perception or memory. It is known by what we have called epistemological introspection such as is involved in the explicit awareness of truth. All that psychology claims to know about cognition, it gets either through this unconfessed epistemological reflection or through a blend of imagination and verbal interpretation which yields only the appearance of knowledge. This blend is what passes by the name of psychological introspection which can never know a psychic process as a fact as distinct from fancy or mere meaning. Belief in psychic reality emerges only as the implication of belief in a spiritual value like truth or beauty or obligatoriness.

The object of cognition is distinguished by the cognition though it is not known as distinct from it. In the awareness of the cognition, the cognition is distinguished from its object which then as not appearing distinct from it becomes indefinite. In the awareness of a feeling or

willing however, the psychic fact is not distinguished from the object, the object being only distinguished from it. The psychic fact and its object are in neither case presented as mutually distinct: the cognitive fact is only distinguished and the non-cognitive fact is only distinguished from. This is apparent from the nature of the value in the apprehension of which the awareness of the psychic fact is implied. Truth does not appear as a *character* of the object while beauty or sacredness appear as such. Hence in the awareness of truth, the object is indefinite and its cognition definite while the consciousness of beauty, etc., implies the reverse—*viz*, the object as definite and the corresponding psychic fact as indefinite. The awareness of the fact of cognition accordingly itself amounts to a cognition while that of the non-cognitive psychic fact is nothing more than a belief. There is no introspective belief in the reality of the mental except as the implication of belief in value; and there is introspective knowledge, as distinct from belief, of knowing only, not of feeling or willing.

There may however be a belief in willing or feeling along with and implied in the knowledge of knowing. In the knowledge of knowing, the object of the knowing is cognitively indefinite but that does not prevent it from being definitely real to a non-cognitive interest. Such definiteness of the object does not prejudice the definiteness of the cognition of it, though the feeling or willing that it implies points to a new conception about cognition—*viz*., the necessity of subjectively realising it. The non-cognitive value of the object known—*e.g.*, its beauty or sacredness—demands to be realised as the truth-value (if that can be called value at all) of the cognition, though the truth which has already presented itself is not less a truth because it is not yet realised. Again just as there is the demand to realise other values as truth, so there may be demand in the non-cognitive interest to realise truth as other value, realise it, as we say, in life. Thus something can be done through feeling or willing to secure the subjective maturation of knowing, as these too may be matured by a discipline of knowing.

We have so far tried to establish that psychological introspection is not knowledge of psychic fact, that psychic facthood emerges only as the implication of belief in value, and that knowing alone among psychic facts, as implied in the belief in truth, can be said to be known. Certain consequences follow. There is in the first place no such thing as false knowledge. If knowing could be known as an indifferent psychic fact, both truth and falsity would be predicable of it. But if knowing is known only as the implicate of the awareness of truth, to know an object is to know it as in some sense implicitly true. Truth cannot be taken simply as additional confirmation of what already is known indifferently, though the explicit knowledge of truth itself testifies to a prior knowing of the object without this conscious assertion of truth. Not that the truth of this mere object-knowledge can be said to be now *recognised*: the loose use of the term recognition is responsible for a good deal of epistemological superstition. Knowledge is implicit knowledge of truth only in the sense that the explicit knowledge of truth is the knowledge of a knowing that was not known. It does not mean that truth as a character or content of the knowing was somehow hidden in it. We can only say that the knowing, when it was not known, could not be false, as then it would be no knowing at all. An object to be known need not be known explicitly to be true; but if it now appears to be not true, it is never said to have been known but taken at best to have been believed.

Another consequence of the view that knowing is only known in the knowledge of truth is that there is no knowledge of objects as merely distinct but not otherwise related to one another. To be known, an object must not only be distinct but consciously confirmed by the contents of other cognitions. The known content must be explicitly coherent and not merely co-existent with other known contents. The coherence emerges not only within the content of a particular cognition but also between it and the contents of cognitions that fall beyond it. The content as a whole of a

given cognition, without losing completeness or self-sufficiency, is felt to be confirmed by the contents of other cognitions that retain their distinction from it and do not get fused. The coherent plurality within the content may be taken as representing a fusion of cognitions, although the coherence does not appear as conscious confirmation but not therefore also as a mere relation of co-existent elements in a whole.

A third consequence of our view about the knowing of knowing is that interpretations of knowing in terms of feeling or willing are excluded as not themselves amounting to knowledge. If the awareness of willing, for example, is not knowledge but at best a belief, a voluntarist interpretation of knowledge has to be regarded, not as a scientific or factual theory, but as a prescription to imagine or believe the fact of knowing in a particular way for some practical end or purpose. It is a contradiction in fact to claim a voluntarist epistemology to be true, though it may be practically useful or even obligatory as an imperative to the imagination. If cognition is only a means to activity, the knowledge that it is so cannot again be a means to further activity without leading to an infinite regress. The awareness that a belief works and is therefore cognition does not itself appear again as an *efficient* belief.

(ii) *Truth is not Relation to a Mere Meaning.*

We have examined the proposition that knowing is only known as the implication of the awareness of truth. There is next the converse proposition that truth is asserted only of knowing. The affirmation of truth in respect of a feeling or willing is, as we have said, only a rhetorical expression of its non-cognitive value. Within knowing however, truth is sometimes taken to be asserted, not of the known content, but of the merely suggested content, of what has been proposed to be called *proposition* as distinct from judgment. We have said that the awareness of the truth of a content is knowledge of the content as *known*, not merely suggested. The content is known as known for the first time in such aware-

ness ; and to say that it is true is to say that it is known as known. In the view just suggested however, the assertion of the truth of a content means only the assertion that it is known, not that it is known to be or to have been known. The subject of the assertion ' it is known ' is taken to stand only for a meant or ' subsistent ' content as distinct from a known or existent content. The predicate *known*—or what is its equivalent, *true*—is understood to be external to it, to be however, not *in relation* to it, but the relation itself, being thus at once term and relation, constituting what is described as a ' flavour ' of the content.

Our objection to such a view is two-fold. On the one hand the merely meant or subsistent content—the *possible*, as it may be called—is an illegitimate abstraction of which no predicate may be asserted ; and on the other, the knowledge or assertion of a content cannot be understood as a relation, far less as *in relation* to it. The first objection comes out definitely if we consider an existential judgment of the negative form " A is not." As we have already indicated, the disbelief in A here may be knowledge but need not imply belief in A as having being in some context. Properly speaking, therefore, such knowledge cannot be called a judgment at all. A is here known as the possible only through the apparent predicate *non-existence*, it being a mere tautology to say that the possible is not actual. The possible has no positive being except as implied by verbal fixation. " A is not existent " is only an illegitimate extension of the form of a negative judgment like ' A is not B ' which implies the existence of A. It should accordingly be recognised as a mere trickery of language : there is no belief in A here, the disbelief being the whole of the knowledge.

Our second objection is that it is a misleading use of the word *relation* to speak of the knowledge or assertion of an object as in relation or as the relation to the object. The realist, we hold, is right when he takes knowledge as external to or distinct from the object : knownness cannot be understood as an attribute or character of the object. When we are aware of the knowledge of an object, we distinguish the knowledge from the object though the distinguishing does not amount to the knowledge of a factual distinction. It appears to be wholly wrong however to speak of the

object as distinct from the knowing of it. We are not aware of the distinction from knowing as an objective fact. Nor is the knowing of the object the *distinguishing* of the object *from itself*. The object known is simply distinguished : it is not related at all to its knowing in the way of identity or distinction. If the act of knowing or distinguishing be knowledge of the distinction of the object from itself, that *itself* would be a term known as distinct from itself and so on indefinitely. We have therefore to recognise that the reference of knowing to its object is no distinction or relation at all, that though we are aware of the knowing of the object as distinct from the object, the so-called distinction of the object from knowing is only unrelatedness of which we are aware but not cognitively.

To explain the concept of unrelatedness. When two contents are known together, they need not be known *as together*. They may not only be known as unrelated in space, time or nature : they may not even be known as barely distinct *from one another*. To know *two* contents, it is only necessary to know that one is distinct from the other but not that the other is distinct from it. When two contents A and B are thus known, A being distinct from B, B is known, not as distinct from nor therefore identical with A, but as unrelated to A. In fact even when we know them as mutually distinct, the two distinctions are not known as making up one distinction. They alternate and the alternation appears, not as distinction between A and B, but as their unity or whole in space, time or nature. They are then not only known together but also *as together*, though the distinction of A from B and that of B from A do not cease to be themselves distinct. Hence it follows that to know one content as distinct from another is *in no case* to know the other as distinct from it but only to know it as *unrelated*, though the two distinctions may sometimes be known together. It is thus intelligible how while knowing is known as distinct from its object, the object is known, not as distinct from, but as unrelated to the knowing.

When therefore in the view under discussion it is held that knowledge is the relation to the object, what is really meant is that

knowledge is distinct from its object but not reversely. Our contention is that such onesided distinction is not relation at all. There is no relation without *mutual* distinction which implies some form of objective togetherness. Knowing and its object are not objectively together and therefore even the known distinction of knowing from its object, which we admit, is not a relation. Yet such onesided distinction has to be necessarily symbolised as a relation. We have to speak of two things—knowing and object, though we know they are not objectively two, not known as two. The awareness of the distinction as onesided is the awareness of the evidentness, manifestation or *prakāśa* of the object, which is no relation but is only symbolised by it. The evidentness of the known content is a category utterly distinct from relation, to recognise which is to appreciate the differential character of knowing.

We have said that the object is known, not as distinct from or identical with its knowing, but as unrelated to it. Properly however we should say that it is known simply as evident and that it is *not* known as related to knowing. There is no knowledge of the circumstance of unrelatedness but only an extra-cognitive awareness of it. As already pointed out, it is only in the awareness of willing or feeling, as distinct from that of knowing, that the object referred to is distinguished from the psychic fact. This distinguishing is not the knowledge of distinction or relation but only a direction or phase of willing or feeling. The object is not known as related to knowing but is willed as an end to be realised or felt as a value that is being realised. There is therefore no conflict between the deliverances of cognitive and non-cognitive consciousness: what we are *not* aware of cognitively we are aware of *non-cognitively*. The distinction between these deliverances is sometimes overlooked; and we have realistic and idealistic theories of knowledge asserting the object to be distinct from or identical with the knowing of it. The former take the willed distinction and the latter the felt identity-in-difference as though it were the known distinction of the object from or the known identity of the object with the knowing of it. To knowledge, the object is only evident and not related to it though symbolised as such. To willing or feeling, this symbolism is real and unrelatedness is a

believed quasi-relation which is by confusion taken to be a known relation.

III. NATURE OF LOGICAL CONFIRMATION.

Truth, we have said, is asserted of the known content. The assertion amounts to saying that the content is known as known. Known-ness or truth is external to it in the sense that knowing is distinguished from its object. Known-ness is no character of the object, being but the fact of knowing, the knowing that reveals the object as evident, as distinct but not distinct from itself. This knowing is also known, known only when confirmed by other cognitions and as so confirmed. The confirmation is not known as a relation within the content of the knowing, for then there would be no break between the content of one knowing and that of another. We have as a matter of fact many cognitions and a cognition does not, consciously at any rate, refer to the entire universe. The elimination of the distinction between cognitions or—what is the same thing—the conscious presentation of truth as single may be a spiritual ideal but we have no right to assume it in the characterisation of an actual cognition. Since a cognition however is not known except when confirmed, there emerges the paradox of the confirming relation constituting it and yet falling beyond it. A cognition, as we have seen, must be complete but it is never known except as confirmed by other cognitions.

Not that confirmation is known as a character of the cognition, or of its object. The object is unrelated to the object of the confirming cognition and the so-called systemic relation is only an imaginary objectification of the subjective circumstance of confirmation. Nor is the subjective circumstance felt as a character of the complete cognition that is confirmed. There are cases indeed where the confirming cognitions get telescoped into the confirmed cognition; but there the latter gives place to a new cognition of which the content is a synthesis of the contents of previous cognitions and presents the confirming relation as some immediate relation of coherence like that between the substantive and the adjective. The cognition however, that is said to be con-

firmed by others without prejudice to its completeness does not get modified in the confirmation : it only gets to be known through it. There may be a strengthening of belief but that is only a psychological circumstance. Logically then, confirmation is not a known character either of the cognition or of the object of it.

The confirmation of which we are aware in the awareness of a cognition implies a conscious distinction of it from the confirming cognitions but not the distinction of the latter from the former. It is accordingly no known relation of the cognitions, though as the onesided distinction is there, it has to be symbolised as a relation. What is symbolised here is a metapsychic or spiritual process which though not itself a cognition is not indifferent to cognition. The given cognition is known only in the assertion of truth in respect of it, truth that is manifested in conscious confirmation symbolised as a relation. It is this pseudo-relation that has been elaborated into the objective symbolism of a system of relations, the system that is said to constitute the known object and which may be regarded as a shadow of truth, an imaginary projection of the knowing of knowing or self-consciousness. It is important to recognise that system is but a symbolism.

There is symbolising in another direction. Confirmation in the subjective or epistemic sphere is no psychic character or relation but a non-cognitive or spiritual over-note of cognition as a psychic fact. It is itself a metaphor or symbolism : the strengthening or maturation of knowledge is but a figure of speech for a mode of cognitive realisation. The process may be otherwise symbolised as the shining out of thought, with the attenuation of error, as a mirror that catches the reflection of truth. Truth cannot be characterised : it has only to be symbolised by the evident content of a cognition, appearing within its magic interior. The interior or reference of a cognition is the conscious gap or discontinuity between the cognition and its object, the sphere of what may be called problematic thought—comprising incomplete but completing meanings, the consciously unknown, the contradictory, and this circumstance of confirmation—all centering round the evident content

that is known. Truth is known as this evident content but not reversely; the particular known content is not known as the truth but is only demanded to be so known, by the process of confirmation and the consequent or independent process of the dissipation of error inherent in it.

VALUES AS OBJECTS OF INTEREST

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In recent times there has been what is often described as a gradual shifting of the philosophical centre of gravity from the problem of knowledge to the problem of value. It may be said without exaggeration that the problem of knowledge has itself become a problem of value. The historical causes behind this change of attitude seem to be obvious enough. The change from intellectualism to voluntarism, the nearly universal application of the concepts of evolution and the struggle for existence with their fundamental ideas of selective and survival values—the discovery of the inherent inadequacy of purely logical categories—these are believed to be the explanations of the phenomenal importance which the problem of values has assumed. Yet these are just some external signs of a yet more serious crisis of the social will—a crisis which is rooted in the deep necessities of things. Formerly, the outside of the social life and the economic values which it produces was supposed to be the main problem, but now it is the meaning, the significance of this Life for the thinking soul of man, its spiritual springs and consequences that has become the most vital consideration. Briefly it is the problem of Evaluation that interests us most to-day. Parallel to this change in the practical attitude of the social Will, there has been a change in the theoretical consciousness of a new aspect of Reality. We have discovered that our entire life is one unbroken chain of value-feelings and evaluation of explicit formulations and implicit assumption of value.

The meaning of our evaluation of objects is more or less an independent fact and is not just a part of the world of facts but

is rather the entire world seen from a new perspective. But if this world of values has interested our attention seriously it becomes evident that a special enquiry must be instituted to understand the new discovery in its completeness. Metaphysics is traditionally concerned more with the Problem of Being than with its evaluation. The special sciences deal with the facts of values and not with the values themselves. We have reached a conviction that a general theory of value which comprehends in a systematic method all varieties of human values is absolutely needed.

In attempting to formulate our concept of value, we should employ the descriptive or empirical method. We should try to remain free from all bias of metaphysical traditions. According to this method we are not to start with some category and then discover examples of it, but first we have to collect examples and then to ascertain their common characteristic. Our method is empirical because the frontiers of the area of our subject-matter are natural and not artificial. We shall consider whatever appears to be relevant to the problem of value and also discuss some value-definitions.

We have seen the necessity of our study and have also declared the nature of the method. Our modest aim in this paper is to make a brief comparative inquiry of value-definition and to arrive at our own.

Values are supposed to be empirical qualities. They are to be immediately perceived. "Human characters and human dispositions have value or worth which belongs to them in the same sense as redness belongs to cherry"—says Laird according to whom values are objective simply and perfectly. There is only one proof of the reality of a perceptual quality and that is only the perception of it. Moore's comparison of good with the colour yellow has only a hypothetical value. Good is like yellow if it is an empirical quality but does good possess the self-evidence of yellow for us? No. Laird's view is more perfectly and more reasonably empirical. He refers to the fact that there is some direct immediate objectivity in the appreciation of

beauty of human conduct. They are not *states* of the subject *caused* by the object. They *present* the object garbed in its quality of beauty or morality. Feeling does somehow colour the object, we do feel the attractive nature of a scene or delightful character of melodies. But this does not mean that the subject is to be totally neglected. For that would mean that the subject was neither attracted nor delighted and he had no *feelings* but a simple sensibility. So it is certain that we must ultimately *refer* to some subjective point unless we wish to overlook the abovementioned difficulties. It is worth our notice that the feeling element would ultimately lead us to *interest*. Santayana views the matter with greater coherence and comes nearest to our views. He says that value is essentially indefinable but existentially conditioned. Delight cannot be analysed but the actual delightfulness of a scene is a synthesis conditioned by the appreciative response of the one who observes it. The delight is *objectified*, transferred from the subject to the object. The indefinable *quale* has an existence in the subject prior to and more legitimate than its transferred existence in the object. The problem is therefore whether value consists in the pure *quale* or in the subjective state or in response which gives the object that state. "Beauty," says Santayana, "is the transformation of an element of sensation into the quality of a thing." In short, it is the transformation in which the value consists. But the difficulty of this view is self-evident. Can economic values be explained in terms of delight and attractiveness? Are there no values of appetites and needs as such? Unless you limit the term value to aesthetic experience, you cannot take it to be "*transformation*." The view of Santayana is helpful to bring into relief the importance of the subjective attitude.

Value is also supposed to be a logical indefinable. There is an important distinction instituted between the substantive good and the adjective good. In "pleasure is the good" it is described that a certain state of feeling possesses exclusively a certain quality which is another thing. Good is not defined in terms of pleasure but is predicated of pleasure. Most of the alleged definitions of good have employed the term in an undefined sense and according to some, that an adjective *can* be used in an undefined

sense is a proof that it is indefinable. This is obviously an unwarranted conclusion. There is no logic of any type whatsoever in such an argument and therefore it is a mistake to call values logical indefinables.

Value is also taken as a form or a structure. The simplest presentation of this view explains goodness as *fitness*. To be good is to be good for something, to be an efficient means of something. But does the real meaning of value consist in the nature of relation of help or hindrance or does it consist in the nature of what is help or hindrance? And if it consists in the latter, as it naturally must, then fitness or helpfulness is in no sense the main character of value.

Value is also defined as self-realisation. Being embodies a definable essence. It has a character logically distinguishable from its existence which may be regarded as more or less perfect exhibition of that nature. The Platonic doctrine of Ideas is the representative example of this view. If good is defined as the realisation by the individual of its universal nature then the universal nature is assumed to be good which remains to be defined now. But good of the universal cannot be something of a still more universal nature. Secondly, an individual *seeks* to realise its own universal nature; but this means that an individual is interested in the actualisation of his own nature. Good lies in his *interest* in seeking. The fulfilment of the universal may be viewed in its relation to knowledge. One who seeks to know seeks to define and explain the discovery of the universal in the particular which is the goal of his efforts. But here again, the same interest-factor is the real explanation of value.

The value of an object is also supposed to lie in the mutual support of its parts. In its unified character value is supposed to be enshrined. The good stands safe like an arch by the help of the counter-thrust of its own parts. But if unity is taken to be an abstract form or relationship, it has no reference to the subject-matter of the science of value. A structural equilibrium is only an organised whole. Integrity is no more adequately prefigured in the intellectual, moral or social unities of life than

in the mathematical, physical or chemical unities of inorganic nature. Again, mere completeness may be found in a perfect tragedy as in the happiness of triumph. Unity, of course, does characterise our World and it may be taken to be a value. Completeness is fulfilment and desire is a form of insufficiency. Both these characters intersect each other—unity and desire. But desire or *interest* is the main feature which defines value. This view tends to make interest as the real explanation of value. For “organic unity” suggests a biological context which emphasises the interest of the living individual. Again, in the conception of reciprocal unity there is an evident relation to the intellectual interest. Thought aims to prove the general and systematic character of its objects. It may be said that an orderly unity is the goal of thought.

In the study of intellectual or scientific values, this characteristic of the intellectual interest must be carefully noticed. It proves that unity is a value but it does not prove that unity is the only value.

Now we have seen how all these explanations of value have been inadequate and they have suggested interest as the most important factor in value. But what is the type of the relation of value to interest? Does value spring from interest and fly on to the object or does the object draw the interest to itself?

Both the possibilities are legitimate: the view which proposes to limit and qualify the object and the view that proposes to qualify the act or state of interest. Both these views must be respected since they represent a duality of aspects and not an existential dualism. The common generic character may be termed as *object of interest* in all possible cases of value.

Value is thus a peculiar relation between interest and its own object.

Ancient Hedonism has an implied assumption of this psychological theory of value. Professor Alexander does not consider value in its *generic* sense but in its strictest sense. Though he seems to have realised the full importance of the subjective side, he ultimately lays his emphasis on the objective side. According to J. L. McIntyre “the value of an object is its relation to—

whether felt or reflected upon—the activity of the individual as a whole.” Meinong and Ehrenfels agree with McIntyre inasmuch as they appeal to the individual as a whole and not to the “*feeling or willing side of the mental nature*” as we propose to do. Santayana has great affinity with our theory, and Ralph Barton Perry is the foremost advocate of this Interest Theory of Value.

TIME AND ETERNITY

BY

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There are two main views regarding the nature of Reality. One holds that Reality is in the making, that change is ultimate; the other that Reality is eternal and unchanging, *i.e.*, timelessly complete. The first view appears to be more in accordance with common sense; the second is to many unintelligible and perhaps even absurd. That the Reality we know is perpetually changing, that things come into existence and decay, that yesterday passes into to-day and to-day into to-morrow, appear to be incontrovertible facts. How can any one maintain that Reality is complete at one stroke, that it already is what it will be in future, that time and succession are merely its appearances and do not affect its essential nature? To say that our point of view is temporal because it is finite is, it seems, only to shirk the difficulty; for the reality of our point of view cannot be denied except by committing an impossible intellectual suicide. It is like saying that time is our appearance and that we are our appearance too.

However, when we say that our point of view is finite and that time is its appearance, we need not hold that we are completely appearance and that time is illusory and totally unreal. In realising that we are finite we realise our relation to the infinite, and in seeing time to be appearance we are necessarily driven to consider it to be an appearance of eternity. We must not expect to be able to see the relation of time to eternity in the same way as we see the relation of events to one another in time. If we are necessarily led by reflection on the nature of time to transcend it and resolve it into eternity, and if we can see, however inadequately, in some cases that we understand, that such a thing is not impossible, we shall have done all that can be expected to be done towards the solution of the problem. After all man is finite

and can only *apprehend* and not *comprehend* the full nature of Reality, and if his apprehension is the necessary complement of what he comprehends, then there is no reason why he should reject what he merely apprehends simply because he does not comprehend it.

Let us first examine the view that time is ultimate, that Reality is essentially changing. Now change cannot be understood except as in time, and so, to say that Reality is changing is to say that Reality is a series of events in time. It will not do to say that time is nothing distinct from the changing events, that time is change itself. Time is the *form* of changing events, and though there cannot be empty time, time is yet to be distinguished from the events that change in it. When we say that change is ultimate we say that Reality is in time, that time extends beyond Reality. Just as motion is impossible except in space which is other than, and extends beyond, what moves, so change is impossible except in time which is other than and extends beyond, what changes. What changes is what becomes another and so there must be time beyond it in which that other succeeds it. If then time extends beyond Reality, Reality is not taken as a whole, for time is excluded from it. There is Reality *and* there is time in which that Reality changes. But include time within Reality as it should be included, let Reality be the whole, time and all, and then can it be said that Reality changes?

Again to hold that time is ultimate because Reality is essentially change is to affirm and deny at the same time the reality of time. The philosophers of change deny the "block" theory of reality; they cannot accept that Reality is complete. And the reason is that Reality is not all there yet, and what is not yet there cannot be considered real. But the same reason must make them deny reality to time. Time is not all there and therefore the time that is not there is unreal. And how much time is really there? The strict present is infinitesimal and tends to shrink to a mere point. The philosophers of change must therefore hold that not only is Reality generated but along with Reality also the time in which it is generated. And this at first sight seems plausible. But can we understand the possibility of change without assuming

the reality of time beyond that which changes? ~~If Reality and time at any instant are co-terminous and there is absolutely nothing beyond, we have a "block" and this makes change impossible.~~ To face the difficulty from another point of view, are those who hold change to be ultimate—and to hold such a view is to hold that there is contingency at the heart of things—prepared to maintain that the future is absolutely contingent, not only the specific nature of the future but the possibility of a future itself? Are they prepared to maintain that there may be no future at all? If they are not prepared to maintain this, if they hold that Reality is essentially changing, they must tell us what makes them say that change is *necessary*. This necessity is understood only if future time is admitted to be not only capable of being real but actually real, and this is really the self-contradictory assumption underlying the philosophy of change. But what is the objection to admitting the future to be real? Are we prepared to deny the reality of the past? If by "being real" we mean "being real in the present," then the past is not real, and if we hold the past to be real because it has been though it is not, we must consistently also hold that the future is real though it is not yet. Either the present alone is real, or the past, present and future are all real. To hold that the present alone is real is almost to annihilate reality and time, for the strict present is a mere point of time and so almost nothing. We do not find it difficult to extend reality beyond the part of space in which we are. What is not here is as real as what is here. Why then should we find it difficult to admit that what is not now may be as real as what is now? It may be said that there is a difference between time and space in this respect. Different parts of space are "here" to different persons, but different points of time are not "now" to different persons. My "there" may be your "here," but my future cannot be your present. But here we overlook the fact that we do not take the two cases on equal terms. In the case of time we take only the persons who have a common present, and say that one person's "then" cannot be another person's "now." Take for instance Julius Caesar and the Duke of Wellington. The latter's present was the former's future.

Space and time are both dimensions of Reality. Just as what is not here in space is as real as what is here in space, so also what is not now in time is as real as what is now in time. What is not now belongs to the past or the future section of Reality from our point of view, but it belongs to Reality and is real. Those who hold that the future is not real until it becomes present argue like one who should say that England is not real until it is here, and should consistently maintain that all reality is strictly confined to what is "here" and "now."

But such a position would be suicidal in a philosopher of change, for change is not confined to what is here and now. What is here and now is essentially changeless. Change must transcend the present. But then how shall we admit the reality of change without admitting that what is not present may be real? And if this is admitted, all is admitted. The reality of change cannot be denied. We know that we are not confined to the infinitesimal present, and to hold that we are so confined contradicts our most patent experience. We perceive change—that is an irreducible fact. But how is change perceived? Change is successive and to perceive change is to perceive succession. Now is the perception of succession successive? If the perception of succession were successive it would be impossible. Unless somehow the variety in succession is synthesised (and to synthesise variety is not merely to sum it up successively) it is impossible to know succession. How variety is synthesised, how succession is perceived without the perception being successive, it may not be possible for us to understand, but it is undeniable that it must be so. Now as the synthesis of succession is related to succession, so eternity may be said to be related to time. Eternity is not temporal, but nevertheless it is a synthesis of time. It is not mere timelessness in the sense of being something that excludes time. It transcends time and takes it up into itself without being itself subject to time-conditions. It has been urged as a difficulty against the timelessness or eternal nature of Reality that it is inexplicable how what is essentially timeless should give rise to succession in time. Now it is not accurate to say that eternal Reality *gives rise to* time-succession; there is not this temporal

relation between eternity and time. The eternal is the synthesis of the temporal and a synthesis is always different in kind from that of which it is a synthesis; otherwise it would not be a *synthesis*, which must necessarily *transcend* all that it synthesises. We may therefore say in answer to the difficulty that what comprehends time-succession must essentially be timeless.

How a whole of what is necessarily temporal may yet be non-temporal as a whole can be seen from a very simple example. In a novel the events narrated are necessarily related in time, but the novel itself as a whole is not in time. This is why the events of one novel cannot be placed in time in relation to the events of another novel. Thus we have a temporal succession of events constituting a whole which is not temporal though it has time within it necessarily. Another point worth considering is that the fictitious events of a story have a grounding in reality; so that though themselves not real they are an expression of reality; otherwise criticism would be impossible, for all criticism starts from the basis of objective reality and assumes that the object of criticism, however fictitious, must be compatible with reality beyond it, or as we may put it, must be secondarily real. So we have the following paradox: Reality, without being, or containing within it, the events related in a novel *as they are related*, is yet a ground of, and comprehends at a different level, those events. In other words, the events of the novel are not real at their face value, but still they are not altogether false, for they are taken up in a transmuted form into Reality. This may enable us to understand how the temporal may be real at a different level from the ultimately real and be comprehended in the latter without making it temporal. One more example which will make our position clearer still and we may end. One and the same subject may be discussed in a number of works and each work will necessarily follow some order which need not be, almost certainly will not be, the same as the order followed in any other work. All the works will develop in the orders which they follow what is involved in the nature of the subject discussed, for all the works will aim at objective truth. Now what is the order in which that which is developed in the works is involved in the nature of the subject?

Is that order the order of any one of the works? The answer necessarily is that the implications developed in the several works must be involved in the nature of the subject in some order, though in no determinate order, not in the order of any one of the works, though in an order compatible with the order of every one of the works and with every other order in which these implications are capable of being unfolded. In the same way all temporal orders, if there are many (and we have no reason to suppose that there is only one), are synthesised in the eternal which is the ground of those orders and compatible with all of them though not identical with any.

EXISTENCE AND EXPERIENCE

BY

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The problem is to enquire how far existence or reality is bound up with experience. It is true that some thinkers mean by reality something other than existence, as for example, Bradley, who maintains that Appearances exist and yet are not real. But I use the word existence here in the sense of reality. To say that a thing exists or is, is identical with the statement that it is real. With this explanation the problem discussed in this paper may be indicated thus :—Is a thing real because it stands or may stand in relation to an individual consciousness as an object of experience or knowledge? Is the subject-object relation, that is, experiencing or knowing, essential to the reality or the existence of a thing or is it only accidental so far as the existence of the thing is concerned? If it is the former then existence is dependent upon the act of experiencing and if the latter then it is prior to and independent of experience. For the present the question of the nature of reality or existence in the latter sense need not engage our attention.

The Idealist, speaking generally, holds that all existence is existence as an object of experience or knowledge. "Whatever is, is Experienced." Thus Bradley says, "There is but one reality and its being is experience." (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 455.) "To be real is to be indistinguishably one thing with sentience." (*Ibid*, p. 146.) "There is no being or fact outside of that which is commonly called psychical existence." (*Ibid*, p. 146.) This is the basic assumption of several Idealistic systems and in the sequel whenever reference is made to Idealism it is to be understood that it is the theories which subscribe to the above assumption that are meant. Idealism in the sense that Reality is spiritual

may be true even according to a Realistic theory of knowledge and what is the distinctive feature of the Idealistic systems of the present day in contrast to the realistic schools of thought is the aforesaid epistemological assumption.

The Idealist is right in insisting on the fact that a thing to be real for anyone, that is, to be known as real it must be experienced by him. In other words, *I* can speak of anything as 'is' or 'real' only if it becomes an object of *my* experience. So with everything that is real for anyone. But how far does the reality of a thing consist in thus being apprehended or experienced by a mind? The qualities that it may be understood to have may all be shown to be relative to the nature and the limitations of the perceiving or experiencing mind. But can we conclude from this that the Reality of the thing consists in being perceived or experienced? It is true that the 'What' of the thing is relative to the experiencing subject and that there is a 'That' is also known only in relation to a mind. Still does not the experience of the 'What' or the knowledge that there is a 'That' imply in its very nature and constitution the 'Thatness' or 'Isness' or "Objectivity of the 'That' " prior to and independent of its being experienced by a mind? To speak in the orthodox language of philosophy, is not a thing-in-itself existing in-itself and for itself implied in the very process of experiencing it?

The Idealist answers "No," and contends that the thing is only because it is known or experienced. In other words he regards the relation of knowing that the object has to the subject as essential to the reality of the object. But he overlooks the difference between a thing existing and its being experienced by someone. The object *as an object of experience* is in relation to consciousness and to state it is only stating a truism. But in order that it may be an object of experience it must first *be* and then be for a mind as an object of its experience or awareness. Of course I do not imply a temporal priority though there may be such priority but only a logical independence. The object must have an external existence, meaning by 'external' independence of its being perceived or known by any mind whatsoever. Doctor Moore rightly says, "The entity which is experienced is never

identical with the experience of the object which consists in the object being experienced. (*Philosophical Studies*, p. 163.) The being of the object is prior to and independent, in its existential aspect, of the act of experiencing it and this is a basic assumption attested by commonsense and one to which all philosophers including the Idealists at some time or other subscribe. If there is no such priority implied in the very act of experiencing it, in the very fact of its being an object *of* experience, then, I submit, knowing a thing would be *creating* it.

If Reality exists only because there are consciousnesses experiencing we are faced with an insuperable difficulty. To say that a thing is real because it is experienced involves the existence at least of the agent or the subject that experiences. This subject exists or is real, otherwise there is no experience. The experiencer must be real apart from or independently of his act of experiencing. We are not concerned now with the 'What' of the experiencer. All that we demand is simply that there must be a 'That' that experiences. According to the idealistic assumption that a thing is real only because it is experienced, we must say that the subject is real only because it is experienced. Only when we apprehend the 'What' of the subject there is the 'That' of the subject. But is it not absurd to say that experience which is the function of the subject is the process of creating the subject? The Idealist recognises the absurdity involved in his contention and surreptitiously introduces a self or consciousness overlooking the fact that the same principle which he applies to the object of experience applies with equal cogency to the reality of the subject as well. Just as Hume applied the Berkeleian criticism of Matter to the notion of Spirit we may apply the idealistic principle of the reality of the object of experience to the subject of experience. The result would be rank solipsism, there will be no external world, nor an internal world, or consciousness. Experience is the only real. But obviously experience is a function or relation which implies, as Dr. James Ward has conclusively demonstrated, a primordial duality of subject and object. To say that the reality of either of these consists in the fact of experience is to assert the existence of a relation with nothing to be related.

Thus the subject and the object of experience stand in the same boat if an object has no independent reality but is mind-dependent or consciousness-dependent, this mind on which it depends is real only if it is experienced by another mind and this again is real only in relation to some other mind and so on *ad infinitum*. This is an impossible position and hence we have to retrace our steps and part company with the Idealists.

To expose further the difficulty involved in the Idealistic doctrine let us turn to the existence of spirits according to Idealism. Even an Absolute Idealist grants that besides the mind or spirit *i.e.*, himself, there are also other minds or spirits. In other words he admits the existence of a plurality of spirits though with the proviso that they are not ultimately real. He says that they are merged, transformed and absorbed in the Absolute. But to be mutilated, transformed and assimilated in the Absolute, at any rate, they must *be*. Otherwise there is nothing to undergo the said operation. Dr. Ward urges that Bradley seems clearly committed to the recognition of a distinction between his so-called Absolute and his 'Finite centres' which implies the reality of both. (*Mind*, January, 1925, p. 33.) Now if the 'finite centres' be or exist, are they so because they are in relation to another consciousness that experiences them? If so, what of this other consciousness? To argue thus would be to dissolve the subject and the object of experience and posit the reality of a function or a relation without any agent whose function it is, and with nothing to be related.

The Idealist grants at least the reality of the Absolute. At any rate to him this is the certainty of all certainties or the only certainty whether it be called Absolute or God or anything else. He can't deny that his own theory of such a reality is different from the reality itself though it may have a place in it. So if he grants the distinction between his philosophy and that about which his philosophy deals, why not admit the same with regard to every object of experience? He can't pretend that his philosophy is the Absolute itself or that the Absolute is real only in so far as it is an object of his or somebody else's philosophising. Thus the distinction between the object of experience and the experience

changes? I do not think Bergson can offer a satisfactory solution to this problem if he holds to 'duration' *per se* as the Ultimate Reality.

Professor Alexander, one of the most brilliant and suggestive thinkers, also ascribes objective reality to Time and says "the Ultimate reality is 'Space-Time' the stuff out of which by various distributions all things arise." In explaining how it is so, he refers to what he calls 'the inherent restlessness of Time' and tells us—'time is the soul of space.' Time is thus the essential factor in cosmic evolution.

But the question is—'why is this restlessness?' What is this restlessness of? Professor Alexander seems to suggest a solution by saying that "the Universe in its *nisus* and its dream is straining to the quality of 'deity.' " But this is rather an explication of the meaning of the word 'restlessness' than a real explanation for it. The '*nisus*' the 'dream' and the 'straining' are hardly explained in his philosophy of the Universe and remain as mysterious as ever.

Now, the reason why even such earnest thinkers on Time, as we find in Bergson and Alexander, are unable to give us a clue to the real nature of Time, can in my opinion be traced to the fact that both of them sunder it from experience and interpret it as a thing apart. And it is strange, indeed, that even Bergson with whom 'duration' stands for a felt 'quality' could have ignored the inseparable connexion of Time with Experience. The unfortunate over-cautiousness on the part of Kant in ascribing any reality to Time is here substituted by an eagerness to predicate *the* reality of it.

The thing is, a purely objective treatment of Time cannot but land us in perplexities. Even the greatest discovery of the present day by Einstein—the Law of Relativity—which has made Mathematicians and Physicists refer things no longer to three axes of co-ordinates but to four, the fourth being the Time-axis, and has thus secured for time an important place and function in the world-order, has yet to decide how far Time is real. If, according to the Law of Relativity, we may describe 'Space-Time' as an order or system of relations that subsist between bodies and also agree with Einstein in conceiving that 'although immeasurab-

ly vast the Universe is definitely limited and capable of exact measurement,' then are we not to be pessimistic about the reality of Time also? It would be better for us, therefore, to look for the reality of Time with the spirit of Kant when he tells us that Time is a 'form of the Inner Sense,' and according to the suggestion of Bergson also, that Time is a 'quality' and not a 'quantity;' and then see whether we have time in any form as real in our experience. Let us therefore see if we can get help from such thinkers as have sought to find 'time' in this quarter.

The Neo-Idealists of Italy such as Croce and Gentile held up before us a view of the Universe as Eternal History. According to this school of thought the concrete form in which Reality is perceived is History. Our own reality, for example, is identical with our history. 'I am' means what 'I have been;' and this 'I have been' is a matter of History. Thus Universal History is to Reality what the history of each individual is to himself. Reality is a process, and this process is in time or rather is Time itself. This would have sounded very much like the Bergsonian doctrine of Time had it not also been said that the world is Mind in Activity, meaning thereby that the world is a gradual unfolding of Pure Mind.

I do not wish to go into the details of this idealistic theory of the Universe, except in so far as it concerns itself with Time. The most striking feature of this theory is its sincere effort to subvert the dualistic interpretation of the Universe as Mind and Matter; but the effort seems to me to hit beyond the mark in doing away with Mind also, and emphasising its activity as if it were something that stands by itself. For it is one thing to say that the Universe is history and quite another to say that it has a history. The one would go to identify Reality with Time, while the other would go to show that Time is a character of the Real. It is not exactly clear what the Neo-Idealists can possibly mean, for if the Universe is History, Time is all in all; and if this is so, why bring in Mind at all? But this theory points out one great truth in bringing out the historical aspect of the Universe and showing that it is the nature of the Mind to be history. And this is vital to our Understanding of the reality of Time.

A very suggestive explanation is offered by Professor Royce. He draws our attention to the true significance of 'Time' and tells us that it is not so much the consciousness of something coming first and then something next that makes Time a matter of interest for us, as the consciousness of the whole succession as such in which the apparently unrelated events stand related to one another. The moment that is no more, has its meaning in the moment that is, which, again, has its fulfilment in the moment that is to be. The successions appear as one whole and give us the idea of Time proper. His further elucidation of the nature of Time-consciousness is more interesting for our purpose when he tells us that the peculiarity of the Time-series consists in the fact that it is "always found to have a determinate direction." "Succession passes from each event to its successor and not in a reverse direction; and herein the perceived Time-relations differ from what we view as space-relations." This direction of the Time-series he interprets as "an event aiming on towards its own fulfilment and extinction in the coming of its successor," and says 'our experience of Time is thus for us essentially as experience of longing, of pursuit, of restlessness.' It is 'a form of the Will.' This restlessness he accounts for as the restlessness of the individual for union with the Universal. He then goes on to add that "the world's Time is thus in all respects a generalised and extended image and correspondent of the observed Time of our Inner experience."

As to this idea of Time we can agree only in so far as our own inner experience is concerned; but the wider application of Time as longing for union with the nature of the Absolute is not satisfactorily explained and might even be said to be logically untenable. Besides, Time as 'longing for union' is only a hypothesis that remains to be established.

Among Indian thinkers we have to look to the Vaishnava school of thought for an objective consideration of Time. According to all Vaishnava thinkers 'the world' as such is not to be dispensed with as 'illusion.' It is grounded in the nature of the Absolute or Brahman. Brahman is dynamically conscious. Māyā is Prakriti. "It is the creative principle and not the principle of causing confusion. Manifestation or expression

pertains to the very nature of Brahman. It is the *Nityavibhūti* of Brahman and includes Kāla and Iswara."

Both *Rāmānuja* and *Nimbārka* "accept Time and *Prikṛiti* to be eternal objective existences—as the *materia*, dynamic, basic reality of the cosmic order, the former having no limitation that is applicable to the latter."

According to *Nimbārka* " 'Kāla' is the principle which pursues every thing to maturation. It is undivided and unchanging (*vide* Sircar's *Comparative studies in Vedāntism*, pp. 204 & 208).

According to *Vallabhāchāryya* Kāla imbibes in it *Sattra* and is the *Sāttvik* manifestation of Iswara. It has three forms (1) *Ādhidairika* (2) *Ādhibhautika* (3) *Ādhyātmika*. *Ādhidairika* Kāla is time, undivided and eternal. *Iswara*, is in this Kāla. Kāla viewed and determined by succession of events especially of outer nature is *Ādhibhautika* Kāla and when viewed as having magnitude equal to that of *Ātmā* is *Ādhyātmika*."

The net result of the above mode of considering time is that Time must necessarily be brought into account for 'Change' or the world of things as an eternal principle in the bosom of the Absolute.

Thus the *Vaiṣṇava* thinkers throw some light on the problem of Time that enables us to look into the matter closely and form an estimate of the true nature of Time accordingly.

What then is the Time? Our fairly exhaustive review of the treatment of Time from different points of view does, in my opinion, bring home to us one important truth, that, Time is after all an indispensable factor of our experience. The world spread out in space before us is a world of things existing with us, but having, as it were, no direct concern with us unless we would choose to take them in our concern. But the world is also a world of events each of which is a curious admixture of 'is' and 'is not' and yet for the matter of that is linked with all the others, all together with myself making up a meaning for me that I call Time. Herein lies the distinctive nature of Time. The chair is here, the tree is there, and I might even say space is everywhere, and that I can say I have no direct concern with the chair or the tree or even with space (for however curious it may sound,

what I call 'myself' in me, I do not find in it, though it and all else may be in me) and yet I am. But I cannot say this with regard to Time. The gathering of the clouds, the flashing of lightning, the roaring of the thunder, the rising of the storm and the coming on of rain are all events no doubt standing by themselves but none the less linked together, one passing into the other and existing in a whole and speaking to me of something which certainly is not before me even as space is; and in each of these severally and in all of them collectively 'I am' Time is, therefore, real *in* experience; for it goes with all our experience. Let us now see whether it is also real *for* experience: whether, in other words, it goes to explain our experience.

In what does the reality of Time consist? With what special content does it appeal to my experience? What is it that makes me feel or think of Time at all? Time is commonly expressed as 'past' 'present' and 'future' with 'the present' as the point of reference; but what is it that draws my attention to the 'present' and makes me look both ways? My answer is, it is the sudden leaping up of the 'present' into my view, the creation of the 'present' for me. The present will never be a matter for concern with me, it will not even exist, unless it brings the sense of creation with it. I shall have no thought of the 'present' and thus none of the 'past' or 'future' either, unless suddenly something comes into being and opens my eyes to the fact of this 'coming into being.' This 'coming into being' is not however to be understood as meaning the positive existence of a material object of perception, for it may equally stand for the absence of one. It simply means, an event, a happening, a change. The bud which I saw there yesterday evening I find in bloom, in the morning; here the material object has remained the same but it would have been of no interest to me except for the 'budding' 'the disappearance of budding' and 'the blooming' all appearing as 'creations' to my mind. Thus both 'coming in sight' and 'passing out of sight' are to my mind 'facts of creation.' Every change so far as I am concerned is a creation. It may be objected here that 'change' is always relative to a position in space. My answer is: this is again a misrepresentation of the significance of change. It is certainly relative, but relative to a psychic interest.

Here again the *Vedāntin* might say, that, it is the 'psychic interest' that occasions a change for us and not *vice versa*; for a psychic interest presupposes a state of preparedness that can be traced to a set of instincts or 'Sanskāras' without which a change will not be perceived as a change. To this I have to say that this is a mere hypothesis until the 'Sanskāras' are established by reasoning; and that, as a matter of fact, such reasonings would go to involve the fallacy of *regressus ad infinitum*. Besides change understood as 'change' is logically born of the relation between Mind in a state of dormancy and Mind in a state of awakening; but 'change' understood as 'change' must be distinguished from 'change' understood as 'happening' or 'creation.' Thus it is change that quickens my sense of interest, or rather, brings it into being and makes me look beyond itself to the fact of creation, opens my inner eye to that on account of which this creation takes place, and this I call Time. You would perhaps ask me here to substitute 'in which' for 'on account of which.' My reply would be that it is because activity has to be regarded as a process that you wrongly give it a spatial form and talk of it with 'in' or 'on;' but a process need not be spatially construed at all, for it appears to our experience simply with a content as bringing forth or creation. Our unsophisticated Mind is nearer the truth here when we say 'Time will bring it about' 'Time will bring its reward' 'Time will heal' 'Time will do its work.' Yes, it is always Time that does the work and nothing else. The plant, we say, 'grown;' but 'grows' how? What is the essential condition of its growth? I should say, it is Time. Take away Time and there would be no growth; and why talk of growth?—it will even cease to exist. Similarly you take up a problem for solution; work at it for days and days; you find no solution; you give it up and forget it altogether; but then all on a sudden after years and years perhaps, the solution flashes up in your vision and you jump up with a creation before you. What has brought this joy for you? Certainly it is not yourself, for you had given it up, had almost completely erased it out of your mind; nor was it any one else that helped you to do it, for it was the business of none to enter into your secrets. It is Time—Time that was active when you enjoyed rest, Time that was awake when you were asleep. You would perhaps say that

the work was being done by your subconscious Mind. Yes; certainly it was 'being done' but not 'was done' and could never have been done unless Time as 'creative activity' had stepped in and got it done for you. Take away Time and it will be an impossibility for you. Yes, take away Time and the stars will cease to run in their courses, the sun will lose its glow, the moon will lose its delight, all creation would die the death of a static stagnation and a blank Absolute of 'nothingness' would stare at itself as a ghost.

Time creates. You would perhaps say "why talk of 'creation' alone" for creation means 'birth?' Do we always have births before us? Do we not also have deaths? Oh, yes, we have; but 'a birth' as a 'change' and not as a 'birth' is a creation for me; and 'death' is as much a 'change' as 'birth' is. Every change is a new-comer in my world of experience, be it 'a birth or a death.' It is the rhythm of birth and death that stands for creation. And the endless sea of incessant change brings me the vision of a creative activity that I call Time.

The time to which we generally give the determinations of past, present and future may be reduced to nothingness; for Time has past present, and future owes its origin to what we call 'the present,' and a little analysis would go to show that the present never exists. We never have a 'now' for us. Psychology has shown that the 'now' is always relative to a particular 'span of consciousness' and the present is always a 'specious present,' so the Time born of such a present must necessarily be false; for it owes its origin to falsity. It is this false notion of Time that is responsible for the anxiety on the part of thinkers to dispense with 'Time as an illusion.' But the Time whose reality is ever with us in the ceaseless flow of events can never be taken away from our experience. It gives meaning to our experience; experience would be unintelligible to us unless we saw creation in it. Time is thus also 'real for experience.'

Now this creative activity that we call Time does not stand by itself. It is the creative activity of God whom Spinoza understands by his 'Universal substance' in the necessity of whose existence lies the necessity of his manifestation. Spinoza is said to have declared Time to be unreal. May be. But we must

not forget that he also believed in the necessary manifestation of the Universal substance. I for myself cannot understand how in the face of this fact he could ever have believed in a *static* Substance. He might not have believed in the 'time' we have shown to be false, but he certainly believed in 'eternity' and 'eternal manifestation.' It would be better therefore to say that he believed in Time as Plato did when he said "Time begins with the creation of things and is the image of eternity." It is all very well to talk of 'substance' as 'absolute,' to divest it of all content and do away with every thing else as 'illusion' or 'appearance,' but can we really talk away the fact of change in so simple a manner as we pretend to do? Every thing changes and so nothing can be said to be real—this we can accept. But for the matter of that are we justified in ignoring 'change' as such? I think, not. We cannot ignore it. It is there but we do not understand it and that is all. It were far better on our part, therefore, to confess our ignorance than take pride in saying that we have discovered a blank static Absolute that can have no meaning for us and which we have never discovered at all. I cannot therefore understand the attitude of Bradley when he tells us "if Time is not unreal our doctrine of the Absolute is false." Nor can I understand the anxiety on the part of Mc Taggart to 'kill' Time when he says 'perhaps Time will be the last enemy to be killed.' Throw away Time if you can; but you cannot.

Reality does not stand for 'isness' but Being. Being implies activity but is not activity. Creative activity is grounded in the nature of 'Being,' and change is always before us; and it is 'change' that causes us to turn our eyes to Reality. And change stands for creation; that is all that we experience. Creation can only be due to a creative activity which we always feel but nowhere find except in the experience of Time. Time is thus the creative activity of God that knows no ending. Time pertains to the real. It is not as Bergson says 'duration'; for duration is only the form in which we picture to our imagination creative activity as a process. It is not concerned with 'evolution' either; for it creates for the sake of creation and knows no selectiveness or purpose. It may operate as 'longing' or 'restlessness' in us and in the heart of everything that it creates, but in itself it re-

implied by the developing human knowledge, we should find ourselves in an indefensible position."

But why should truth be looked upon as a finished and complete thing, if Joachim wants to adhere to the view that truth is a "Significant whole?" For the idea conveyed by a "significant whole" is just the opposite of a self-contained existence. In an earlier passage of the same chapter, Joachim identifies a significant whole with "an organised individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled." Now such an organised individual experience is, as he says further, "absolute self-fulfilment, absolutely self-contained significance," and nothing short of absolute individuality, nothing short of the complete experience, can satisfy this requirement. What is important to observe here is that truth is a self-contained significance and not a self-contained existence. For a self-contained significance, the entire process which we call the world of finite experiences or the world of history, is a vital necessity. It cannot have any meaning apart from this.

Now the most curious thing is that Joachim has himself stated this in most emphatic terms. Thus, for instance, in answer to the questions, Whose is this ideal experience? Where and when is it actual? What is its precise relation to the finite experiences? Joachim says, "Now one answer to such questions is, 'Such an experience is nowhere and at no time, no one possesses it, and it is related to nothing save itself.' For the questions assume that Truth is a finished product, a static consummated whole of experience, which is somewhere at some time, exclusive of the finite experiences as occurrences in time and place, and yet related to them.....But this was not what was meant.....They regard it as the experience of a 'this-now,' much as I may here and now experience this toothache. But this again was not meant, though the misleading associations of the term 'experience' to some extent justify the misunderstanding." He further says, "On the other hand, if we answered, 'Such an Ideal Experience is everywhere and at all times; it is

the partial possession of all finite beings, and they the incomplete vehicles of it' we should merely be repeating more explicitly what we have asserted. The mere assertion is useless; but nothing short of an entire system of metaphysics could serve as its justification.....Perhaps the most hopeful procedure will be to start from a few typical examples of 'true' judgment. If we show their 'truth' expanding in each case into a system of knowledge, and that again as borrowing what truth it possesses from the Ideal Experience which is struggling for self-fulfilment in it, we shall be able to face the difficulties we have raised." * Joachim next takes such mathematical judgments as '2 and 2 make 4' and shows that their meaning takes us to the entire mathematical science. So again, the meaning of the historical judgment 'Caesar crossed the Rubicon in the year 49 B.C.' can only be understood in the light of the whole history of Rome in the time of Caesar.

It is quite clear that the self-fulfilling or the process can only be understood in the light of the self-fulfilled or the complete meaning, and the self-fulfilled, conversely, can only be understood through the self-fulfilling, that is, through the process. Why, then, does Joachim speak of a fundamental opposition between the self-fulfilling and the self-fulfilled? The reason is, that Joachim lapses from the standpoint of Truth as meaning to that of Truth as Dasein or existence. It is the lingering traces of the existential view of Truth that are responsible for Joachim's difficulty. Reality is not a 'Dasein' or existence at a particular point of space or time. Not being of the nature of a Dasein, the entire process which we call History gives completeness to its meaning. In fact, it has no meaning except through the process. The more it includes the process, the more meaning it acquires. Caesar's crossing the Rubicon has no meaning as an isolated fact. It acquires meaning as it is understood in reference to Roman history. And its full meaning takes it even beyond Roman history into mediaeval and modern history. Nay, it takes it further. It

* *Nature of Truth*, pp. 83-84.

is the same with the moral 'ought.' It is both self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled. Its complete meaning takes us far beyond anything that exists or has existed in the past, into the limitless future that is yet to be. The moral 'ought' cannot be understood except in reference to a process, for it rests upon a striving, upon an effort to make things better, which implies a process. But it is not for this reason indefinite; on the other hand, the 'ought' has a well-defined content.

The opposite danger to this superstition of Dasein is the fetish of change. Bergson believes that his conception of reality is truly dynamical because he views it as a process, a continuous flow. But this is a great mistake. The dynamism that alone can express reality is the dynamism of purpose, of meaning. A vague flow reveals no dynamism, just as uniform motion reveals no force. If, as Bergson says, movement is not a mere translation from one static point to another, so also equally it is not a flow from one indefiniteness to another. What makes it, in fact, more than a 'mere translation' is the presence of a purpose. Dynamism does not mean indefiniteness; on the contrary, indefiniteness reduces it to a static condition. Bergson, in fact, in order to avoid a Space-mechanism has given us a Time-mechanism.

There is nothing in an indefinite flow but a monotony. A flow that is merely a flow can never exhibit any variety. All variety is the work of a conscious purpose. If the talent of the painter, to use one of the stock examples of Bergson, were no better than one which goes on listlessly and is constantly being modified by the works which he produces, then it would be a misnomer to call it a talent at all. Yet Bergson believes that such a talent is the picture of creative activity. Let us quote the whole passage where this example occurs:—

"The finished portrait is explained by the physiognomy of the model, by the nature of the artist, by the colours mixed on the palette; but even with the knowledge of what explains it, nobody, not even the artist, could have foreseen exactly what the portrait would be, for to predict it would have been to produce it before it was produced—an absurd hypothesis which is self-destructive. So

it is with the moments of our life, of which we are the architects. Each one of us is a sort of creation. And just as the talent of the painter is formed or is deformed, in any case is modified, by the influence of the works which he produces, so each of our states, even at the moment when it proceeds from us, modifies our personality, being the new form which we have given ourselves. We are therefore right in saying that what we do depend upon what we are, but it is necessary to add that we are, in a certain measure, what we do, and that we create ourselves continually.' (*L'Evolution Créatrice*, p. 7.)

Now, what does this passage truly mean? Does it really show that the talent of the painter is creative? We do not think it does. What it merely establishes is that the paintings of the artist cannot be foreseen beforehand, not even by the artist himself. We do not know if any artist will take it as a compliment if he is told that nobody knows what line his art will take, in what direction it will develop. He will probably take it as meaning that his art is yet unformed, that it has not yet reached maturity, and so far from regarding it as a compliment, he will take it as a criticism meant to bring home to him the fact that his powers are not yet fully developed. What sort of a talent is it which cannot indicate the direction in which it will develop? If the talent is worth anything, it will surely *create* for itself its own lines of development. It will not drift, it will not allow itself to be swept away by the passing tide, but it would determine its course. Indeterminism is so far from being a characteristic of creative activity, that, on the contrary, it is a sure sign of its absence. As Alfred Fouillée has pointed out, want of determination is a sign not of creative freedom, but of its opposite, nature-necessity.

Supposing Bergson's ideal is realised and that we do succeed in having a pure flow which cannot be represented either by a straight line or a diagram or an idea or a concept, in what sense will it be superior to spatial mechanism? Supposing the course of the world were not like that of a bullet hurled from a cannon, but as Bergson imagines, like that of a shell whose fragments split up into other fragments, these other fragments into still others,

and so on *ad infinitum*, what then? Would there be an end of all mechanism? Or rather, would not mechanism return with a vengeance, only changing its dress? Should we not be irretrievably committed to a mechanism of time? For this flow that is not a flow towards anything, this movement that is not a movement directed by any end is unrelieved mechanism, though it may be a mechanism of time and not a mechanism of space. Mechanism for mechanism, in what respect is temporal mechanism superior to spatial mechanism? Perhaps it is worse, for there may be some hope in spatial mechanism that time may bring some relief, but there is absolutely none in temporal mechanism. The antidote to mechanism is not blind movement but purposive activity.

Escape from mechanism is sometimes again sought, as Husserl has done, by erecting a new world, called the world of Essence (*Wesen*). A contrast is made between the meaningless world of facts and the significant realm of Essence. Such a contrast misses, however, the very problem of reality. For the problem is to find the meaning in the world of facts, not to create a new world, superimposed upon the old. Husserl's world of Essence is essentially on a par with the mathematician's *n*-dimensional Space. Whatever charm it may possess as a kind of logical gymnastics, it does not take us an inch nearer the solution of the problem of reality.

Nor is the distinction which Rickert makes between the world of values and the world of reality of any help in the solution of our problem. The mistake which Rickert makes is in confusing reality with existence. This is perfectly clear from the example which he uses to show the distinction between reality and value. Thus Rickert says, "A great painting, for instance, is on its real side, nothing but canvas and colour. Its value-side is what makes it a painting." (*System du Philosophie*, p. 119.) Now nobody, unless he is hopelessly committed to the pure *Dasein*-view of reality, will say that the real side of a painting is nothing but canvas and colour. To take such a monstrously mean view of reality and then to say that reality is not adequate, is to act upon the old maxim: 'Give a dog a bad name and hang it.'

We thus see that there is no escape from the problem of Reality by such short cuts as were devised by Husserl and Rickert. It is in fact not possible to set up a rival world which is a complement or counterpart of the world of reality. Reality in its fulness can leave no room for such a rival. This is expressed by saying that reality is meaning.

AN ESSAY ON METAPHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL TIME INCLUDING TIME IN THE THEORY OF REALITY.

BY

J. WALKER TOMB.

“ The tide of water that thou seest is that portion of eternity which is called Time, measured out by the Sun and reaching *from the beginning of the world to its consummation.*”

Addison, *Vision of Mirza.*

Philosophers and sages in all ages have attempted to give a satisfactory definition of time, but judging from the obscurity which still surrounds the subject, as well as from the multiplicity of definitions and the want of general acceptance of any one of them, without success.

Some one has wittily remarked that if a philosopher and a physicist be asked what time is, the philosopher will answer in a long speech (or essay), whereas the physicist will immediately pull out his watch and say “ here it is ! ”

The obscurity regarding the true nature of time has arisen partly from confusing “ time ” with “ duration,” and partly from using without qualification the word “ time ” to connote two wholly separate and distinct conceptions—mathematical time and metaphysical time. This obscurity has been still further deepened by the erroneous definition of time in the Theory of Relativity and the “ philosophic consequences ” which according to the teaching of the relativists follow from it.

We shall endeavour in this essay to show that duration is a mental conception derived wholly from introspection, what is called metaphysical time being the duration of “ mind ” or personality, while mathematical time is the duration of matter.

We shall now enquire into the origin of our conception of duration.

At a very early age, every intelligent human being becomes aware not only of his own individual existence, personality or "ego" but of the continuance or *duration* of that existence, personality or "ego."

The dawn of personality is thus described by Tennyson :—

The baby new to earth and sky,
 What time his tender palm is prest
 Against the circle of the breast,
 Has never thought that "this is I: "

But as he grows he gathers much,
 And learns the use of "I," and "me,"
 And finds "I am not what I see
 And other than the things I touch."

As we grow older and experience and intelligence increase, we observe that the material world in which we live, move, and have our being, *and to which our material bodies belong*, also possesses the quality of continuance or duration.

It will be found on analysis that the mental impression of duration of personality from which our conception of duration in general is derived, depends upon the integrity of three factors, consciousness, personality, and memory, and that where any one of these three factors is wanting the conception of duration cannot exist.

Consciousness, as every one is aware, is non-continuous, being interrupted regularly by sleep, as well as being capable of being interrupted by narcotics, injury and disease. Personality which is limited to the life of the individual, is constantly changing from birth to death or senile decay and second childishness,—a phenomenon which may reasonably be attributed to the incessant metabolic changes in the brain-cells inseparable from life. This change though normally small and often imperceptible either

subjectively or objectively over short periods, is nevertheless very obvious over long intervals, the personality of the whining school-boy with his satchel being markedly different from that of the same boy changed by process of time into the lean and slippered pantaloon. Bergson therefore rightly holds that no two total states of mind at different times are exactly alike. The gradual change of personality throughout normal life is referred to by Hazlitt in one of his essays, where alluding to the re-reading at long intervals of old and favourite books, he says "they bind together the different scattered divisions of our personal identity." Personality is also liable to change from circulation in the blood of neurotoxins such as alcohol, cocaine, or hashish, and from deficiencies of glandular secretions (the gonade, thyroid, etc.) as well as from insanity, being altered, dissociated or lost, according to the type of insanity suffered from.

The consciousness of personality or personal identity consists in the capacity fully to appreciate the significance of the expression "I am," and the mental impression which we possess of the *duration* of personality which is metaphysical time, is caused by the record in *memory* of a succession of "I am's," each "I am" existing only in the immediate present and becoming in turn an "I was" through the agency of memory. In loss of memory due to senile decay, as well as in the amnesia produced by hyosine ("twilight sleep"), though the consciousness of personality may be unimpaired from moment to moment, the capacity to appreciate the duration of personality, *i.e.*, the passage of (metaphysical) time is lost, through want of the memory necessary to convert each successive "I am" into its corresponding "I was." The duration of conscious thought represented by the idea "I am," when viewed retrospectively, is the minimum amount of duration of personality capable of being appreciated, and constitutes the unit of metaphysical time for each individual, representing Locke's "moment" which he defines as "the time (*i.e.*, duration) of one idea in our minds." Possessing no unit of measurement of metaphysical time, we are compelled to express the approximate duration of our ideas in terms of the duration of matter, *i.e.*, of mathematical time, which has been a fruitful cause throughout the ages of the confusion of mathematical and metaphysical time.

Metaphysical time which is the duration of personality, is therefore an integration of consciousness, personality and memory. It is also transient in character, being limited to the life of the individual.

We shall now consider mathematical time which is the duration of matter. Science teaches us that matter regarded as a form of energy, is indestructible, undergoing change from one form into another in the case of the stabler (non-radio-active) elements without demonstrable loss of substance or breach of continuity. The duration of matter unlike the duration of personality may therefore be considered to be *real*, continuous, and uninterrupted, "flowing" like "an ever-rolling stream" unceasingly. It was probably this figurative conception of the duration of matter which Newton had sub-consciously in mind when he wrote that "absolute true mathematical time *flows equally*," though as we shall subsequently see Newton confused "time" with "duration." That the duration of matter is mathematical time—*the measurement of the duration of matter being the measurement of mathematical time*—will become more apparent from consideration not only of the quotation at the head of the essay where time is referred to as enduring "from the beginning of the (material) world to its consummation" but also of some of the well known definitions of time (and duration) though their exact meaning was by no means clearly grasped by those who made them.

Plato and St. Augustine both held that before God created the world there was no time but that when He created the world (*i.e.*, matter), He created time also. St. Augustine nevertheless subsequently confused metaphysical time (the duration of "mind") with mathematical time (the duration of matter) and wrote "time (*i.e.*, metaphysical time) is nothing and cannot be measured."

Kant with great perspicuity held that the distinction between metaphysical and mathematical time involved the "*permanence of substance*," *i.e.*, the indestructibility or duration of matter. Descartes held that time is simply one way of thinking of duration *i.e.*, the duration of matter (or of mind), and Leibnitz held that everything that we can conceive has "duration" but not "time."

and that all possible (material) worlds must be in "time" (since mathematical time is the duration of matter). Mathematicians (De Sitter and others) agree that where there is no matter, (mathematical) time must cease to "flow."* Astronomy as well as geology teaches us that even in a lifeless universe (mathematical) time must still exist. In such a universe, we are also compelled to recognise, the measurement of (mathematical) time would be indistinguishable from as well as identical with the measurement of the duration of matter.

The Schoolmen held that time was a product of mental construction with an objective basis of validity. They therefore appreciated, though darkly, that "duration" (which they mis-called "time") was a purely mental conception and that matter was the objective basis of (mathematical) time.

Locke, Berkeley and Hume confusing the notion of duration with metaphysical time held that our notion of the time came solely from the succession of our ideas. They were in consequence wholly unable to offer any definition of mathematical time.

Newton also confused time with duration and wrote, "absolute true mathematical time, of itself and from its own nature without relation to anything external, flows equally and its other name is duration" thus proving that great mathematicians though often great astronomers are not necessarily great philosophers!

That mathematical time is the duration of matter will also appear from consideration of the word "eternity" which we use to connote the duration of the immaterial or spiritual world associated in our minds with the conception of God, the phrase "out of time into eternity" meaning out of the material world into the immaterial or spiritual world. This distinction is also brought out in the word "secular" which from originally meaning "through ages of time" as opposed to "eternity" has come to mean, "of or belonging to the temporal and material world" as opposed to the immaterial or spiritual world, hence "lay" as opposed to "clerical." The Schoolmen drew a distinction between time and eternity predicating "time" of this (material)

* *Stimson, Easy Lessons in Einstein*, p. 56.

world and "eternity" of God and the immaterial or spiritual world.

Spinoza confusing duration with time limited "duration" (i.e., time) to finite and material existence predicating "eternity" of God only.

Thomas Aquinas confusing time with duration drew a distinction between the "time" (duration) of men and "time" (duration) of angels, that is to say between the duration of the material world and the duration of the immaterial and spiritual world.

Mathematical time, we are therefore forced to conclude, is the duration of matter, *the measurement of the duration of matter being the measurement of mathematical time.*

This conclusion claims acceptance not only from its intrinsic truth but also from the light it sheds on the classical definitions of time (and duration) which have hitherto remained either obscure or meaningless.

From this it also follows that mathematical time is one of the many "dimensions" or properties of matter (length, breadth, "thickness," *duration*, mass, etc., etc.). Our familiar world of everyday experience is, therefore, we find one of (at least) four "dimensions."

Time has been confused by some with motion, owing to the fact that it is impossible to measure mathematical time except by means of matter in motion, time on earth being measured by the rotation of the earth *daily* on its axis, and by its revolution *yearly* in its orbit round the sun, while pendulums or clocks kept in motion mechanically are used for the more convenient sub-division of the day into "hours," "minutes," and "seconds."

Aristotle and the Greeks considered time as motion or as "something which could be counted" and Lobachevski the Russian mathematician famous for his investigations into non-Euclidean geometry, which has come into such prominence with the theory of relativity, held that "the motion of one body if it is taken as the measure of the motion of another body is called time."

That time is not motion is at once apparent from the consideration that the duration of matter is in no way affected by its motion or velocity.

Time is also confused with motion in the Theory of Relativity. Einstein writes, "By the time of an event we mean the *position of the hands of a clock* in the immediate neighbourhood of the event." "Time is nothing more or less than the *measurements* obtainable by means of clocks." "Every reference body has therefore its own particular time."*

Eddington also writes, "The relativist has no notion of time except as the result of *measurement* with some kind of clock."† What it is which is measured in relativity with a clock, neither Einstein nor Eddington states and is left to conjecture, but we have discovered after much error that it is simply mathematical time.

The word "time" therefore in the theory of relativity does not connote the duration of matter but the "frequency" or rate of movement of the hands of the observer's clock, the phrase "no time" as used by relativists merely meaning "no frequency or movement of the hands of a clock." Yet so deeply implanted in reason is the association of the word "time" with duration, that the relativists, forgetting the meaning of Einstein's definition of time as the movement of the hands of a clock, confound the phrase "no time" which in relativity merely means "no movement" of the hands of the observer's clock with "no duration," and have built upon this misconception a bewildering philosophy which dethrones reason and shakes our disposition with thoughts beyond the reaches of our souls—until by close examination we discover wherein its falsity lies.

Einstein's statement that "every body of reference has its own particular time" may be unambiguous

"Every body of reference has its own particular frequency or rate of movement of the hands of its clocks which is the unit of

* Einstein, "Relativity." Translation by Lawson (Methuen & Co.), pp. 23, 24, 26, 36.

† Eddington, "Space, Time and Gravitation," p. 13.

measurement of mathematical time for that particular reference body."

For those unacquainted with the theory of relativity it is necessary to explain that according to the (restricted) theory of relativity the "frequency" or rate of movement of the hands of a clock depends upon its velocity in space, varying from "unity" in the case of a clock at rest to "zero" in that of a clock travelling with the velocity of light.

Atomic frequency in a body of reference similarly varies with the velocity of the body of reference, and as metabolism in all vital phenomena must ultimately depend upon atomic frequency, life and thought may be assumed to be slowed down as velocity increases until they cease altogether at the speed of the limiting velocity of light. If we take a body of reference at rest and represent its atomic frequency as well as the rate of movement of the hands of its clocks by "unity," then the "frequencies" both of the atoms and of the clocks of similar bodies of reference with different velocities in space will vary as shown in the following table:—

Velocity.	Relative "Frequency."
Nil	1
260,000 kilometers per second	$\frac{1}{2}$
290,000 " " "	$\frac{1}{3}$
297,000* " " "	$\frac{1}{4}$
299,000 " " "	$\frac{1}{5}$
299,625 " " "	$\frac{1}{6}$
299,900 " " "	$\frac{1}{7}$
299,999 " " "	$\frac{1}{8}$
300,000† " " "	0

From this table it will be seen that atomic frequency in a body travelling at the speed of 299,000 k.p.s. which is considerably greater than the maximum velocity of an electron, would be reduced to the twelfth of the atomic frequency of a body at rest, so that—assuming that the earth is at rest in space—and that the body

* The maximum velocity of an electron.

† The velocity of light.

travelling at the speed of 299,000 k.p.s. originally started from rest *with the same units of measurement of time* as used on earth, the units of measurement of time on the body would now be twelve times larger than those on earth (with which it originally started), that is to say one "month" there would now represent one "year" on earth.

Metabolism would also be correspondingly slowed down, though it is doubtful if life or thought, as we know them, could exist at such a velocity unless it be assumed that our earth itself is travelling through space at this speed.

The absurdity of the definition of time as the "frequency" of a clock becomes at once apparent when we consider the case of an observer travelling with the velocity of light.

To the non-relativist events are simultaneous when the time interval between them is zero, however widely the events may be separated in space, but according to the relativists, confusing the movement of the hands of a clock with the duration of matter (i.e., mathematical time) all events are "simultaneous" as reckoned by the clock of an observer travelling with the velocity of light, since his clock has "stopped" and registers "no movement" between all events however widely separated in mathematical time the events may be.

Regarding a hypothetical railway journey of $8\frac{1}{2}$ hours from London to Edinburgh, Bertrand Russell* writes, "But if the observer had been a ray of light travelling round the solar system starting from London at 10 A.M. reflected from Jupiter to Saturn and so on until at last he was reflected back to Edinburgh and arrived there at 6-30 P.M. he would have judged that the journey had taken him *no time*," the explanation of this extraordinary state of affairs being, as we have already seen, that the "frequency" of a clock travelling with the velocity of light is reduced to zero; "no time" in relativity (confused by the relativists with "no duration") merely meaning "no movement" of the hands of the observer's clock.

* Bertrand Russell, "A.B.C. of Relativity."

Another relativist writes regarding two observers "A" and "B" the latter of whom is supposed to be travelling with the speed of light while the other observer "A" is at rest :—

"Events separated by a finite time-interval to "A" would be "simultaneous" to "B." "B's" clock would lose 24 hours (in one of "A's" days, i.e., his clock would "stop") time (meaning the hands of the observer's clock but confused by relativists with duration) would appear to stand still for "B" and the whole of "A's" world—past, present and future—would be concentrated for "B's" perception into "a moment of time." (The expression "a moment of time" is here used for the phrase "no time," i.e., "no movement of the hands of the observer's clock which is misconstrued as equivalent to "no duration")." It is very interesting to think that the whole panorama of the world's history from the dawn of creation to the end of time might be conjured up for our inspection if only we could travel with the speed of light !!!

Eddington* also refers to a hypothetical aviator travelling with the speed of light as enjoying "immortality and perpetual youth," though as we have seen above all atomic frequency and with it all life and thought cease at this velocity.

The definition of time as the position of the hands of a clock has led the relativists into inextricable difficulties regarding "simultaneity" of which no less than *four different conceptions* or definitions exist in relativity.

By Einstein's original definition "the time of an event is the position of the hands of a clock in the *immediate neighbourhood* of the event." According therefore to this definition, events are "simultaneous" when the positions of the hands of clocks in the immediate neighbourhood of the events are "identical." This Einstein's first definition of "simultaneity" confuses the notion of simultaneity which is a purely mental conception with its *measurement*. Such a definition of simultaneity also does away with the notion of "*simultaneity*" except where the observer is in the *immediate vicinity* of the events and their accompanying

* Eddington, "Space, Time and Gravitation," p. 26.

clocks since to be certain that events are " simultaneous " according to this definition, the observer must be able to see the positions of the hands of the clocks in the immediate neighbourhood of the events. This being so, when events are so situated (as on different bodies of reference) that the clocks in the immediate neighbourhood of the events cannot be directly seen by the observer, Einstein proposes to measure " simultaneity " by the position of the hands of a (one) clock in the immediate neighbourhood of the observer, the events being notified to the observer by means of light-signals, though light, while constant in velocity to all observers is not " instantaneous " and cannot traverse unequal distances in equal times. By an observer situated with clock midway in space between the events the light signals from the events will then be recorded by his clock as having arrived " simultaneously," but by all other observers not so situated in space, whether in motion or at rest, the events though " simultaneous " according to Einstein's first definition of simultaneity, *i.e.*, according to the positions of the hands of clocks in the immediate neighbourhood of the events will not be recorded by these observers' clocks as having arrived " simultaneously." On these grounds Einstein asserts that the events while " simultaneous " to the observer situated midway between them, are not to be regarded as " simultaneous " to the other observers not so situated and formulates the statement that " events which are simultaneous to one observer will not be simultaneous to another observer in motion with respect to the first observer.*

This constitutes Einstein's second conception of simultaneity which is exactly analogous in principle to reckoning " simultaneity " by ear instead of the sight while making no allowance for the velocity of sound.

Einstein's third conception of " simultaneity " is as follows :—

All events which happen at *any one point in space*, however widely separated the events may be, not only in mathematical time but as measured by " the readings of the hands of a clock in the immediate neighbourhood of the events " are to be considered as

* Einstein, *Relativity* (Methuen & Co.), 7th Ed., p. 26.

" simultaneous " with each other, and with events situated at the points of reflection of the paths of rays of light sent out in all directions into space between any two of the events in such a way that the emission and return of any one light-ray shall coincide exactly with any two of the events, the rays being reflected back to the point of emission *midway in mathematical time* between the two events.

This, Einstein's third conception of simultaneity, is thus concretely stated by Bertrand Russell :*

' Suppose I could observe a person in Sirius, and he could observe me : anything which he does, and which I see before the event " E " occurs to me is definitely before " E ; " anything that he does after he has seen the event " E " has happened, is not definitely before or after " E." Since light takes many years (*i.e.*, nine) to travel from Sirius to the earth, this gives a period of twice as many years in Sirius (*i.e.*, eighteen) which may be called " contemporary " (or " simultaneous ") with " E " since these eighteen years are not definitely before or after " E "!! Regarding this definition it may be remarked that according to the theory of relativity an observer travelling with the speed of light from Sirius to " E " (at whatever distance from Sirius near or far " E " is situated) and back again to Sirius, will reckon by his clock as " simultaneous " the moment that he leaves Sirius, the moment that he arrives at " E," and the moment that he arrives back again at " Sirius," as well as all events which have occurred both *en route* and at Sirius between his departure from there and his return, since his clock has " stopped " and registers " no movement " between all events wherever and whenever they may be.'

We may therefore, if we choose, regard Einstein's third conception of simultaneity as a " restricted " instance of his fourth or " general " conception of simultaneity, *viz.*, that all events everywhere are " simultaneous " as reckoned by the clock of an observer travelling with the speed of light since owing to his velocity his clock has " stopped : " this " general " conception of simultaneity being derived as a corollary from Einstein's original definition of time as the movement of the hands of a clock !

* Bertrand Russell, " A.B.C. of Relativity."

From consideration of the foregoing one is driven to speculate how such an absurd and obviously erroneous definition of "time" (and "simultaneity") could ever have obtained any acceptance.

The reason for this, apart from the fact that no satisfactory or generally accepted definition of time existed, we conjecture to be, that with the formulation by mathematicians of the experimentally-deduced "law" of the constancy of the velocity of light for all observers in space whatever their velocities, a conception "contrary to reason" as based on all previous observation and experience, and with the further formulation by Einstein—based on the assumption of the accuracy of this law—of the new law of gravitation which is a fundamental property of what relativists call "space-time" and which has so triumphantly explained many hitherto inexplicable phenomena in nature, any definition of "time" (or "space") made by mathematicians, however repugnant to reason, was for some time accepted by non-mathematicians without challenge as having the same validity as the experimentally deduced (and apparently irrational) "law" of the constancy of the velocity of light, though Plato unkindly remarked that he had never met a mathematician who could reason correctly, and Bertrand Russell defines mathematics as a subject in which one never knows what one is talking about or whether what one is saying is true.* Eddington† also confesses that as a mathematician he does not want to know the significance of the variables "x," "y," "z," "t"‡ that he is discussing.

What is called by the relativists "space-time" may be defined as the hypothetical 4-dimensional-continuum of the mathematician used for calculating the paths of bodies in motion§ in space, in which the distance travelled by light in "unit" time appears as the fourth "dimension" or quantity. It is based on the experimentally-justified assumption that the velocity of light is constant for all observers in space whatever their velocities,

* Eddington, "Space, Time and Gravitation," p. 14.

† Eddington, *loc. cit.*

‡ The variables of the 4-dimensional continuum: "t" being the distance travelled by light in a given unit of time.

§ It should be clearly grasped that "space-time" has no application to bodies not in motion in space.

the square of the so-called "interval"* between two "events"† in "space-time" (in the restricted theory) being obtained by taking the square of the distance between the two events and the square of the distance travelled by light in the time between the two events and subtracting the lesser of these from the greater.

When therefore the relativists speak of subtracting the "space-interval" from the "time-interval" or "space" from "time" they mean subtracting the square of the distance between two "events" from the square of the distance travelled by light in the intervening time.

Of "space-time" Minkowski, the mathematician, writes :—

"Henceforth space in itself and time in itself sink to mere shadows and only a kind of union of the two present an independent existence!"

Eddington writes, "Physical space and time are found to be closely bound up with the motion of the observer and only an amorphous combination of the two is left inherent in the external world!"

Bertrand Russell‡ writes :—

"Between two events there is a measurable relation called the 'interval' which appears to be the *physical reality*§ of which lapse of time and distance in space¶ are two more or less confused representations."

"The old separation of space and time rested upon the belief that there was no ambiguity in saying that two events in distant places happened at the same time!"

* This combination of measurements is such that the result will be the same for all observers, whatever their velocities and units of measurement of space and time may be.

† Any body of reference at any given moment is an "event" in relativistic terminology; a body in motion in its orbit constituting a series of such "events."

‡ Bertrand Russell, "The A.B.C. of Relativity."

§ The word "space" in the theory of relativity really means the *unit of measurement* of space as the word "time" means the unit of measurement of (mathematical) time, though this is not the sense in which it is used by relativists.

¶ Thomson and Tait in their well known "Treatise on Natural Philosophy," p. viii, remark, "Nothing can be more fatal to progress than a too confident reliance on mathematical symbols, for the student is only too apt to consider the formula and not the fact as the physical reality."

“ Finally we come to geography in which is included history. The separation of history from geography rests upon the separation of *time* from space. When we amalgamate the two in “space-time” we need one word to describe the combination of geography and history!! ”

“ In the old view a piece of matter was something which survived all through time while never being at more than one place at a given time. This way of looking at things is obviously connected with the complete separation of space and time in which people formerly believed!! ”

“ It is not true that the past determines the future in some sense other than that in which the future determines the past, the apparent difference is only due to our ignorance because we know less about the future than about the past. This is a mere accident ; there might be beings who would remember the future and have to infer the past!!! ”

“ The collapse of the notion of one all-embracing time in which all events throughout the universe can be cited must in the long run affect our views as to cause and effect!!! ”

The above are striking examples of the dethronement of reason in relativistic philosophy.

The great importance of the theory of relativity lies in its recognition of the fixed ratio which all matter in motion in space bears to a limiting velocity which cannot at present be distinguished from that of the velocity of light and to the mathematical consequences which follow from this relationship.

This importance, which does not depend upon the erroneous definitions of “ time ” and “ space ” as given in the theory, will in no way be affected detrimentally by their enforced abandonment, and by the recognition that each particular body of reference cannot and does not possess its own “ time ” and “ space ” but does possess its own *units of measurement* of time and space which depend in turn upon its velocity in space ; “ space-time ” being clearly recognised as a mere mathematical term for the hypothetical 4-dimensional continuum, and not as it is at present asserted to be by relativists the *physical combination of space and mathematical time*.

When this has been done all philosophical difficulties in the theory of relativity will disappear, and the fantastic metaphysical system, built on the assumption that time is the rate of movement of the hands of a clock, will gradually recede into the crowded limbo of forgotten metaphysical absurdities.

FACT AND SUBSTANCE

BY

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Fact and substance are two distinct concepts in philosophy. A substance is that which exists and has relations and qualities. A fact is defined by Dr. McTaggart as "the possession by anything of a quality or the connection of anything with anything by a relation." (*Nature of Existence*, p. 10.) Taking this definition to be true, it is evident that a fact as such cannot be said to exist. A fact can only be said to exist when the thing about which it is a fact, exists. The idea of existence is, in the first instance, appropriate to substance only.

Another point to be noted is that a fact, by our very definition of it, cannot be simple. It involves a multiplicity of elements, and a certain relation between those elements. Something that simply *is*, is not a fact.

Is there however anything simple? And if what exists is in some sense a substance, is there a simple substance? Our definition of a substance, it is evident, precludes the possibility of a substance that is simple. A substance is not merely something that exists. A substance, we are told, must not only exist; it **must** have relations and qualities. What has mere being is indistinguishable from non-being. To say therefore that something merely exists is to say that nothing exists. A substance **must** exist, and have at the same time relations and qualities.

An interesting question arises here: If substance is **nothing** apart from its relations and qualities, is the idea of "existence" **at all** appropriate to it? Something can be said to exist, which *in the matter of its existence*, does not admit any relation to or dependence upon anything else. It exists merely and purely without any further implication. So far however as it is related, and is **significant only** as thus related, it forms an element in a *fact*; and a fact we have seen does not as such exist; it exists only **when**

the substance about which it is a fact exists. Putting the matter a little differently, we must either hold that a substance "exists and has relations and qualities," or that it "exists as something related to qualities, etc." In the former case the fact of its having relations and qualities is a mere addition and an accident so far as its existence is concerned. Existence is so to say intelligible by itself. In the latter case, existence is bound up with the fact as a whole, and to say that an element of this fact is what primarily exists is to make a statement which is patently erroneous. Substance then, defined as that which has relations and qualities, cannot be said truly to exist.

It was the genius of Kant to show that nothing that we knew came directly to us as a matter of pure intuition. We never, therefore, knew the thing or substance as such. All our intuitions had to be mediated. And this mediation consisted in the separation of elements and their subsequent synthesis in knowledge by the understanding. What we knew was never an unrelated and unmediated something; it was always a certain fact. The real thing cannot be said to be related or mediated. It cannot be defined as "that which has qualities and stands in relations." What does so, is only an element in a known fact; and for that reason, it has no self-existence; it has only phenomenal existence, which is existence as known by us.

What is intelligible to thought is factual existence only. But this is not true existence. If thought were withdrawn, there would be no sense in saying that anything of the sort existed. Reality therefore which has self-existence must be unrelated and unrelatable. It must be quite simple; and what is simple can have no filling, no inside, no structure; it cannot exist in space or in time or in any other dimension requiring thought or intelligent synthesis. The only question would be whether anything of the sort does actually exist.

It is evident now that so far as our knowledge is concerned, we can never find any evidence of a simple substance; and our definition of it as that which has qualities and stands in relations seems to be the only plausible one. But so far also we have no real substance at all. We are dealing merely with facts or knowledge; and a fact we have seen can never be simple.

The simplicity of a substance has however been denied on ontological grounds. Dr. McTaggart in his *Nature of Existence* holds this position. He does not simply argue that we cannot know a simple substance, but that there can be no simple substance. A substance is simple according to him when it is indivisible in every dimension. We have a dimension wherever a series is found, *e.g.*, space, time, intensive quality. Everything then which has extensity, intensity or protensity is divisible. The question whether there can be any substance which is indivisible in every dimension is easily answered. There can be no such substance. So far, however, as any proof is concerned, he is of opinion that it is impossible. The proposition that there can be no simple substance is both self-evident and ultimate. He only advances certain considerations, which according to him, make its truth acceptable, such as that every substance must have a filling or content, an inside, a certain internal structure, duration, etc. He has also analysed the substances which are empirically known or which are capable of being perceived, namely perception-data and the Self, and tried to show that there is no evidence of a simple substance anywhere.

That neither perception-data nor the Self is simple, does not surprise us. Nothing that we could ever know can exist simply. Differentiation is in the very nature of what is ever known. This differentiation may be due to the limitation of our knowledge. But it was Kant's point, and rightly, that this limitation of our knowledge communicated itself to the thing; and that what we knew was always differentiated. Divisibility in any particular dimension is only one case of this differentiation.

It might be argued here that the question is after all an empirical one. Unless we can show that something does actually exist which is not a perception-datum, and which is at the same time simple and undifferentiated in every sense of those terms, we cannot dispute the truth of the assertion that every substance is in fact divisible and has parts. The proposition however that we have to contend against is not merely that every substance is in fact divisible or has parts, but that every substance *must be* thus divisible. This latter contention is not based on purely empirical grounds, and there is therefore no obligation on us to restrict the

issue merely to a question of facts. Besides, it is evident, that any argument on purely empirical grounds can never lead to agreement. Unless the theoretical prejudice is first eliminated, evidence of the right type will not be accepted in simple faith; and not being thus accepted will prove nothing. The proposition then which we want to uphold is a general one, namely, that if any thing exists at all, it is that which is necessarily indivisible and simple.

We have already seen that every fact of which we can be aware, exists only relatively to an intelligent act. It cannot exist apart from the latter. We shall now go farther and affirm that if all that existed were of the nature of a perception-datum or an empirical fact, the latter itself would never be realised. Something must be self-realised. It must not be differentiated. What is differentiated necessarily implies a principle of synthesis transcending it. This principle itself can never be differentiated. Something therefore must be simple; and relatively to the empirical facts that are known, it must be transcendent. The only thing which answers to this description is the principle of intelligence or the self, without which no synthesis is possible, and no fact can be known to be what it is.

Dr. McTaggart speaks of every substance as being divisible in some dimension. But if by a dimension we understand what constitutes a "series," how is a "series" to be realised without a principle of unity in it which does not itself fall into any series? He is anxious to show that a substance must have an "inside." But a substance that is spread out, is external to itself, and is divisible in some one dimension or another will have no inside. In order that it should have an inside, it must not be external to itself in any respect,—it must be wholly self-contained and indivisible. The idea that a substance must have a filling or an internal structure can be significant if we can distinguish in thought the filling and that which has the filling. But if the filling for us is the substance and the structure is the thing, we are not advancing a further consideration for the non-simplicity of a substance, but simply so defining substance that any argument to the contrary should become impossible. The plain question to be answered is, what is substance apart from the filling? If it is nothing, why

use different names and delude ourselves into thinking that we have found the solution of a problem?

Our conclusion is that there can be no evidence of a simple substance so long as we seek to find it among facts that are experienced. But this evidence is unmistakably indicated in that there is experience at all. The unity of experience is primarily, and essentially not structural or objective; it is subjective,—it is the unity of the subject or the self. This unity can never be shown to be differentiated or otherwise than as wholly simple. If anybody however doubts whether this unity can be said really to *exist*, it would be interesting to have pointed out to us something that does deserve that august qualification.

SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

BY

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By self-consciousness we ordinarily understand a consciousness in which the subject and the object of consciousness are one ; it is a knowledge in which the knower knows himself. But how is this possible? It has been said that " To identify I and Me is logically impossible, for, *ex vi termini*, it is to identify subject and object " (Ward, *Psychological Principles*, p. 379). But if it is impossible to identify I with Me, it means that I cannot be known. The answer that " The I is known reflectively in the Me, because the Me has been synthetically constructed by it (much as an artist paints his own portrait by means of a mirror) " (*ibid*, 381) does not very much alter the situation. It is not at all clear why what is synthetically constructed should be a reflection of the constructing subject. Again if the self (I) is not directly known, the reflection cannot be known as the reflection of the self. The fact that we believe in the existence of the self does not by itself prove that a reflection can be known as the reflection of the self when we have no direct acquaintance with the self. Moreover the reflection of a thing is not the thing itself. We do not therefore get a genuine case of self-consciousness when we are conscious of a reflection of the self and not of the self itself. The very same self which is conscious must itself be given in an act of awareness in order to constitute a case of self-consciousness. We do not get a case of self-consciousness, therefore, even when one part of the self is supposed to know another part of it. For the knowing part being different from the part that is known, we find that, in this case the knower (knowing part) is conscious of an other (known part), and not of itself.

But is not the subject in being conscious of itself required to turn itself into an object and thus cease to be a subject? Is not the

subject, therefore, never to be known in its true character? Is not, again, the distinction between subject and object absolute? It seems to be our experience always that that which is known is distinct from that which knows it. If in one and the same act of knowledge the subject could indifferently become either subject or object, and if the same were true also of the object, then when we say 'I know the book,' we might as well say 'The book knows me,' and both the statements should be equally good readings of one and the same fact. This however is never the case. So if self-consciousness is to be regarded as a fact we must be able to show either that what is known in knowledge is not always an object or that there is no absolute opposition between subject and object.

McTaggart seems to think that there is no absolute opposition between subject and object, and holds that the self can become its own object. (Cf. his article on Personality in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.) His argument is that if it were not true that the self can become its own object, no self would know its own existence, since no self can know its existence without being an object of knowledge to itself. And since we know that we exist, it should follow, he thinks, that we can become objects to ourselves. It cannot be denied, he further argues, that there are certain relations in which a substance can stand to itself and there is nothing in the relation of knowledge to justify our supposition that it is not one of such relations. But is it a fact that there is no absolute opposition between subject and object? To be a knower does never appear to be the very same thing as to be known. We have already seen that the subject and the object, in any particular act of knowledge, can never interchange their positions without altering the significance of the situation. The place and the function of the object in any knowledge are never those of the subject. And if the situation is to retain the same significance the subject must remain subject and the object, object. If this must be so then we cannot say that on any account the subject itself can be its own object.

Whenever we assert any relation we do so on the supposition of some difference between the terms which are related. Without such a supposition even the relation of identity does not become

significant. But even if we admit that the relation of identity does not presuppose any such difference and that it is a relation in which a term stands to itself, we cannot persuade ourselves to believe that the relation of knowledge is a relation of this sort. When I say "I know this" I can never mean that I am identical with "this."

How is it then that the self is aware of its own existence or knows itself? It seems even here we are bound to make a distinction between the self which knows and the self which is known. For epistemology the self as knower cannot be identical with the self as known. But metaphysically, we may suppose, the self is so constituted that it is able to perform the double function of knower and known, in one and the same act of knowledge. If we accept this solution we are not required to do away with the distinction between subject and object which, for epistemology at least, seems to be absolute. When the distinction between subject and object is so clear in every admitted instance of knowledge, we cannot, on the strength of a disputed case, *viz.*, that of self-knowledge, assert that the subject can become its own object. So the majority of those, who believe in self-knowledge, appear to have followed the course we have just indicated.

But if the whole self is the knower, and if again the whole self is to be known, how can we think of the same self as knower and known and also keep the distinction between knower and known intact? We have already seen that in self-knowledge that which is known must exactly be the same as that which knows. We require identity as well as difference. Because self-knowledge is a case of *knowledge*, it is required that knower and known should be different, and because it is *self-knowledge* it is again necessary that they should be identical. How is this possible?

It is no explanation of the difficulty to suppose that there is metaphysical identity in spite of epistemological difference. When we are moving on the level of knowledge, we do not get at a metaphysical substance which is neither subject nor object. The difficulties of self-knowledge are difficulties of knowledge and should be, and can be solved, if at all, only within their proper sphere. If by self we mean the subject, and if it is intelligible only as subject, then in order to vindicate self-knowledge, we must be able to show

that the subject itself becomes the object. If this is impossible and if self-knowledge is also a fact, then we must believe that what is given in knowledge need not always be an object.

The point that clearly emerges from our discussion so far is that the subject as subject is never an object. To be a subject is to be a knower and we submit that the knower as knower is never reached as an object. When I know you, I may believe that you have the capacity of knowing, but I can never find you, as an objective content of my knowledge, actually performing the function of knowing. The conscious subject is never got at in the form of an object. When I take you to be a conscious subject, I understand you after the analogy of my own self. But you as a subject—actually being conscious of something—do not directly enter the field of my consciousness. When you are my object you are simply a factor in my knowledge, and being such a factor, you are never directly seen to initiate or actually perform any function of knowledge. If by object we understand some definite content, held up before our mind, in any concrete act of knowledge, it is easy to see that neither the subject nor knowledge itself is ever an object to us. The pure subject never presents itself before us, far less as a definite content.

If the subject and knowledge are never our objects, how do we know, it may be asked, that there are subjects and knowledge? If I am to know that there is the subject and there is knowledge, is it not necessary that the subject and knowledge should be my objects?

Now if by object we mean anything of which there is any consciousness (not necessarily by an external subject), then, of course, we have to say that all things in the world, including subject and knowledge are objects. But when its meaning is so widened, will objectivity retain any distinctive character? In any concrete case of knowledge, we have a subject as well as an object, together with the fact of knowing. We know what a subject, and what knowledge, are only in the act of knowing. When we know anything we are conscious of the subject and knowledge as well as of the object. So in a sense all these may be said to be objects. But it is a sense which will render objectivity almost meaningless. Even when we say that all these are objects, they cannot be objects

in the same sense. The subject is subject-object, knowledge is knowledge-object whereas the object is object-object or mere object. But when we have made a distinction between subject and object and knowledge, we cannot then speak of subject-object and knowledge-object with significance or consistency. If our analysis of knowledge into subject, object and knowing is valid then the term object should have a meaning which cannot be shared also by subject and knowing. If all of them could be objects, objectivity would be the only form of knowledge and existence. But this would make objectivity devoid of all real significance. The object is only a factor in knowledge; it cannot absorb in itself the whole being of knowledge, together with that of the subject. Knowledge is not exhausted in the being of the object. When we know, our knowledge is not exclusively confined to the object only. It relates itself to the subject as well as to the object. In any knowledge, besides the object, there is the fact of knowing as well as the subject. All these three factors must be there. The subject is given as subject, knowledge is given as knowledge and all of them need not be given as objects. In knowing anything we are conscious of knowing as knowing as well as of ourselves as conscious subjects. In one and the same act of knowledge, in which something is given to us as the object, our selves as conscious subjects together with the fact of knowledge are revealed in their proper character. We do not need to direct a further act of knowing upon the subject and knowing, in order to know what they are. But they are not given as objects. If they were to be given as objects in order to be known, their true character would never be known.

When I know, I am conscious of the fact of knowing as well as of myself as the conscious subject. But I am conscious of myself as the knowing subject and not as an object. The object of my knowledge in this case is X and not myself. Self-consciousness is not a new species of knowledge in which the subject needs to become the object, but it is an invariable aspect of all knowledge in which the subject remains subject and the object, object.

Is it not possible, it may be objected, for a being to be conscious without being self-conscious? It is conceded, as e.g. by McTaggart, that "the only conscious being of whom I am ever

aware is necessarily self-conscious, since it is myself." "But," it is argued, "I am not always self-conscious when I am conscious. Memory gives me positive reason to believe in states when I am not aware of myself at all.....in which I am conscious of other objects and am not conscious of myself, because my attention does not happen to be turned that way" (McTaggart, *ibid*). It is believed that a self could always be self-conscious if circumstances turned its attention to itself. "But this does not," it is maintained, "alter the fact that at those times we are just as really not self-conscious as at other times we are really self-conscious." (*Ibid.*)

We are however inclined to believe that self-consciousness is inseparably bound up with all consciousness. We cannot say anything about a consciousness with which we are not acquainted; but the consciousness which we find in ourselves seems always to carry self-consciousness with it as an inseparable aspect. We do not propose to deny that we are not always explicitly self-conscious. But it is only a question of emphasis and clearness. To be conscious may not literally mean to be self-conscious. But in fact self-consciousness cannot be divorced from consciousness. It is an aspect of consciousness to which at times pointed attention may not be drawn, but which, all the same, can always be discovered by careful analysis.

If we try to see now whether we can be conscious without being self-conscious, our experiments are bound to end in failure. Actually by observation I cannot find myself to be simply conscious without being self-conscious. The very attempt to see whether I am self-conscious at once makes me self-conscious. So we must go to past experience in order to prove that we can be only conscious without being self-conscious. Suppose I remember a state when I was conscious of X and was not conscious of myself. If any one now asks me whether I was conscious of X, I must be able to say that I was. Now, that I was conscious of X is not a case of direct present knowledge but is a case of memory. And what I remember is not simply X or the consciousness of X but the whole fact of myself being conscious of X. But I can remember only that which I knew. So if I am able to remember that I was conscious of X, it is certain that I knew then that I was conscious

of X. This shows that I was not merely conscious of X but was conscious also of myself (being conscious of X), *i.e.*, was self-conscious.

Let us even suppose that I positively remember that I was not conscious of myself and that it is a case of true memory. Here on the strength of memory, I am asserting something about myself, not about myself as I am now but about myself as I was at some point of time in the past. But if I had absolutely no experience of myself at that point of time, how can I rationally assert anything about how or what I was at that point of time? If my mind were a perfect blank about myself I should not be able to remember anything about myself. When I remember that I was not conscious of myself, I do not try to hold a blank picture of mere unconsciousness before my mind. But I remember myself as being unconscious of itself. But how can I remember myself being in a particular state, unless myself in that state were originally known to me? By memory we cannot be led back to a conscious state in which we were not conscious of ourselves. It appears impossible therefore that we should be able to establish the separation of consciousness from self-consciousness, either by direct observation or by memory. The fact that we think we are at times not conscious of ourselves, only shows that at those moments our minds are much too occupied with the objects of our knowledge and not that self-consciousness is altogether absent. To be able to say that I am conscious and not to *know* that I am there or *that I am conscious* seems an impossibility.

It may be objected that our whole discussion tends to do away with the obvious distinction between the judgments "I know" and "I know that I know." If the distinction between these two judgments is a valid distinction, then to be conscious cannot mean to be self-conscious. This would also show that there can be knowledge of knowledge.

The judgments 'I know' and 'I know that I know' may appear to be different, but in fact the latter judgment is only an explicit statement of the former. When we say 'I know that I know,' we do not really make an advance in our knowledge from when we simply said 'I know.' It is the same knowledge made more explicit or self-conscious. To say that I know that I know

is to use the language of report or external communication. The fact reported is the same fact that is given in the statement 'I know.'

When I say 'I know that I know,' by the second 'know' I cannot mean anything different from what is meant by the first 'know.' 'That I know' is only a repetition of 'I know.' For it is impossible that within knowledge, as expressed by the first 'know,' another actual process of knowledge (as required by the second 'know') should take place. When I say 'I know' I understand something and when I add further 'that I know,' I do not get within the first knowledge and discover another real and new knowledge, but I only repeat myself. It is possible to get the same knowledge twice over, but it is not possible to get knowledge of knowledge or knowledge within knowledge, understanding knowledge in the two places in the same sense.

When I know anything, I know that I know it. The fact that *I know that I know*, is revealed and involved in the primary fact that *I know*. Self-knowledge is necessary to constitute a complete case of knowledge, but it is not by itself a new case. It is an aspect of knowledge which we may overlook at times but which we can never rationally deny.

We conclude therefore that self-consciousness is a fact but it is a fact which does not involve the necessity of turning the subject into an object. It is an aspect of all human knowledge in which the subject reveals itself as subject.

PROBLEM OF THE UNIVERSAL

BY

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The problem of the universal is as old as Socrates in the west and perhaps older still in Indian thought. The universal was the object of determination in the well-known Socratic dialectic. It was so valued for knowledge of the true nature of anything, that the particular as such dwindled into insignificance for the purpose. The universal thus came to be regarded as the true reality underlying the particulars. The same thought found an emphatic recognition in Plato and formed the basis of his philosophy. The universals were regarded by him not merely as the true essence of the changing particulars, they were given also a transcendental place in his Idealism. Aristotle, though not so poetic in his flight of thought, continued still the same position. The universals were with him, as with his master, the real essences of particular things, though deprived of a supersensuous existence. In the mediaeval thought, influenced in this as in other respects by Plato and Aristotle, the problem of the universal formed one of the central topics round about which the Scholastic speculations revolved in its development. The attitude towards the problem was in the beginning an epistemological one. It was given a distinctive logical turn in later Scholasticism. In three different ways was a solution of the problem attempted in the period, and we find in them representatives of Realism, Nominalism and Conceptualism. Coming down to the modern period, we do not observe for some time any distinct trace of the older form of Realism. But the other two attitudes towards the problem are found to reappear more or less. The English philosopher—John Locke—brings the problem to the forefront in his system of thought, advocating what may be called a revival of the older conceptualistic

solution. Bishop Berkeley—his successor—turns the table against him, however improperly it may be, and offers a solution which is of standing merit. David Hume openly recognises this merit and sounds what may be considered to be a true note on the subject. The problem henceforth assumes a definite form, and the solution in subsequent thought appears to waver between conceptualism and nominalism of the psychological kind. Coming down to the present day we observe, however, the problem taking up again an epistemological turn which, in a sense, may be regarded as a revival of the old Realism of Plato and Aristotle. The School of Bradley would find in the particular nothing but universal elements, a definite group of which, however brought about, is supposed to make the individuality of the particular. The universal under this view must have real existence, though not in the Platonic sense. They make up the contents of the particulars and their relations; rather the particulars are the relations which constitute them. In the Realism of the Russell's type we find a half-way admission of the Bradleian position here. The particulars as such are not denied their reality, but the relations obtaining in them are regarded as universals to which they would give a 'subsistence,' why not existence they know themselves better. There is, of course, nothing in the name. Yet it is the name which appears to have influenced their thought. The particular can be analysed out, it is thought, into elements that can be named by general terms alone; and so the Bradleian would run to the conclusion that there must be universals, corresponding to the names, which make up the particular. The same glamour of the name appears also to have influenced the thought of the Russellians, so far as their half-way solution is concerned. But if the name, as general, be what determines their position, why should they stand half-way and not go up further in the thought they thus partially adopt? If the universals are reals in existence, they might as well make up the particulars themselves. No, they could not possibly do so form the standpoint of their favourite pluralism which would be jeopardised by the admission.

It is not my purpose here to give a history of the development of thought on the problem in our countries. Still it would not be quite out of place, I think, to make a bare reference here

to the attitudes adopted in Indian thought on the problem. The source of the problem may in a way be traced to the Upanisadic thought which forms the background of Indian speculations. But it is found there only in its germinal form from which it is not possible to determine exactly what definite positions were adopted towards the problem. The problem is given a prominent place in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought on the one hand and in the Jaina-Buddha systems on the other, and between them we find that all the three different positions of the Scholastic period are represented more or less. It is difficult no doubt to determine what, exactly the position of Kanada was from his *sūtras*, whether it was realism or conceptualism. But later Vaiśeṣika, with which is incorporated the Naiyāyika position, is distinctly realistic, even of the Platonic type. True conceptualism may be said to be represented by Jainism, and the Buddhistic position on the subject, as presented by later writers, is distinctly nominalistic. In Sankhya-yoga and Vedānta the problem does not appear to be handled as a special subject of their speculations, except in a by-way, from which it becomes difficult to make out what their real position was. Śankara no doubt touches at places on the subject, but more negatively than positively to criticise the Naiyāyika position, from which what his real attitude was cannot be definitely ascertained. The Mimāṃsakas appear to adopt uncritically the Naiyāyika position in this as in other respects. They do not appear to have any special solution to offer on the subject.

Now in view of the present-day controversies on the subject in the West, a fresh approach to the problem is felt to be necessary. This approach must, again, be from the psychological side, as it was in the beginning of modern empiricism. The question now is what is the nature of the universal *as a mental fact*. From an examination of its nature, as apprehended by the mind, it may be easier to determine also what must be the source of its knowledge. When we use a general name with some significance, there hangs round the name something in the mind, which the psychologist of the day would call its *sense of meaning*. Now this sense of meaning appears, on closer inspection, to be something *sensuous* in character. But it is so vague and varying in its nature that it often becomes difficult to apprehend definitely this *sensuous*

character. It is so in cases where the universal is of the most abstract kind. But there are different degrees of fineness in the sense corresponding to different levels of abstraction. It is for this reason perhaps that many psychologists make a distinction between imagination and conception. I do not say that the universal as an object of knowledge is what is called a *generic* image. For even when there is in our mind a generic image of an individual sensible object or of a class of such objects, there is still hanging round the image a shadowy something, a 'halo' in the language of William James, which makes the meaning of the image. Call this by the term conception, but it does not appear to be purely of the nature of an intellectual notion. The sensuous character of the meaning remains there, however shadowy it may be. Rightly have the psychologists, therefore, called this mental fact a *sense*. Now if it really be sensuous in its nature, as it appears to be, the source of the knowledge must be supposed to be the usual gateways of sense. Is it so? It would be difficult no doubt to refer to any particular sense for its origin, except in special cases where its definite sensuous nature is apparent. But the fact is that it does not owe its origin to any particular sense. It is often the combined result of the influences of different senses. It may be supposed to be a special and unique product of them. In this sense, the conception of a universal may be said to be rather formed for the mind than by the mind.

But if the sense, whether one or many it does not matter, be its real source, then the universal as a mental product must be of the nature of the particular. For our senses give us the particulars alone. Even Mr. Bradley would admit this. Here is an anomaly to be solved. It was for this anomaly perhaps that the advocates of the true universal as an object of knowledge were led to suppose the existence of a supersensuous faculty for its apprehension or origin and called it by a different name—*nous* or reason. But this admission would hardly solve the difficulty. In the first place, the existence of such a special organ for the knowledge may be doubted, as it has been actually doubted by many thinkers. The Realists, for instance, who would admit the universal as a relation 'subsisting' between particulars, do not appear to have felt the necessity of this admission. The sense which gives the

particular is credited with the higher power for the universal as well. Besides the admission of a special intellectual faculty for the purpose would hardly do justice to the sensuous character of the object. The Realists are rather nearer the truth in their view of the source of the knowledge. This view would at least allow the sensuous character of the universal to stand unaffected. But the difficulty with them, as with the Idealists lies in giving the universal a real existence, or subsistence as the case may be, in the realm of sense. Is there really any universal outside the mind existing among the concrete objects of experience? It would be very hard to say so. For the objects, as we apprehend them, are really particular in their nature. Let us take an example of white things. It would be contended by a Bradleian that to call them all white means that the universal *white* is a constituent of each of them. But where is this universal white except in the name? For the whiteness of each of the white things is unique and different. There may be different shades of whiteness and not one definite whiteness present in them all. In this sense then the whiteness of an individual piece of white paper is not only different from the whiteness of a white wall but also different in different pieces of the same sheet of paper. No one would dispute that, when we know that an artist would be using different shades of the white paint to present in his picture different white objects all regarded as of the same colour. The differences may be so fine that we fail to apprehend them. But none the less the differences are there. This much even Mr. Bradley himself has admitted. It would be said perhaps that they are still the different shades of white underlying which there is something--the *universal* white. But where is that universal white? Have I experienced it as a special object of knowledge anywhere? Humorously but rightly has the Buddhist logician Pandit Asoka says on the subject: "There are five fingers on the palm of a hand that are distinctly perceived. The sixth the universal finger is never perceived among them. He who sees the sixth there, sees certainly a horn on his head." There is no such thing as the universal as such existing anywhere, the general names but stand for a series of similar particulars which alone are signified in a shadowy manner by the general name applied to them, as Mr. Sigwart has well

put it in his Logic. It may be argued perhaps that I am assuming here the very thing whose existence I am denying as similarity implies possession of identical elements by objects similar. In reply I can only say that they do not. There can be similarity as felt by us without any identity. The universal has thus no place in the world of existence. If it exists anywhere it must be in the mind. This is also virtually admitted by Mr. Bradley.

John Locke emphatically stands for the view that the universal is a mental product. But at the same time his position was not free from error of another kind. In the account he gives of the formation of a general concept by comparison of particulars, he tacitly assumes the existence of identical qualities in the particulars under a class, the concept being regarded as a creation of the mind out of the ideas of their common qualities. This account is psychologically a fanciful one, though it is found to be still uncritically adopted by some psychologists of the day. Berkeley attacked the whole procedure of his predecessor, and his own account of the nature and use of the universal comes nearer the truth. The universal is, according to him, but a sense of meaning, particular in character as an idea, but having a general signification and application. The representative character of the idea is thus clearly indicated by him. But he too was not quite consistent by admitting, in his subsequent writings specially a distinction between an idea and a notion, meaning by the latter something purely of an intellectual character. The true and consistent position on the matter appears in his worthy successor David Hume. The sense of meaning which goes with a general name is shewn by him to be a peculiar mental product due to the mingling of various impressions and ideas, all particular in themselves. It is an impression still, but of a unique nature, generating a propensity in the mind. As for its real existence in things, that is a fiction.

May be Hume is right here. But then how does this mental product arise? It is difficult to explain the whole process of its production adequately. For it is not always a conscious process, so that we might analyse it. It has been stated above that the universal is more often made for us than by us. The experience of particular objects similar in nature generates somehow a sense

of meaning corresponding to the general name covering the particulars. It is a shadowy product, but still representative of the particulars regarded as a class. It is an *abstract* in this sense. And the abstract grows finer and finer as the sphere of the particulars represented becomes larger and larger. The abstract as thus representative becomes applicable to them. It is through such abstract, again, that intellectual operations of a higher kind are carried on. The results of such operations become applicable to the particulars because they are representative in character. Here we find some explanation of the bearing our abstract thought has on practice. It is through this representative touch with the particulars that there arises the possibility of a theory being verified in the world of experience.

The question may arise now that, if the particulars alone are the real and the only real, why should there be any need of the universal at all? This question has in a sense no reason to arise. Because this is the human way of gaining, utilising and enlarging knowledge. There can possibly be beings different in their mental constitution from ours who would perhaps have no need of the universal. The omniscience we ascribe to God needs no mediation of the universal for his knowledge. His knowledge is regarded as immediate, extending to all the particulars of the universe. Our lot is different, for we know only a few things immediately; the larger part of our knowledge is necessarily mediate. This is an unavoidable imperfection in us, perhaps a sign of our finitude. But still why should our mind need the universal at all, so abstract in its nature. The only reply would be that this *is* a necessity, with us. Abstraction and its result the universal are the instruments which we in our imperfect condition have to use. It may be this imperfection has its root in the bodily self—whose preservation and maintenance in the midst of the complex surroundings needs the adoption of some simple means. In the selection of means again we naturally economise our labour as much as is consistent with our safety. Our intellectual instruments of abstraction and generalisation secure this economy. They are needed for vital purposes of life. The universals, as explained above, have thus a biological basis, and as such they are the *first* by way of knowledge both individually and racially. The children

and the primitive men, as is well-known, work with such abstracts—the universals. The older view stood for the universal as the ideal, the newer should stand for the particular in its place. The one is a *sign of our imperfection*, the other of perfection.

SECTION OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

Before we proceed to the main item of to-day's business, the reading of papers and their discussion, may I with your permission make a few preliminary observations of a general character on the latest work done in the field of Indian thought and on the criticisms made thereon. Excellent histories of philosophy have been written, to which such highly appreciative references were made yesterday, and critical studies of individual systems, topics, or authors have also been published. The most notable event, however, is the venture to bring out an encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy, some of the splendid volumes of which have already appeared. But this is neither the place nor the occasion for reviewing them. Suffice it to say that the work done so far has yielded results of immense value. There is, however, a point in respect of the criticisms on them, which I think deserves our consideration. The greater emphasis that has been laid on language, the dress that thought wears, than on thought itself has, to some extent, as it appears to me also, diverted the course of enquiry from the main objective of philosophic studies, namely, the rational pursuit of Ultimate Truth. Though the work turned out is of very great interest to the historian, to the theologian and to the man of pure letters, yet the student of philosophy feels somewhat disappointed. Competent critics have held in respect of these labours that we in India still find delight in turning out the kind of work that our ancestors turned out during what may be characterised as the most stagnant period of the history of our speculative thought. For the past at least seven hundred years after the six Darśanas or systems were formulated, we have

been employing our best talents not in giving to the world a seventh or an eighth Darśana but in interpreting and re-interpreting the ' words ' of our forefathers, including the ' words ' of the ancient Śrutis and building up a Vedantic or a logical technique chiefly suited for purposes of discussion appropriate to each school of *word-interpretation*, which generally goes by the name of Indian philosophy at present. We have been lost, they say, in admiration for the skill that we have developed in squeezing the texts of antiquity and in pursuing a kind of argumentation which is held in perpetual bondage to scriptures and which is becoming the despair of impartial thinkers outside the Vedantic world. This continuance of the enslavement of our mind to ' words ' and the charms of their authority has, as the critics say, made it well-nigh impossible for us to realise what is meant by freedom of thought, the very soul of philosophy. As interpreters of scriptures we have elaborated distinguished schools of theology or mystic religion, which has no doubt roused the curiosity of many a western theologian or mystic. But turning to philosophy proper, some of our most recent critics ask : What are the special additions or the distinctive contributions of value which India alone has made to the world's rational pursuit of Truth? Our activities till now have been only such as to show that we also have achieved what thinkers in other parts of the world have. But the question is : What have we attained to which others have not, in the world of pure philosophy? There is much to admire in India as in many other countries. But what is there to learn from her which we cannot get elsewhere?

It will perhaps be said that in the light of the work done by well-known western oriental scholars, more examinations and estimates are being made now than were possible at any time in the past. But here we must distinguish between the western *scholar* and the western *philosopher*, though the two may be occasionally combined in one. To the scholar the study of words is certainly of greater consequence. And he naturally studies words in all their bearings. And his love of originality sometimes sets him in opposition to what we call the traditional interpretation. In following such a scholar we sometimes lose ourselves in the maze of ' words,' the cue, namely, the importance which the

philosopher attaches to thought, whichever the language used, being often missed.

Let me refer to three or four instances to illustrate what I say. I shall confine myself to such cases as have received the imprimatur of some of the best authorities in the field.

It has been declared (1) that Gaudapāda was a Buddhist or that he was more Buddhist than Vedantic in his outlook, or that he at least drew his inspiration from the teachings of Buddhists; (2) that Śaṅkara, though he appeared to denounce Buddhism, was himself a Buddhist in his convictions; (3) that Śaṅkara, the author of the commentary on Gaudapāda, is different from Śaṅkara, the commentator on Bādarāyaṇa; (4) that Śaṅkara believed in the reality, though of a lower degree or kind, of the external world and (5) that some of the Buddhists believed in an Ultimate Existent Entity which they called Śūnya. Arguments drawn from the study of 'words' do, no doubt, lend support to the above inferences, though others draw inferences of a different kind based on literary, historical or linguistic grounds. But, all that concerns primarily the Oriental Congress; our business here is with philosophic evaluation of the data that the scholars give us. Now Gaudapāda's thought, as a system, as a consistent whole, is altogether inexplicable on any Buddhist basis, whereas it is possible to see soundness in it, only in the light of the Vedantic Advaita. Neither does mere agreement in some common ideas prove that one has borrowed from another. Nor does it follow that because men in the same philosophic atmosphere agree up to a certain stage that their goals are not different. These points have been discussed by Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara themselves. The former most clearly indicates in the last chapter of the Kārikā what his position is as distinguished from that of the Buddhist. Again, the Nirguṇa Brahman of Śaṅkara in which there is no Māyā, or which has no relation to Māyā, cannot be rationally or philosophically derived from Śaṅkara's Sūtra Bhāṣya alone. To do so, the Sūtra Bhāṣya has to fall back upon Śruti or Yoga Samādhi, i.e., mystic trance, which, though of very great spiritual value, is not of much consequence in the world of rational enquiry. For, how do we know that what the Śrutis say, or what the Yogī or the Mystic experiences is truth and the highest

truth? As Śankara himself points out and Ānandagiri explains, the Sūtra Bhāṣya takes the student of *philosophy* only up to a certain stage after which it is Śankara's commentary on Gauḍapāda's Kārikā that is the Advaitin's guide to Ultimate Truth. In other words, Sūtra Bhāṣya and Kārikā Bhāṣya form an indivisible whole or unity. And though enquiry based on 'words' may lead one to the inference that Śankara, the commentator on Bādarāyaṇa's Sūtras is different from Śankara, the commentator on Gauḍapāda's Kārikā, making the former Śankara a kind of idealist and the latter a type of realist, yet a study of Śankara's thought, as a systematic whole, points to the utter futility of the attempts made to prove that the two commentators are different persons.

Similarly, if the word 'Reality' is understood in Śankara's sense, the least trace of reality, of whatever degree or kind, found in the objective world or in anything created by Brahman makes it impossible to establish, as a philosophical truth Śankara's *eternal* and *absolute* non-duality of Brahman, that is, that nothing but pure Brahman exists *at all times*. Our modern authors, relying upon the strength of their knowledge of words or language, sometimes see that they have to face an irreconcilable situation in having to explain the existence of Māyā and of a Mithyā Prapañcha (illusory world) to tide over which they clutch at Mysticism or Yoga and seek to justify Śankara's position. This feat only proclaims the more loudly to the world that such Vedānta, whatever be its merits in the mystic world, leads but to a blind alley in philosophy. That it has little value as a path leading to Ultimate Reality on rational grounds is most trenchantly put by Lord Ronaldshay and others of his school.

Turning to the Buddhist, let alone his mystic experiences for a while. How has he proved, as a *philosophic* enquirer, the existence of any Ultimate Reality? That question does not appear to have been answered by the Oriental scholar.

The excess to which this infatuation for 'words,' which relegates substance or content to the back-ground, is carried, is best illustrated by translations like 'The Touch of Untouch' used in some interpretations, the attempt to understand which expres-

sion has baffled some of the best students of philosophy in my part of India.

I shall not waste your precious time by references to any of the many articles which are based upon sentimental or poetic fantasies which have a most powerful fascination for mystics, but which do not conform to the requirements of rational truth, though they wear the mask of philosophy.

Let it not be understood that I deprecate the study of ' words ' or that I under-estimate the importance of ' Language ' as a vehicle of thought. And no scholar studies words apart from their meaning. But here I only appeal to those whose aim is *philosophic* truth, to shift the emphasis from language to thought—not thought in sections isolated from each other, which every scholar, nay everyone, does and which may really suffice for other than philosophic purposes—but thought as a consistent *whole* and in its bearings upon *truth*. Gaudapāda and Śāṅkara state their view in regard to philosophic interpretation in Kārikā II—30. First, truth indicating the underlying unity of thought must be got at and then should the attempt be made to interpret so as to be in harmony with such truth.

So far as my limited knowledge goes, Gaudapāda appears to have been the first Vedāntin of historical times to have seriously considered the most significant fact that every school of philosophy, nay everyone, who has a philosophy of any kind, holds that his own view is ultimately true or nearest to the Ultimate Truth, though he sees that others are equally strong in their conviction that theirs is the highest truth. For centuries have the *theological* Vedāntins fought, each claiming to possess the key to truth. So have theologians done all the world over. But it is not clear whether it has occurred to them to ask first what truth is so that they may afterwards test the truth of their own beliefs and of their own interpretations of the scriptures.

It is being recognised more and more in modern philosophy that the first question of importance that one has to find an answer for is, " what is the meaning and nature of Truth and of Ultimate Truth " so that we could explain the whole of life. As the ancient Indian thinkers hold, Ultimate Truth is that which explains all that exists; it is that which gives us a point of

view from which not only religious life but also scientific pursuits or rather all phenomena, social, moral, mental, physical and others, get a *consistent* explanation. How to get at an Ultimate Truth of this kind was the problem that Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara over a thousand years ago set before themselves, so that such truth may be a guidance to men in this world. In fact this part of their thought appears to me to be their greatest contribution to philosophy and to philosophical interpretation.

Now, have our modern investigators applied such a truth-test to the systems interpreted or examined by them, or have they merely taken words or passages here and there and interpreted them independently of it? As you all know the main thread that appears to run in all devious ways through the entire history of Indian thought, including the atheistic, the agnostic and the nihilistic schools, is the thread of the evolution of the concept of Truth. And yet have we not remained far too long in the leading strings of 'word-interpreters,' unable to assert our right to pursue Truth independently, in spite of the philosophic searchlight that thinkers like Gaudapāda and others before them placed in our hands centuries ago? It is not meant to argue here that the authority of the Śruti or the importance of interpreting its words is of no value. They serve a purpose of their own and that a no mean purpose. But they can have no place in philosophy, though such interpreters may be ranked among the foremost in the world of scholars, in the absence of independent and previous rational enquiry into the meaning of Truth. And to what extent our modern interpretations have failed in this respect, to that extent, I believe our critics to be in the right.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am aware that we may not all be able to see eye to eye with one another in respect of what I have said. Yet I presume that we are all agreed on the one point that our aim must be such that the net result of our activities should show, by drawing a clear line between the work of the scholar and that of the philosopher, whether India, past and present, could make any addition of value to the world's stock of philosophical knowledge, *i.e.*, knowledge based up on a *rational* study of Truth and Ultimate Truth.

ŚANKARA'S DOCTRINE OF MĀYĀ*

BY

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The doctrine of *māyā*, the central and the most important theme of the Advaita philosophy of Śankara, has been misunderstood and misinterpreted in the West and very often been unjustly criticised by western thinkers. The *māyā-vāda*, it is true, is really a difficult theory to understand, and it is no wonder that it should present difficulties to all serious students of philosophy. In this country also the *adhyāsa-bhāṣya* of Śankara and the *māyā-vāda* expounded in it, are regarded as the most difficult of all philosophical treatises. But that even eminent western thinkers should, without giving such an important philosophical doctrine serious reflection which it undoubtedly deserves, dispense with it as a philosophical trifle, is really regrettable.

The doctrine of *māyā*, as expounded by Śankara, can hardly be traced to the Upaniṣads, and all such attempts are bound to be more or less futile. The occasional references to such passages as *मायान्तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् सवितरं तदेवम्*, etc. (*Svetāsvatara*), fail to give any idea of the doctrine of *māyā* as explained by Śankara. The *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda, the gift of Śankara's Paramaguru to Śankara, contains the germs of almost all the aspects of Śankara's philosophy, and the doctrine of *māyā* also can undeniably, I believe, be traced to this invaluable work. Śankara's indebtedness to the *Kārikā* of Gauḍapāda can hardly be exaggerated. Even the highest aspect of the doctrine of *māyā*, the *ajāta-vāda* which denies the aspect of creation altogether, is explained in the *Kārikā*.

The doctrine of *māyā* is understood very often by western thinkers to be a mere device to deny the reality of the universe and to explain the same as merely an illusion. But this is not the truth.

* I have read Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya's paper bearing the same title as this, in the Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress, after this paper was sent to the Secretary of the Indian Philosophical Congress. It has given me great satisfaction to find that the views adopted here have a general agreement with the interpretations put forward by such an eminent scholar as Prof. Bhattacharyya.

The doctrine of *māyā* is an attempt not to explain away the universe, nor to deny it altogether, but rather to explain the reality of the universe, to show the nature of reality that it possesses and can possess. It is an attempt to explain how the finite universe can come out of the Absence and the Infinite. The difficulty of explaining the fact of Creation is the greatest difficulty which the philosophical mind encounters in course of explaining the mysteries of the universe. The philosophy of almost all countries has more or less ignored the difficulty of explaining how the finite could ever come out of the Infinite, and almost all religious systems have tacitly assumed the possibility of communion and relation (and even in some cases identity) with the Absolute of the finite individual, without ever seriously stopping to think how this can happen, how the finite can ever reach the Infinite. The Infinite, *ex hypothesi*, is something which no relation of finites can ever yield. The fine logical mind of Śankara could not ignore this supreme and fundamental difficulty in the way of all religion, and also in the way of an advaita philosophy. The age of the Upaniṣads was more or less the age of Faith and Authority, and the mere appeal to Śrutis stopped all argumentations, and hence in India also the difficulty, the difficulty of connecting the finite with the Infinite, could not show its face uncovered then. But the age of Śankara, the age following the rise of Buddhism, was the age of Reason and Śankara had to win his case more by logic than by an appeal to authority. Hence it was impossible for Śankara to avoid the difficulty, and he faced it boldly. The doctrine of *māyā* is the logical answer which Śankara offered to the difficulty. It was thus an epistemological and a logical necessity on the part of Śankara to formulate the doctrine of *māyā*.

The doctrine of *māyā* does not mean any different ontological position of Śankara from that held by the Upaniṣads. The reality of Brahman, one without a second, undivided, pure, untouched by any sin, is alone upheld, and the reality of the world is described to be phenomenal and empirical.

The descriptions of *māyā* in various ways leading to altogether different views have created much confusion and been the source of infinite troubles to students of philosophy. This confusion can be avoided to a very great extent, I think, if we try to understand

the stage of realisation which a particular description points to. The Upanisads, the source of the Vedānta philosophy, abound with contradictory passages, irrelevant descriptions, etc. We have not to seek for them and find them out. Contradictory epithets are applied to the same subject times without number in the very same sentence (*e.g.*, तदेजतन तन्नेजतन, तद्दृष्टं चक्षुः च तत् न सत् तन्नासदुच्यते, etc.). These are all irrelevant and illogical statements to the superficial student of the Vedānta and the Upanisads. But these really contain the essence of the Vedānta and these are the devices which the Vedānta invents to describe the Indescribable, to explain the non-relational Absolute. The contradictions can always be reconciled and explained, if we regard them not as descriptions of the same stage of experience, but as denoting different stages of realisation of the Absolute. The Absolute is the very same unchangeable Reality that ever persists, but our apprehension of the same reveals differently in different stages. We can in this way notice three markedly different stages in the description of māyā :—

(1) Māyā is regarded as the source of this universe. It is the finitising principle that brings in differences and relations where no differences and relations exist. It is the power or śakti that is (अघटनघटनपटीयसी) *i.e.*, it can do what cannot be done. It is that which explains the Creation of this universe, the rise of the Finite out of the Infinite. The variety and multiplicity of the universe can all be traced to this śakti. In this sense, it does not differ from Herbert Spencer's Force. It is not only not unreal, in this sense, but it is most real (वास्तवी) in as much as we have to derive from it the reality of all that we see and touch. It is the *kāraṇā-rasthā* or the primal cause of all that exists in (सूक्ष्म and खूब) subtle and gross conditions. At this stage, the question of reality or unreality of this universe does not at all come in,—only we learn to trace the variety and multiplicity of gross and subtle things to their primal cause.

(2) Māyā is described as *anirrachanīyā*, neither real nor unreal. It is not real, because in the ultimate experience of the realisation of Brahman, not only the gross and the subtle universes do disappear, but no trace of the primal cause even can be noticed.

The trace of all finitude and limitation, the least signs of all variety and multiplicity, however diluted they may be, are bound to disappear, when we are merged in and realise the One Infinite. But when we miss that blessed mood of realisation, and so long as we cannot retain the memory of that blessed experience so that it alone always shines before us, we fall back upon the realm of duality and limitation, and then *māyā* as the primal cause of all that shines is regarded as real. This *anirvachanīyate* is more a logical category than a stage of realisation.* Logically we can neither deny it nor affirm it. It presents itself but it is not. It is like the day-dream the reality of which is denied even when it is presented. We cannot say whether it is or is not. *Māyā* is **नित्य अविद्या** or eternally negated in Brahman. It presents itself through its effects, but it is already eternally negated in Brahman.

(3) *Māyā* is *tucchā* (**तुच्छा**) altogether unreal. This is known as the *ajātarāda*, the theory holding that there has never been the creation of this universe. Where the Infinite alone shines, there is no room for the finite to appear. At this stage (i.e., the highest stage of revelation) it is seen that the finite never was, and there can never be any finite. All finitude and limitation, with their sources, disappear altogether, never to appear again.

So Śankara declares that there is no reaching of the Infinite by the finite, but the Infinite alone is, and all finite beings are really the One Infinite, only appearing different through an inexplicable riddle not further definable.

Through the doctrine of *māyā*, Śankara gives us the conception of an Absolute, which is really transcendent, which is not merely a relational Absolute like the Absolute of Hegel. The highest stage of intuitional realisation, soaring far above the intellectual reaches of the discursive understanding and the relational reason, reveals an Absolute that is really one without a second. Such an Absolute is really pure and free from all relations, because it is *māyālīta*, above all finitising relations. Without the intervention of *māyā*, the Absolute is bound to be related to the universe in some way or other, and hence becomes a relational, if not also a relative, Absolute.

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE INDIAN DOCTRINE OF NON-SOUL

FROM THE JAINA STANDPOINT

BY

HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA, HOWRAH.

“ *Ajīra* ” or Non-Soul is the group of substances to which the soul remains attached in its state of bondage. The substantial element of what is ordinarily called the Material Universe,—so alien and foreign to the pure nature of the Soul,—is the *Ajīra*. The attachment to *Ajīra* is the *Jīra*’s Bondage (*Banḍa*) and freedom from it is the state of the Soul’s Emancipation (*Mokṣa*). In the *Jaina* philosophy, the Non-Soul is a reality; in other words, the *Ajīra* is as real a substance, as the *Jīra* itself. The worldly existence of a *Jīra* and its transmigratory continuance are due to the *Jīra* being allied with this foreign substance, the *Ajīra*.

The *Buddhists* of the nihilistic school (*Sūnyavādins*) deny the real existence not only of the Soul but of any substance whatsoever. They do not admit the reality of *Ajīra* or the Non-Soul. Their arguments are preserved in some of the mediaeval texts which are as follows :—

Are we to suppose that the atoms comprising a thing have contact or ‘ *Sam-yoga* ’ with each other? What then, is contact? Is it identical in essence with the atoms? This is impossible as there can be no such atom as contact. Or, is contact a different phenomenon from the atom? This being supposed, we ask,—Is it altogether different or different only in some respects? To say that contact is different from the atoms in some respect involves a contradiction. If, however, contact is altogether different from the atoms, the question is,—Does it really,

subsist between the atoms? If it really subsists, does it subsist by means of contact? This is impossible as contact being itself an attribute cannot have itself as its attribute. Then again it may be asked, "Has the gross substance parts or not?" Obviously it has parts. Has it only one part or more than one? Admittedly, a gross thing has more than one parts. Are these parts different from one another? In that case, you cannot talk of one gross thing. Nor can you say that the parts are not different from one another; for, it is apparent in our perception that a gross thing has various parts.

The *Buddhists* accordingly contend that there cannot be any Non-Soul.

To the position of nihilism, the *Jainas* object in this way. First of all, they point out that it is not an absolute rule that a gross substance must always be the product of atoms. Threads which are gross, produce gross cloth. Soul and Space, on the other hand, are substances which are not the effects of material atoms. Where, however, an object is the product of atoms, it is to be noted that it is produced by an activity, dependent on proper time and other conditions. The relationship that subsists between the producing atoms in such a case is that of a contact. The relationship of contact is to be understood to be separate (different) from the atoms *in some respect*. There is no contradiction in such a position. A phenomenon in its *one and the same aspect* cannot be both identical with and separate from another. But it may be different from the other in its mode, yet identical with it in substance. Then again the fact that one atom joins with another need not prove that an atom has parts. For the matter of this, it is sufficient if we suppose a power or capacity in the atoms to join with one another. As regards the question whether a gross thing has various parts, the *Jaina* theory is that they are so, not *absolutely*, but *only in some respects*. This would remove all the difficulties.

The *Vedāntins* are opposed to the absolute nihilism of the *Buddhists*, inasmuch as they admit the reality of the *Brahman*,—the one and the non-dual Self—but agree with them so far as their

denial of the Non-Soul is concerned. In support of their contention that a thing external to the self is unreal, the *Vedāntins* often urge that its nature is inexpressible. It may be pointed out, however, that as a matter of fact, we have words for signifying all things we meet with in our experience. Words are caused either by our knowledge or by the objects known. It cannot be denied that we have the knowledge of objects; so that if knowledge be the cause of words, we cannot say that objects are inexpressible. Nor can it be contended that there are no real objects to cause the words. For, if there be no objects, how do you account for our knowledge of them? The *Vedāntins* point out that things appear to be both existent and non-existent; the *Jainas* urge that you cannot call things unreal on this account. It is also contended by the *Vedānta* philosophers that things have no real nature. It may be pointed out in reply that to *pratyakṣa* or our direct apprehension, things do appear as real. *Anumāna* or inference also shows that the external things have reality; for, if these be not real, the Soul also may be said to have no proof of its reality. The *Vedāntins* sometimes put forward the argument that the so-called external things are not varied inasmuch as they are identical in nature with the *Brahman*, the only Real of reals, the one, self-same, ultimate Reality. The *Jainas* point out that there is no reason why we should accept this extremely monistic position and identify all the varied things of the world with the *Brahman*. *Pratyakṣa* or direct perception unmistakably shows that things are different from one another. If it be said that things are essentially one and appear as varied owing to our *avidyā* or ignorance, the same line of argument may be urged against the *Vedāntin* himself to show that things are essentially different from one another.

There is another class of philosophers with whom *words* are the only reality.

According to these thinkers the *noumenal sound*,—the *Śabda Brahman* as they call it—is the ultimate and the only reality. On the one hand, it is the cause of the vowels and the consonants of our languages and consequently the *rāchaka* or what expresses and signifies the objects of our knowledge; on the other, it is the

vāchya or the Objects, signified by sounds (words). The philosophers of this school contend accordingly that the Non-Soul consists of the noumenal sound.

The *Jainas*, on the contrary, reject this theory and point out that words or sounds do not necessarily accompany all forms of our cognition. We have visual perceptions of blue, etc., which are not attended with words and auditory sensations of sounds, e.g., blue, etc., which are not attended with any corresponding visual sensations; perception is possible without sounds.

Can we again identify objects with sounds? It is manifest to every one that objects are certainly more than the ordinary words or sounds which are used to express them. Here, however, the philosophers of the Grammatical school make a distinction among sounds. They say,—

“When air passes to the proper places (e.g., the throat, etc.) a man is enabled to utter a word; such a word is due to the operation of the vital principle (or, the air which is in the bosom) and is called the *Vaikhari* word. The *Madhyama* word is not dependent on the vital principle or air but consists in an *internal vibration*, so to say. Lastly, there is the *Sūkṣma* or *subtle* sound which is eternal; it is self-luminous; it has no distinctions within itself (due to component letters, etc.) and is indivisible; it is the Revelation. The Universe is permeated by such sound and hence is the world said to consist in words.”

The *Jainas* point out that the nature of an object and its perception have nothing to do with the first and the second kinds of words. The alleged third kind of words is no real word or sound at all (which has letters, etc., as its component parts),—inasmuch as it consists in a revelation or a direct vision of the Self or the Object. Then again so far as the objects of the world are concerned, does the *Śabda-Brahma* or the noumenal sound modify itself into each and every object or does it not? In the first case the sound becomes many in number, which is opposed to the theory of these grammatical philosophers themselves. In the second case, the variedness of the objects, their states and manifestations become inexplicable. The theory that the world con-

sists of sound, being but a modification of it, is thus not maintainable.

Thus it is that the Non-Soul cannot be said to be sound.

The philosophers of the *Sāṅkhya* school look upon the *Prakṛti* or the *Pradhāna* as the principle of the Non-Soul. The contention of the *Sāṅkhya* school is that an effect prior to its being explicit is existent (potentially) in the cause. From this general truth, it follows that the *Mahat*, the *Ahamkāra*, etc., which have the characteristics of being effects must have the *Pradhāna* as their cause in which they existed in an implicit state, before they became explicit as effects.

The *Jainas* criticise the doctrine that the Non-Soul is the *Prakṛti*, as it is conceived by the *Sāṅkhya* philosophers. The *Mahat*, etc., have been said to be identical in essence with the *Prakṛti*. If so, how can we look upon the former as the effects of the latter? Then again it has also been said that the *Mahat*, etc., are different from the *Pradhāna* in that the former are the products while the latter is uncaused, etc. But how can *Mahat* etc., which have been said to be essentially identical with the *Prakṛti* be different from it as well? The *Sāṅkhya* thinkers look upon the *Prakṛti* as eternal. If so, why does it produce its evolutes, one after the other and not all at once? There is another difficulty with regard to the *Prakṛti* being the cause. When it produces an effect, does it change? If it changes, then the immutable nature of the *Prakṛti* is admittedly destroyed. If on the contrary, it does not change, then the *Prakṛti* as the cause and its mode as the effect become co-existent. Thus the doctrine of the *Pradhāna* is not maintainable. The *Sāṅkhya* doctrine that the effect is latent in the cause is also misleading. The arguments that are adduced in support of this contention may be turned against it as well. For, if the effect is already existent, you cannot talk of its being caused. Secondly, if a phenomenon is already existent, we cannot speak of another phenomenon as its cause. Thirdly, in order that a particular phenomenon may come out of another given phenomenon, the former must be supposed to be in some sense non-existent before its emergence. Fourthly, in order that you may speak of the capacity of phenomenon to produce another phenomenon, the latter must be non-existent before

its production; for, if it is already existent, how can another phenomenon be said to be capable of producing it? And lastly, the fact that we look upon a phenomenon as the cause of another, goes to show that the latter phenomenon is non-existent before it is produced by the former as its effect.

The phenomena of the world do not prove the unity and oneness of the ultimate cause; they rather show that the world has a plurality of material causes. Even admitting that the phenomena of the world are all characterised by *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, it does not prove that their cause *Prakṛti* also is characterised by the very same principles. A cause is not exactly like its effect. Next, it should be noticed that the fact that the phenomena of the world have the marks of being effects does not prove that the unitary *Pradhāna* as conceived by the *Sāṅkhya*, is their cause; it proves only that the phenomena of the world have varied causes. Thus it is that the *Prakṛti* as conceived by the *Sāṅkhya* school is not the cause of the universe.

The *Ajīva* is thus not the *Pradhāna*.

What then is the *Ajīva*? As observed already, it is the group of real substances to which the *Jīva* remains attached so long as it is in the state of bondage. In its pure nature, the Soul is free. In its *sāṃsārika* or transmigratory existences, however, the soul appears as limited and finite,—in these series of births and rebirths, the bondage of the soul is real. It follows from this that what supplies or forms the fetters of the bondage of the soul,—the *Ajīva*—is also real. The *Ajīva* is thus a group of real substances, according to the *Jainas*.

The non-psychical substances according to the *Jaina* thinkers, are five in number, *viz.*, *Pudgala* or Matter, *Dharma* or the Principle of Motion, *Adharma* or the Principle of Rest, *Ākāśa* or Space and *Kāla* or Time. The conception of *Dharma* and *Adharma* as two cosmic principles of Motion and Rest is peculiar to the *Jainas*. The remaining three substances are admitted to be real by the thinkers of the *Vaiśeṣika* school also.

The followers of *Kaṇāda*, however, besides admitting the reality of Matter, Space and Time, look upon *Dik* or Points of direction and *manas* or Mind, as two other non-psychical reali-

ties. ' *Dik* ' according to them is a reality which determines the direction of things. A is to the *east* of B; B is to the *south* of C and so on;—such a determination of the location of things is made possible by the reality of the substance called *Dik* by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. *Dik* is real, eternal, all-pervasive and one. The ten directions of it, *viz.*, East, North-east, North, North-west, West, South-west, South, South-east, Up and Down are due to the One *Dik* being determined by different positions of the Sun in the sky at different times. The *Jainas* point out that the conception of a *Dik* as a reality is unnecessary. The points of direction are better explained by *Ākāśa* or Space. Space is a real substance admitted by the *Jainas* who maintain that our determination of the East is due to a particular part of Space (*Ākāśa-Pradeśa-Śreṇī* or series of Space-points) being marked by the rise of the Sun and so on. The apprehension of Space is essential to our apprehension of direction, this is to the East of it, etc., etc. It is thus reasonable to explain our apprehensions of direction by a reference to *Ākāśa* or Space without admitting the reality of a separate substance, called *Dik*.

Manas or the Mind is another non-psychical substance according to the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Observation shows that our sensations come in one after another and not all simultaneously. It is the Mind as a reality which prevents the sensations from rising simultaneously. The *Jainas* look upon *Manas* as the internal sense and refuse to regard it as an independent reality. According to them Mind is either *Dravya-Manas* or *Bhāra-Manas* and is constituted of very fine and subtle Matter called *Mano-raganā* and as such, purely material in essence. The author of the *Tattvārtha-rāja vārttika* says, " *Manas* is of two modes, *viz.*, the *Bhāra-Manas* and the *Dravya-Manas*, both of which are material in essence. How? Because *Manas* is nothing but (a mode of) Matter. The *Bhāra-Manas* is characterised by *Labdhi* and *Upayoga* and is material because it is wholly dependent on *Pudgala*. The *Dravya-Manas* is constituted of *Pudgalas*, transformed into *Manas*,—the *Pudgalas* which are capable of evolving a peculiar capacity (in the Soul) and which assist the Soul in its functions of discriminating good and bad (*Guṇa* and *Dosa*), of recollection, etc., etc., on the occasion of the destruction or the

mitigation of the *Jnānāvaraṇa* and *Vīryāntarāya karmas*. Hence *Dravya-Manas* is also material."

The varieties of the Non-Soul according to the *Jainas* are thus five, viz., Matter, Time, Space and the two Principles of Motion and Rest.

A FEW SHORTCOMINGS OF JAINISM AS A SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY.

BY

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In philosophy our aim is to know truth, *i.e.*, to interpret experience in its various aspects in a coherent and systematic way, and the only guide that we have along this thorny path of the search after truth is reason. It is on the bar of reason alone that the claims of the various philosophical hypotheses—for all systems of philosophy are mere hypotheses to explain and interpret experience—are to be judged. The more rational and comprehensive a system of philosophy is, the more acceptable it will be. There is a struggle for existence and supremacy even in the field of philosophy, and we must note that only that system will win in the long run which takes note of all the aspects of experience and explains them in the most rational and the least self-contradictory manner. On this general view we shall point out a few inconsistencies and shortcomings that appear to us to lie in Jainism as a philosophical hypothesis to explain the universe.

✓ *Jaina Logic of anekānta-vāda*—that things have various aspects which all must be taken note of in a system of complete knowledge—is very valuable for philosophical thinking, but unfortunately it seems that Jaina Ontology itself does not listen to its own logic. It wrongly emphasises only one *anta* or aspect of experience, namely, plurality and independence of the factors of the world-whole, and neglects the other, no less important and real, aspect, namely, the unity of the Universe. The Universe does not consist of a plurality of individual spirits and atoms of matter alone, it seems to be an organic unity behind all its multifarious aspects. To neglect this unity and to construct a system of philosophy on plurality alone is a very serious violation of *anekānta-vāda*. Even a great pluralistic thinker, Leibnitz, in whose philosophy we find a strong reaction against the Monism of Spinoza, could not neglect the unity-aspect of the world, and to explain it had to admit a harmonising God and some sort of

'Pre-established Harmony.' It may be admitted here, that Jainism admits, as its logic requires, some sort of unity in the world, but that remains in logic alone and does not enter the sphere of ontology or metaphysics. There has been made no serious attempt to understand how the world seems to be one inspite of plurality of its constituents, how the unity is related to the plurality that is dogmatically accepted as real and ultimately real, and how can interaction, which is an actual fact, be possible in a collection of things absolutely different from one another qualitatively. These and many other problems of similar nature are very important for philosophy and no system of philosophy can afford to neglect them.

Another great problem, namely, the epistemological question as to how knowledge can be possible if the subject and the object of knowledge are two absolutely distinct and independent realities, as we find them to be so in Jainism, has been overlooked by Jainism. The phenomenon of knowledge is a proof against ultimate pluralism of any system of philosophy. A great Brāhmana thinker, Vaśiṣṭha, said long ago :

द्रष्टृदृश्ये न यद्वेकमभविष्यच्चिदात्मके ।

तद्व्याख्यादमन्नः स्यान्नदृष्टेक्षुमिवोपलः ॥ (यो वा VI, 9, 38, 9)

which when put in modern language will come exactly to what Prof. Radhakrishnan says: "If the two, subject and object, the individual mind and the independent reality, are separate, there can be no knowledge at all. Either knowledge is arbitrary and groundless or dualism is wrong." Therefore on serious epistemological considerations we have to come to the conclusion to which Vaśiṣṭha comes :

सम्बन्धे द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यादीनां मध्ये द्रष्टृर्हि यद्वयः ।

द्रष्टृदर्शनदृश्यादिवर्जितं तदिदं परम् ॥ (यो वा III, 127, 53.)

That is, the distinction of subject and object and knowledge between them is not that between independent realities, but a distinction made between the aspects of one and the same reality, which itself is above and beyond and yet in all its partial aspects. If any philosophy considers the knowing spirit and the known world as independent realities it overlooks this principle of epistemology. Jainism seems to do so.

The ultimate duality of spirit (jīva) and matter (ajīva pudgala) which are said to have been so intermixed and related from time immemorial that the sole attempt of an aspirant for perfection consists in separating and abstracting the one from the other cannot be a rational doctrine. Long ago did Vasiṣṭha point out what Lotze says in modern times :

न संभवति सम्बन्धो विषमाणां निरन्तरः । (यो° वा° III, 121, 37)

ऐक्यं च विद्धि सम्बन्धं नास्त्यसावसमानयोः ॥ (यो° वा° III, 42)

That is, two things having no reality common in both cannot have any relation of interaction between the two. Interaction in metaphysics as well as in physics point to a common reality subsisting equally in the related factors. This logical necessity has compelled the physicists to postulate the existence of ether and the metaphysicians to postulate the existence of a Substance at the root of matter and spirit. If Jainism does not admit the existence of such a reality—a Root-Substance manifesting itself both in spirit (jīva) and matter (ajīva), it will be stopping short of a completely rational metaphysics, and taking a partial and relative view of the whole and ultimate truth.

Jaina Psychology deserves great credit in recognising five kinds of knowledge, namely, (1) *Mati*, i.e., ordinary knowledge derived through the commonly recognised means of perception and inference, etc., (2) *Shruti*, i.e., knowledge conveyed by others through words or other signs; (3) *Acadhi*, i.e., knowledge got through clairvoyance or clairaudience, etc.; (4) *Manah-paryāya*, i.e., telepathic knowledge of others' thoughts; and (5) *Kecala-jñāna*, i.e., omniscience. The Annals of the Psychical Research Society are full of the data, a study of which will endorse and substantiate all these. But a philosophical consideration of all the last three kinds of knowledge, which are accepted as facts by Jainism, will surely go against the ontological position of Jainism. Since the discovery of such facts by the Psychical Research Society, Western minds are perplexed as to how to explain them. Sticking to realistic and pluralistic notions in metaphysics, it is very difficult to explain them. The Vedantic theory of the identity of each individual spirit with the One Universal Spirit which is the Root-Substance

and the Depositary of all events, past, present and future of the universe, is a hypothesis that very easily explains these startling facts. Myres, who was very keenly alive to the newly discovered facts of the supernormal psychology, advances a hypothesis which is very much like that of the Advaita Vedanta and very much different from the philosophy of Jainism. "The conscious self of each of us," says he, ".....does not comprise the whole of the consciousness or of the faculty within us. There exists a more comprehensive consciousness." The concept of this 'more comprehensive consciousness' is found to be similar to the Vedantic concept of God in Fechner, a great German thinker, according to whom "Individual minds represent only the waves within a wider consciousness. The most comprehensive consciousness, the being whose body is the world, is called God, whose mind includes within itself all the separate forms of consciousness, but at the same time transcends them and forms above them a unity peculiar to itself."

The theory of or belief in the ultimate perfection accompanied by omniscience, and unconditioned bliss is another puzzle in the pluralistic realism of Jainism. The Absolute whole alone can be perfect, and there cannot be a plurality of Absolutes for that will be a contradiction in terms. There can be only one most Perfect Being, without a second by its side. Reason also demands that the perfect Absolute must be an eternal reality, for if it were not so the ideal of perfection itself would not be conceived. The perfection of an individual consists in realising its identity with the perfect God. But in being more and more perfect, *i.e.*, in realising our identity more and more with the Absolute Reality, we become less and less individual. The more we are perfect the less are we limited and finite. The more we cease to be particular beings the more comprehensive do we become. This process goes on until the finite centre of consciousness expands into the circle of infinite dimension and thus include all other centres within it. Now it no longer stands side by side and so outside any other centre as a centre representing the whole circle from a particular point of view alone, but as the all-comprehensive circle comprehending within it all possible points-of-view. It is only in this way that the concept of perfection for each individual can be intelligible.

Jainism unconsciously implies this when it holds that gradually we have to purge ourselves of all matter (*karma-prakṛtis*) which causes imperfection or limitation in us, for it is the forces of matter alone which we imbibe within us by our immoral acts that make us finite and limited individuals. All distinctions owing to which one spirit is distinguished from another are the results of our Karma-pudgala, and it is very difficult to say what remains there in the spirit to distinguish it from the perfect spirits which too have cast off all finitising pudgalas. The self which was wrongly taken to be finite on account of its mixture or identity with the finitude created by karma-energies, now when purged of all material limitations comes to realise its pristine glory of perfection and omniscience. This can be possible only when we accept the Vedantic view of the immanence of the perfect and omniscient God in all of us as the very Self or our selves, who is ever ready to shine in all his glory whenever we cast off finitising interests, nay, who is ever present in all his perfect Glory as our deepest Self but whom we do not see because our vision is directed outward or because we are blinded by our ignorance.

Now, if it is thus possible to realise our true self and to become perfect and omniscient, and thus to transcend our individuality, how can we maintain the individuality or *jīratva* to be the ultimate truth. It is certainly real and true from our limited point-of-view, but our limited point-of-view itself is not the ultimate truth as it can be transcended in a higher realisation, and as it is perpetually corrected by reason. We have seen that reason demands a Root-Substance to start with and the immanence of the ideal even in the present and the actual realisation of the ideal of perfection in future, how can then we maintain the ultimate reality of individuality and plurality? Vasiṣṭha has rightly said :—

आदावन्त च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपितत्तथा । (यो वा IV, 45, 45)

that is, that which does not exist in the beginning as well as at the end, does not exist even at present. If it somehow appears to be the truth, it can be an appearance at the most, which reason and higher realisation should transcend. So

the plurality of spirits and the ultimate duality of spirit and matter are not the ultimate truths but only appearances.

Life, Jainism rightly believes, is controlled by the Law of Karma—As we sow, so we reap. But if the Law of Karma works justly, rationally, and intelligently, does it not presuppose that there is a just and rational moral government behind the universe? Does it not also presuppose some Cosmic Intelligence—a perfect and just moral Governor, a God? A Law without any Law-giver and Law-controller is a fiction. In a world where there are innumerable agents, all free to act in their own way and to their best advantage, there cannot be any guarantee of justice and stability. Our freedom and hope of Nirvāṇa will be at stake where anarchy prevails. Agreeing with Jainism in its criticism of an external Creator, however, we cannot dispense with God as the One Universal Spirit, immanent in the universe, controlling and governing the universe by the Law of Karma and other laws. This the Jaina philosophy denies. A perfected Tirthankara, or even a multiplicity of such Tirthankaras living somewhere far away from the world of mortals cannot satisfy this logical necessity of an immanent Spirit governing the universe from within.

The reason for these shortcomings in Jainism is perhaps that the early Jainism like the early Buddhism was primarily a system of practical ethics and consequently it took note only of those aspects of experience which ordinary moral consciousness discovers and thinks sufficient for itself. Philosophy is very much different from mere ethics or religion. Ordinary ethics or theology cares little for the philosophical soundness of its views. Philosophy, however, is a rigorous search after truth and takes note of all sides of experience.

All the above suggestions, however, are in keeping with the Jaina logic of *Anekānta-rāda*, which is a great contribution of Jainism to Indian thought. Criticism is a great stimulus for the growth of a philosophical system, and the above remarks are offered only from that motive. Jainism will not cease to be Jainism, rather it will be Jainism perfected, when it gives a patient hearing to the demands of its own Logic, and improves accordingly.

RAMĀNUJA'S CRITICISM OF THE MĀYĀVĀDA

BY

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It seems to me that sufficient attention has not been paid in the modern philosophical world to Rāmānuja's criticism of the māyā-theory formulated in his chief work, *The Śrībhāṣya*. To a casual or hasty reader, the criticism appears to suffer in value because of its want of logical arrangement and the fact that every one of the seven charges, considered by itself, could be formally answered in one way or another. A careful consideration, however, of the criticism as a whole would reveal the fact that every possible aspect of the question has been discussed by Rāmānuja and that the total effect of the charges is very crushing indeed. The criticism can be appreciated much better if we can rearrange and restate the several charges in modern terms. For this purpose I propose to consider the question under the three aspects of (i) the nature of māyā (comprehending Rāmānuja's *āśraya*, *svarūpa*, *anirracanīyatva* and *pramāṇa anupapattis*), (ii) its supposed effect (*tirodhānānupapatti*), and (iii) its possible cessation (*nirartaka* and *nirṛtīyanupapattis*). I shall in the following pages use the terms māyā and avidyā synonymously.

The fundamental question about the doctrine of māyā is in regard to its nature, reality or status. The Advaitin makes it the principle of explanation of the world. All philosophy is only an attempt at explaining our experience, at solving, by means of rational concepts, the problem of the world and of life. As a hypothesis of the world, therefore, the doctrine of māyā suggests

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that the world, from the standpoint of the highest reality, is unreal and an appearance only,—an appearance, too, that, unlike the appearance of a mountain in the waters of the lake, below, is only an imagined appearance, the result of *adhyāsa* due to beginningless nescience or *avidyā*, as the appearance, e.g., of a rope as a snake or of shell as silver. That is, experience as a whole, both cosmic and individual, is referred to *avidyā* working in the form of *adhyāsa*. Be it noted, however, that *avidyā* cannot be made the principle of explanation of experience, for it states only the way in which experience works: experience works always in the way of *adhyāsa*, false transference or, superimposition, and this is *avidyā*. This is only a psychological, empirical explanation of experience. The question therefore still remains: What are the logical or philosophical conditions of the possibility of this experience itself, of this so-called *adhyāsa*? It must be noted that the question is a relevant and legitimate one involving no error of *vernunft*. It may be said that experience is as such unreal, for Brahman is the sole reality. But it is suicidal to start from the other end of the scale, for we are not asking for an explanation of Brahman but only for an explanation of the world. Hence when it is said that the world-experience is a form of *avidyā*, the question arises:—What are the logical conditions or presuppositions of this ignorance or this false experience?

In certain passages Śaṅkara points out that the *adhyāsa* and the consequent appearance are made possible because of the cognitive mechanism of the individual, or more generally, the *upādhis* or the limitations by means of which we ascribe to Brahman what does not naturally belong to him. And certain modern interpreters of the *advaita*, state, in the language of modern philosophy, that “Brahman cast in the moulds of logic is the world of experience,” that “*avidyā* is the fall from intuition, the mental deformity of the finite self that disintegrates the divine into a thousand fragments.” But it is convenient-

ly forgotten in such cases that the individual, the finite self, is itself a creation of avidyā. Hence it is impossible to hold that the finite self is the condition of avidyā without involving oneself in a logical seesaw. Should we, on the other hand, maintain that Brahman being the sole reality, he himself is the logical prius and presupposition of avidyā, it becomes inexplicable how a nature essentially consisting of self-luminous intelligence is compatible with avidyā which is essentially nescience. Still, there being nothing else but Brahman, avidyā, if it is a fact, must be explained by Brahman himself as being a part of his nature.

In this sense, then, is to be understood Rāmānuja's first criticism of the māyāvāda, technically called, *Āśrayā-nupapatti*. "What is the seat, locus or *āśraya* of avidyā?" asks Rāmānuja. He is surely not so unphilosophical as to imagine that avidyā "is a concrete reality, a *tertium quid* between the Absolute and the universe, even perhaps existing in space, etc.," and to ask in consequence for a physical or physiological seat for this ignorance. What he wants to know is the philosophical explanation of the concept which, as we have seen, cannot easily be given. Avidyā, in effect, is simply the generalised concept of experience: it is the problem itself and not its solution.

The fact of avidyā, however, it may be said, is undeniable since judgments such as "I do not know" are within the experience of everyone. Avidyā is not simply the absence or negation of knowledge, but it has a positive character (*bhāra rūpa*) and is capable both of a gross and a subtle existence. And yet it is not an absolutely real entity since it is destroyed by vidyā. Hence it is said to be *anirvacanīya*, indescribable. Rāmānuja's two objections against the *svarūpa* and the *anirvacanīyatva* of avidyā may be considered together in this connection. He urges, in sum, that avidyā must be granted to be a reality, as real as Brahman himself. For Brahman is

the basis of everything that exists, even as an appearance, and if Brahman appears at all, he, by virtue of his eternal nature, appears eternally. And Śaṅkara, in accordance with his dictum that "what is eternal cannot have a beginning, and whatever has a beginning cannot be eternal" (Commentary on the *Tait. Up.*, Introduction), must himself admit that avidyā is eternal, because it is beginningless, and hence really real. Again, it is admitted that the inmost self of the world is Brahman. If the inmost self of anything is its essence, truth, the world in its essence and truth is sound and real and there appears to be not much point in saying that it is *māyā-mātram*. Granting, however, that this world is *māyā*-produced, this *māyā* must be either an entity entirely different from, and maintaining itself in opposition to, Brahman—a conclusion which Rāmānuja forces upon his opponent at the end of the discussion—or an integral part of Brahman himself.

With its *scarūpa* thus determined one way or the other, the *anirvācanīyatta* of avidyā also disappears. The indescribability of *māyā*, it is said, depends upon the difference in the *tertium comparationis*, for it is *asat* from the *pāramārthika* standpoint, and *sat* from the *prātibhāsika* standpoint, and the two standpoints ought not to be confused with each other. The question, *e.g.*, 'What is the cause of *māyā*?' involves such a confusion, the mistake of making a transcendent use of an empirical category. This stump of cautioning against the shifting of standpoints is, however, a bit overdone. For, firstly, to give *māyā* a characteristic (indescribability) derived from viewing it from two entirely different standpoints, itself involves such a mistake. Secondly, if *māyā* be transcendently ideal and empirically real, it means that it falls within experience, and, as such, must have a cause. Thirdly, the transcendent standpoint is in itself inadmissible in 'a thinking consideration of things,' for logic, it is admitted, can tolerate only the determinate *Īśvara* and not the *nirguṇa* Brahman. To think *nirguṇa* is to make it *saḡuṇa*: and

as for *becoming Brahman*, it is the hugest joke, the crowning humour, indulged in by this system of inexplicabilities and indescribabilities. Fourthly, while the *ādvaitin's* postulation of the *nirguṇa* is itself an overstepping of the limits, his elaborate philosophy of Brahman—and specially, his insistence that Brahman is both the material and the efficient *cause* of the universe, or generally that he is the *ground* of the world—is a most flagrant breach of the etiquette of the standpoints. His other statements are doubtless modified, *e.g.*, “Brahman is *sat*”—but this means simply that he is not *asat*; “Brahman is *cit*”—but this only implies that he is not *acit*, etc. But so can we too suggest that *māyā* has a cause meaning simply that it is not uncaused; that it is real and describable implying merely that it is not unreal and indescribable and so on. If *māyā* then is not unreal, uncaused and indescribable, and Brahman is the basis of everything, even of the phenomenal world, how can it be maintained that he is unrelated to the world, or that the very question of such a relation is a confusion of standpoints? The truth is that the philosophy of the indeterminate or the *nirguṇa* is a negation of all philosophy and its problems and so Rāmānuja's contention holds: All cognitions relate to entities or nonentities; and if it be held that the object of a cognition possesses the features of neither, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions.

While admitting *māyā* to be the creative energy of God, Rāmānuja, in his *pramāṇānupapatti*, fights against characterising *avidyā*, in its relation to knowledge, as a positive entity different from mere nonexistence of knowledge. He tries to show that there is no *pramāṇa* by means of which we can become aware of the existence of such an entity. For want of space, however, I cannot enter into his arguments here but shall content myself with observing that, on grounds of logic, there appears to be no way of challenging his conclusion that there is practically no difference between the ignorance that is a mere antecedent nonexistence of knowledge and the other

alleged nescience which is said to have the nature of a positive entity.

Having discussed the nature of avidyā, we may next turn to consider its supposed effect. By means of its twofold action of *āvaraṇa* and *vikṣepa* upon Brahman, avidyā not only creates the *jīva* but confounds him with nescience. In his *tirodhānānupapatti*, Rāmānuja contends that the *āvaraṇa* of Brahman can only mean the destruction of his essential nature, self-luminous intelligence. But it may be replied that the suppression of the unity of Brahman and the substitution of the experience of diversity are only effective for the *jīva* and can have no influence upon Brahman himself for the causal relationship involved here is not *pariṇāma* but *vicarta* in which the cause, without undergoing any change, produces the effect. Even *vicarta*, however, implies that Brahman has become perverted, *i.e.*, in some sense actually modified. The time-honoured illustration of the rope-*adhyāsa*, intended to show that *vicarta* does not affect the cause, militates in fact against the theory of advaita itself. For, how is it that only ropes or such other substances are always mistaken for snakes and not, *e.g.*, trees or rocks? Why is it that silver is always imagined in shell only and not in sand or stone? The fact is that in such cases the object mistaken for another object, does actually possess certain qualities of the latter on the observation of which is based the inference that it possesses all the other qualities also of that latter object which may not be the case. It is therefore a case of *misinterpretation* and not *misrepresentation*. A certain length of the rope, its twisted character, etc., constitute the snake-element of the rope, and engender the belief that it is a snake; and even when the belief is later on sublated, the snake-features which gave rise to it continue in the rope undisturbed: only their association with the other qualities of the snake is given up. In like manner, I apprehend, the appearance of Brahman as the diversified world is possible because the elements of such a world—its diversity, etc.,—exist in Brah-

man himself and then *adhyāsa* would mean connecting these observed features of reality with certain unobserved features such as their apparent independence, destruction, etc., which, on the dawning of *vidyā* may be sublated. Anyway, the theory of *virata* would establish a unity-indifference as the highest reality which would knock the bottom out of the whole system of *advaita*. Hence either *māyā* must be held really to conceal Brahman's nature, or it must lead to the positing of *saṁgha* Brahman as the highest reality.

It is also clear, from the above analysis of the rope *adhyāsa*, that it is impossible, even according to *virata*, for the effect to belong to a different order of being from the cause. Just as in the case of the snake, the world also, in so far as it is based upon Brahman, is not only nondifferent from Brahman, but identical with him.

The foregoing must have made it clear that *vidyā* does not cause the world to disappear, for its observed features are well-grounded in Brahman and therefore indestructible. Moreover, *avidyā*, as we have seen, must be taken to be eternal, and unless we assume a separate finite *avidyā*, for each soul, there seems to be no prospect of its cessation for any by any kind of knowledge whatsoever. It is in this sense that Rāmanuja urges his *nirartaka-nirṛtyānupapattis*, the first pointing out that because the knowledge of the unqualified Brahman is as such impossible, *avidyā* cannot cease thereby, the second insisting that *avidyā*, which for him is only another name for man's original sin, can, like the latter, be burnt only by divine grace and divine worship. In any case, it is important to observe that what is destroyed by *vidyā* is not the world itself with all its diversities, but only our false perspective in regard to it. Even the *jīvanmukta* does not cease to see a diversified world, he only ceases to estimate it as before. (The diversified world is therefore in every sense real.) Otherwise the

world should have disappeared even when one person attained vidyā, and the better way to make it disappear would be to set about destroying it by force rather than to try to know Brahman. Moreover, the differentiations of the knower, the knowledge and the known, being all unreal to the advaitin, even that knowledge which is believed to be capable of eradicating avidyā will have to be unreal and require another real removing knowledge and so on *ad infinitum*. For it is illogical to hold that one unreality will destroy another unreality, that darkness will expel darkness.

THE PROBLEM OF PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE ADVAITA VEDANTA

BY

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In the Vedānta as in other systems of Indian Philosophy the theory of knowledge is not prior to the theory of being. Epistemology does not precede but follows ontology. That the problem of knowledge should presuppose a theory of reality is natural, in spite of Kant's contention to the contrary, in as much as knowledge is knowledge of that which exists and the way in which we know things presupposes the way in which the things exist. The history of eastern as well as western philosophy shows how the problem of the nature of the reality has been considered first, and the problem of the nature of knowledge has been dealt with subsequently, the solution of the latter having been deduced as a corollary from the solution of the former. In fact the form of the epistemological problem varies according to the metaphysical theory with which a particular system of philosophy starts. Dualism, postulating two altogether distinct and separate substances, *viz.*, mind and matter, has to face the question, "How does mind, which is a distinct entity by itself, know matter?" or, in other words, "How does matter, an alien substance, subject itself to the noetic activity of the mind which is foreign to it?" Pluralism, positing a plurality of independent and unrelated substances, puts the problem thus: "If all things are unrelated why should subject and object come into relation with each other in a particular fact of knowledge?" To monism the problem of knowledge appears quite in a different way: "If all is in essence one, the dualism of subject and object is only apparent and not real, only relative and not absolute." Thus we see that a particular theory of reality has its own special way of approaching

the problem of knowledge. The object of this paper is to present the problem of perceptual knowledge as dealt with in the Advaita Vedānta with a view to bring out its important aspects.

The metaphysics of the Advaita Vedānta recognises but one supreme principle, *viz.*, the Ātman which is absolutely one, the one without a second. It is *chit*, intelligent, conscious. Consciousness is the very essence and being of Ātman and not simply its attribute or property. We must say that the Ātman *is* consciousness and not simply that the Ātman *has* consciousness. It is 'Prajñānaghana,' consciousness through and through, just as a salty steppe is salt in each and every particle of its being. The Ātman pervades the totality of existence, is immanent in all things sentient as well as insentient. The all-pervading Ātman is, moreover, self-luminous (*svayamprakāśa*). The Ātman thus indwells all things and illuminates them by its self-luminous nature. This might lead to the supposition that all things stand self-revealed by virtue of the immanent *chaitanya*, that at any time knowledge of all things is available to any subject and that there is no room for ignorance of any thing whatsoever. It might appear, therefore, to a superficial observer, that in the system of the Advaita Vedānta, the fundamental axiom of the immanence of the one, self-luminous Ātman leaves no scope for the possibility of the particular, perceptual knowledge. In order to guard against such an erroneous supposition it is necessary that we should draw attention to a vital conception in the Advaita Vedānta, *viz.*, that of Avidyā. The function of Avidyā is two-fold: it has got capacity to create (*vikṣepa*) objects as well as to veil (*āvaraṇa*) them. Avidyā thus, has cosmic creative significance, no less than a psychic, epistemological import. Here we are concerned with the latter aspect of Avidyā. It is essentially because the Avidyā clouds the self-luminous *chaitanya* that is immanent in all objects that there arises the need of the particular perceptual knowledge. The original Avidyā is regarded as assuming manifold states or modes, which are called *vṛttijānānas* as distinguished from the *mulājānāna*. The Vedantic theory of perceptual knowledge, thus, stands against the background of two important metaphysical presuppositions, *viz.*, the all-immanent and self-luminous Ātman and the all-creating and all-veiling Avidyā.

We should note at this point an important distinction drawn in the Vedānta between what is called svarūpa-jñāna and vṛtti-jñāna, that is to say, between knowledge as essence, permanent, never-ceasing knowledge which is Ātman's nature and transient, impermanent, variable knowledge, knowledge which comes and goes. The two distinguishing marks of the former kind of knowledge are self-luminosity and eternity. The svarūpa-jñāna moreover is not dependent for its existence and content on the object. But the case is different with regard to the ordinary perceptual knowledge. It is relative, other-dependent and occasional. It will be easily seen that the problem with which we are for the present concerned, refers to the latter and not to the former kind of knowledge.

Whatever may be the metaphysical presuppositions, every attempt to formulate a theory of perceptual knowledge has to take account of the facts of experience, when a certain object of the external world, say a table or a chair, is presented to a subject, there arises knowledge of that object in the subject. The presentation of the object implies contact of the sense-organ with the object. This contact of the object and the sense-organ is only one condition, among other conditions necessary for the rise of an awareness of the object in the subject. Apart from the contact of the object and the sense-organ there is the need of the conjunction of Antahkarana (internal organ) with the particular sense-organ. This is because, at one and the same time more than one sense-organ might be in contact with their respective objects and send in impressions which would create a confused and bizarre perception. Again, it is a matter of ordinary experience that mere contact of the object with the sense-organ is not productive of perceptual knowledge as is exemplified in such expressions as 'staring vacantly at objects.' The importance of the rôle of antahkarana will be realised if we see furthermore, the peculiar position which the Ātman holds in the Vedāntic epistemology. In the Advaita Vedānta the conception of the subject is markedly different from what we are familiar with in the analysis of experience given by western philosophy. The cognitive apparatus according to the Vedānta is not simple but complex. The subject is not viewed in one single and simple aspect. There is,

first, the Ātman as mere witness (sākṣī). Again over and above the Ātman there is the Antahkarana (otherwise called buddhi). The relation of the witnessing self to the Antahkarana imparts an air of transcendentalism to the Vedantic theory of knowledge. The self always remains uncontaminated by the cognitive functions of the Antahkarana much in the same way as it is unaffected by the pleasurable and painful feelings, or stands static amidst manifold doings. It is the Antahkarana which is the recipient of all the momentary cognitions, while the self merely witnesses the cognising activities of the Antahkarana. It must be remembered however, that though the internal organ cognises external objects it is the self that imparts cognitive power to it. The internal organ being in itself non-intelligent is incapable of knowing objects without the illumination of the Ātman. Sankara lays special emphasis on this point. He tells us that "it is the Ātman that makes buddhi the knower of objects by lending its light to it. The Ātman pervades buddhi, just as an emerald pervades a cupful of milk by its lustre. The buddhi thus enlightened by the Ātman takes the form of the object it knows." (Brih. Bhāṣya 4.3.7. also Sūtra. Bh. 2.2.29.) In this respect the Vedantic doctrine of knowledge resembles the Sāṅkhya view, according to which Puruṣa illuminates the non-intelligent buddhi and enables it to know objects. The modifications of buddhi remain material and mechanical until they are witnessed and thus illuminated by Puruṣa.

The modification of Antahkarana occasioned by the contact of the object and the particular sense organ is called vṛtti. Vṛtti plays a very important part in the act of knowledge as the Vedānta understands it. When a particular object, say a flower, is brought before a subject, the eye comes in contact with the flower. The contact of the eye with the flower occasions a modification of the internal organ after the model of the flower. The mind is thus said to take the form of the flower. In the same manner, when the eye comes in contact with a chair or a table a vṛtti corresponding to a chair or a table arises in the mind. It will be seen that a vṛtti is a particular mode of mind, a determinate form of consciousness. Vṛtti rises like a ripple on the still surface of sentience. It is in vṛtti that the basic and potential conscious-

ness comes to a point and focus. The *vr̥tti* introduces a dynamic factor in the otherwise static consciousness. The special significance of the conception of *vr̥tti* in the Vedāntic epistemology is due to the fact that the ultimate principle of existence according to the Vedānta is consciousness (*chaitanya*). The special task for the Vedāntin is to show how the universal and indeterminate consciousness becomes particular and definite in the fact of knowledge. It is here that the conception of *vr̥tti* is of signal service to the Vedāntin. The Vivaraṇa points out in this connection that though consciousness (*chaitanya*) is present everywhere, it is only in the Antahkaraṇa and through its *vr̥tti* that knowledge dawns, "just as light, though cast on air, sky, etc., illuminates only those objects which possess form, or just as fire, though potentially present in all objects does not acquire the power of burning until it is actualised as for example in a red-hot iron-ball."

We have seen so far how *vr̥tti* is a vital factor in the Vedāntic problem of perceptual knowledge. We have still to consider what exactly is the function of *vr̥tti*. The Vedāntins differ in the answer they give to this question. Some hold that because the *jīva* is finite, being limited by the *upādhi* of Antahkaraṇa, *vr̥tti* merely serves to establish a relation of the knower and the known between the consciousness immanent in the subject and that, immanent in the object. Others maintain that consciousness is present everywhere and so in the object also, but it is obscured by *Avidyā*; the *vr̥tti* therefore serves to remove the clouding *ajñāna* so that the self-luminous *chaitanya* immanent in the object shines forth and the object is perceived. There are others still, who regard that *vr̥tti* is useful in manifesting the identity of subject-consciousness and object-consciousness. The Siddhāntaleśa-Saṅgraha sums up these different views characterising them respectively as *Chiduparāga*, *Avanābhivibhava*, and *Abhedābhivyakti*.

It should be noted that we nowhere find in Śaṅkara's writings a special treatment of the problem of perceptual knowledge taken as such. His view is to be gathered from passages where he only indirectly refers to this topic. For example, in his refutation of the Buddhist *Vijñānavāda* we get the following—"In every act of perception a subject is conscious of an external object say a post or a wall,—corresponding to an idea in the mind. The

object of which one is conscious in the perceptual act cannot but exist externally. That the external thing exists apart from consciousness has to be admitted on the ground of the nature of the consciousness itself, as it receives its content from outside." (Sūtra Bhā. 2.2.28.) He clearly recognises in the same place that when one is conscious first of one object and then of another, consciousness in its generic aspect remains the same: while what changes is only its specific content. He draws a two-fold distinction, a distinction between the external object and the state of apprehension on the one hand, and that between the fleeting state of apprehension and the abiding self on the other. This two-fold distinction however, may be said to be the result of subsequent analysis and reflection undertaken for the purpose of systematisation of experience, rather than the datum of immediate experience. When knowledge arises it is essentially a unity, an unanalysed and undifferentiated whole. The Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, a later Vedāntic treatise, emphasises this point. It characterises perceptual experience as a unity (abhedā) of consciousness immanent in the object which exists at the time of perception and which is capable of being perceived, and the consciousness immanent in the subject. It points out that chaitanya is present in the subject that knows, in the object that is known and also in the knowledge-process itself. Now perception so far as it is an apprehension (jñānagata-pratyakṣa) is, according to the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā, the unity of object-consciousness and vṛtti-consciousness; while perception so far as it is a revelation of an object (viśayagata-pratyakṣa) is the unity of object-consciousness and subject-consciousness. Barring the distinction between perception as an apprehension and perception as a revelation of an object, which is hardly significant for us, we may only note that the Vedānta-Paribhāṣā rightly understands perceptual knowledge as an immediate unity of the subject and the object. Against a probable objection that perception cannot be taken as unity when as a matter of fact, it contains such differentiation as is expressed in saying "I see this," an explanation is added that the unity of the subject and the object does not signify their identity (Aikya); it only means that the object has no existence apart from, and independently of, the conscious substratum of the subject (Pramā-

tr̥sattātiriktānyasattākattvābhavaḥ). Here is a clear expression of the truth which all idealism emphatically teaches, *viz.*, in the immediate fact of knowledge the subject and the object do not appear as two independent entities but are essentially related with each other.

The Vedantic theory of perceptual knowledge, no doubt, raises some critical considerations. It may be asked, in the first place, how does the *vytti* take the form of the object at all, if, *ex hypothesi*, the object is veiled by *Avidyā*? It is not the sense-contact that is regarded as removing the covering of ignorance as is naturally expected, but rather the *vytti* itself is understood as performing that function. It must be said, however, that there can be no *vytti* unless there is sense-contact, nor, can there be any sense-contact until the *vytti* removes the veil of ignorance from the object. No way seems to have been found, out of this difficulty. Somehow it is arbitrarily assumed that the internal organ (*antahkarana*) is modified after the model of the external object. In the second place, the Vedantic doctrine of perception seems to fit in well only with the perceptions of a particular kind, *viz.*, the visual ones. When we hear a sound, it cannot be regarded that our mind is modified after the form of the sound. Again, in the Vedantic doctrine of knowledge mind is regarded as passive and receptive and not as active and selective. We fully recognise now-a-days that in each act of perception an incoming sensation is reacted upon by the mind in the light of the residual traces of past experience. Every perception is a case of apperception. Whatever is sensed is interpreted and assimilated. Mind plays an active part in perceptual experience and cannot be regarded as being simply passive and receptive.

The merit of the Vedantic epistemology, however, should not be judged from the psychological stand-point but from the metaphysical one. Its real value lies in the sound metaphysical insight it presupposes. The merit of the Vedantic doctrine of knowledge consists in the view it puts forth as regards the nature of knowledge. The Vedānta teaches that knowledge cannot be regarded either as a relation or as an act. It is not a relation, because a relation requires that both the terms should continue to exist as long as the relation lasts. In the case of knowledge,

however, the object may not be present after it has once given rise to knowledge and yet the knowledge of that object persists. Again knowledge cannot be regarded as an act, because it leaves that which is acted upon intact, while it makes the author of the act, *viz.*, the subject, suffer a change and we have no example of such an act in our experience. Knowledge according to the Vedānta is a particularisation of a general principle. Consciousness is primal and fundamental; knowledge of this or that object is a particular, determinate mode of the universal, indeterminate consciousness. The Vedantic theory of knowledge stands sharply contrasted with the Nyaya epistemology. According to the latter, knowledge is an attribute of the soul; the self and the not-self are absolutely separated from each other. Knowledge, as the Nyāya understands it, is the result of causal collocations; it is a copy of the external object. The Vedānta urges that a radical sundering of the subject and the object renders knowledge an inexplicable fact, a veritable mystery. Knowledge cannot be regarded as the result of the causal collocations of factors which are discontinuous with each other. So long as the object remains absolutely apart and complete in itself, we have no means of determining whether the copy correctly represents the original or not, as the latter can never be known as it is in itself. The Vedantic epistemology brings out a valuable truth when it states that the subject and the object do not simply come together in a mechanical manner but they are organically related as parts of a wider whole of experience which includes and at the same time transcends them both. Knowledge becomes intelligible when we recognise that the subject and the object mutually imply each other and are dependent on each other. In fact they are moments in a higher unity of experience.

WHAT IS SAMARĀYA?

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The conception of *samarāya* is described as the corner-stone of the Vaiśeṣika in modern works on that system of philosophy.* While the description shows that the importance of *samarāya* is recognised, the terms employed in rendering it into English such as 'inherence,' † 'inhesion,' ‡ 'inseparable relation' § and 'intimate union' || raise a doubt whether its exact nature is well understood. The object of this paper is to endeavour to determine its nature and to seek for a parallel to it, if any, in the other systems of Indian philosophy which may help us to discover its true meaning. That *samarāya* is a relation is clear enough; but it is not the only relation admitted in the system, there being others like *samyoga*, *vibhāga*, *paratva*, *aparatva*, etc., and until we interpret *samarāya* in reference to them, we cannot claim to have understood it completely. It is not possible however within the short compass of this paper to deal with the several relations recognised in the Vaiśeṣika. So we shall select *samyoga* as typical of them, alluding to the others only in a general way. We propose also to consider the question, as far as possible, in the light of the distinction made in modern philosophy between external and internal relations.

The relation of *samyoga*, it is stated, holds exclusively between *dravyas*• while that of *samarāya* is found not only between *dravyas*—though only when they satisfy a special condition, as we shall see—but also between *guṇa*, *karma*, *jāti* and *viśeṣa* and entities to which they may belong.** The relation in-

* Cf. *Tarka-saṅgraha*, pp. 98-99 (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1918).

† Keith Indian Logic and Atomism, p. 196.

‡ Gough Translation of *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, p. 4 (Benares Edn.).

§ Das Gupta History of Indian Phil., Vol. 1, p. 232.

• *Tarka-saṅgraha*, Eng. Translation, p. 96 (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1918).

** See *Dinakarīya* on the *Muktārāṭi*, p. 85 (Nirn. Sag. Edn., 1916).

*** These would be the following: *dravya* and *guṇa*, *dravya* and *karma*, ultimate *dravya* and *viśeṣa*, and *vyakti* ('particular') and *jāti* ('universal'). The last again may be of three sorts—*dravya* and *jāti*, *guṇa* and *jāti*, *karma* and *jāti*.

involved for instance in 'hat on the head' or 'cloth in the jar' is *samyoga*; but that between the 'cloth' and the 'threads' out of which it is made or between the 'rose' and its 'redness' is *samarāya*. That is, while *samyoga* obtains only between objects of one particular order, *samarāya* may be found between objects of the same or of different order. We shall refer later to *samarāya* of the former kind, *viz.*, that between two *dravyas*, and shall, for the present, restrict our observations to the latter. Now in the example of *samyoga* given above, *viz.*, 'cloth in the jar,' the objects may or may not be related in the manner indicated by the preposition 'in.' They are seen separate before they are conjoined and again, when they are disjoined, they continue to be so. In both cases alike each object, at least according to Vaiśeṣika, remains in itself and unaffected. If for this reason, *viz.*, that it makes no difference to the relata, *samyoga* is taken to be an external relation,* one is apt to regard as internal, *samarāya* which as found between 'rose' and 'redness,' say, is far unlike it and is actually contrasted with it in Vaiśeṣika works.† To see whether it would be correct to regard it so, a slight digression into the Vaiśeṣika view of knowledge is necessary. The system, as is well known, is realistic, and as such believes in the existence of objects independently of and outside the knowledge which refers to them. To avoid however the familiar difficulty that faces all realistic doctrines of accounting satisfactorily for Error, the Vaiśeṣika restricts the scope of its realistic postulate to what is known as the *nirvikalpaka* and maintains that the statement, that whatever knowledge points to exists apart from that knowledge, applies only to *that* level of perception. As regards the *sarvikalpaka* which is derived from or built out of the *nirvikalpaka*, it may or may not refer to a fact; and whether it is true or false in a particular case has to be determined on entirely other grounds. By *nirvikalpaka* here, we have to understand mere presentation as distinguished from perception involving judgment; and what is given in it is the *isolated* thing—altogether uncharacterised. Thus when we perceive a 'red rose,' the perception, it is assumed, is

* Compare, e.g., Taylor: 'Elements of Metaphysics,' pp. 147-8.

† See for example *Tarka-Saṃgraha-Dīpikā*. p. 62 (Bombay Sanskrit Series, 1918).

but it is not necessary for our present purpose to enter into that question. For *samavāya* relates eternal entities as well for example an 'atom of *prthivi*' and its 'odour'—which as we have said are not modifiable; and since the explanation we give of it in that case must be identical with the explanation in the other case, change, even supposing that things that are not ultimate are subject to it, cannot be ascribed to *samavāya*. It accordingly follows that in all cases alike *samavāya* leaves the terms it relates entirely unaffected.* In other words, it is an external relation like *samyoga*. The very fact that it is independent and relates ultimately simple factors shows that it cannot be an internal one.

If *samavāya* also is an external relation, 'wherein,' it may be asked, 'does it differ from *samyoga*?' The distinction between the two may be stated in various ways. For example, things in *samyoga* relation are in juxtaposition and occupy different spaces; those which are connected by *samarāya* are experienced in one and the same space.† The most important difference however from the present standpoint is that while *samyoga* is transient (*anitya*) and manifold (*aneka*); *samarāya* is eternal (*nitya*) and one (*eka*).‡ Things related by *samyoga* can, as we know, be separated; and the separation does not affect them but only destroys the relation. Things related by *samarāya* cannot always be sundered;§ but where they can be, one at least of them suffers destruction as the result of such sundering. But the relation itself, it should be remembered, though it ceases to be revealed through that particular instance, continues to be;|| and is revealed through other similar instances, just as 'cow-ness' (*gotva*), which is a universal and therefore one and everlasting, does not disappear when a particular 'cow' dies but persists in others.¶ In other words, while *samyoga* only exists, *samarāya*

* This is made quite explicit in the Vaiśeṣika maxim: *Viśiṣṭam suddhāt nātiricyate*. Cf. *Muktāvali*, p. 296.

† Cf. *Nyāya-Manjari*, p. 312:

Pratiti-bhedāt bhedo'sti deśa-bhedastu negyate.

‡ The later *Naiyāyikas* and the *Mīmāṃsakas* following *Prabhākara* refuse to view *samavāya* as either eternal or one. See *Dinakariya* on the *Muktāvali*, p. 86, and Jha, 'Prabhākara School of Mimamsa,' p. 92.

§ E.g., 'atom of earth' and its 'fragrance.'

|| See *Upaskāra* on *Kaṇāda's Sūtras*, p. 296.

¶ Compare for the parallelism between the two *Prasasta-pāda's Bhāṣya*, pp. 326-328. (*Vijayanagram Series*).

subsists. It should not be thought that in so describing them, we are importing into the Vaiśeṣika philosophy a notion alien to it; for the distinction between subsistence and existence is quite fundamental to it. It divides the six positive categories it postulates into two classes—one consisting of the first three which are *sat* (real) because of the universal *satta* attaching to them* (*sattā-sambandha*) and the other consisting of the last three which are described as *svātmāsāt* or 'intrinsically real.' They are neither in Time nor in Space and are independent of both. The former are characterised by borrowed being; the latter, on the other hand, are in their own right. This distinction is remarkably like that between subsistence and existence; and as *samavāya* is one of the last three *padārthas* and *samyoga*, as a *guṇa*, is one of the first three, the description we have given of them is quite in accordance with the basic principle of Vaiśeṣika philosophy.*

A second distinction of equal importance may also be deduced from what has been stated thus far. The relata in *samyoga* are technically described as *gyata-siddha* or 'normally separate'; and those in *samarāya*, as *ayutasiddha* by which we should understand that this relation holds between things of which one is invariably associated with the other.† The 'redness,' for instance, is never apart from a 'rose' or some such object and it is inconceivable that we should find it without at the same time finding its correlate. The two are, no doubt, as conceived in the system, ontologically quite distinct; but while one of them can exist by itself, the other cannot. That however is no disproof of its distinctness. The reason why it is not seen by itself is that it becomes related to its correlate *as it comes to be*. Its origination, as it is said, is simultaneous with its relation: *Jātaḥ sambuddhaśca iti ekah kālah*.‡ In other words, unlike *samyoga* which is adventitious or contingent, this relation is necessary, though the necessity, we must add, is only one-sided.

* Prāsaṅga-pāda's Bhāṣya, pp. 17 and 19, and Bhāmati, p. 387 (Nirn. Sag. Fr., 1904). In later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thought this distinction was practically given up by the expedient of what is described as *ekārtha-samarāya*, see Dinakariya on Muktārālī, pp. 40-41.

† See Tarka-saṅgraha, p. 61. Compare the term *asrāntanrya* used in respect of it in the Nyāya-kandali (Vizianagram Series), p. 325. This seems to be the origin of the name *paratantrata* sometimes given to *samarāya*. See Jha: 'Prabhakara School of Mimamsa,' p. 88.

‡ Uddyotakara: Nyāya-rārtika II, i, 33 (Benares Edn., 1915), p. 236. Nyāya-manjari, p. 312. The former work enunciates this principle in connection with the question of 'whole' and its 'parts.' Its applicability to all cases involving *samarāya* is clear from the latter work.

The 'rodness' in our example presupposes a *dravya* but the reverse does not hold good,* for the 'rose,' may exist out of this relation and it is the self-same thing whether in this relation or outside it. Hence when we describe *samavāya* as an external relation, it is not in the sense that both its terms are independent as in *samyoga* but only one. There seems to be sufficient warrant in modern philosophy for describing such a relation as external.†

We have so far treated of *samavāya* as it manifests itself through certain sets of entities. It is also manifested, as we have stated already, in another situation and like *samyoga* is found between two *dravyas*. But while the latter can exist between practically any two *dravyas*,‡ the former is found only between certain kinds of them. To determine what the *dravyas* should be in order that *samavāya* may hold between them, it is necessary to draw attention to the rather peculiar view of causation held in the system. It maintains that the effect comes into being anew and is quite other than its material cause. The 'cloth' made from the 'threads' for example is, according to this principle, an entirely new product and abides in them, the relation between the two being *samavāya*. This is the condition for *samavāya* being found between two *dravyas*: they should be material cause and effect.§ Here also then we find the same conditions as before: First, there are two entities which on the basis of common experience are regarded as distinct; secondly, one of them, the effect, is dependent upon the other, its material cause and presupposes it which is independent; and lastly, when the latter emerges into being, it becomes, in the very act of doing so, related to the former. Thus there is complete parity between this case of *samavāya* and the others which we have already considered. To judge from Kaṇāda's Sūtra, VII, ii. 26, the doctrine of *samavāya* seems to have been first enunciated in connection with the production of *dravyas* and thereafter extended to the other cases

* This is explicitly recognised by some: *Utpannam dravyam kṣanamaguṇam akriyā-kam, ca tiṣṭhati*. Compare *Tarka-sangraha-dīpikā*, pp. 4 and 7 (Bombay Sanskrit Series).

† See Joachim, 'Nature of Truth,' p. 50 n., and Bradley, 'Essays on Truth and Reality,' p. 337 n.

‡ The Vaiśeṣika denies *samyoga* between all-pervading (*vibhu*) *dravyas* like *ākāśa* and *ātman*. See *Dinakariya* on *Muktārālī* p. 73.

§ These, according to the Vaiśeṣika, are the same as 'parts' and 'whole.' See *Tarka-Sangraha-Dīpikā*, p. 62. Like the material cause, the 'parts' are conceived as prior to the 'whole.'

like *dravya* and *guṇa*, *vyakti* and *jāti*.* The problem of causation always loomed large in ancient Indian thought ; and the Vaiśeṣika, in contradistinction to the other schools maintaining identity in some sense or other between the material cause and the effect, formulated absolute distinction (*atyanta-bheda*)† between them, devising *samarāya* at the same time as their connecting link. The basis of the extension from this to the other cases is probably to be found in the fact that wherever *samarāya* is revealed, casual factors will have been in operation as implied by the maxim already quoted : *Jātaḥ sambaddhasca iti ekah kālah*. In the case of the ' red rose ' the colour is what is caused ; in the case of ' cow named Khaṇḍa,' it is the particular cow. That is, what is produced in these cases is not the relation which by hypothesis is eternal, but one of the relata.‡ *Samyoga* also involves a reference to causation similarly, but what is produced there is the relation itself. Now whatever positive thing is produced, according to the Vaiśeṣika, not only is in Time and Space but also necessarily abides in some *dravya* which is described as its *samarāyi-kāraṇa*.§ *Samyoga*, being a product, must abide, so soon as it arises, in a *dravya* ; and since it cannot be either a *dravya* or *karma*, it is classed as a *guṇa*, these three being the only things that can be produced. *Samarāya*, on the other hand, is regarded as an independent *padārtha* which only relates but is not caused and therefore requires no *dravya* or *Samarāyikāraṇa* to abide in, like *samyoga*.|| Accordingly it is described as directly connected with the relata ;¶ but *samyoga* is indirectly so, for, being a *guṇa*, it needs *samarāya* as an intermediate link to connect it with its *samarāyi-kāraṇa*. That is, *samyoga* is a mediated relation while *samarāya* is an immediate one. This constitutes a third difference between them.

There is a conception in another system which confirms our view of *samarāya*. The Viśiṣṭādvaita of Rāmānuja formulates a

* See Vierṭi on *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras*, p. 294 (Gujarati Press Edn.) and Keith : ' Indian Logic and Atomism,' pp. 196-8. The extension already appears in *Prāśastapāda*.

† Note the expression *ihedaṃ* occurring in the *Sūtra*.

‡ This extension, owing to the similarity of the circumstance, necessitated the admission of cases where the relatum too is not produced : e.g. ' atom of earth ' and its ' frag-
lance.' See *Prāśastapāda* : *Dhāṛya*, p. 324.

§ See *Prāśastapāda*'s *Tihāṣya*, pp. 16, 18, and 26.

|| See *Nyāya-kandali* : 329.

¶ This is technically described as *svārūpa-sambandha*, i.e., it is self-related not un-related.

relation known as *apṛthak-siddhi* which corresponds to *samavāya* practically in all respects.* It accepts real distinction between the two things related by it and also inseparability between them. But there is one important difference : the relata are represented there as implying an inclusive unity (*viśiṣṭaikya*) and as subserving it. On account of its implication of unity and interconnection; *apṛthak-siddhi*, in spite of its resemblance to *samavāya* in other respects, is to be taken as an internal relation. It seems in fact the Viśiṣṭādvaita rendering of *samavāya*. The relata and the relation are the same in the one system as in the other, but the manner of interpreting them is different. Tagore, the poet, has somewhere stated that a road between two places may be looked upon either as linking them up into one whole or as keeping them apart. The situation is the same but the explanation is different. Exactly like it seems to be the distinction between *apṛthak-siddhi* and *samavāya*. While the pluralistic Vaiśeṣika looks upon *samavāya* as holding its terms apart, the eventually monistic Viśiṣṭādvaita regards them as unified by *apṛthak-siddhi*. Now if *samavāya* also were an internal relation, as implied by the several English expressions used as its equivalents in modern works, the fundamental difference between the two schools of thought would disappear and Rāmānuja's refutation of the doctrine of *samavāya* would have no point in it.†

To sum up : The relations of *saṃyoga* and *samavāya* are both external—the former in the sense that it relates co-ordinate factors ; the latter in the sense that one of the terms is relative and subordinate to the other. Speaking generally, the Vaiśeṣika seems to repudiate internal relations altogether. Its uncompromising realism and pluralism render this conclusion necessary. It recognises only external relations but they are not all of the same kind and there are at least two varieties of it as illustrated by *saṃyoga* and *samavāya*.

* See *Sribhāṣya* and *Sruta-prakāśikā*, pp. 75-6 (Nirn. Sag. Press), also *Tattvamuktalālāpa* (Benares Edition), p. 646. There are a few differences between the two conceptions but they are such as are necessitated by the basic difference between the two systems. The Viśiṣṭādvaita does not recognise *viśeṣa* : hence one variety of *samanavāya*, viz., that between ultimate substance and *viśeṣa* is not found in it. Another difference is that the relation between 'body' and 'soul', which is not *samavāya* in the Vaiśeṣika, is *apṛthak-siddhi* here.

† *Śrī-bhāṣya*, II, ii, 12-16.

THE GROWTH OF THE CONCEPT OF BRAHMA

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Traces are left in the Upaniṣads of the way in which the ancient mind of India groped for the concept of Brahma and eventually attained it by a slow and steady endeavour. It is possible, therefore, to discover in outline the history of the growth of this concept. By 'history' here we do not mean mere chronology; the logical process of the growth of a philosophical concept is far more important than mere chronology. Besides, chronology itself is a difficult matter in Śruti literature where alone the history of this concept might be traced.

Usually no doubt we have a chronological scheme with regard to these books: no doubt, we regard the *mantras* as the earliest production; the *Brāhmaṇas* are placed next; and they in their turn were followed by the *Upaniṣads*. But it will be readily admitted that this chronological scheme is at best a working hypothesis; it is certainly not applicable to all the books brought under these various names. We can certainly not say that every *mantra* book was earlier than every *Brāhmaṇa* and that all the *Upaniṣads* came after the *mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas*.

If this were the case,—if, that is to say, we could be certain that the chronological order of the *mantras*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads* were unalterably fixed, and that whatever was found in whichever of the *Upaniṣads*, was necessarily posterior to anything found in any of the *Brāhmaṇas* or *Vedas*, then our task would have been very much simplified. But unfortunately this does not seem to be the case. On the contrary, we have reasons to think that some of the *mantras* were composed after some of the *Brāhmaṇas* and that some of the *Upaniṣads* preceded the later *Brāhmaṇas*. At any rate, it is difficult to think that all the *Upaniṣads* that we know came after the whole of the *Brāhmaṇa*-literature had been composed. It seems futile therefore, to attempt to construct a history,

of the concept of Brahma by merely pointing out what is found about it in the *mantras*, *Brāhmaṇas* and *Upaniṣads*.

In tracing the growth of the concept of Brahma, what can and ought to do is to find out, if possible, the logical stages through which this idea developed. Every philosophical idea and for the matter of that, every idea takes time to develop and passes through a sequence of stages. Sometimes, traces of these stages are preserved; and with reference to the concept of Brahma, they seem to have been preserved in the *Upaniṣads*. We shall endeavour to see here how far they are detectable.

Logically, it is necessary to define the nature of the concept of which we are attempting to construct the history. The nature and implications of the concept of Brahma are fully worked out in the Vedānta-Sūtras. Differences of opinion exist as to these implications and also as to the relation of Brahma with the individual and the world. But there is little difference of opinion about the character of Brahma as the ultimate reality. He is a conscious Absolute, the source of all and the ultimate goal of all creation. He pervades the whole universe. The soul and the world—the subject-object of consciousness—find a meeting place in Him: they both proceed from Him. He is in the individual soul as He is in the external world. His presence can be felt—can even be proved—but is difficult to describe. He it is that presides over the senses of the individual and enables them to function; and He also presides over the objects of sense and enables them to be sensed. He is the ultimate reality of the self and the not-self; He is the source of both and is the link between the two. He is a Unity; He is a Spirit; He is the alpha and the omega of all things.

The mental efforts made to reach this concept have left interesting traces in the *Upaniṣads*. Usually a philosopher presents us only with the thoughts in which his thinking culminates; the actual thinking—the psychological processes through which these ideas were eventually attained—seldom see the light of day. No doubt, when an author writes several books, and these mark stages in his thought-development, an indication is not wanting of the way in which he searched for the truth. But at best, it is a imperfect indication of the underlying psychology of the man; it

may indicate the psychological 'type,' as Jung would put it, to which he belongs. But the stages through which his mind passed, may still remain obscure. A book gives us the results of a man's thinking, and will seldom tell us—unless the author himself discloses the fact—whether it was the result of a year's thinking or of a decade's continued study. Much less will it tell us the stages through which the author's mind reached the ideas which find expression in his book. This is the usual rule; but we have a different story to tell of the Upaniṣads.

The Upaniṣads embody the results of the thinking not of an individual thinker but of whole generations of thinkers. They focus together the ideas that arose in the minds of a people in the course of a fairly long period of time. They not only preserve the thoughts of these men but even exhibit the stages through which they arrived at the sublimest conceptions. The books of the Upaniṣads can hardly be arranged in any finally settled historical order; and the presentation of ideas in any one of them cannot also be regarded as following any definite chronological scheme. Yet here and there in them, we find traces of the thinking itself by which the concept of Brahma was reached. And it is not altogether impossible to arrange them in their logical sequence.

It should be noted here that we are confining ourselves to the Upaniṣads. The concept of Brahma and other concepts of the Upaniṣads also, were further developed and their implications more thoroughly drawn out, in the Sūtras and the subsequent literature of the schools of Vedānta. A complete history of the growth of the concept of Brahma, would undoubtedly cover these later writings also; but that would be too long a subject for a single paper.

1. Brahma as the ultimate unity of all things, is really the unity of two other lower unities: (i) In the first place, we reach the unity of soul by subsuming the *prāṇas* (senses) under it; (ii) in the second place, the phenomena of the world cognised by these senses, are also subsumed under a unity. And this really meant a unity of the gods under a supreme god-head: for, to the Upaniṣadic thinker, the phenomena of nature were but workings of the various divinities that peopled the universe. The concept of Brahma was but this twofold unity of the gods and the *prāṇas*.

2. The above process would give us Brahma only as the *One*. A slightly different process of thinking was necessary for conceiving Him as a *spiritual* Being. This was done by reaching the notion of individual soul, which led up to the notion of a world-soul along with it.

3. Brahma is the ultimate unity ; He is a spirit. But He is also the source of all things and the goal of them all too. It is, therefore, shown that the world evolves out of Him and also that it loses itself in Him.

The stage of intellectual growth at which the search for Brahma, *i.e.*, for an all-pervading unity, began, already involved a belief in (i) a multiplicity of gods presiding over the manifold forces of nature, and in (ii) a plurality of functions of which the individual soul was capable. The unity of Brahma implied : first, the unification of the soul-functions in the soul—the *prāṇas* subsumed under the *ātman*—and along with this, there was the unification of the gods in the supreme god-head or Brahma. The first process is called the *adhyātma* or process pertaining to the soul ; and the second is called the *adhidaivata* or the process pertaining to the gods.

(1) The conception of the soul as the unifying principle of the sense-functions (*prāṇas*) is mediated by the concept of a *mulhya* (or chief) *prāṇa*. The so-called 'vital breaths' are but manifestations of this chief *prāṇa*. Besides this chief *prāṇa*, there are eleven other *prāṇas* which function as the eleven senses.

It is needless to add that before the concept of a *prāṇa* or sense could arise, it was necessary to understand the difference between the experience of one sense and that of another ; that is to say, it was necessary to know first of all that touch-sensations were different from smell-sensations, for example, and that they constituted a special class, before touch could be thought of as a sense distinct from smell as a sense. We have traces of the discovery of this truth also in the Upaniṣads. There are passages which emphasise the fact that all touch-experiences must be referred to the skin and all visions to the eye, and so on. (Br. ii. 4. 11.) This was the first step in the process of unification which resulted in Brahma. All sensations of a particular kind are

unified by being referred to the corresponding sense ; and then all the senses are unified by being referred to the soul.

There is a series of Upaniṣadic texts in which this theory is variously suggested ; and these texts are considered and systematised in Vedānta-Sūtra, ii. 4. In the Vedānta-Sūtra, the questions raised are : (i) What is the number of the senses ? And (ii) are they self-existent or derived from Brahma ? As to the number, the conclusion arrived at is that it is eleven, exclusive of the chief *prāṇa* ; and as to the second question, it is concluded that they are all derived from Brahma.

The Upaniṣadic texts considered in this connection, contain traces of the way in which the first thinkers sought for a unity. As has been just pointed out, they first of all unified the sensations of each kind by the concept of a corresponding *prāṇa* or *indriya* (sense). Thus in Br. ii. 4. 11, we have : " Just as all waters flow but to the sea, all touches to the skin, all visions to the eye, all desires to the mind (*manas*), etc." Here we have the unity of the sense-experiences in the corresponding senses.

This gives us the various senses. As to the number of these there is some ambiguity in the texts. Some passages seem to suggest that it is seven, some put it at ten, and so on. But, as the author of the Vedānta-Sūtra concludes (ii. 4. 1-6), a synthesis of these passages settles the number at eleven. Curiously enough, this number accords with that given by the Sāṅkhya school. Though the author of Vedānta-Sūtra is never tired of assailing the Sāṅkhya, in the matter of the *prāṇas*, they remarkably agree.

After the discovery of the eleven senses, the next step for the Upaniṣadic thinkers was the conception of the *mukhya prāṇa*. In Ch. v. 1, we have an interesting anecdote which establishes not only the separateness but also the superiority of the chief *prāṇa*. The same conclusion is reached with the aid of the same arguments, sometimes repeated *verbatim*, in Br. vi. 1. And in Br. i. 5. 3, we are told that the chief *prāṇa* unifies the five vital breaths, *prāṇa*, *apāna*, etc. (cf. Vedānta-Sūtra, ii. 4. 12).

Up to this, we have eleven *prāṇas* and one *mukhya prāṇa*. The next step would naturally be a reduction in this number with a view to attain unity. In Br. i. 5. 3, we find that this number is reduced to three, viz., *manas*, *vāṅk*, and *prāṇa*.

Now must come the conception of the soul or *ātman*. This is very often found to synchronise with the advent of Brahma-idea, specially in the Br. Uṇ. The soul of the body and the soul of the world coalesce frequently enough. Thus, in Br. ii. 1. 17-19, we are introduced to the concept of the soul which controls the senses and withdraws them from their sphere of activity when it goes to sleep. In the very next passage (Br. ii. 1. 20), this soul is spoken of as the source of everything;—a description which fits in more closely with the notion of Brahma rather than that of the individual soul. We find here, however, that from their notions of the senses, our authors arrive just where they might be logically expected to arrive, *viz.*, at the notion of the soul.

Along with the unification of the *prāṇas* under the notion of the soul, the concept of Brahma already looms in the not-distant horizon. Thus in Br. iv. 1, we find Brahma is alternately identified with *vāk* (speech), *prāṇa*, the eye, the ear, and so on. And then the declaration is made that all these are but *partial* manifestations of Brahma and none of them exhaust his reality.

Logically the concept of the soul may be considered a step below that of Brahma. But in actuality, the two ideas emerge almost simultaneously in the Upaniṣads; and the one changes easily into the other. It is a peculiarity of Hindu thought that the body is very often regarded as an epitome of the world and meditation on certain centres of the body has been suggested as a means for attaining knowledge of the world (*cf.* Yoga-Sūtra). And hence the identification of the soul of the body with that of the world was not a difficult process for these thinkers. Besides, the very fact that extreme monism (*advaitism*) arose out of the Upaniṣads, shows that this identification was implied in their sayings. In many cases, the attainment of the idea of the soul (*ātman*) was tantamount to the appearance of the concept of Brahma. An additional argument in support of this is found in the fact that a number of the Vedānta-Sūtras discuss the question whether certain terms used in certain contexts mean the finite self or the infinite Brahma (*e.g.* i.1.12; i.1.23; i.2.13; i.3.14; etc.). In all these cases, the terms used are interpreted to mean Brahma; but they might as well apply to the finite soul. This shows that in the thinking of the Upaniṣadic philosophers, the soul was but

one reality which was thought of now as finite and now as infinite—the soul of the body and soul of the world in one (*cf.* Ch. vi. 3, 2; etc.).

But at the same time, it must be conceded that, whether they deserved to be called theists or not, occasionally the Upaniṣadic thinkers transcended the finitude of the individual soul and reached the sublimer concept of Brahma as distinct from and superior to it. Thus in Br. iii. 7. 22, we are introduced to the idea of “that which is present in consciousness, is yet distinct from it, whom consciousness cannot grasp but whose body, as it were, consciousness is and who controls consciousness from within.”

(2) It has been repeatedly said in the Upaniṣads that the senses are presided over by the gods who also control the corresponding phenomena of nature, and thereby make sense-function possible. Thus in Ait. ii. 4, we are told that Fire became speech and entered the mouth of men, Air became *prāṇa* and entered the nostrils, and so on. And that these deities also preside over the corresponding forces of external nature, is laid down in Ch. iii. 18, Br. i. 3, i. 5, etc., where we are brought face to face with the conception of an external world of deities (*adhidairata*) and an internal world of soul (*adhyātma*) (*cf.* Vedānta-Sūtra, ii. 4, 14). And we are also told that the senses not only arise out of the deities of the external world but they also revert to them upon liberation (Br. i. 3, 12. *et seq.*); thus, speech freed from its connection with the body becomes fire again, *prāṇa* becomes air, the eye goes back to the sun, and so on.

In order to reach the concept of Brahma, it was obviously necessary to transcend the manifold of divinities as much as the manifold of the senses. This was also done. Thus, in Kena iii, we have a beautiful picture of the way in which the Upaniṣadic thinkers thought away the independent existence of the Vedic deities, without at the same time making them altogether unreal. So also, in Br. iii. 9, Śākalya asks: “How many gods are there?” Yājñavalkya’s answer is that the number may be variously conceived as several thousands, several hundreds and also as thirty-three, six, three, two, one-and-half, and also as *one*. Then, a list of thirty-three is given, of whom the larger numbers are but a glorious unfolding. But these thirty-three may be

further reduced until we reach the *prāṇa* ' or Braluna who is also called the " That " ' (Br. iii. 9. 9).

The world of the Vedas, and therefore that of the Upaniṣads also, was so full of gods and semi-divine agencies that matter as matter hardly existed for them at all. We seldom find anything in the Upaniṣads which suggests that the material world is dead matter alone, and not either an emanation from Brahma or at least presided over by deities. Thus in Taitt. i. 7, we are told of the material world—the '*adhibhūtam*' ; but even there the enumeration of the things of the world includes '*ātman*' ; the others are water, plants, etc. And they are to be thought of along with the '*adhiloka*' (earth, sky, etc.), and the '*adhidera*' (*agni, vāyū*, etc.). And this whole is to be thought of as in-dwelt by Brahma. In i. 6. 2, the same Upaniṣad speaks of Brahma as '*ākāśa-śarīra*' —i.e., as having space as his body. Vedānta-Sūtra i. 4, 23, *et seq.*, considers the Upaniṣadic texts which regard the material world as a *mode* of Brahma ('*pariṇāma*'). The same idea is further elaborated in Sūtras ii. 1. 24, *et seq.* The incessant campaign that the Sūtras carry on against the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika systems, i.e., systems that believe in an unconscious material principle as the cause of the universe, also indicate the attitude of the Upaniṣads towards matter ; for, it is needless to point out that the Sūtras only expound what is contained in the Upaniṣads (*cf.* Sūtras ii. 1, 4, *et seq.* ; ii. 2. 11, *et seq.*). Matter, therefore, offered no difficulty to the Upaniṣadic thinkers ; and the unification of the deities implied for them the unification of the world of phenomena also.

Having unified the senses in the concept of the soul and the deities of the external world in a supreme deity, the Upaniṣadic thinkers had nothing else to do but synthesise these two in a higher unity in order to attain the concept of Brahma. The external world for them was really the world of deities ; and the internal world was the world of the senses presided over again by these deities. These two parallel multiplicities are unified first into two apparently separate unities ; these two are next thought of as one and this is Brahma.

In Praśna iv, we have this attempt preserved. " Just as birds retire for shelter to their nest on a tree, so does everything

ultimately depend on the *great soul*:—the gross earth and the essence of earth, water and its essence,—the eye and the visible objects, the ear and the audible things,.....the *prāṇa* and all that the *prāṇa* sustains." Here we find the senses of vision, of audition, etc., and the corresponding sensuous objects are all unified in Brahma.

In Ch. iii. 18, similarly, we are told : " One should worship *manas* as Brahma ; this is worship as conducted within the self (*adhyātma*). As to worship conducted outside in the world of gods (*adhidaivata*), *ākāśa* or space should be worshipped, as Brahma. Both these kinds of worship or meditation—*adhyātma* as well as *adhidaivata*—have been enjoined. This Brahma has a fourfold manifestation : *rāk* is one, *prāṇa* is one, *cakṣu* (eye) is one and the ear is one. This is his manifestation in the soul (*adhyātma*). As to his manifestation in the world of gods (*adhidaivata*), *Āgni* is one, *Vāyu* is one, *Āditya* is one, and the directions of space are one. Both these forms of meditation have been enjoined—the *adhyātma* and the *adhidaivata*." And so on. Here also we find a unification of the senses and the sense-world in Brahma.

(3) The stages indicated above give us Brahma as the supreme Unity of all things. Incidentally it is also no doubt suggested that He is a spirit. But the idea that He is a spirit is more fully developed after the individual is conceived as spirit and is thought as one with Brahma. Thus in Br. ii, in the famous Bālaki-Ājātaśatru anecdote, we have an attempt to reach Brahma in the manifestations of nature—in the sun, moon, lightning, sky, air, fire, water,—in the reflexion of a person in a mirror, in the sound that follows him when he walks, in the space on his sides, in his shadow, and finally in his intellect (*ātman*: cf. Śaṅkara). But all these attempts fail. We are then taken to a sleeping man who is called up and awakes. Thence it is argued that when a man sleeps, the soul withdraws itself with the senses from the external world and moves in a world of its own. Like a great king at the head of his officers, now going to his territories and now coming back to his city, the soul also at the head of its senses comes to the periphery of the organism and dominates it and then in sleep withdraws to its central abode in the inmost

cavity of the heart. Here we reach the conception of a spirit as distinguished from the body yet controlling it like a king controlling his territories.

Having thus reached the conception of a spirit, our author quietly proceeds to say that it is the source of all things. Like sparks proceeding from a fire, all the *prāṇas*, all the *lokas*, in fact everything proceeds from this *ātman*. Obviously this *ātman* of the individual is taken to be the same as the *ātman* of the universe.

In Br. iii. 7, we are introduced to the conception of an '*antaryyāmin*' or indwelling controller—the spirit that controls the universe. These texts are considered in Vedānta-Sūtra i. 2. 18, *et seq.*, and also in ii. 3. 13. We are told by the author of the Sūtras that the term *antaryyāmin* there refers to Brahma. He is the spirit that is in earth, water, fire; He is in the heavens, in air, in the sky, in the sun; He is in light, in darkness, in fact, in everything. Besides, He is in *prāṇa*, in speech, in the eye, and so on. And He is also in the individual soul. Not only is He immanent in everything, but He is also the controller and director of everything. He is the great seer, the great hearer, the great knower—in fact, He is the great spirit.

In Br. iii. 8, the same idea is more eloquently expressed. We are told there that the sun, moon, heaven and earth, time and the divisions of time—the moments, day and night, the half-month, the month, the seasons, the year—all these are held in their place and made to function according to an appointed system, by this indwelling spirit.

(4) The next and final stage in the evolution of the concept of Brahma, was to regard Him as the source as well as the end of all things. This also is done in plenty of places. Thus, in Br. ii, we have both these forms of reasoning side by side. We are told that "just as smoke emanates from a fire with damp fuel, so the Vedas, etc., are breathed out by the great Soul." Again, we are also told that just as all waters flow unto the sea, so does the universe culminate in Brahma (*cf.* Praśna, vi. 5). In Taitt. iii. 1, Brahma is described as that from which all things are born, by whom all things, when born, are sustained and in whom they all merge at the end of their existence. In Br. i, and Ch. vi, we

have the cosmogony of our philosophers; and along with it, we have the conception of Brahma as the origin and end of all things.

Taitt. iii, seems to give us in the form of an anecdote, an account of the way in which the concept of Brahma was gradually reached by the Upaniṣadic thinkers. Brahma is that from whom all things proceed, by whom all things are sustained and in whom all things eventually terminate. How can He be known? As food (*anna*), as *prāṇa*, as the eye (*cakṣu*), as the ear (*śrotra*), as mind (*manas*), and as speech (*vak*). These are the gateways, as it were, of knowing Brahma (*cf.* Śaṅkara, on this text). The disciple tries one after another of these means, but eventually discovers Him in the innermost recesses of his heart as *ānanda* (bliss).

According to Ch. viii. 1, the alpha and omega of the universe and of the finite self, is to be found in "that which dwells in the little lotus-shaped dwelling house in the city of Brahma,"—meaning thereby the cavity of the heart (*cf.* Vedānta-Sūtra, i. 3. 14, *et seq.*). Brahma is sought in the external world—in nature where the manifold deities manifest themselves; He is also sought in the subjective realm of the soul—in the senses and their function. The world is found to agree with the senses and the senses with the world. This leads to the notion of a higher reality which comprehends them both. This is Brahma.

It must not be imagined from what we have said above that the Upaniṣadic mind first knew Brahma as a unity, then as a spirit, and last of all as the origin and end of all things. We are not suggesting a chronological order but only a *logical* sequence. The concept of Brahma implied these three aspects and what we have attempted here is only to indicate the way in which these aspects gradually emerged in the thinking of the Upaniṣadic philosophers.

It will also be noticed in the above account that the Upaniṣadic thinkers arrived at the concept of Brahma not from an observation of nature so much as from an insight into the workings of their own soul. Two things really mattered for them:—the gods in the world outside and the *prāṇas* within. The material world—the elements of nature, earth, water, fire, etc.—were at best only the '*āyatana*'—a plane of existence or sphere of activity of the deities (*cf.* Br. iii. 9; Ait. ii. 4; etc.). The gods they inherited from the Vedas and the *prāṇas*, though not entirely a fresh

discovery (*cf.* Atharva-veda, xi. 4), were analysed and emphasised more fully by them. And it was from these that the concept of Brahma as an all-pervading and all-controlling reality arose.

It was not merely an empirical concept; it was not merely a summation of experiences of diversity. But it arose out of a perception of the manifold of the world and the diversity of soul-function, which themselves betrayed the unity underlying them. And in this the Upaniṣadic thinkers differed largely from the early Ionian thinkers. These latter arrived at the conception of soul (*nous*), after trying to unify the manifold of the world with the help of material principles, such as water, or air, or fire. No doubt, for them the material principle (*hylē*) was instinct with life (*zoē*). Yet, from all we know about them this principle was not regarded in the same way as a Vedic ṛṣi would regard a god, such as Agni, Varuṇa, etc. This difference probably explains the fact that while the successors of the Ionian thinkers in Greece had some difficulty in tackling the problem of matter (*hylē*), the Upaniṣadic thinkers and their successors who inherited the whole fabric of Vedic thought, were not troubled with the vexed question of the relation between matter and spirit. They slowly climbed up to the concept of Brahma as the soul of man and at the same time of the world, as a spirit which gave rise to matter as well; and they conceived the material world itself as in-dwelt by spiritual presences, as, in fact, a manifestation of spirit-realities; and this saved them the trouble of finding a solution of the duality which was the stumbling-block of the Cartesian School and which was overcome by Spinoza more or less in the same way as by them, *viz.*, with the help of the concept of an all-pervading and all-producing Absolute. Both Spinoza and the Upaniṣadic thinkers were God-intoxicated men; but unlike Spinoza, the Upaniṣadic thinkers did not inherit a sharp and unbridgeable duality of mind and matter: they rather had gods without and gods within; and Brahma topped them all and was easily conceived as the beginning and end of them all—as the source, sustainer and goal of all.

NYĀYA DOCTRINE OF COMPARISON (UPAMĀNA)

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The word 'comparison' is the English equivalent for the Sanskrit term 'Upamānam' as used in the different systems of Indian Philosophy. The term 'Upamāna' is derived from the words, *Upa* meaning approximation, and *māna* meaning cognition. Etymologically considered therefore, *Upamāna* or Comparison consists in the cognition of similarity between two objects. This derivative meaning, however, requires certain qualifications in order to give a complete definition of 'Upamāna.' In the first place, 'Upamāna' as a valid method (pramāṇa) gives us knowledge of the relation between an object and its name (saijñā-saijñānam). Secondly, the cognition of similarity, that leads to the knowledge of the connection between an object and its name must be distinguished in a two-fold way. It must be a cognition of resemblance to a familiar object of experience as also one that must have been testified to by the declaration of an authoritative person.* Thirdly, we observe that the same cognition of the relation between a thing and its name (upamiti) may, in some cases, be due to the cognition of dissimilarity (vaidharmyopamāna) or of a peculiar property as such (dharma-mātropamāna) in the same way as it is due to that of similarity (sādharmyopamāna) in others. Now keeping all these facts in view we propose to give the following definition of 'Upamāna as pramāṇa.' Upamāna or comparison is the source of true knowledge of the relation between a thing

* It is to be noted that the original tendency was to take verbal cognition of the similarity, as the ground of the resulting cognition of an object as related to a name. According to the later Naiyāyikas, however, it is perceived similarity, reinforced by memory of the previous verbal cognition, that leads to the knowledge in question.

and its name, through the cognition of its known similarity to a well-known object or otherwise. Thus a citizen, who does not know what kind of animal a 'gavaya' may be like, is told by a woodman that it is just like the cow that is familiar to the citizen. The similarity of the 'gavaya' to the well-known cow being made known to the citizen when next he encounters a wild ox (gavaya) in the forest he cognises its similarity to the cow and comes to know that the name 'gavaya' belongs to the animal before him and others of its kind. Likewise, when a medical student collects plants he is guided by the 'Upamāna-principle based on similarity and dissimilarity' (sāmānyavādī-bhūmyopamāna), because he identifies plants according to the descriptions given in the *Materia Medica*. As to Upamāna based on the cognition of certain peculiar property as such (dharma-mātra) we have an instance in the citizen's application of the name 'karava' to the camel, through the cognition of its peculiar features as these are made known to him by some trustworthy assertion.*

We may compare the Nyāya view of Upamāna with that of other systems of Indian philosophy. Of these systems, however, it is only the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta that recognise Upamāna as an independent method of valid knowledge, while others deny all validity to it or include it under Perception or Inference or Testimony. But while agreeing with the Nyāya system in accepting Upamāna as a distinct pramāṇa, the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta systems differ markedly from the Nyāya in their conception of Upamāna. In both we have essentially the same conception expressed in slightly different ways. According to both, Upamāna is the instrumental cause of the knowledge of likeness of an object not now perceived, due to cognition of likeness in another perceived object. Thus when a citizen meets with a 'gavaya' in the forest, he has a cognition of its likeness to the familiar cow at home, which is indeed a product of perception. But next he has a cognition of the cow's likeness to the 'gavaya.' This latter cognition of the similarity of the 'gavaya' inhering in the cow is based on comparison.† This cannot be due to per-

* Bhāṣya, Vārtika, Tātparyā, Vytti on Nyāya Sūtra 1-1-6. Kārikavah Tarkasamgraha, Tarkabhāṣā, etc.

† Varadarāja, Sūtrasamgraha, 23. Sāstradipikā, Vedāntaparibhāṣā, etc.

ception, since the cow is not actually present before the citizen at the time when he perceives the 'gavaya' in the forest. Nor can it be due to inference in which the subject (citraka) is always an object of perception and the ground (liṅga) is present in the subject. Here however the subject of reasoning, *i.e.*, the cow, is not an object of immediate perception and the alleged mark (hūga), *i.e.*, the perceived likeness, is related not to the cow but to the 'gavaya.' It must be due to an independent pramāṇa called Upamāna or comparison. Hence while the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta schools take comparison as the basis of our judgments of similarity and dissimilarity, the Nyāya establishes it as a method of naming, definition and identification.

Next, the Naiyāyikas argue that comparison is not only a valid but a distinct and independent method of knowledge (pramāṇa). It brings about the cognition of the relation between a name and the class of objects denoted by it. This cognition cannot be accounted for by any other recognised pramāṇa, say, Perception or Inference or Testimony. Hence there must be some other pramāṇa which is different and distinct from all the rest and which is the means or source of our knowledge of the name of a group of things. This distinct and valid source of knowledge or pramāṇa is called Upamāna. We have observed that the Naiyāyika view of Upamāna as a valid and distinct pramāṇa has been accepted by the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta systems, although their conception of Upamāna is different from that of the Nyāya system. But the other systems of Indian Philosophy accord an altogether different treatment to comparison. In some systems it has been denied the bare position of a valid source of knowledge or pramāṇa as such. In some other systems it has indeed been recognised as a valid source of knowledge or pramāṇa, but not as a distinct and independent pramāṇa. These include it either under Perception or Inference or Verbal Testimony and so regard it as a specific form of one or other of these pramāṇas. Hence the Naiyāyikas take great pains to establish the validity of Upamāna as a distinct pramāṇa, *i.e.*, as not only valid but also irreducible to any other pramāṇa.

With regard to the first point, namely, the question of bare validity, it has been pointed out by the Sceptics and the Chārvākas

that Ūpamāna has no validity at all and so must be excluded from the list of pramāṇas. It is urged here that comparison is based upon similarity or dissimilarity of some sort. Of such similarity etc., there are three possible variations. It may be either perfect or semi-perfect or partial and imperfect. But none of these can yield the desired result, *viz.*, the valid cognition of a thing's name. Thus in the case of 'comparison based on similarity' (Sādharmyopamāna) we see that there can be no Ūpamāna if the similarity denotes perfect resemblance between two things. Supposing there is perfect resemblance between the cow and the 'gavaya,' the assertion: "the 'gavaya' is like the cow" is tantamount to the statement: 'the cow is like the cow.' But this statement is tautological and leads to no new cognition. Likewise if we take the similarity in the sense of semi-perfect or imperfect resemblance there is nothing to prevent the application of the name, 'gavaya' to the buffalo or the cat, since the former resembles the cow in many points and the latter in some such unimportant point as the nature of being an animal. This shows **that** in whatever possible form we may take the similarity, which is the basis of Sādharmyopamāna, there is no sure path leading from this right on to the desired cognition of the subject as denoted by a name. The same reasons have, *mutatis mutandis*, the effect of overthrowing the other kinds of Ūpamāna. Hence Ūpamāna cannot at all be given the status of a valid method of knowledge.*

Now the Naiyāyikas give a twofold reply to the above sceptical argument against the validity of Ūpamāna. The argument rests on a misunderstanding as to the real nature of comparison as pramāṇa. It is not the case that when comparison is based on similarity it is necessarily committed to one or other of the three modes of perfect, semi-perfect and imperfect resemblance. Far from this being so, it has been expressly laid down that the similarity must be one that has accredited bearing on the subject in question. That is, the similarity in question must be essential and requisite, and serve as the sufficient ground for the cognition of the relation between a thing and its name. Comparison as a valid

* Nyāya-Sūtra, 2-1-42. Visvanatha, Vṛtti, 2-1-42.

method operates through such resemblance as is rooted in the object and causally determines the cognition of its necessary relation to a name. As a matter of fact there is no fixed rule that the similarity must denote perfect or almost perfect or imperfect resemblance. What particular sort of resemblance is denoted by the similarity depends on the special circumstances of the case and the context in which an argument through comparison occurs. As such it makes a selection of its own objective and brings it under a concept or name in the light of our previous experience. In the stock example, the judgment 'this is gavaya' is brought about, not by the degree of resemblance between the cow and the wild ox, but by reason of the suggestiveness it has acquired in relation to our past and present experiences. It is this suggestive character that restricts the application of the name 'gavaya' to the wild ox and excludes the buffalo, the cat and the like. That comparison may sometimes lead to erroneous judgments, *e.g.*, 'this is gavaya' in the presence of a buffalo, need not be denied. But then this difficulty is not peculiar to comparison. All of our perceptions or inferences are not *ipso facto* valid. Still we accept them as valid methods of knowledge. If that be so, why deny the validity of comparison as a method? Wrong comparative judgments may, like erroneous judgments of perception, be explained as due to some faulty application of the principle and not to the logical principle itself.*

Now to the second point, namely, the question of the distinct validity of Upamāna. Admitting that Upamāna is a valid source of knowledge (pramāṇa) it may be pertinently asked: Is it also an independent method of knowledge (pramāṇāntara)? This question has been answered in the negative by several systems of Indian Philosophy. These systems reject the Naiyāyika view of Upamāna as an independent method which brings about the cognition of something that is otherwise inexplicable. On the other hand, they reduce comparison as a pramāṇa to one or other or to a combination of Perception, Inference and Verbal Testimony. Hence the Naiyāyikas spare no pains to defend their position against all attacks.

* Nyāya Sūtra, Tātparya, etc., 2-1-43.

In the first place, it has been urged by the Bauddha logicians that *upamāna* is a valid but not an independent source of knowledge. It can be explained as a form of perception or as a synthesis of perception and testimony. In the example of the 'gavaya' the contents of the knowledge derived from comparison may be analysed into (i) presentation of the points of similarity between it and the cow, and (ii) memory of certain instruction given about them in the past. But the cognition of similarity is obviously due to the perception of the 'gavaya' in relation to the cow. When one sees the cow and the 'gavaya' together he actually perceives that the latter is similar to the former. Then as to the advisory assertion, 'the gavaya is like the cow,' it is nothing more or less than verbal testimony as to the similarity between the two animals. This proves that comparison is no independent *pramāna* but only a combination of perception and testimony. Now the Naiyāyikas point out that the Bauddha contention rests on a grave mis-understanding of the real nature of comparison. The essential point in comparison is the immediate presentational knowledge (*upalabdhi*) of the relation between an object and its name. It consists neither in the perception nor in the verbal cognition of similarity between the cow and the 'gavaya.' On the other hand, comparison is the means of our cognition of the relation between a class of animals and the name 'gavaya' as a given fact. This latter cognition cannot be equated with nor adequately explained by perception or verbal cognition of similarity. Hence comparison is fundamentally different from Perception and Verbal Testimony.*

But then it has been maintained by many thinkers--the *Jains*, the *Vaiśeṣikas* and the *Sāṃkhya*s included--that comparison is only a form of inference. It may very well be conceded to the Naiyāyikas that comparison is neither the perceptual nor the verbal cognition of similarity between the cow and the 'gavaya.' Hence Perception and Testimony cannot take the place of comparison. It may also be admitted with the Naiyāyikas that comparison consists properly in the cognition of the relation between a class

of things and its name. But this latter cognition is really inferential so that it is inference and no comparison that is the ground of the knowledge in question. Analysing the Naiyāyika's comparison we find three component factors. There is first the communication of some knowledge about the denotation of a word (gavaya) by authoritative statements. This is obviously a case of knowledge by testimony and in the form of a cognition that the word 'gavaya' denotes a class of objects resembling the cow. Secondly, there is the observation of a certain animal resembling the cow. With this we have a cognition of the animal's similarity to the cow, and this cognition is purely perceptual in character as it is due to actual sense-object contact. Thirdly, there is the cognition that the name 'gavaya' denotes animals of the same class as this particular animal now actually observed. This last cognition is wrongly supposed by the Naiyāyikas to be due to comparison. Really it is an inferential cognition grounded on the knowledge of universal relation (vyāpti) between a word and its denotation. Put syllogistically in its simpler form the inference stands thus: Animals like the cow *are gavayas*: This is an animal like the cow: Therefore this is a gavaya. Here the validity of this judgment 'this is a gavaya' rests on the universal relation between the word 'gavaya' and the animals denoted by it.*

To this, the Naiyāikas give the following reply. It is true that comparison includes certain elements of knowledge derived from perception and testimony. But that cannot affect its independence as a valid method of knowledge only if it has some distinctive character of its own. Does perception become inference because it includes images and affections as well as sensations? Or, is inference the same as perception because it touches perceptual cognition at several points of its course? Comparison takes the help of perception and testimony, but it so works them up as to give a new knowledge about the name of an object, which cannot be given by perception or testimony as such.

As to inference, what it does is not so much to explain the process of reasoning involved in comparison as to test its validity. An argument through comparison does not rest on inductive generalisation and its application to a new case. The process of reasoning in comparison consists in the application of a problematic concept (*gavaya*) with a certain objective reference to some perceived facts which are suggestive of the concept. In it we do not find the necessity of the knowledge of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) between two things. The knowledge of *vyāpti* is a *conditio sine qua non* for all inferences but not so for every or any comparison. Further there is an unmistakable difference between the forms of the cognition produced by Inference and Comparison. The resulting cognition in comparison is always expressed in terms of likeness, etc., while inferential cognition is expressed in terms of the relation of ground and consequence. In inference the introspective consciousness is a feeling of the 'therefore-relation,' while in comparison it is a feeling of similarity, etc. In comparison we are not conscious of any inferring but of comparing (*Upaminomi*, that is our feeling). Hence comparison must be different from Perception, Inference and Testimony, the form of the cognition produced by it being radically different from that of the cognitions produced by the latter. *Inference* is distinguished from Perception because our cognitions are different in character in the two cases. Just for the same reason comparison is to be distinguished from other methods of valid knowledge (*pramāṇas*).*

Of course with regard to the validity of the knowledge derived from Comparison we may ask two questions : (i) What constitutes the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the knowledge? and (ii) what is the measure of its validity (*prāmāṇyaniścāyaka*)? According to the Naiyāyika, the truth of the judgment of comparison lies, like that of other judgments, in its correspondence to facts (a fact being what is immediately given). The judgment 'this is *gavaya*' is valid in so far as it attributes a character (*i.e.*, *gavayatva*) to the subject, which really belongs to it. The judgment

* *Nyāya-Sūtra*, *Bhāṣya*, *Vṛtti*, etc., 2-1-44ff. *Varadarāja*, *Sārasaṅgraha*, p. 91. *Vāchaspati*, *Tātparya*, 1-1-6.

corresponds to a real relation between the 'this' and the predicated attribute (*i.e.*, is arthākāra). As such the knowledge expressed in the judgment is cognition of a *given* fact (arthajanya).

As to the second question : What is the test of the validity of comparison? Or how are we to ascertain its truth? the Naiyāyikas would give two answers. First, it has been said that the general test of truth, namely, success of practical activity (pravṛttisāmarthya) applies very well to comparison. That the judgment of comparison is valid is established by the fact that it leads to success in practice. It is the coherence of experience between its cognitive and conative aspects that assures us of the truth of any judgment. The validity of comparison also is to be ascertained by such conative verification. Here then, the validity of our knowledge is ascertained by means of an *inference* from its workability. Knowledge based on comparison is valid because we can successfully act upon it. But from this we should not conclude that comparison is not an independent method of knowledge. The fact that the validity of comparison requires to be tested by inference is no ground for denying its independence. The validity of our perceptions and inferences requires more often than not to be substantiated by other perceptions and inferences. Still we have no misgivings as to their being independent methods of valid knowledge. What is necessary here to avoid a possible misconception is to distinguish between the fact that a method *is* valid as giving true knowledge and the other fact that we *know* its validity by means of some test. Comparison is an independent method in so far as it gives true knowledge about certain facts, although the knowledge of the truth of that knowledge depends on an external evidence like inference (parataḥprāmānyagraha). A second view of the matter, that has the support of some Naiyāyikas, is that the judgment of comparison is of itself necessarily and intrinsically valid (Svataḥpramāṇa). Knowledge by comparison has for its content a necessary external relation between two terms (the gavaya and its name). To be conscious of this necessary relation is to become self-conscious of it, *i.e.*, to know it as a necessary relation. Hence the judgment of comparison certifies its own truth, although it may be validated on some other ground

whenever necessary. Which of the two views of the knowledge of validity is true, *i.e.*, whether the validity of comparison is self-evident or not, is not discussed in this paper. But on any view of the matter comparison may be regarded as an independent method of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*).*

* *Nyāyabhāṣya Tātparya, Parīśuddhi*, etc., 1-1-1, 1-1-3 and 1-1-6.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF GAUDAPĀDA

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• Of all the systems of Indian thought that of Vedānta has undoubtedly been the greatest living spiritual force which has determined the practical and speculative life of the people. And it would not be going too far from the truth to say that of all the different schools of Vedāntism, it is the Advaita School that has received the widest acceptance from the Indian mind as it has most strongly appealed to its taste and temperament and has most convincingly satisfied the demands of its keen intellect and lofty imagination. Now, this Advaita School of Vedānta philosophy, which might be traced to the hymns of the Ṛg Veda, and which has its chequered history through the earlier Upaniṣads—sometimes looming large as in the pure Idealism of Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī symposium and sometimes obscured by realistic, pluralistic and nihilistic lines of thought, traceable to the co-operative and syncretic work that the Upaniṣads are—owes its first clearer formulation to the epoch-making genius of Gaudapāda; the Advaitism of Śaṅkara being a fuller development of the nucleus of this absolutist thought propounded by Gaudapāda, with modifications of his own. Besides the age and atmosphere to which Gaudapāda belonged was surcharged with traits of Buddhistic thought and consequently his philosophy is of perennial interest for the historian of Indian Philosophy. The philosophy of Gaudapāda thus represents a line of thought which was emerging from the vague glimmerings of the Upaniṣadic horizon on the one side, and which, while so emerging, was at the same time outshining the opposite horizon of Buddhistic subjectivism and nihilism on the other. My object in this present article is to indicate in general outline how the philosophy of Gaudapāda has given to the idealism of the

Upaniṣads a definite monistic direction and mould, avoiding at the same time the Scylla and Charybdis of Vijñānavāda and Sūnyavāda, a more detailed treatment of other aspects of his philosophy being reserved for other occasions.

The central proposition of Gaudapāda is that what is, is one unborn (aja), awake (anidra), dreamless (asvapna) consciousness which is self-illuminated (prabhatam bhavati svayam) and which is the only reality, and which is identical with Ātman. Hence it follows that reality or existence belongs only to Ātman or absolute self-consciousness and all else is unreal. The world of our experience with its diverse contents, physical and mental, is a figment of our imagination (*Māyāmātramidaṁ draitaṁ adraitam paramārthataḥ*). Gaudapāda maintains that the reality of a thing consists in "that which is complete in itself, that which is its very condition, that which is unborn, that which is not accidental or that which does not forego its own character."* Thus the test of reality being immutable persistence for all eternity and neither objectivity nor practical efficiency, and such a test being satisfied in quiescent or tranquil self-consciousness which is Ātman, it follows that the world of our experience or *Jagatprapañca* which is the field of change and becoming must be unreality. Now Gaudapāda has confirmed this his metaphysical conclusion as to the nullity of the *Jagatprapañca* by a psychological analysis of experience—first of all by pointing out the similarity of the waking world to the world of dream-consciousness, and secondly by showing that the moulds of time, space and causality into which the world of our experience is cast, are themselves meaningless and hence the world of our experience also is a mere unreality.

The most obtrusive reality which enforces itself upon our consciousness is the reality of the waking world whose existence our senses refuse to deny. Gaudapāda disillusion us by pointing out in a manner similar to Descartes' that the waking world is no more real than the world of our dream-consciousness.† Just as the objects of waking consciousness are nullified in dreams even so the objects of our dream-consciousness cease to exist with the

* Sāṁsiddhikī, svābhāvikī sahaajā akṛtā ca yā

Prakṛtiḥ seti vijñeyā svabhāvaṁ na jahāti ya, IV. 9.

† Gaudapāda's Kārikā, II, 4 and 7.

dawn of our waking life. Experiences in dreams are coherent in their own order as much as experiences in waking life are, but each of the two sets of experience is unreal in an absolute sense. But Gaudapāda differs from Descartes in so far as Descartes assigns to the world a second-hand reality derived from the reality of God. Gaudapāda also differs in this point from Śankara though they are at one in their ultimate position that Brahman or Ātman is real and the phenomenal world is unreal. Thus while Gaudapāda argues out the unreality of the world by demonstrating that the waking world is on a par with the dream-world, Śankara keeps up in a pronounced manner a distinction between the dream-world dream and the waking-world by assigning to them different degrees of reality though however he comes to the conclusion common with Gaudapāda that both the worlds melt into the ultimate reality of Brahman. Thus it follows that Gaudapāda tends more towards subjectivism than Śankara who retains in his system realistic elements in a relative and not an absolute sense.

Now the subjectivism of Gaudapāda received its colouring from the line of the *Vijñānavāda* argument which he appropriates and uses to refute the standpoint of the Realist, without however identifying himself with the *Vijñānavādin*.* The contention of the Realist is that the world of objects exists outside and independently of our mind as the determining cause of the varieties of our cognition (*prajñapti*) and feeling (*kleśasyopalabdhiśca*). But Gaudapāda points out that the extramental world is as much unreal as the mental world, that the relation of the percipient and the perceived is only apparent and not real, each of these two terms of the relation having derived their air of reality from the movement of consciousness (*vijñānaspaṇḍitam*) quite in the same manner as the line of fire of a fire-brand (*ālāta*) appears straight or curved according to the different kinds of its movement. And just as on the cessation of all movement of fire-brand all linear differences in the fire disappears, even so on the cessation of *chitta* which grows and dies and is not a reality, all differences between the mental and

* *Prajñapteh sanimittatvam ityādi etadantam, vijñānavādinō baudhaśya vacanam bahyārtha vāḍipakṣa-pratiśedhaparam acāryena anuṃmoditam. Śankara's commentary on Kārikā, IV. 28.*

the material world disappears. All duality is mental,* and whatever is mental is ultimately unreal, and if mentality or understanding could be sublated (*amanībhāve*), there would be no cognition of any duality which is the soul of the empirical existence. Now the very mind or *citta* or *viññānam* is an *ābhāsa* or unreality, for mind or *citta* grows or becomes, and whatever grows or becomes is unreal. Gaudapāda thus goes beyond the *viññānavādin* in so far as he points out that *viññānam* or *citta* which becomes is not the basic principle but an unreal aberration of one unitary changeless self-consciousness or *Ātman* in relation to which all changes are unmeaning. Hence the world of experience which is mind-begotten (*manah-kalpitam*) is as unreal as the mind itself from which it is projected.

Then from this negative attitude to the world of experience he proceeds to give us a constructive conception of the ultimate reality by a subtle dialectic which at once reminds one of Nāgārjuna.† He points out that the unreality of the world of experience suggests the reality of something which transcends experience, something which persists as a transcendent onlooker through the transient modifications of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep, and it would be complete nihilism to deny all reality as is done in the *Mādhyamika* system of thought; and this reality is thus identical with pure thought or consciousness. He goes on to say that reality alone is, and never becomes; change, becoming and origination are foreign to the nature of reality. For origination is itself an unreality. Origination to be a reality must be either self-origination or other-origination, but neither is possible. For we cannot imagine the origination of a water-pot from its own nature (*svataḥ*), nor can we reconcile ourselves to the belief that a thing can originate out of another thing (*parataḥ*) of its kind. And if it be maintained that the earthen jar originates from a source other than itself, *viz.*, from earth, then we must point out that all ideas of existence, origination and decay are forms of speech and not representing anything in reality corresponding to them. Further a thing can either be or not be. Now if a thing is, then no

* *Manodṛīyamidam dvaitam yat kincit sacarācaram*

Manasohyamanībhāve dvaitam naivopalabhyate. III. 31.

† *Mādhyamika kārīkā.* *Nirvāṇaparīkṣā*, Ch. 25, p. 197ff. (B.t.s.)

becoming or origination ; and if a thing is not, then also no origination, for origination of a non-existent thing is as absurd as the origination of the horns of a hare. And even if a thing is both *is* and *is not*, even then also origination is meaningless in respect of either of its aspects. Thus Gaudapāda concludes that since origination or change is foreign to reality and all changes belong to the world of experience which is looked down upon, as it were, by a transcendent metempiric consciousness, the ultimate reality is then that absolute consciousness or Ātman, 'the ever unborn, awake and dreamless, that illumines itself by itself.' And the finite consciousness or *citta* whose nature is origination and change is responsible for the world of experience which is the realm of duality. Now when the *citta* is dissolved, the world of diversity and change is dissolved along with it, and the translucent absolute reality of the Ātman shines forth in its own light.

The above may be said to be a synoptic representation of Gaudapāda's general philosophical standpoint in relation to the dominant current of Vedāntic thought that permeated the Hindu mind of that age and to the Buddhistic lines of thinking which were still ringing in the ears of the generation which had just passed the age of Asaṅga, Asvaghōṣa and Nāgārjuna.

Now, before I close I deem it worth while to refer to the question whether Gaudapāda was a Buddhist or belonged to the orthodox Brāhmanical School, and, along with it, to the allied question whether Gaudapāda was the first inaugurator of Advaita Vedāntism. As regards the latter question it may be urged that there seems to be no tangible evidence that between the older Upaniṣad age and Śaṅkara there appeared any individual philosopher who may be credited with the formulation of Advaitism excepting Gaudapāda. As Dr. Dasgupta puts it, "I do not know of any Hindu writer previous to Gaudapāda who attempted to give an exposition of the monistic doctrine (apart from the Upaniṣads) either by writing a commentary as did Śaṅkara, or by writing an independent work as did Gaudapāda."

There is, however, another hypothesis* that the origin of the Advaita school may be pushed beyond Gaudapāda to Upavarṣa,

* Cf. Dr. Guha's Introduction to his "Jivātman in Brahmasūtras."

the reputed Mīmāṃsā philosopher as its real founder. Such a hypothesis is based on the ground that Śaṅkara has referred to him twice in his *bhāṣya* as *Bhagavān Upavarṣa*; and that in the earlier part of his commentary on the Mīmāṃsā philosophy (prathame tantre) where he has the occasion to deal with the reality of the soul, Upavarṣa makes a promise to take up the problem in detail in the supplementary part of his commentary on the Sārīraka or the soul.* But in view of the fact that there is really nothing more than mere promise in the shape of an actual commentary on the Sārīraka available, it would be a gratuitous assumption to say that Upavarṣa was the founder of the Advaita school, of which Gaudapāda is consequently a later exponent. In the absence of positive evidence in favour of Upavarṣa, and in the face of the fact that Śaṅkara himself distinctly mentions in his commentary on the opening verse of the fourth chapter of the Kārikās that Gaudapāda is the founder of the Advaita school † it is difficult to deny Gaudapāda the credit of a founder of Advaitism. And Śaṅkara's recognition of Gaudapāda as the founder of Advaita school and as the teacher of his teacher whose tenets he is traditionally said to have been trained by the latter to represent and defend, and Gaudapāda's intrinsic doctrinal difference from what either the Vijñānavādin maintained or the Sūnyavādin denied, force one to the conclusion that Gaudapāda was a Hindu philosopher, and not a Buddhist, and was the first to promulgate the Advaita Vedāntism after the earlier Upaniṣad period.

There are, however, two things which have led some writers to surmise that Gaudapāda was a Buddhist and not a Hindu. The one is that there are several instances of similarity in expressions, such as, *prapañcopaśama*, *saṃvṛti*, *jāti*, in the sense of origination, *dharma* in the sense of quality or entity, the simile of the *ālātacakra* which are common to Gaudapāda and Nāgārjuna, and specially the similarity in the following parts of their respective verses *sambuddha stamvande dvīpadāmvaram* (G. IV. i) and *sambuddhastamvande vadatamvaram*. (N. I.) And the other reason is that Gaudapāda's method of dialectic is leavened with the Vijñā-

* Vide Brahma-Sūtras, III, 3, 58.

† Advaitadarśanasampradāyākartuḥ advaitasvarūpeṇaiva namaskārārtho'yaṁ adyaḥ ślokaḥ. Śaṅkara's Com. on the 1st Kārikā, Ch. IV.

navāda and Sūnyavāda spirit, as we have already hinted at. Dr. Dasgupta has based his conclusion that Gaudapāda was himself a Buddhist on these evidences; and the special point worthy of note in this connection is that the expression, *asparśa-yoga*, has been interpreted by him as “probably referring to Nirvāṇa.”

But we would venture to differ in this point from the learned Doctor, and would like to point out that this similarity in form and matter of Gaudapāda's arguments is indeed a similarity, but does not, however, on that account argue him a Buddhist any more than the sophistical expressions and dialectic used by Socrates make him a sophist or Kantian. Besides all the assertions of the learned Doctor with regard to Gaudapāda's adherence to Buddhism are scarcely more than problematic. “I believe,” he says, “that there is sufficient evidence in his Kārikās for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist and considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha.” Then he whittles down the force of his problematic remark by further adding that, “it is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or Buddhist, so long as we are sure that he had the highest respect for the Buddha and for the teachings he believed to be his. Certainly to have regard for a particular tenet of philosophy or religion and its founder is not equivalent to identifying oneself with that tenet.

As regards his adoption of the so-called Buddhistic expressions it may be pointed out that the expressions, *prapañcopaśamam*, *siram* and the like which are said to point to Nāgārjuna's terminology, are no less the watch-words of the Upaniṣadic teachers. In fact they occur within the very Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad (Śloka 7 and 12), which Gaudapāda undertakes to explain. As for the specific expression, *asparśa-yoga*, which Dr. Dasgupta interprets as “probably referring to Nirvāṇa,” it may be urged that in the two places where that expression occurs (III, 39, and IV, 2), there is the unmistakable reference from the context, to the relationless self-consciousness or Ātman realizable by Yoga. Nor can we lay Gaudapāda down as a Buddhist for the similarity of his dialectic to that of Nāgārjuna either. For to think that a full-fledged propounder of the Upaniṣad doctrine was ignorant of dialectical argument, so much so that he must have imitated Nāgārjuna in this matter, is to ignore the entire trend of Upaniṣad

teachings. And apart from this general relation even specific instances of dialectic argument resembling that of Nāgārjuna are not infrequent in the Upaniṣads. The very seventh Śloka of the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad which he undertakes to annotate and to elaborate runs as, “*nāntahprajñam na bahihprajñam nobhaya-tahprajñam, na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam,*” and this is apparently a facsimile of the dialectic which Nāgārjuna has employed in his attempt to determine the nature of Nirvāṇa among other things. Moreover, supposing that Gaudapāda was a Buddhist there seems to be no ostensible reason why he of all Buddhists has taken care to expound any of the Upaniṣads, the sacred texts of the anti-Buddhistic cult.

The real situation seems to be this that Gaudapāda who was inspired with the subtle monistic idealism of the Upaniṣads had to meet the arguments of Buddhism which had just established its stronghold upon the Indian mind by the great genius of Aśaṅga, Asvaghōṣa and Nāgārjuna previous to him, and therefore he could not but be largely influenced by the line and spirit of their arguments and also could not possibly establish his own standpoint against Buddhism without meeting its votaries on their own grounds. That he was not a Buddhist and that his doctrine differs fundamentally from that of the Buddhist, has been emphatically pointed out by himself in so many words when he says, “*naitad buddhena bhāṣitam,*” where he finally distinguishes his own position from that of the Buddhist of the Vijñānavāda school by insisting that the one ultimate reality of the Ātman which transcends all relation of knowledge, knower and the known, has never been posited by Buddha. It is more proper, perhaps, to say that Gaudapāda cast the Buddhist line of thought into the Vedāntic mould than to think that Gaudapāda was a Buddhist, or was at least a crypto-Buddhist.

GAUDAPĀDA AND VAŚIṢṬHA

(A comparative survey of their philosophy)

BY

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Gaudapāda, the author of the famous *Kārikās* on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, is quite well-known to the world of Indian Philosophy. He is considered by the oriental scholars to be the first exponent of the Advaita Vedānta after the *Upaniṣads*. This view stands unchallenged only so long as the work known as the *Yoga-Vāśiṣṭha* has not been studied, and its date definitely determined. It is really strange why oriental scholars have not yet turned their attention to this important work which when studied thoroughly will perhaps be found not to be a post-Śaṅkara work, as it is generally believed to be. In the *Yoga-Vāśiṣṭha* we find almost every view held by Gaudapāda, and there can be found lines in the *Yoga-Vāśiṣṭha* parallel to almost every line of the II, III, and IV chapters of the *Kārikās* which represent the philosophical position of Gaudapāda, yet it is strange that there is hardly any line, except one or two borrowed perhaps from some common source too well-known at that time, which is literally identical in the two. Leaving the question which work is the earlier of the two to the historians, we shall here attempt a brief survey of the opinions shared equally by both Gaudapāda and Vāśiṣṭha, the philosopher in the *Yoga-Vāśiṣṭha*, under four main heads, namely, *Idealism* (*Kalpanā-vāda*), *Illusionism* (*Māyā-vāda*), *Acosmism* (*Ajāta-vāda*), and the *Method of Self-realisation* (*Yoga*).

I. *Idealism* (*Kalpanā-vāda*).

It has been sometimes maintained by the students of Hindu philosophy that "Hindu thinkers have been and are (in the

epistemological sense) not only Realists but Realists of a thorough-going type. There is no trace of Subjectivism which may be found in the Buddhist schools." Now, whatever might be said of other Hindu thinkers including perhaps Sankara also, Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha at any rate were thorough-going Idealists. Both of them hold that the reality of the world-experience consists in its being imagined by mind. Here is what Gaudapāda says : " The external as well as the internal objects are all imagined (K. II. 14). Those objects that are in the subtle condition within as well as those that are manifest without, are all the work of imagination, the difference between them lying only in the means of their cognition (K. II. 15). The whole experience consisting of perceiver and perceived is merely imagination of mind (K. IV. 72). The whole duality, of whatever kind, is merely a phenomenon of mind (K. III. 31). As movement makes a fire-brand appear straight, crooked, etc., so activity makes thought appear as perceiver and perceived (K. IV. 47). As are dreams, magical creations, and castles-in-the-air, so declare the scholars of the *Upaniṣads*, this cosmos to be (K. II. 31). All entities are like dream-objects sent forth by the creative power of the Self (K. II. 5)."

In the same way declares Vasiṣṭha :—

" Everything in the world-experience is the work of imagination only (YV. VIb. 210.11). All this world-experience is a wonderful working out of consciousness in itself like the rising and falling of the city of dream (YV. VIb. 42.16). All the three worlds are the creation of the activity of mind alone (YV. IV. 11.13.) This universe is considered to be the overflow of mind (YV. IV. 47.48). Everything is constructed by the imagination of the self as in dream (YV. III. 10.35). The world-experience comes out of the heart of consciousness as a tree comes out of a seed (YV. VIb. 51.8). The world-experience is like a castle-in-the air (YV. VIa. 33.45)." And so on.

Do they give reasons like Berkeley for holding this startling position in philosophy? Yes they do give some, though not in a

systematic way. Gaudapāda is very brief in his statements. His arguments for Idealism may be gathered from the following : “ (i) A thing is said to be real because it is experienced and on account of its being the cause of an action. But are the objects of our illusory knowledge which are mere ideas of the mind not such? There is no difference between the two in these respects. Therefore the so-called real things are also thought-creations as the illusory ones are (K. IV. 44). (ii) We all know that mind assumes a duality of the objects and the subject in dream by its own power, so there is no reason why in the waking experience we should not think that it acts in the same manner through the same cause (K. III. 30). (iii) The duality (of the perceiver and the perceived) is a work of the mind because when the mind is annihilated, *i.e.*, expanded into the Infinite Self (as in the case of Samādhi) the duality is not at all experienced (K. III. 31).”

The arguments of Vasiṣṭha for Idealism may be gathered as the following :—

“ (i) The phenomenon of knowledge cannot be explained if the subject and object are two things quite different and opposed in their nature, for no relation can exist between two heterogeneous things (YV. III. 121.37,42). That which comes into consciousness cannot but be a mode of consciousness for nothing of a different nature could have entered consciousness (YV. VIb. 25.12). If the object were something of a different nature from the knowing mind, it will ever remain unknown, and there would then be no proof even of its existence (YV. VIb. 25.15). (ii) The whole world-experience, with its cities and mountains, etc., can be duplicated in dreams. We all know that the dream objects are only modes of consciousness. There is no reason why the objects of the waking experience should not be taken to be so. (iii) The world-experience and its objects do not exist for the consciousness of the Yogī (who has learnt to put a stop to the activity of his mind) (YV. III. 60.27). When the mind is lost in the Infinite consciousness (as in the case of Nirvāṇa) there is no experience of any duality (YV. VIa. 93.44). All these considerations show that the mind is the nave of the wheel of the world (YV. V. 49.40).”

But then, is there any difference between dreams and the waking experience if the latter is just like the former which, of course, we all know to be a play of ideas in our mind? Both Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha think that there is hardly any difference between the contents of the two. Thus says Gaudapāda :—"The wise regard the waking and the dream states as one because of the similarity of the objective experiences in them (K. II. 5). The mind, though one, appears dual (subject and object) in dream, so also in the waking state, it, though one, appears dual through its creative power (K. III. 30), etc." In the same way Vasiṣṭha holds that "There is no difference between waking and dream-experiences except that one is more stable than the other. The contents of both are similar in entirety, always and everywhere (YV. IV. 19.11). The waking experience is just like that of dream (YV. III. 57.50), etc., etc., (YV. VIb. 23, 24, 29, 42). Dream also appear as waking states so long as they last, and the waking state looks like a dream when the objects of perception are not stable and lasting (YV. IV. 20.12). From the standpoint of the permanent Self there is absolutely no difference between the contents of dream and waking state (YV. VIb. 161.24). Although the waking man never apprehends his waking state to be a dream, the dead man rising again to experience a new life thinks his past life to have been a dreamlike existence (YV. VIb. 161.25). As a man may recollect the many sleep-dreams he has experienced throughout his life, so the Perfect Sages can remember the waking dreams they have experienced in their long history of transmigration (YV. VIb. 161.30)."

Now, if the world-experience is a work of imagination, who is the author of it? Gaudapāda raises this question in K. II. 11 and answers it thus: "The Ātman, all light, imagines these objects by himself through his own power; he alone cognises the objects so sent forth. This is the last word of the Vedānta on the subject (K. II. 12). The Lord brings about the variety of subjective experience as well as that of objective experience (K. II. 13). The first result of ideation is Jīva from which the various entities subjective and objective come forth (K. II. 16)." Thus according to Gaudapāda, the first product of the Creative imagination in the Absolute Reality, which is Consciousness, is

Jīva (a finite entity) which imagines the objects of its experience. Vasiṣṭha calls the Subject of world-experience by many names one of which is also Jīva, but the names most often used are *Manas* and *Brahmā*. "The world-experience," thus says Vasiṣṭha, "is spread out by *Brahmā* manifesting himself in the form of *Manas* (YV. III. 3.29)." How *Brahmā* arises in the Absolute Reality is explained thus: "*Manas* comes out of the Absolute Reality like a sprout. The Creative power of the Absolute Reality (which is always inherent in it as its inseparable nature) by its own free-will, in a mere sportful overflow, comes to self-consciousness at a particular point, which in reality is forgetfulness of its being one with the whole reality, and on account of intensity there, begins to vibrate in the form of imagining activity ('conceiving') and assumes a separate and distinct existence for itself apart from the Whole whose one aspect it is in reality (YV. IV. 44.4; III. 96.3; IV. 42.4, 5; VIa. 114, 15, 16; VIa. 33.30; III. 2.56; etc., etc.)."

Thus we see that Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha have the same Idealistic standpoint. Gaudapada, however, does not raise the problem, which is very important metaphysically, whether it is the individual or the Cosmic Jīva which imagines the world-experience including that of every individual. On the answer of this question will depend whether he is a Subjective or an Objective idealist. Vasiṣṭha raises the problem and answers it in a satisfactory way reconciling the claims of both Solipsism and Realism, which does not concern us here.

II. Illusionism (*Māyā-vāda*).

Having established the ideality or the imaginary nature of the world-experience, both Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha proceed to point out another very important feature of the objects of experience, namely, their temporary appearance in the field of consciousness. We have seen that the objects of the waking life are similar to those of dream-state. But we generally regard the contents of a dream to be unreal because they do not persist for a long time, but

come into consciousness for a short while and vanish. Similarly in the waking experience we regard some objects as unreal appearances when they are perceived for a short while but vanish soon from the view. But is not the experience of everything in this world of a similar nature for the eternally existent Self, before whose vision numberless objects have come and gone? The Eternal Self has experienced the beginning and end of innumerable objects. Every object of experience has in the consciousness of the Self a beginning and an end before and after which the object was not and will not be. But can that which is real ever cease to be? If it is real it must ever exist. A temporary appearance cannot be said to be real. This is how both Gaudapāda and Vasiṣṭha argue. The real, according to Vasiṣṭha, is "that which never comes to an end (YV. III. 4.62), and that which has a beginning and an end cannot be real in any way, for real is only that which has neither a beginning nor an end (YV. IV. 5, 9)." Gaudapāda also repeats the same line literally in K. II. 6; and in K. IV. 31 which has been translated as "That which is naught at the beginning and is so also at the end, does necessarily not exist in the middle." "On this logic of reality the objects of experience cannot be said to be real at all (K. II. 32)." But do they not appear to be so? So do illusions and dream-objects appear, but we all know them to be unreal. "All things seen in dream," says Gaudapāda, "are unreal, being seen within the body; for in so small space how could objects exist and be seen." So on and so forth (K. IV. 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, II. 1, 2, 3). "Objects therefore are illusory appearances though they appear to be real (K. II. 6). That they serve some purpose (and so should be regarded as real in opposition to the illusory appearances which do not serve any purpose) comes to naught in dream, hence (on the previous above-mentioned principle) they are illusory appearances (K. II. 7). Even in dream we make the usual distinction of unreal, calling the subjective imagination within the dream unreal and the objectively existent things as real, as we do in the waking experience. Yet in fact both are illusory appearances (K. II. 9, 10)." So, as Vasiṣṭha says, all objects of experience should be viewed as "illusory appearances, visions of ignorance, mere *māyā* (literally that which does not exist), delusions of consciousness and dream-

like appearances (YV. III. 57, 54); like illusory water in a desert (YV. IV. 1.7); like an unsubstantial rainbow (YV. IV. 1.23); like the appearance of a snake in a rope (YV. 100.58); like an unreal city in the sky (YV. VIb. 190.13); like a second moon in the vision of a diseased eye (YV. III. 66.7); and like the movement of trees in the vision of an intoxicated fellow (YV. III. 8); "etc., etc.

In this connection, it will be interesting to note in the *Kārikās* as well as in the *Yoga-Vāśiṣṭha* the connotation of the term *Māyā* which has played a very conspicuous part in the subsequent philosophy of India, and has very often been misunderstood both by the followers of *Māyārāda* and its opponents; specially because Gaudapāda is generally believed to be the father of *Māyārāda* in Vedānta. The word *Māyā* occurs in some eight *Kārikās* of Gaudapāda: (II. 12; III. 19, 27, 28; IV. 58, 59, 61, 69). A careful consideration of the significance of the word will bring one to the conclusion that by Gaudapāda *Māyā* is used in the sense of a peculiar power which enables its possessor to create some forms which do not exist in the sense of the really existent, yet give the appearance of their being so, and also enables him to multiply or change himself into any number of forms, without, however, himself undergoing the slightest modification. The products of such power were characterised as *Māyā-maya* (मायामय) and sometimes as *māyā* even. An illustration of such a peculiar capacity was, in old times when people did not know well the secret of the so-called magic, found in the activity of a magician. Śaṅkara very often uses this illustration to make people understand *Māyā*. But a careful study of the stories of Lavana (YV. III) and Gādhī (YV. V book) given by Vāśiṣṭha in illustration of *Māyā* will convince us that *Māyā* is not like the power of a magician so much as like that of a Hypnotist, in the best possible sense, who by his thought-power can produce, and was able to produce in ancient India, before the vision of others, or even of himself, things and scenes which do not exist in reality, but appear to exist. *Māyā* is thus, according to Vāśiṣṭha, a power or capacity of the Absolute Reality, which is Consciousness, to think out or "conceive" forms which come to exist when thus thought out or imagined (YV. VIb. 70.18). "It is the Creative Power of the

Ultimate Reality and it can imagine the world-appearance as the thought-power of an ordinary man can build his world of imagination (YV. VIb. 78.6). It is called by the names of Prakṛti, Divine Will, Creative Force, and the World-Māyā (YV. VIb. 85.14)."

So there is nothing very peculiar about the word *Māyā* which has been very much misunderstood in the later philosophy of India. The reason why it has been so misunderstood is perhaps the sense of illusoriness accompanying the word. If the conception of the real and the unreal of Gaudapāda and Vaśiṣṭha stated above that 'all that has a beginning and an end is unreal' is accepted, it will be quite clear that except Consciousness which experiences the beginning and end of all objects everything is unreal, however long it may appear in the field of consciousness. In this sense all the products of *Māyā* are unreal, for they have a beginning and an end. The activity of the Divine Will itself having a beginning and an end is unreal. And Will has no meaning when not active; it, being merged in and become one with the Infinite and Absolute Consciousness then, is also called unreal both by Gaudapāda and Vaśiṣṭha (K. IV. 58; YV: VIb. 82. 2, 3, 26, 27).

III. *Acosmism (Ajāta-vāda).*

Just as *kalpanā-vāda* paves a way for *māyā-vāda* so does the latter do for *ajāta-vāda* or acosmism. Acosmism is the doctrine which denies the existence of the world of plurality and change in and before the truly real. It shuns a compromise between real and unreal, being and non-being, perfection and imperfection, logic and life. It is rigorously logical, and pursues logic to its furthest flight, caring little for the consequences and ridicule from the man in the street, for the opinion of whom the Pragmatists care much. For it truth is truth and should not stand in need of respecting the so-called demands of life. Parmenides and Spinoza, Vaśiṣṭha, Gaudapāda and Śaṅkara have been the greatest acosmistic thinkers of the world.

In philosophy even, Acosmism is the least understood doctrine. It is often talked of only to be criticised and ridiculed, and seldom to be sympathetically understood. Yet Gaudapāda asserts twice in his *Kārikās* (III. 48 ; IV. 71) that "It is the highest truth." So also does Vaśiṣṭha say that "It is the most victorious doctrine of the Spiritual Science that in reality there is neither ignorance nor illusion but only Brahman resting peaceful in its own glory (YV. VIa. 125-1)."

We have no time here to go through all the arguments which Gaudapāda and Vaśiṣṭha give in favour of Acosmism. We shall therefore be content only to notice a few points in this connection. It is not difficult to grasp the logic of Acosmism only if we raise our vision a little higher than the usual and be strictly logical apart from the consequences. Gaudapāda names his view *Ajāta-vāda* (non-production) and argues for it thus : "That which is cannot be produced (for it is already there), and that which is not cannot also be produced (for it will be something coming out of nothing which is quite absurd) (K. IV. 5)." "It is inconceivable that the unborn and the immortal which ever exists can ever become mortal (IV. 6)," for as we have seen beginning and end imply unreality and the real is always real. Moreover, change is an illogical conception for it implies the transformation of a thing into something else. But how can anything change into what it is not? If it is something, it must ever remain what it is. "The real can never become unreal, for the one *is* and the other *is not* (K. IV. 7-9)."

These statements are not mere quibbles; behind them lies a great truth which must not be ignored. The Principle of Identity in formal logic requires in the judgment 'S is P' the presence of some identical X which persists unchanged both in S and P, to make the judgment possible. If we look deep into this problem, we shall discover that from the point of view of X there is neither S nor P for X always subsists as X unchanged in spite of its changes of form from another point of view. This is made clear by Vaśiṣṭha through a number of illustrations. Think of a gold ornament, a bracelet or a ring. From our points of view bracelet and ring are realities, for they, as bracelet and ring, have a peculiar value for us which mere gold has not. But if we

look at them from the point of view of gold as such, bracelet and ring have no existence in and for gold. Gold is gold and nothing other than itself. In the same way Brahman ever remains Brahman in itself and never experiences or undergoes change (YV. III. 11.8, 33). Take another illustration. We say that water can be changed into several forms, solid, liquid and gaseous, etc. But if there is anything like water which can equally stand as the subject of all these forms, does it actually undergo any change in any one of those forms? If it did it will not be water everywhere. Water, therefore, exists as the immutable X behind all these forms quite untouched by the change. So is the Absolute Reality untouched by any change of forms that we perceive, no matter if they appear to be real from our point of view; for our limited point of view itself is non-being from the point of view of the Absolute Reality (K. II. 32, YV. III. 42, 4; YV. III. 100.39).

Both Vāsiṣṭha and Gaudapāda severely examine the category of Causality and the analogy of the seed and tree, and show in the interest of Acosmism that both are fictions in relation to the Absolute Reality. The conception of cause and effect, says Vāsiṣṭha, can hold true of the forms where one form precedes the other, but that which underlies all forms and so does not proceed or follow anything, for it is present always and everywhere, cannot be related to any form as its cause or effect (YV, VIb. 96, 26; 28; VIb. 53, 17; etc., etc.). Even on the Sāṅkhya conception of causality which means the transformation of something into another, Brahman cannot be said to be the cause of the world-appearance, for, how can that which is transformed into something else be real, and how can that which admits even of partial change be called permanent (K. IV. 11; YV. VIa, 49, 2-4, 8, 9)?

As regards the 'Seed-and-tree' analogy, that too cannot be applicable to Brahman and the world. For, Gaudapāda says, "the illustration of seed-and-tree being itself a part of what requires to be proved cannot be taken as a proving illustration (K. IV. 20). "How can that," argues Vāsiṣṭha, "which is so subtle in its nature as to be even beyond mind, be the seed of the gross physical objects having visible forms, etc., etc. (YV. IV.

1, 21, 25, 26, 28, 32, 33).'' '' A seed, moreover, cannot begin to germinate unless there are some external favourable circumstances to help germination, nothing like which is present in the Absolute Brahman (YV. VIb. 54. 21). Again, a seed ceases to be itself and perishes altogether in giving rise to a tree, but Brahman cannot be said to perish like this (YV. IV. 18, 24).'' The only way therefore, if any, in which we can relate these forms to the reality is the analogy of dream (YV. VIb. 176.5, VIb. 195.44), although in reality they are as unreal as the son of a barren woman (K. III. 28). '' They, in fact, neither exist apart from the perception of the particular consciousness of the experiencer, nor involve any change in the being of the reality (YV. III. 5, 6). Like their production the production of the world is false; like their growth the growth of this world is false; like their enjoyment the enjoyment of this world is false; like their destruction the destruction of this world is false (YV. III. 67, 73).''

Both Gaudapāda and Vaśiṣṭha thus conclude that from the highest point of view, *i.e.*, in truth, nothing is ever produced and that the truth of philosophy is *Ajāti-rāda* (K. IV. 3) or *Ajāta-rāda* (YV. III. 13.4) which Vaśiṣṭha enunciates thus: '' There is nothing like the world in reality, not even in name; Brahman alone is real, and every thing is in reality Brahman (YV. IV. 40.30; III. 4, 67).'' This is the boldest truth ever declared by Philosophy, which will ever assert itself in spite of the fact that much has been said against it and much can be said against it.

IV. *The Method of Self-realisation (Yoga).*

Philosophy in India has never been merely an intellectual pursuit; and truth was never meant only to be discovered and appreciated. Philosophy was to be lived and truth to be realised. '' Having known the truth within and without,'' urges Gaudapāda, '' one should *become* the truth, should ever rest in it, and should be firm in it (K. II. 38).'' Vaśiṣṭha divides thinkers into two classes, namely, the wise (*jñānī*) and those to whom

knowledge is a helping friend in the world, (*jñāna-bandhu*), and prefers the ignorant to the latter (YV. VIb. 21.1). A wise man according to him is "one who having come to know the truth brings it into practice (YV. VIb. 22.2)." This is why, almost every system of Indian Philosophy devotes a portion of it to *Yoga* or the method of practical realisation of the truth discovered by the system. Let us now briefly find out the *Yoga* of Gaudapāda and Vaśiṣṭha.

The truth according to both is the One Absolute Reality without a second by its side, resting in its own blissful essence without the slightest touch of change or multiplicity in it. It is the essence of myself as well as of the universe. This is the ideal before us as long as it is not a living experience with us. To be anything other than that is the bondage and suffering we are experiencing. But what is that which binds and limits us? Both Gaudapāda and Vaśiṣṭha think that it is the *mind* which by its conscurring activity creates limitation and bonds for us. It has the power to imagine any thing which it creates by its own power (K. II. 18-29 and YV. III. 91. 16; III. 60. 16). It imagines the world of change and multiplicity, and causes its own bondage and freedom. If the conscurring activity of the mind be somehow stopped, the whole trouble will be over (YV. IV. 4.5). "The whole duality, of whatever form, is simply a creation of the mind, and it is never experienced when mind is naught (K. III. 31)." In the same way Vaśiṣṭha says, "Mind is the nave of the wheel of the world-experience, and if it could be stopped from movement the whole trouble would be over (YV. V. 49. 40). If through intelligent effort the conscurring activity of the mind is stopped, the world-experience will vanish (YV. V. 50.7), etc., etc."

Now how to bring the activity of the mind under control and stop it? In answer to this question Gaudapāda tells us: "When mind ceases from imagining, by a knowledge of the truth of the *Ātman*, it remains at rest for want of things to cognise (K. III. 32)." Vaśiṣṭha deals with the subject very thoroughly and gives us a very detailed scheme of mind-control which we can review here in bare outline only. According to him there are

three chief methods of controlling the mind,' any one or all of which might be practised. They are : 1. *Brahma-bhāranā*, i.e., imagining oneself to be identical with the Absolute Reality (YV. VIa. 69.49, 52) with its negative accompaniment of *Abhārabhāranā*, i.e., imagining the non-existence of finite things (YV. III. 21.7) ; II. *Prāṇa-spāṇdana-nirodha*, i.e., the control of the movement of the vital airs, which is said to be very intimately connected with the movement of the mind (YV. VIa. 78.15, 16 ; V. 13, 83) ; III. *Vāsanātyāga*, i.e., giving up all desires, for desire is said to be the motive power of the mind which comes to naught without desire (YV. VIa. 95.5). There are also other minor methods suggested by Vaśiṣṭha for the control of mind, a bare mention of which will not be out of place here. They are :—1. Becoming convinced of the unreality of the mind itself (YV. IV. 11, 27) ; 2. Giving up imagining-activity, i.e., *saukalpa* (V. 13, 20) ; 3. Having a disregard for the objects of enjoyment (IV. 35.4) ; 4. Control of the senses (III. 144.48) ; 5. Annihilation of the egoistic tendencies (VIa. 94.13) ; 6. Attempt to realise cosmic consciousness (VIa. 128) ; 7. Practice of disinterestedness (VIb. 28.23) ; 8. Realisation of equanimity in all states (V. 13, 21) ; 9. Giving up the sense of being an agent of actions (III. 95.35) ; 10. Mental renunciation of everything (V. 58.44) ; 11. Practice of always being merged in the idea of the Self (III. 1. 36) ; etc., etc.

These details need not confuse an aspirant. All these methods ultimately are only the so many optional, but at the root identical, ways of breaking the limitations that we have gathered around us and consequently have surrounded us with a false, yet hard to crack, shell of individuality, which acts as an obstruction to the flood of Divine Light and Bliss which are ever ours, but from which we have disinherited ourselves by being satisfied with the glow of smaller lights, which, however, we now and then discover, are not sufficient for the craving of our heart and for the satisfaction of our intellect both of which ever yearn for the Infinite.

This is in short what Gaudapāda and Vaśiṣṭha teach us in common. There is no doubt that much can be said against this

kind of philosophy, yet before we stand up to criticise them, it is our duty to understand them sympathetically and honestly, so that we may not in the haste of judging them add to the already existing lot of blunders.

SECTION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

BY

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The Philosophy of Religion.

The history of religion reveals a perpetual antagonism between the domain of science and supernatural revelation. The warfare between reason and belief is conducted with fatal weapons in five different fields and each is threatened with dissolution and death by the other. There are five fundamental concepts of reality known as atom, life, consciousness, reason and intuition corresponding to the Vedantic terms Annamaya, Prāṇamaya, Manomaya, Vijñānamaya and Ānandamaya. The world-views presented by the Sciences dealing with these categories, viz., the Physical Sciences, Biology, Psychology, Philosophy and Aesthetics are termed as Mechanism, Vitalism, Panpsychism, Rationalism and Subjective Mysticism. Religion organises its own forces of supernaturalism, animism, anthropomorphism, theology and fundamentalism and offers battle to the five kingdoms of science on their own terms. Science employs the canons of higher criticism based on the evidence of sense perception and reasoning and shakes theology to its very foundations. Theology relying on Super-sensuous knowledge seeks to demolish reason and reject the heresies of science. The Philosophy of religion mediates between the two extremes and harmonises their differences from a higher point of view.

Mechanism employs the concept of atoms and explains the laws of nature with mathematical accuracy in the light of logical methods. Naturalism thus reigns supreme in the physical order revealed to us in sense perception. It regards the cosmos as a collocation of physico-chemical changes. Suns and stars move endlessly in a soulless way. The soul is a by-product of matter and phosphorescence. Beliefs arise from the dance of atoms in the

brain, freedom is only a fiction and spiritual life is a secretion of the diseased brain. But mechanism is only a device of thought and it does not exhaust experience. The religious feeling is outraged and it ousts materialism altogether. Where naturalism ends, supernaturalism begins. Supernaturalism distrusts sense perception and appeals to myths and miracles. It is the faith in the pantheon of spirits which are benevolent as well as hostile to human interests. By a suitable system of sacrifices and prayers, the votary propitiates the deities and is rewarded with property, progeny and power. But polytheism does not satisfy the logical demand for unity and the moral demand for inner purity. The belief in miracles is not warranted by experience. Besides, the value of miracles is more important than their existence and the belief creates caprice in the Divine nature. The propensity in man to deify desires and their objects creates the polytheistic heaven and its pleasures are perishing and painful. That Heaven itself is soiled by unruly passions and perpetual wars.

Biology explains Reality in terms of teleology and substitutes the living organism made of cells for the mere mechanical aggregate. The protoplasm and the *prāṇa* originate and function from within and are not externally determined like matter and motion. Life has the power of self-emergence and spontaneity and has a special mode of behaviour. The living do not evolve from the non-living but are due to vital units. Life responds to the stimulus, reproduces itself and is sustained by persistence and variation. The vitalist views reality as a creative impulse, *clan rital* or entelechy. The vitalist idea of entity is a mythical and mysterious thing acting blindly without any direction and inevitably lands us in Animism. Animism is the belief that the source of life is breath or *prāṇa* different from body and it attributes life and divinity to the natural forces. The soul is the double or the shadow of the body, survives after death and haunts the graveyard. Animism gives rise to the belief in ancestral worship, fetichism and possession. But vitalism and animism do not cover all the known facts of reality and religious experience and afford no stability or security.

Psychology marks the transition from the category of cell to that of sensation. It studies consciousness as a stream of presenta-

tion with conative and affective elements giving rise to the perception of the empirical self. Reality is Manomaya and is mental and monadic and these monads are centres of appetite and form realm of ends. The mental series cannot be reduced to material particles or vital units. But mentalism is as one-sided as mechanism and commits us to subjectivism. Religion reacts against this panpsychism and grows into anthropomorphism. This theory ascribes the origin of the universe to Divine Thought, Feeling and Will and thus interprets the Divine nature on the analogy of human experience. God is a personality with a body and mind akin to our own. But anthropomorphism is a form of picture-making and is due to the tendency in man to regard all beings like himself and therefore he makes God in his own image and attributes to Him his own form and feeling. The personal God is the result of the personifying tendency natural to man and His will and power are so capricious and cruel that the apologist of theism finds the problem an ultimate mystery. The Kingdom of God is designed on the model of the human state and suffers from all its psychological limitations.

Reality is Vijñānamaya or Rational. The category of reason marks the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness or discursive thought. It employs the logical method of discovering and determining truth and advances arguments to prove the Being of God. Hume attacks in a classical way the cardinal proofs of natural theology and brings out clearly the antagonism between science and superstition. All reasoning, from design to designer, from idea to existence and from effect to cause, is due to the false light of the 'transcendental Shrine'; to infer the infinite from the finite exceeds the limits of reason. Rationalism whether it is metaphysical or theological ends in agnosticism and positivism. There is no passage from nature to nature's God and the proofs of God admit of no finality or consistency. Thought cannot transcend itself and in its attempts to erect the absolute it commits suicide. Religion protests against rationalism and distrusts reason and takes refuge in traditionalism and scriptural faith. Reason with its cold logic is impervious to the demands of the heart and by analysing feelings, it ultimately annihilates them. Philosophy stimulates thought but does not satisfy it and allay the hunger of

the soul. Gnosticism affirming the knowability of God is answered by agnosticism and agnosticism ends in absolutism and thus a vicious circle is formed. Absolutism which is the completion of agnosticism invites us to worship the universe and its unity and affords no scope for love.

Reality is *Ānandamaya* or the bliss of mystic intuition, sense perception, and reason are not the only gateways of knowledge. While rationalism infers truth, mysticism intuites it at one stroke, without going through any logical stages. Reason dissects reality in the interests of life and only gives us spatial diagrams. Reason gives us partial views of God, but intuition invades the infinite and has a vision of the whole. The rationalist worships at the gate of God, but the mystic enters the inner shrine and has an immediate apprehension. Owing to this spontaneity, intuition claims its own certitude. Theology disputes the claims of mysticism, rejects it as a mere subjective feeling and takes its stand on the bedrock of Revelation. Scripture as the Word of God is the only source of Spiritual faith and is impersonal, infallible and eternal. Being a direct communication of God every scriptural text is absolutely trustworthy. But historic and higher criticism is entirely opposed to this fundamentalist faith and it evaluates its authority in terms of human values.

It is the task of the Philosophy of Religion to eliminate the incrustation of religion and discover the residual elements which form its kernel. By employing the scientific method and the canons of immanent criticism, it examines the varieties of religious experience set forth successively in supernaturalism, animism, anthropomorphism, dogmatism and fundamentalism, selects the essential and eternal principle underlying them and co-ordinates them into a systematic whole. The higher alone explains the lower and spiritual truths are discovered only by spiritual life. Religion is the thought of God revealed in faith and realised in intuition. Every soul has the divine right to seek for God, its inner life and light, see Him face to face and thus attain absolute freedom from sin, sorrow, and ignorance. The eternal verities of religion are verifiable in personal experience and are embodied in the logical idea of rationality, the moral idea of righteousness and the aesthetic idea of rapture. While Philosophy gropes for God

without any fixity or finality in its speculation, theology becomes dogmatic and fanatical by substituting sect for system and ritualism for righteousness. But in the Philosophy of Religion, religion illumines Philosophy, and Philosophy justifies religion. Revelation is a body of eternal objective and spiritual truths treasured up in scripture and realisable by intuition. Religion mediates between Revelation and Intuition and corrects the dogmatism of the former and the subjectivism of the latter. The fallacy of anthropomorphism is removed by spiritualising human values. Man is made in the image of God and he can grow into His transcendental purity and perfection. The goodness of man is consummated in the grace of God. The greatest miracle of religion lies in the immanence of God in the impure soul with a view to redeem it from its sinful career. Spiritual truths are often clothed in sense-experience and the symbol should be distinguished from its sense. Sin is only an accident and is ultimately a case of self-alienation, and when the soul is cleansed it shines in the light of God and is lost in immortal bliss.

DR. WHITEHEAD'S VIEWS ON RELIGION

BY

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In Dr. Whitehead we find the happy combination of a rich and varied knowledge of science and a penetrative metaphysical insight. His books on the 'Concept of Nature,' the 'Principles of Relativity,' the 'Principles of Natural Knowledge,' and 'Science and the Modern World' have established his reputation as a critic of the current scientific thought. He is one of those who have felt that the foundation of the exact sciences is in need of a radical transformation which will lead to a new and a more adequate metaphysics. The development of the sciences themselves has necessitated, according to him, a change in our philosophical outlook as a whole which cannot be ignored in any discussion of the outstanding problems of reality, life and value. His views on the ultimate nature and validity of religious experience are based on this conviction, and though all of them may not prove to be acceptable in their entirety they are worth our serious consideration.

From the point of view of a scientist what is most striking about religion is the relation of antagonism that one ordinarily finds between it and science. It seems that the results of science are on the whole in direct conflict with the beliefs of religion, so that we must abandon either the clear teachings of science or the clear teachings of religion. The issue seems to be of the utmost importance. For, if the conflict is an ultimate one, it can only mean to a scientist that the beliefs of religion are incapable of standing the tests of accurate observation and logical deduction and are therefore only fictions of our imagination. He cannot be interested in those beliefs as statements of facts unless they are submitted to the only kinds of tests which he recognises and are found to be satisfactory.

Dr. Whitehead, however, believes that the clash between science and religion is a sign that "there are wider truths and finer perspectives within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle science will be found." There have always been conflicting ideas and beliefs in the respective domains of science and religion. In both these regions of thought such conflicts have always revealed the fact that most of our statements are one-sided truths requiring additions, distinctions and modifications. We do not think that whenever two religious beliefs or scientific theories are in conflict, one of the two must be absolutely false. We have to search after points of view from which we can ascertain the relative measure of truth which each of the conflicting beliefs or theories embodies and have to attain some wider vision which reconciles all of them with one another. We should apply the same principle to the questions in which there is a variance between science and religion. We must take all precautions in either sphere of thought against error and base our beliefs on solid reasons as far as practicable, but in the event of a clash between the two we must not hastily abandon doctrines for which we think we have some kind of reliable evidence. We may be more interested in a particular set of doctrines than in another, but this does not entitle us to ignore the evidence on which the other set of doctrines appears to be based.

The discrepancies between science and religion must be considered to be natural in view of the fact that they ordinarily deal with widely different aspects of the world. According to Dr. Whitehead, "Science is concerned with the general conditions which are observed to regulate physical phenomena; whereas religion is wholly wrapped up in the contemplation of moral and aesthetic values." (Science and the Modern World, p. 229.) These discrepancies appear to be downright contradictions, only when we forget that science and religion deal with the world from different standpoints and consider either of the standpoints to be absolute. If we perceive that scientific truths are not absolute statements of facts with which all other statements regarding the same facts are incompatible, there will always be room for religion and the discrepancy between science and religion will not appear to be final or wholly irreconcilable.

Religious truths, like scientific truths, are based on actual experience. Religious experience consists, according to Dr. Whitehead, in the apprehension of a character inherent in the nature of things, in the appreciation of a rightness which the world as a whole manifests in spite of evils and disharmonies. Religious dogmas or beliefs are attempts to formulate in precise terms this experience of the general character of the world. Such beliefs have a transforming effect on the character of a man who holds them sincerely. It is in this that we find a distinction between religious beliefs and beliefs of other kinds. A man's conceptions of the worth of his own individuality and his destiny depend upon his intuition of the general character exemplified in the universe as a whole. Religion is therefore defined by Dr. Whitehead as "the art and theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things."

Dr. Whitehead lays much stress on the feeling of solitariness as an essential element of the religious consciousness. He even defines religion as "what the individual does with his own solitariness." (Religion in the Making.) A man is religious only when he finds himself confronted by the world as a whole. Religion is not primarily a social fact. It is a mistake to think that religious emotions are in their essence collective emotions generated by the collective activities of the members of a tribe or community. Such collective emotions may not touch the innermost life of a man. Unless a man is fully conscious of his individuality he cannot have the genuine religious experience. He cannot be religious unless he feels solitary.

Religion, so far as it receives external expression in human history, has, according to Dr. Whitehead, four factors or sides of itself,—ritual, emotion, belief and rationalisation. These different factors have emerged in the order in which they are mentioned, though the order of their emergence has been in the inverse order of their importance for religion. Ritual is defined as "the habitual performance of definite actions which have no direct relevance to the preservation of the physical organisms of the actors." Such actions give free play to superfluous energy and when repeated for

their own sake provide the joy of exercise and the emotion of success. In this way emotions become associated with rituals and rituals are repeated for the sake of the emotions which accompany them. Ritual and emotion form the only elements of primitive religion. Religion in the proper sense, however, emerges when efforts are made to explain the purpose of the rituals. Such efforts generally take the form of myth-making. Rituals come to be connected with some persons or things, real or imaginary, so that belief in a myth about such persons or things involves the belief that by performing certain rites something can be got out of them or some evil can be averted. A myth, in other words, is a primitive religious belief which satisfies the demand of incipient rationality. Religion enters the fourth stage when religious beliefs are re-examined, re-interpreted and organised into a coherent system. This is the stage of rationalisation. It is a mistake to think that rational religion consisting of systematised beliefs has emerged in complete independence of the antecedent social religions of ritual and myth. As a matter of fact it has emerged as a transformation of the pre-existing religious forms, and it has always been influenced by the general level of culture attained by the different peoples among whom it has flourished.

It is however difficult to accept the view, which Dr. Whitehead seems to propound, that ritual in the unusually comprehensive sense in which he defines it, can be the source of religion as such. We cannot find any immediate connection between religiousness and ritual defined as the repetition of movements which men share with the lower animals. All kinds of movements have not come to be associated with religiousness, nor has any and every kind of emotion come to be regarded as a religious emotion. A particular kind of physical movement cannot stimulate a distinctively religious emotion unless it is already associated with some belief about some divine being or other. Psychologically, a religious emotion that is stimulated by a ritual must presuppose some kind of religious belief. It will be more proper to say that religious emotions have found outlets in some special kinds of movements than to say that such movements when constantly repeated have given rise to the religious consciousness. Crude religious beliefs relating to divini-

ties must have originated independently of rituals and not merely as attempts to explain the purposes for which they are performed or as devices to enhance the emotions accompanying them. Rituals, in other words, may be religiously used, but they cannot have been the source of religion.

We can, however, agree with Dr. Whitehead when he says that religion in its primitive stages was mainly a social or tribal affair, but that with the dawn of rationalism it has come to be essentially a matter for the individual. Religion gradually ceases to be a mere name for certain social customs and ceremonies, it comes more and more to signify a man's attitude towards the universe as a whole in so far as such an attitude has a transforming effect on his inner character. This is sure to happen as religion becomes rationalised. Men cease to entertain beliefs simply because others hold them, their religious emotions cease to be stimulated by customs and ceremonies which have no meaning for them. The history of religious progress is a record of changes in men's beliefs brought about by reformers fighting against customary beliefs and meaningless ceremonies.

Thus, in developed religion dogmas assume great importance. It is when we attempt to give expression to our religious experience in the forms of dogmas that the question whether such experience is ultimately valid or not arises. The evidential force of the deliverances of the religious experience has often been considered to consist in the specific nature of the emotions which they arouse in us. But such a claim is sure to be undermined by psychological explanations of the origin of such emotions. The attempt to supersede reason by emotion in respect of the validity of religious beliefs is often a failure. Reason alone is the safeguard of the objectivity of religious intuitions.

Thus religion requires the backing of a rational metaphysics without which it is reduced to a mere emotional phase of our life. Religious experience reveals truths as exemplified only in particular instances. These truths must be supported by an adequate metaphysical view of the universe before they can be accepted as

satisfactory. Dr. Whitehead believes that an adequate metaphysical justification of the objective validity of the deliverances of our religious experience can be given, and he also believes that such a justification will show that religion and science are not ultimately in conflict with each other.

A philosophy which is to give us an account of the universe as a whole cannot altogether ignore the special sciences. These sciences have collectively evolved a world-view, the absolute validity of which appears to the average scientist to be beyond question. Dr. Whitehead calls it scientific materialism. It is the theory which presupposes "the ultimate fact of a brute-matter or material spread throughout space in a flux of configurations." This matter is the stuff which underlies nature and in terms of which the entire world of our experience can be described. Dr. Whitehead believes that this scheme of scientific materialism is in a process of dissolution as a result of the development of the sciences themselves. According to him, though this materialistic scheme may have some truth as a workable assumption adopted by natural sciences for the purpose of describing certain special aspects of the world, it is found to be entirely inadequate if taken as a philosophical doctrine. The sciences, he points out, are abstract. The entities with which they deal are not concrete entities or immediate matters of fact, but are "elaborate logical constructions of a high degree of abstraction." If we confine ourselves to certain types of facts abstracted from the complete circumstances in which they occur, the scientific descriptions express these facts to perfection, but they break down as soon as these are taken into account. Philosophy, on the other hand, is a critique of abstractions. It harmonises them by assigning to them their relative status as abstractions and also completes them by direct comparison with more concrete intuitions of the universe, thus forming more complete schemes of thought.

The error which Dr. Whitehead finds at the basis of scientific materialism or the mechanical theory of nature is the belief in 'simple location' from which arises the fallacy of 'misplaced concreteness.' According to his definition, "To say that a bit of

"There will be many matters of administrative business," observes the Joint Committee later on, "as in all countries, which can be disposed of departmentally; but there will remain a large category of business, of the character which would naturally be the subject of Cabinet consultation. In regard to this category the Committee conceive that the habit should be carefully fostered of joint deliberation between the members of the Executive Council and the Ministers, sitting under the Chairmanship of the Governor. There cannot be too much mutual advice and consultation on such subjects; but the Committee attach the highest importance to the principle that, when once opinions have been freely exchanged and the last word has been said, there ought then to be no doubt whatever as to where the responsibility for the decision lies. Therefore, in the opinion of the Committee, after such consultation, and when it is clear that the decision lies within the jurisdiction of one or other half of the government, that decision, in respect of a reserved subject should be recorded separately by the Executive Council, and in respect of a transferred subject by the Ministers and all Acts and proceedings of the government should state in definite terms on whom the responsibility for the decision rests. It will not always, however, be clear, otherwise than in a purely departmental and technical fashion, with whom the jurisdiction lies in the case of questions of common interest. In such cases it will be inevitable for the Governor to occupy the position of informal arbitrator between the two parts of his administration; and it will equally be his duty to see that a decision arrived at on one side of his government is followed by such consequential action on the other side as may be necessary to make the policy effective and homogeneous." And yet more direct is His Majesty's instruction to the Governor. "You shall encourage the

Cabinet
consulta-
tion.

The
fixing of
responsi-
bility.

Task of the
Governor
delicate
but poten-
tial.

habit of joint deliberation between yourself, your Councillors, and your Ministers, in order that the experience of your official advisers may be at the disposal of your Ministers, and that the knowledge of your Ministers as to the wishes of the people may be at the disposal of your Councillors." We have it however, on the authority of those, who, one after another, were responsible for nine long years for the working of the new constitution and had inside information of how it was respected in the several provinces of India, including Bombay, Bengal, Punjab and U. P., that its spirit was honoured more in its breach than in its observance, with a determination on the part of those who proclaim their regard for the sanctity of the constitution to be greater than that of those to whom it is given, and who are said not to be able to appreciate it because they are not used to the best things of the world. That is hardly convincing, though I think, we must agree with Sir Courtenay Ilbert when he says "that there is no constitution, however carefully and ingeniously framed, which cannot be made unworkable by an impracticable and sufficiently obstinate minority,"—he might have added unpractical and perverse,—and that "there is hardly any which cannot be made to work with a sufficient amount of goodwill." It is doubtful whether there is any real goodwill in a five per cent. of the educated Indian population and in more than 10 per cent. of the entire Indian population though, it is easy to assert that in the remaining 90 per cent. there is a positive, deep-rooted distrust of England, her professions and above all her intentions, even though, when it is explained to them that the constitution under which they live is a flexible and not a rigid one,—flexible in the sense that much of its gradual or immediate expansion may be effected without an Act of Parliament and

**Spirit of
the Re-
forms dis-
regarded.**

**They can be
made to
work all
the same.**

**Indian
constitu-
tion more
flexible
than rigid.**

under the rule-making powers of the government. To that extent it must be regarded to be superior to the colonial constitutions and, even to that of the United States of America, or other prominent constitutions which have been given or made, and not grown. The elasticity of the Indian constitution therefore lies, as Sir Courtenay Albert puts it, in the "extensive use, of what has sometimes been called delegated legislation, legislation not directly by Parliament, but by rules and orders made under an authority given by Parliament." And nowhere has the policy of giving and using delegated power been carried farther than in the Government of India Act of 1919. The reasons for such extension of powers to the Government of India are obvious. Parliament is as hopelessly pre-occupied with the affairs at home or with foreign affairs that, it is not possible to persuade her to afford the time necessary for the consideration of the details of Indian Constitution or Administration. But whatever the reasons may be, the power is there, and the Indian people would be well-advised to fully realise that situation and, exploit it as best and as fast as they can, even though, the Reserved side of the executive government is armed with the power of obtaining such monies, and securing the passage of such laws, as are necessary for the proper administration of the province by the well-known process of certification. Not so the Transferred side, for the principle of certification does not apply to it, beyond what is absolutely necessary for the safety and tranquillity of the province or, for the purpose of carrying on the administration of any (transferred) department. It is also by taking advantage of the certificate procedure that the Governor can place against what he thinks an obdurate, obstructive and hostile legislature, any bill upon the statute book necessary for the discharge of his responsibility to Parliament. Thus it will be seen that,

Indian constitution superior to Colonial or American constitution in one aspect.

Certificate procedure does not apply to the Transferred side

Governor's
certificate
is not
final.

Significa-
tion of
Governor-
General's
assent in
emer-
gent cases
is tenta-
tive and
temporary.

England
in a
difficult
position.

devices in the constitution are made for meeting any emergency foreseen or unforeseen, and for preventing a transferred department from being closed down by reason of supplies having been refused. But a bill to which certificate has been applied is forthwith submitted to the Governor-General who reserves it for the signification of the pleasure of His Majesty. Should His Majesty in Council signify his assent, it becomes law and shall have the same force and effect as an Act passed by the local legislature and duly assented to. Provision also has been made to cases of extreme emergency where loss of time involved in the procedure referred to may cause trouble, in that the Governor-General in such a case may signify his assent to the Bill, entitling it to have the force and effect of law. This, however, is tentative and temporary, for the signification of the assent of the Governor-General does not do away with the necessity of submission to His Majesty for allowance or disallowance. An Act so made, must be laid before each House of Parliament without undue delay, and no Act is presented to His Majesty for his assent, without copies thereof being laid before each House of Parliament for not less than eight days during its session prior to such presentation, to enable the House to avail of an opportunity to express its opinion upon the matter. A notable instance is the Ordinance Bill in Bengal, which was thrown out in the Council by a decided majority, but later certified by His Excellency the Governor at the instance of the Agents in India of His Majesty's Government, who, I am afraid, have thereby helped England to lay herself open to a charge of leading a double life,—taking up the pose of a peaceful nation and the attitude of a peace-maker before the League of Nations while ruling India by threat, coercion and force.

PART IV

PROCEDURE OF BUSINESS.

(a) Rules of Business in the Ministry or Executive Council.

The Rules known as the “ *Rules of Business* ” are framed and promulgated by the Governor under the authority of the statute. These are the rules which make for the more convenient transaction of business in his Executive Council or with his Ministers. The rules have got the status of and are treated as orders or acts of the Governor-in-Council. Under the rules themselves the Governor has got unrestricted power to allot the business of the various departments, such as the first perusal of papers and the initiation of orders thereon, in such manner as he chooses. It is under these rules that cases have to be ordinarily submitted by the Secretary in the department to which the subject belongs to the Member-in-charge, for such purposes as we have noticed, and for such orders as may be deemed fit. The authority to dispose of, or cause to be disposed of cases of minor importance belongs solely to the Member-in-charge. In cases however, of special urgency the Secretary of the department concerned would be justified in asking the Member-in-charge for his sanction to a proposed order based on an anticipatory approval of the Governor to whom a case in certain circumstances may be submitted direct for orders. The authority of the Member or Minister-in-charge is limited by the rule which requires the submission to His Excellency of all proposed Resolutions on Administration Reports, proposed circulars embodying important principles

Power of
the Governor.

Urgent cases
and the
power of
the Secretary.

The authority of the Member or Minister.

or changes, all correspondence with the Secretary of State (in respect of Provinces or Presidencies authorised to carry on such correspondence), Government of India, the High Courts or any public Association recognised by Government, except correspondence on routine matters. all orders conveying censure or praise to gazetted officers, orders dismissing officers in receipt of a pay in excess of Rs. 100 a month, all proposals for the disposal of provincial balances, answers to questions asked in the Legislative Council, petitions connected with sentences of death passed in criminal cases and all cases which in the opinion of the Member or Minister-in-charge are of sufficient importance. Should there be an occasion for the Secretary to submit a case for reasons stated to the Governor direct, the rules make it incumbent upon him to apprise the Member or Minister-in-charge of the fact.

Opinion of the majority in respect of the appointments.

A further examination of these rules of business discloses the fact that there are certain appointments which are listed as Class I and II respectively, nomination to which is made either by the Governor direct, or by him on the recommendation of the Member or Minister-in-charge according as the appointment belongs to the reserved or the transferred category. The concurrence of the majority of the Council and—or the Ministry deliberating as a Cabinet—is a *sine qua non* for some of these appointments, and the rules governing the procedure of nomination and appointment are so well hedged in, that concurrence cannot be withheld merely on the ground that some other person is deemed to be better fitted for the particular office, but only, if there are specific objections on public grounds, such as unfitness for the office in question. The net result of such a rule is manifest. On the other hand, the Governor stands supreme and unfettered by his Council

Governor's position supreme.

when it is proposed in any department to negative the recommendation, or to overrule the decision of the Board of Revenue, of the Commissioner of a division or of the Head of a Department, in any matter of major importance connected with the Reserved side of the Government. The provincial rule with regard to the submission of cases by departmental Secretary to the Governor direct, and without the intervention of the Member or the Minister-in-charge, is identical with what prevails in the Government of India (*ante* p. 133) and as there, the provincial Secretary has got to bring the fact of his having done so to the knowledge of his chief. And this power in the Secretary is easily explained. He is Secretary to the Government of which the Governor is the head, not Secretary to the Member or Minister whose function is to advise and suggest, but not act independently of the Governor, such as that which prevails under a government responsible to the will of the people. However important a case may be, one Member of Council to whose department it legitimately belongs, may not refer it to another Member or Minister personally for opinion, without the previous consent of the Governor, though any Member or Minister may call for any papers in any department of the Secretariate other than his own ; but the papers requisitioned may not be forwarded to him without the consent of the Member or the Minister-in-charge of the department to which they belong. The circulation however, of these papers among Members or Ministers, or the bringing in of them before a meeting of the Council, are matters in which the Members or Ministers can only make their formal request to the Governor who may or may not comply with it. No order of the Governor-in-Council shall be deemed to be valid, unless it appears over the signature of a Secretary, or Deputy Secretary, or an

Central and provincial rule re submissions of cases to head of administration alike.

Papers before the Member or Minister.

Validity of orders.

Under-Secretary or an Assistant Secretary, except where a particular enactment specially authorises another officer to sign such documents.

(b) *Favoured Position of Certain Departments.*

Matters of
revenue.

The Financial department of a provincial government is legitimately placed in a position of advantage, for, certain matters are privileged from being brought forward for the consideration of the Governor-in-Council, or Governor in the Ministry, without a previous reference to it, such as a proposal involving (a) an abandonment of revenue for which credit has been taken in the Budget, or (b) expenditure which has not been provided for in the Budget, or (c) expenditure which has not been specifically sanctioned, although provided for in the Budget. In the same way the Legislative Department is in a favoured position for, whenever it is proposed in an Executive department (a) to issue any statutory rule, notification or order or (b) to sanction under a statutory power, the issue of any rule, bye-law, notification or order by a subordinate authority or (c) to submit to the Secretary of State or the Government of India any statutory rule, notification or order, for issue by him or them, a draft of the same must be submitted to the Legislative department for opinion, as to whether it is strictly within the power conferred by the Legislature, and is in proper form as regards wording and arrangement, and if necessary, for revision. But the constitution places the Governor in a position of authority to direct from time to time the modification of such rule, though as a matter of fact he seldom does it.

Function
of the
Legislative
Department.

A refutation of the opposite, however, is not a positive proof of anything. Are, then, there any positive grounds on which it might be definitely said that the personality of the dead one continues after the dissolution of the physical body? There can be two convincing proofs of the continuity after death: either the person who is now dead physically but continues to exist somewhere, in some or other way, should inform us with sufficiently convincing evidence amenable to reasonable tests, that he has not ceased to be with the dissolution of the physical body; or, one may himself remember his having survived the dissolution of his previous physical body. It is apparent that both these proofs are difficult to be got, and difficult also to be correctly estimated, although people are busy in finding out such evidences. We need not here enter into the difficulties of judging the validity or genuineness of these kinds of evidences. There are great scientists who have considered these difficulties in a truly scientific spirit, and yet have declared that "the hypothesis of surviving intelligence and personality,—not only surviving but anxious and able with difficulty to communicate,—is the simplest and most straightforward, and the only one that fits all the facts." (Oliver Lodge: *The Survival of Man*, p. 221.) Recently Mr. Kekai Nandan Sahai of Bafeilly has collected a number of cases (*vide* his pamphlet: *Reincarnation*) in which the memory of the previous physical existence is to a great extent retained and verified. In the face of such facts and of our previously reached conclusion it is merely dogmatic to say that a personality ceases to exist with physical death, we are led to think that our existence does not end with the end of the physical body.

This hypothesis is very much strengthened when we study other aspects of our experience, the dream and the sleep states. "The study of dream," says Dr. Du Prel rightly, "frees us much more thoroughly from that physiological prejudice than can the investigation of psychical functions in the waking life." (Du Prel: *The Philosophy of Mysticism*, Vol. I, p. 54.) While a man is asleep his psychical activity sinks for the time being below the threshold of consciousness. But the activity of their inner personality, in all its aspects,—intellectual, emotional and volitional,—is very much heightened, as is evident from the dream-expe-

rience of ours, and from the activity displayed by a somnambulist and by a hypnotised or an entranced person. Dr. Du Prel's study of sleep has convinced him that "the more the threshold of sensibility is displaced the more the positive side of sleep would become apparent, producing always new psychical reactions" (*Ibid*, p. 147). It means, in other words, that the more we are free from the bodily consciousness, the more clearly we experience another state of existence. And, it may, therefore, be that when we are totally free from the body and the physical senses, we may continue to experience and exist in a world the like of which our dreams daily show us, however vaguely it may be. Vaguely, probably because some link ties us with the physical body even when we are very much free from it in dreams.

Thus, to deny existence after physical death is dogmatic; there is some actual evidence in its favour, and it is very much probable that it may be so. Nay, it is also necessary, if the constitution of the world is not irrational. For, it is irrational that our efforts and desires should evaporate into nothing, and should not be satisfied in the long run. It is irrational and absurd that a moral, gentle and noble personality is evolved and built here under hardships and struggles and with tears, only to be split suddenly on the rock of death. Are all our aspirations for perfection, omnipotence, omniscience and absolute bliss nothing more than illusion and mockery? Are Christs, Neros and Washingtons all to be levelled by death? Are the martyrs and condemned murderers sailing in the same boat only to be dashed into nothingness? "Should Kant and Goethe, Buddha and Christ, have laboured and suffered for the race, without thereby at the same time advancing a transcendental subject of theirs, nature would be in the highest degree wasteful" (*Ibid*, Vol. II, pp. 223-224). It cannot be so if the world is rational. And, unless reason rules the world, science, philosophy, morality and religion are absurdities. Suicide, in that case, would be the best course of action for a suffering man. But we think the universe is rational, simply because reason is one of the manifested forms of the Reality in man. Reality may, therefore, be more than rational, but it cannot be less or otherwise.

THE UNIQUE EXPERIENCES OF SAINT MĀNIKKA VĀCHAGAR.

BY

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Introductory.

The original experiences of a great man to whom Religion was not a mere habit or tradition, but a living passion, have an immense personal charm, and are of unique philosophical worth.

We are not concerned here with their psychological explanation, or pathological origins, but with their spiritual value---as the inner revelation of deep-seated longings and passionate yearning for the Divine.

W. James gives the following *characteristics of Saintliness* ; * and they all apply to Mānikka Vāchagar—

(1) “A feeling of being in a wider life than that of this world's selfish little interests; and the conviction, both intellectual and sensible, of the existence of an Ideal Power”—with Mānikka Vāchagar, this Power is the Lord Śiva.

(2) “A sense of the friendly continuity of the Ideal Power with our own life, and a willing self-surrender to its control”—this we find throughout the life-history of Mānikka Vāchagar, and find passionate expression in his songs.

(3) "An immense elation and freedom, as the outlines of the confining self-hood melt down"—or, as the Upanishads have it,

ॐ
मिथुनं हृदयमन्विच्छन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
चोयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ।

Mānikka Vāchagar had 'seen' the Supreme Being in Perum durai; and all doubts of the soul, all shackles of Karma, and the heart's invisible attachments to the things of flesh had broken and fallen asunder from that instant.

(4) "These inner conditions have their typical practical consequences—*asceticism*—the self-surrender may become so passionate as to turn into self-immolation—the saint finds positive pleasure in sacrifice and asceticism, expressing thereby his loyalty to the higher Power."—

Mānikka Vāchagar left home and family, resigned power and office, and retired to Chidambaram to spend the remainder of his days on earth in ascetic devotion to the Lord.

The Saint, Mānikka Vāchagar, is unique in history as making frequent references to his extraordinary, and what we may call, miraculous experiences, in the course of his songs. Religious history is everywhere copious in miraculous incidents; and in India especially, legend and miracle very soon rally round a man who has had any pretence to holiness or wisdom. But, where have we such passionate, sincere, and forceful expression of the sense of the Supreme Presence and its ways in a Saint's authentic works, as we have in Mānikka Vāchagar's case? We have a good deal of legend and Purāṇa about him, as we have of any other religious teacher or Āchārya. But, disregarding them all, if we turn to his own works, we are struck by his remarkable testimony to the Super-

natural and the Supersensible, and the singular ways in which his Lord chose to deal with him.

To make this plain, I will give a brief outline of his life, and recount the chief incidents in his career, as narrated or alluded to in his own works.

Outline of Mānikka Vāchagar's Life.

We have no authentic account of his life, of any historic value. His date is uncertain. It is a disputed point whether he lived prior or subsequent to the authors of the *Tevāram*. But it is certain that he lived before the 10th century A. D., when his works, along with those of the other great Śaiva saints, were included in the Tamil Canon, under the authority of King Rajaraja the Great. We do not know even his personal name. "*Mānikka Vāchagar*" or "*The Jewel-tongued*," was a title, it is said, bestowed on him by the Lord of Chidambaram; and the other name by which he is known in Tamil works, '*Pāḍavū'ar*,' or '*Vāḍavūradigal*,' is only a place-name, and not a personal one. It is certain he was a Brāhman of high standing and great learning, and was the chief minister to a Pandyan king of unknown age, known in the *Purāṇas* as Arimardana. This was the heyday of his worldly prosperity and greatness. But his mind was not in his work or of this world—it was distracted by a spiritual longing and restlessness. He clearly saw the limitations of his environment, and aspired for a higher freedom through special revelation in which he firmly believed. Many of his poems, especially the *Tiru-Chatakam*, are full of this spiritual discontent with existing things, and eagerness to seek deliverance from them.*

* *Tiruvāchagam*, V, 25-53 (the translations in this paper are from Pope); the same sentiments will be found also in V, 5; 12-14; 27; 40; 45; and X, 10.

In all this is a good deal to remind one of St. Augustine's confessions. Mānikka Vāchagar was still in his early youth, the prime minister and favourite of the great Pandyan king, the virtual ruler of the kingdom.

One day, the king orders Mānikka Vāchagar to go to Perumdurai, a sea-port in the Chola country, where he heard that a large consignment of foreign horses had arrived; and he asks his minister to purchase for him a number of them, for which he entrusts the latter with a large amount of money.

Mānikka Vāchagar sets out with a good escort; and while he encamps in the outskirts of the sea-port town, he hears the hum of religious music from the neighbouring woods. He sends a messenger to ascertain its nature; and finds that a great teacher was seated beneath a tree instructing a large assembly of Chelas. As soon as Mānikka Vāchagar sees him, he knows that the Guru is none other than the Lord Śiva himself with his hosts. He reverently approaches, is initiated and instructed in Divine knowledge by Śiva himself. Henceforth, Mānikka Vāchagar has become a regenerate being, a *Jivan-mukta*. He straightway renounces the world, and assumes the garb of the ascetic outwardly and in spirit—this is Mānikka Vāchagar's conversion; and he refers to it in almost every one of his poems, pouring forth in soul-stirring terms his unworthiness of the election or choice by the Great God himself, who deigned to come down from Kailāsa to seek him out of millions of far worthier souls in waiting.*

In these and others of his songs, Mānikka Vāchagar regards Śiva as "his Guru, the friend, almost the familiar companion; and he addresses him often with a mixture of awe and of simple affection that has a peculiar effect.

Through all Mānikka Vāchagar's poems, this personal relation of God as manifested Guru to his devotees or disciples is most prominent"—(Pope).

Mānikka Vāchagar has become a new man, a *saint*. Being no longer of this world, he forgets the king's business on which he has come; stays on in Perumdurai, having rendered the king's treasures to his new Master. News of the defalcation soon reaches the king, who immediately orders his minister's return. Mānikka Vāchagar returns to Madura; and gives some lame excuses for his conduct which do not satisfy the king. He is arrested and imprisoned.

But one day the king hears that a large contingent of foreign horses have been brought. He relents, confesses his mistake in disbelieving in Mānikka Vāchagar's word, and orders his release. The latter sees the hand of the Great God in this; and recognises him in the leading Greek who has brought the horses. The king orders for the proper care of his purchases, and retires for the night, only to be disturbed by wild howls of jackals—for, the horses were not real horses, but jackals magically turned into horses. They make the night hideous, frighten the citizens, and escape into the woods. If miracle there was, this story so familiar to South Indians, is certainly one. But it is not a mere tradition or legend that has grown round the Saint in the course of ages,—for, Mānikka Vāchagar himself refers to it often.*

The king becomes indignant at the trick played on him; and submits Mānikka Vāchagar to torture. In answer to the latter's prayers, Śiva sends a tremendous flood down the Vaigai which threatens the Pandyan capital. Mānikka Vāchagar is released, and restored to power once more; and under his supervision, protective works are undertaken to

* *Tiruvāchagam*, II, 25-45 ; XXXVI, 1-2 ; XXXVIII, 1 ; L. 7.

save the city from destruction. The Great God himself does "coolie" work in answer to the prayer of an humble old woman who has no one to do her share of forced labour, eating her rice-cakes for his wages. He is slack in his work, is reprimanded, and beaten. The whole world trembles at the audacity of the king, who immediately recognises his mistake, and acknowledges the greatness of his minister.

Mānikka Vāchagar refers to this miracle as follows:—*

The king now wants to retain Mānikka Vāchagar's services,—even to hand over his kingdom to him. But the latter has done with the world and its ways, renounces all pomp and wealth, and returns to his Master in Perumdurai. After sometime, Śiva, his task of converting and initiating Mānikka Vāchagar accomplished, return to Kailāsa.

His hosts remain with the Saint for a time; and then, one day, they disappear in a flame that suddenly appears in the temple tank.

His sorrow at the departure of the Lord and His hosts, his anguish at the separation, and his passionate longing for reunion, form the theme of many of his most beautiful lyrics.†

Mānikka Vāchagar is far more personal than the authors of the *Tevāram*; and his poems have the peculiar charm of showing forth a mighty soul's travails, longings, and joys.

The miraculous incidents of his life are no mere tradition in his case; but essential incidents of his spiritual history, as real to him as the ways of his Lord. His poems read as though he has come in intimate contact with his God, and personally experienced the mysterious and miraculous modes in which that God chose to deal with him.

* *Tiruvāchagam*, II, 46-47; VIII, 8; XIII, 16; XXX, 2.

† *Tiruvāchagam*, V, 19, 23; XXIV, 1; XXXII, 1; L, 2.

the Vedas, but learning in a host of secular sciences as well, as a 'mere name' compared to the definite impressions left by the mystic states (Chand. VII. 1). Yet the tendency of a researcher, as opposed to that of a dogmatic adherent of texts is distinctly apparent throughout the Upaniṣads. Even Sankara who quotes the authority of the Śruti so often, has had to admit that 'The office of texts is not to metamorphose existing things, but only to make existing things clear' (Commentary on Puruṣa Upaniṣad VI. 2). It is difficult to say when the idea of Śruti as a revelation began. No doubt, the Svetāśvatara Upaniṣad (VI. 18) says :—'He who created the Brahmā first and entrusted the Vedas unto him;' but the attitude of almost all the other seers of the Upaniṣads appears to be creative rather than reproductive. In Brhad. (II. 4.10) the three Vedas are called 'the breath of the great Being;' but the same credit is given to Upaniṣad, Purāṇa, etc. So it appears to be merely a general statement. Manu and Sayana do undoubtedly speak of the Veda as an infallible authority but they are surely writers of a much later age.

In problems like that of the process of creation, or that of the definite nature of the Indefinite Universal Substratum, where in the very nature of things, means of direct perception or definite description are not available, Gaudapada (Mandukya Karikas, I. 6-9 and II. 21-29) confesses that different possible solutions are equally right or wrong. Sankara calls narratives of creation an 'attractive hyperbole' or 'a popular story' (Intr. to Aitareya Upaniṣad). What could be more frank than the statement of Rg Veda itself :—'He (i.e., God) only knows; or else He (also) knows not?' (X. 129. 6).

2. All changes in nature obey a law; and there is no *freakful* interference from an *external* God.

The word 'Rta' has several meanings in Vedic literature; but if we take it, as Griffith does, to mean moral or natural law, then Rg Veda (IV. 23.9) seems sufficiently explicit on the point 'Firm-seated are the eternal law's foundations.' However the usual idea in the Upaniṣads is the supreme power not of Natural Law but of the Brahman or the 'Indestructible Being' over all the forces of nature, all processes, cosmic as well as individual, and all actions, religious as well as secular. (Kena 17-23 and Brhad.

III. 8. 9-11). Yet it must be noted that the Brahman of the Upaniṣads is the immanent substratum of nature. He 'the protector of the universe, etc., etc.,' is according to Kauṣ. III. 8 (in some editions III. 9) 'my soul; that men ought to know.' The Gīta is however more explicit. 'Beings follow nature (Prakṛti)' (III. 33); 'nature' here refers no doubt probably to only one aspect of natural law, the law of Karma. Remarkably enough, Śaṅkara in his commentary on this verse puts in the mouth of Śrī Kṛiṣṇa Himself, the words:—'Nature is irresistible to Me or to anybody else.'

3. The whole universe is interconnected; and there seems to be a fundamental unity in the universe. 'The only necessary view of God, is:—'That immanent Power of Law—not necessarily co-terminous with the laws of material nature known so far—which governs the whole universe from within.'

The idea of a fundamental unity occurs as a positive assertion instead of as a probability in the philosophy of the R̥g Veda, and especially in that of the Upaniṣads and the Gīta. 'This entire universe is the Puruṣa alone, both that which was, and that which endures for the future.' (R. V., X. 90-2; compare also R. V., X. 129.2 and X. 82.6). 'That highest Puruṣa' according to the Gīta (VIII. 22) is He in whom all beings dwell, and by whom all this is pervaded.' The imagination of the Upaniṣadic Philosopher ever postulates an evolution. 'In the beginning, my dear, this was pure being, one without a second' (Chand. VI. 2.1). In the Taittiriya Upaniṣad (II. 1) again, the crude scientific notions of those days come forward to trace the evolution from Brahman through the Akāśa and other elements to food and right up to man.

That the Brahman or the Ātman—the fundamental substratum of the universe—governs it from within, has already been shown in (2) above; but its immanence is indicated more often, by postulating its identity with the individual soul than with 'the Power or Law' in nature. 'That particle which is the soul of all, that is Truth—it is the universal soul—Oh Svetaketu—Thou art that' (Chand. VI. 12.3). One text however (Bṛhad. III. 7.3.23) distinctly unifies all the forces of material nature and identifies them with the Self as well as the universal Inner Ruler. 'There is none that sees but He..... He is thy soul, the Inner

Ruler, Immortal.....' That the Brahman is a harmonising principle is shown by passages like Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (IV. 4.22)——'He is the bridge that holds together the worlds and prevents them from clashing together.' Śrī Kṛṣṇa while speaking of the three Guṇas says, 'Know them to proceed from Me. Still I am not in them; they are in Me.' (Gita VII. 12).

4. All that can, in the present state of our knowledge, be definitely said about that Substratum is, that it is 'Existence, Power or Law, or rather all the three in one.'

Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad repeatedly warns us against confusing the Brahman with any conceivable object. 'Neti, Neti' (Bṛhad. IV. 2.4.) Sat, Cit, Ānanda are the usual terms used to describe Brahman in later Vedānta, based on texts like Bṛhad. III. 8.28, Taitt. II. 1. and Sarvopaniṣatsar 21. But that 'Sat' means *mere* existence in a general sense is shown by Katha (VI. 12), where it is said that He cannot be seen except as 'It is.' Similarly 'Cit' or 'Jñānam' (according to Bṛhad. IV. 5.13) signifies not a consciousness or mind like ours, but 'Prajñāna Ghana,' i.e., the essence of consciousness itself. 'He, the immortal, infinite supreme Brahman, in whom both knowledge and ignorance abide unmanifested.....and who again rules knowledge as well as ignorance is different (from both)' (Svetāsvatara V. 1). The idea of 'Ānanda' does not of course appear necessary so far, in the scientific conception of the substratum. But even in the Upaniṣadic conception, it must be noted that it signifies not pleasure, but some sort of impersonal bliss or harmony.

5. Our very finite existence and intellect *probably* preclude the possibility of a more definite knowledge of that Fundamental Substratum. It seems impossible to describe in terms of phenomena, that which is the cause of all phenomena.

The Upaniṣads seem to have no doubt on this point. The formula 'Neti Neti' or the idea of the Brahman being an unknowable and incomprehensible harmony of all pairs of opposites, and yet above them all, occurs in Iśa, Svetāsvatara, Gita and repeatedly in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad. Gaudapada in Mandukya Karikas (III. 26) distinctly confesses that 'pure incomprehensibility (of Brahman) is the reason' for the statement

'Neti Neti.' Brhadāranyaka explains the reason of the incomprehensibility itself. 'When there are two, then (only) one sees another' (IV. 5.15). 'You cannot behold the beholder of beholding' (III. 4.2).

6. The universe is neither non-existent, nor unreal; it is only its multiple aspect that is philosophically or scientifically untenable and hence a mere appearance or an idea.

The formula 'Neti Neti' does not necessarily signify the denial of the existence of the phenomenal universe; for in Brhad. (II. 3.6) already quoted, the seer of the Upaniṣads says almost in the same breath 'Satyasya Satyam.' This latter phrase occurs independently also in Brhad. (I. 20) as regards the Ātman. That the whole world has proceeded from Brahman and acts by His support, is shown by the texts like Taitt. (II. 6-7), Chand. (VI. 3.1-4) and Atharva Veda (X. 8.31). Brhadāranyaka (II. 3.1) clearly admits that there are two aspects of Brahman, 'with form and formless, mortal and immortal.'

7. The individual soul *appears* to be merely a 'mobilised equilibrium' or 'a group consciousness' capable of being revived, suspended or partitioned. It is essentially, though *perhaps* not indentially, the same as that Immanent Substratum. It *appears* however to be much closer to that Fundamental Principle than anything else we know of.

The individuality of the Soul has, as far as I know, never been definitely questioned by the Upaniṣads except in so far that the individual soul is regarded identical with the Cosmic. Again on the question of this identity, the scientist considering our meagre knowledge in this domain would be rather cautious; while the mystics of the Upaniṣads appear quite certain and explicit. The idea is repeated very often by them. The well known formula 'Tat, Tvam, Asi' occurs in Chandogya (VI. 8.7 and VI. 12.3) (compare also Chand. III. 11.3 and Brhad. III. 4.2). The 'Dṛṣṭi' (i.e., Soul) of Patanjali's Yoga Sūtras (II. 20) may be a slightly different conception from the Ātman of the Upaniṣads. Yet it too is explained as 'pure seeing' or 'pure vision' which is not much different from 'pure knowledge,' the attribute of Brahman. The exact identity however, was not assumed to exist. Brahma-sūtras (XIII. 43 and 50) speak of the individual soul as an

'Amśa' (*i.e.*, part or aspect) or Ābhāsa (*i.e.*, image) of Brahman. Brhadāraṇyaka (IV. 4.5 also) confesses that 'the soul which is Brahman, which consists in knowledge, mind, etc., etc.....becomes as are its works, etc.' All the same this lack of identity was regarded as merely apparent, for the same Upaniṣad (I. 4.10) restores the identity as soon as correct knowledge is gained. It must also be noted that a further stretching of that identity in the idea that the macrocosm is built on the pattern of the microcosm has of course no justification in modern science.

That the soul is the nearest clue to Brahman is of course quite emphatically shown by the Upaniṣads. (See Taittiriya II. 1-5) where all the five 'kośas' are traced through, and also the story of Gargya (Bṛihad. II. 1 and Kaush. IV). "The Lord doomed the senses by turning them outward.....some wise men however seeking immortality finds the self by turning his eyes inward" (Katha IV. 1).

The residence or entrance of the Ātman or Brahman in the cavity of the heart—'Nihitam Guhāyam'—referred to in texts like Katha (II. 12), Taitt. (II.1) and the Gīta (III.17) must not be regarded as signifying that the soul is an object placed somewhere in the body. Śaṅkara in his commentary on Taitt. II.1 and II.6 explains, that this is merely figurative language (prakalpayate). 'The cavity of the heart is only 'the place of its realisation.'

8. The effects of Karma are automatic and immediate.

The first part of this proposition is brought out clearly by texts like Mahabharata Anuśāsan, *i.e.*, XIII Parva (7th Chapter) 'As among a thousand cows, the calf knows its mother.....As without any one's stimulation, flowers and fruits do not transgress their due season, so does the past deed.' According to the Gīta also (V. 14) the fructification of Karma appears to be a natural process, in which God as such does not interfere. 'It is "Svabhāva" that does it all;' and if we follow Śaṅkara 'Svabhāva' stands for Prakṛti.

As regards the second part the Hindoo Scriptures are usually inclined to postulate the possibility of the postponement of fructification to later births; but this variance may be only apparent; because by the fruit of actions, it was physical or social effect that was usually meant. The psychologist, Patanjali, however, has not

neglected to mention quite definitely the automatic and immediate mental effects. 'Karma Āśaya' as well as 'Vāsanā' (Yoga Sūtras II. 12. and IV. 8) both refer to such effects. See also (9) below.

9. Virtue and vice are psychological phenomena and nature guarantees their psychological effects with the infallibility of natural law. Physiological effects are indirect and secondary. So also are the social effects, being less easy to predetermine owing to the complexity of the social mechanism.

That virtue and vice are definable, only in psychological rather than in physical terms, is indicated by the Gita (XVII. 11-12 and XVIII. 25-35) where the classification of actions and attitudes under the three 'Gunas' is explained. 'The real seat of virtue is in the mind and not in the outward act; so say the wise' (Mahabharata XII. 7063). The same book repeats the same idea several times as regards the true import of asceticism or saintliness (III. 13448, XII. 343 and 5961).

Mahabharata (Udyoga Parva, Chap. 34 or V. 1242) depicts, how the mental effects (*i.e.*, Karma Āśaya spoken of by Patañjali) gather strength and gradually lead to effects on the physical plane. 'Sin practised oft, experience shows, men's understanding steals at length. And understanding gone, the strength of sin unchecked, resistless grows, etc., etc.' 'That physiological or social effects are secondary and indirect' is an idea which I have not found explicitly stated anywhere; but it seems to be almost implied in Patañjali's Sūtras (II. 4) where it is admitted that effects on the physical plane may remain dormant or get extenuated or overpowered.

That we at least begin, our heaven and hell, by our mental attitudes, here on earth, may be the import of the Gita (XVI. 21). 'Triple is the gate of hell—lust, wrath and greed.'

10. Destiny is merely the resultant of all the cosmic forces. If, as in so many personal matters, other forces happen to be individually or collectively negligible, the force of the individual may be the prominent deciding factor.

As shown in (2) above the Hindoo Scriptures speak usually of 'the power of Brahman' rather than 'law' or 'resultant of cosmic forces' as governing human or cosmic destinies; but with

the usual significance of the term Brahman, the other idea may also be implied.

On the second part of the proposition the attitude of the Hindoo Scriptures is rather shallow and one-sided very often. Likewise others say, this Puruṣa has the nature of desire. 'As his desire, so his resolve (*kratu*); as his resolve, so is his work; as his work, so is his reward' Bṛhad. IV. 4.5. Chandogya (III. 14.1) confirms the same idea as regards results after death. However Mahabharata, Anuśāsana, *i.e.*, 13th Parva, Chap. 22, verses 8 and 9 are couched in a remarkably modern spirit. They make factors of heredity (from the side of both parents) and influences of food and occupation as practically the only deciding factors as regards the nature of our actions, whatever the external circumstances may be. This is put rather too strongly perhaps; but a confirmation of the modern ideas of heredity and physico-chemical influences on the

d by this ancient text is really remarkable. The Gita (III. 27) is also equally remarkable. 'All actions are wrought by the qualities (Gunas) of man only. The soul is never excluded by egoism thinketh I am the doer.'

11 Prayer does not always bring about the desired result. At its best it may carry merely the force of concentration and confidence and may have to contend with other forces.

The inevitable fruitfulness of prayer is of course assumed in Vedic Hymns; but the rational explanation of its action does not seem to have engaged the serious attention of the contemplative seers of the Vedas or the Upaniṣads; and the Hindoo Scriptures otherwise do not seem to be explicitly in favour of the above proposition. But it is remarkable that the Rg. Veda (I.14.3) as well as the Atharva Veda (I.8.2) combines to deify the power of devotion or prayer in Bṛhaspati or Brahmanaspati; and most Vedic scholars are agreed that Vedic gods represent forces of nature. (*Cf.* Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts, Vol. V, p. 272 and Griffith's comments on the above mentioned verses). It may be also noted that by the age of the Brāhmanas, the idea that the Gods are helpless in granting prayers, if the necessary ritual is correctly performed, had already taken root. Thus the rituals and accompanying prayers were conceived of, almost like the modern conquest of nature.

12. The culmination of moral and religious effort on the practical side lies in the control and proper utilisation of mental forces and, not in the vision of, or union with, an external God : that is, visions of religious men, may at best, be a means to an end, and not an end in themselves.

Leaving aside the later Bhakti schools which deny the above proposition, this idea is implied in the methods of Jñāna Yoga, as expounded by the Gita and the Upaniṣads, as well as in the methods of Patañjali.

Mandukya Karikas (III. 40-45) distinctly make mental control as the essential feature of the achievements of a Yogi. More than Samādhi even, it is perfect detachment according to Gaudapada that should be the aim of a Yogi. ' It (i.e., the mind) should not be allowed to indulge in the bliss (even) of that condition (i.e., Samādhi) ' Karikas (III. 15). Some few passages of the Gita appear to have a distinct Bhakti strain; (e.g., XVIII. 64-67) but more often it is otherwise. II. 59-61 give perfect control of the senses and the mind and perfect desirelessness as the final achievement on the practical side, acquired, ' after the Supreme is seen ' Nirvāṇa surrounds a self-controlled man on all sides ' (V. 26), i.e., he is emancipated even in this life. In the description of liberated souls in the Gita, ' knowledge of the self ' is mentioned, but not ' the vision of God.' In VI. 45-47 a Yogi is regarded as the highest. Hatha Yoga, the first part of the practices of Yoga, is purely a set of physiological exercises. The art of Prāṇāyāma is also a purely physiological process; but its great significance as a means of approach towards the final goal, is shown by indirect allusions to it in Brhad. (I.5.22 and 23) and Kauṣītaki (II.5) and explicit description given by Svetāsvatara (II.8-15) and the Gita (V.26). Prāṇāyāma is one of the types of Yajña in the Gita (IV.49). This shows that Mukti, Nirvāṇa or realisation is the result of a regular culture dependent upon physiological processes, rather than that of the favour of a Being independent of us, gained by penance or devotion. ' The weak cannot attain the Ātman ' (Mundaka III. 2.4).

Patañjali's Yoga is defined as ' Citta-vrtti-nirodha ' which means control of mental forces (I.3). Kaivalyam, the culmination of Yoga is with him the removal of ignorance, establishing oneself in the real nature of Draṣṭā, i.e., the seer or the self (II. 25).

of happiness and misery in the present life. The Hindu answer to this perplexing question is that happiness and misery are due to *pūrva karma*, not present *karma*, that suffering is the reward for misdeeds in former births. A man's condition results from his own deeds. We accuse God when we ourselves by our folly bring misfortunes upon ourselves. Sin and suffering, like sowing and reaping, go hand in hand. Past history is a fact of the utmost importance in spiritual life as in the physical world, where the modern scientist says that the history of a simple electron is important. The individual carries with himself the legacy of his own past. The thoughts, words and deeds of a man are causes which must work out their corresponding effects. The effects of action rebound on the author. The individual makes himself. This doctrine is of great ethical value since it emphasizes human responsibility and teaches there is no such thing as a cruel fate or unjust God and that it is foolish to rail at misfortune as if it is undeserved. This doctrine of moral causation is just, logical and perfectly reasonable.

The objection that this doctrine is essentially fatalistic is a gross misrepresentation. *Karma* is not an irremediable handicap telling heavily against all future efforts. It is also a preserver of human endeavour. Individual effort is not stifled as will be seen from the *Yogavāśiṣṭha*. Destiny and individual effort are not incompatible. *Karma* does not shut out all hope. Past effort is destiny; present effort is exertion and it is possible to conquer past effort with present effort. We must get rid of the false notion that fate is driving us. Just as all present was in the past, the future is in the present.

One more question remains: what becomes of God's sovereignty, if man's freedom is a fact? The Government of God and the responsibility of man, God's freedom and man's freedom involve a dilemma. Either man's freedom is illusory and abolished by the Supreme Being or the Supreme Being is no longer Supreme, His Supremacy being limited by man's freedom. God's freedom is absolute and man's freedom is limited and the freedom of both is real. The *Śrutaprakāśikā* states:—*Amātyasya svatantratve rājñastannāpahīyate ēramēva parasyāpi jīrasātantryadāyinaḥ na*

scātantryam parādhīnascarūpāt prachyutam bhavēt scātantrya-dāyīnā pumsā tatpratyānyicāraṇāt. A king's freedom does not suffer from his delegation of powers to his ministers. In the exercise of their powers the ministers are independent. Theirs is freedom by delegation while that of the king is his own and both are free. God's freedom and man's freedom do not conflict. God's freedom is absolute while the finite reals have freedom by delegation.

Before concluding we may note in passing that Śāṅkara's treatment of this question of individual freedom or agency is not ethically as satisfying as Rāmānuja's. The former regards the agency of the soul as unreal, an agency by super-imposition. But the analogy of the carpenter in the *Brahma Sūtras* in this context gives him trouble. How is the carpenter not a real agent? Rāmānuja has not to experience such a difficulty since he accepts genuine choice, real agency.

Rāmānuja with an abiding faith in the existence of a real moral order has an indubitable conviction that men are free. Keenly alive to the facts of human responsibility and freedom he points out that it is possible to gain a rational and an ethically satisfactory view of human life which "neither blinks its tragic aspects nor denies the joy and adventure which it contains," that it is also possible to reconcile God's sovereignty and man's freedom and to justify the ways of God to man.

PROBLEM OF COMPARATIVE VALUE

BY

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The problem of generic value is to determine the meaning of good, evil or valuable. The problem of comparative value is to define the meaning of Better, Best or more or less valuable. If values are functions of interests, as Perry holds, how are we to compare them?

We have not to answer the question, what is most valuable?—because, we have first to understand the meaning of most valuable.

We have not to find out an object we most desire, because such an effort is founded first, on a wrong assumption that there is a preference which is common to all and is also supreme; now this is not true to facts. Secondly, the object of such a preference is supposed to be the Best; now right or wrong, this supposition has already begged the question.

The problem of comparative value like that of generic value cannot be solved by an appeal to a personal bias. "I like more" is not a relevant answer to the question what is the meaning of Better? If it is taken as relevant, it only repeats the question, since we have still to find out the meaning of "liking more or less."

"I prefer X to Y"—if this means that X is *better* than Y then it is a *judgment* the truth of which depends on the evidence given by the meaning of Better. Now, if "I prefer X to Y" means that I *like* X more than Y, then it is a "Motor-affective" fact which may serve as an evidence for proving that X is better than Y, if being assumed that comparative liking constitutes the

meaning of better. As a judgment "I prefer X to Y" is quite impersonal and objective. As the description of a motor-affective fact, it refers to a state or relation of a comparative interest to an object, and as such it has no judging power. It can serve only as an evidence for the truth of comparisons.

Preference is nearer to liking than to an impersonal judgment and hence should be thus understood. Like the words "appreciation" or "valuation" preference also is sometimes loosely used and no discrimination is made between interest and judgment, thus making a false claim to objectivity or infallibility. Preference, like the interest of the simpler type is grounded in cognition. When I prefer X to Y my preference is mediated by cognition. There is a *judgment* of comparison operative—when X and Y are seen and either of them is preferred to the other. But it should be noted that preference, like interest, is fallible, since the objects among which preference is made may not be correctly perceived. Act of comparison is cognitive but the objects compared may not be always well-cognised.

What is, then, the characteristic condition of an object which renders it Better than another? What makes a thing the Best among several others?

The characteristic condition of objects judged as Better is that it must be quantitative in some sense of the term. It must be some kind of magnitude. The conception of quantity need not be limited to the series of numbers. The comparative form in grammar, according to Russell, is *prima facie* evidence of quantity. There are different kinds of magnitude.

Secondly, the *Better* object must be better in respect of the same condition which renders it good. It has not only to be more or less, but more or less *valuable*. Value consists in the relation which an object sustains to favourable or unfavourable interest, and if an object is better or worse, it must be the *relation* of the object to the interest, which must have determined that character. It is the interest which confers value on the object, and the interest alone is entitled to determine the amount of value conferred. If Good is pleasure—the Better is determined by the greater amount of pleasure. If Good is Whole, the less whole the worse. If Good

is Universal Love, the more of universal love, the better. The generic value may be defined in any way—for example, pleasure, whole, universal love, etc., the comparative value will depend upon the same definition.

Thirdly, if interest is a quantity, then every interest is commensurable, that is, it must be greater or less in some respect than some other interest. But it does not follow that two interests which are commensurable in *some* respects are commensurable in *all* respects, or all interests are commensurable in *any* respect. Two interests may be commensurable in one respect but not in another; two interests like two sensations, may be commensurable in duration without being so in intensity. An interest X may be commensurable with interest Y, and incommensurable with interest Z, just as a distance from one point is commensurable with a second distance from the same point but incommensurable with a third distance from a different point. The range of commensurability is a question of fact and hence it should be ascertained by an examination of the kinds of magnitude which interests possess. Whether these kinds of magnitude are reducible to one by summation or multiplication is not pre-determined by the general assumption that interests are quantities.

There are four notions which Perry has accepted as principles of comparing values—Correctness, Intensity, Preference and Inclusiveness. It is in these four respects that interests are quantitatively verifiable and comparable.

We have accepted one category of value and we must attach ourselves to that category even while studying the problem of comparative value. Estimate of value is to be effected by a comparison of quantifiable natures of interests. All the four principles mentioned above, *qualify* interest which is constitutive of value. Secondly, they preserve the generic character of value among the elements so compared and again they do not introduce any fresh conception of value not comprehended within that generic character.

All the four principles agree in one respect. They enable us to judge value without compromising it. The principle of correct-

ness is a non-quantitative principle, and hence does not yield a judgment of comparative value.

That principle is expressed in the judgments like "this value is founded on truth," "that value is founded on error." Values founded on error are none the less values for being thus founded. Mistaken interests give to objects values which are as real as those given by correct interests. Of course, values founded on erroneous interests are *less stable* than the values founded on correct interests. Instability of values varies with the degree of knowledge. Values are elliptically qualified as correct or mistaken values. What is correct or mistaken is the perception of objects and their inter-relations. Values themselves cannot be correct or incorrect. They simply are or not. The object of a correct interest is not, *ipso facto*, better than the object of an incorrect interest. For Better, like Good depends upon what happens to interest itself; and it is from interest, and not from the mediating judgments that the object derives its value. Within the narrower fields of human fact mistaken interests are very much transitory, but in broader fields of religion, politics, and social sciences, mistaken interests continue for long, and they create values which last for centuries.

The three remaining principles—Intensity, Preference and Inclusiveness, correspond closely to Intensive, Distensive and Extensive magnitudes respectively which W. E. Johnson propounds in his Logic. The three principles define the quantities of interest and hence they provide standards of comparative value by which to determine better and worse, best and worse, the most and the least valuable.

An object X is better than Y if (1) the interest in X is more intense than the interest in Y; (2) if X is preferred to Y and (3) if the interest in X is more inclusive than the interest in Y.

Order of Preference is distinct from the scale of intensities. I *prefer* X to Y means, X is more to my taste than Y, which is different from my taste for X is stronger or more intense than Y.

The difference between 'intenser' and 'prefer to' is also confirmed by their independent variability—the interest in X may rise to any intensity but it may still remain least in the order of preference.

We may have two or more interests in the same object. These two interests are distinct in the sense that they are functionally independent. Satisfaction of one interest from an object does not imply the satisfaction of another. Thus the value of such an object of united interests is Better than that of an object of a single interest.—Better in the sense of being Inclusive, not in the sense of being preferred or in the sense of being more intensely desired.

It does not follow from the general fact of comparative value that there is any one absolute Best or any absolute Worst that is to say there is no one supreme superlative. The only sense of Best which can be ascertained is that in which it is applied to one among three or more than three terms.

If X is better than Y and also better than Z, then X is the best among X, Y and Z. That X is "the best Possible" in the sense, that there can be nothing better than it, does not follow; nor does it follow, that because there is a definable sense in which X is the best of the group X, Y, Z, this sense will yield the term P than which no other term is better.

There is a sense in which unity may be said to be the maximum of the series of fractions, inasmuch as, no fraction in the strict sense can be greater than unity. But it does not follow that there is any such limit to the increase of value, any more than there is any greatest number. In the case of unity, it should be noted that we have waived the difficulty that unity is not in this sense a fraction at all but only a limit to the series of fractions having a character that is altogether distinct from the series of fractions which it limits. A similar difficulty appears in the well-known Philosophical conception of a Perfection that transcends the quality perfected. We can never assume that there is any perfect object than which nothing can be better. In fact, it will be difficult to give any meaning to such a conception of perfection except one which will be either religious or emotional.

So no one superlative value is logically available for us. There are superlative *values* real in their own sphere, and ascertained by their corresponding interests. It is philosophically impossible to arrive at a Value-Absolute. There may be eternal

values of Münsterberg—there may be ultimate, objective, or intrinsic values, but there cannot be *one* eternal, ultimate, objective, or intrinsic value. This is a conclusion which we cannot hope to escape if we view values as objects of interest. We as personalities start with a definite number of interests and hence, we are bound up with a corresponding number of values. We cannot be said to have one single interest, though, this does not preclude the possibility of one single harmonious system of interests. The interests with which we start as human beings are capable of harmonious development and it is this which gives us the required unity.

There are two methods of comparing values. One the Corrective and the other the Quantitative. Both the methods are useful —the Corrective in the cognitive aspect and the Quantitative in the motor-affective aspect of our life. Values studied by these two methods can be *compared* and *harmonised* but no one Value-Absolute can be had.

Both Philosophy and commonsense have recognised all the four principles in some shape or other. The Corrective principle is used in intellectual spheres and in the various sciences. The Hedonistic School or the Cult of feeling employs the intensive principle. The preferential principle is accepted by humanists and by the cult of rationality and taste where the level or quality of interest is accounted more significant than either their intensity or number. The principle of inclusiveness is emphasised by religions and by moral rigorism—whether in the exaltation of the Self above its transitory and partial appetites or in the exaltation of the group above its constituent members or in the exaltation of Humanity above any smaller groups.

The three quantitative principles—Intensity, Preference and Inclusiveness, are independent of one another and must all be accepted by any theory which attempts to define comparative value of all objects in all respects. They are independent in the sense that they cannot be reduced to one another both in their meaning and their causal variations. Intensity is not a function of preference nor preference of intensity, nor inclusiveness of either these two. These three principles bear a peculiar relation to one another.

discarded just as ethics has discarded intuitionism, "moral sense," and innate ideas of right and wrong. An empirical view cannot, of course, recognize any *a priori* ideas or concepts,—all will be seen to be conditioned by development experiences and influences largely social. The individual mind itself and all its activities, expressions, ideas, feelings, knowledge and concepts develop gradually under normal, social and physical influences, experiences and interactions. This view must also hold of religious experiences and ideas. If they are vital psychological experiences, as I take it, certainly they have no unique origin and development, unless it be held that one has a religious make-up quite separate from the remaining sum total of his psychological make-up, which no one here could hold. Rather, religious experiences, and ideas of the individual, must also be seen to be psychologically developed, as are any other psychological attainments, to have their setting in concrete social and physical influences. For a study of the religious experience and development of individuals or groups, the *given* data are psycho-physical beings growing up in, and seeking adjustment to a physico-social environment.

This may lead to the question whether religion or religious experience is essentially individual or social. The same question may be asked of any psychological experience, or of mind itself. Is the *self* individual or a social self? Obviously there is no such being as a purely individual self, nor any purely individual psychological experience. A psychological self develops only in a social environment with an increasingly conscious give and take of influences and ideas. Especially is this true of all experiences of values: we cannot conceive of any individual having values all of his own, without reference to a social origin, meaning or relationship. If we speak of an individual's values in terms of the highest self, that highest self necessarily involves being the best social self,—varying as may be ideas of the best society. Even those beauteous hermit souls who have found the end to be union or communion with God, or even absorption into an Infinite, have thereby chosen their ideal *socius*. Moreover, one has but to glance at the whole vast array of religious practices, ceremonies, rites, festivals and symbolisms, to see how very social is their origin;

make-up, emphasis and significance. The very emotions and sanctity by which they are cherished is obviously social, and guarded by social pressure and sense of values. Religious values are essentially social values. Even creeds and the most philosophical concepts we may well find rooted in social influences, experiences and values. Though as in any psychological phenomena, individuals are the units or foci of conscious experiences, those very experiences, religious as all kinds, are possible only in a "matrix" of social customs and ideas. Hence an adequate psychology of religion must use an adequate social psychology.

Here we may pause to see what, then, are the differentia of religious experiences? What is religion? These criteria we have suggested: (1) If vital at all, it is surely a phenomenon of psychological experience, its origin and significance empirical. (2) It is essentially social, as is the psychological individual essentially social. Its values are obviously social values. (3) Moreover, religious values arise from the concrete experiences of practical life. In fact, as Dr. Ames states: "The values of religion are also other kinds of values at the same time: economic, political, social or aesthetic,.....Religion, then, should be understood to find the values which it cherishes in the stream of actual concrete experience." (4) Finally, out of the great complex of practical social values, those which society considers the highest, the most important for the best life, *are* the religious values. To these *highest social values* is attached religious feeling, sanctity and emotional security. Striking is the agreement of many contemporary definitions of religion: "conservation of values" (Höfding) "determination and effort to realise the highest social values" (Coe), "endeavour to secure the conservation of socially recognized values through specific actions" (Wright), "pursuit of the highest social values" (Ames), "the co-operative quest for the good life" (Haydon).

To glance at the great common expressions of all religions is to see that they arise out of the most fundamental and practical life needs, and the most vital interests; they gather round the most important social events and the crises of the life-cycle: food, water, protection, home and family, birth, marriage, death. Think how all peoples protect these and build strong social and

emotional sanctions round them in religious ceremonies, rites, taboos. Those objects which are most important for life are sacred, or in more cultured groups are symbols of spiritual, social qualities, *e.g.*, water, fire, bread, air itself; those events which are crucial for society are the occasions for religious rites, ceremonies, festivals, *e.g.*, marriage, death, seasonal changes; those relationships which are most cherished give rise to religious practices, and symbolisms, *e.g.*, mother, father, brother. The occupations, social organization, and means of living may determine the whole religion of a group, *e.g.*, the Todas, whose religious customs and sanctities completely centre round their dairy life and objects. There is no richer source for such illustrations than Hinduism, of which every phase is so closely bound up with social customs, relationships, and values. One fundamental reason for the long, vital history of Hinduism is that it has consistently recognized *dharma* as equivalent to religion.

There follows, too, the obvious conclusion that religious objects and values, as all values, change and grow with time and place, ways and means of living, social organization and development. Of primitive groups the needs, values and sacred objects are largely physical; with increasing social development there emerge social and moral qualities, and relationships, inculcated by religion. With the increase of reflective life there is emphasis of the value of life and of knowledge. So to-day "these are the sources of the new religious idealism, the technique and method of science, the evolutionary world-view, the social ideal of democracy, the dream of economic freedom, the hope of international co-operation." (Haydon). Just here, we will see later, is the secret of an adequate philosophy of religion for the day: to incorporate vital, contemporary values, and quietly drop those no longer related to humanity's needs and problems.

Throughout this elaboration there has been evident the necessity for a true psychology of religion of the historical method. This has been rapidly developed in recent years by the remarkable growth of the study of history of religions. It is probable that in it lies the greatest hope for a truly scientific method of religious thinking and findings. It has made vast contributions to the psychology of religion, and promises still greater, ultimately also

to philosophy of religion, and to the solving of changing religious problems. For the philosophy of religion it is significant to realize that religion is not one but many. "Accordingly a valid religious science will devote itself to the conscientious interpretation of each one of the multitude." (Haydon). The comparative method is then discredited, as well as any "preconceived idea as to the standard of religious excellence," or of one supreme religion, or one revelation "delivered once for all to the saints." Moreover its own methods have been critically tested and improved. Dr. Haydon gives this statement of the rigorous method urged by Toutain at the International Congress of Religions at Oxford: "A rigid exclusion of all *a priori* and a refusal of all hasty generalizations; careful and minute criticism and analysis of sources; conscientious search for every fact which might clarify the data; detailed studies before reconstruction of the whole; immersion of the mind in the whole milieu of the time and place studied."--- "History of religions is, however, no longer history in the sense of twenty years ago. The materials are part of a living, social process, and can be ensouled only by the fact-finding, critical, and interpretative aid of a score of methods belonging to other sciences." (Haydon). So valuable helps are found in sociology, social psychology, evolutionary ethics, geography, anthropology, ethnology, archaeology, philology, biology. These, then, are great promises for a scientific philosophy of religion.

But now as Philosophers you may urge that though it be agreed that the preceding is an adequate explanation of religions, there remains to be seen its relation with Philosophy of religion. That relation is, I submit, the relation of functional psychology to functional philosophy, of a psychology of values to a science of values. And if religions are vital, what part with them have any philosophical conceptions or professed values or realities, unless they, too, have vital, functional meaning for the highest life toward which both religious practice and thought strive? Again functional psychology reminds us that philosophical concepts themselves arise out of social and practical issues, problems and patterns. I believe that every concept of religious philosophers has its origin in practical, social milieus, and its testing in functional effectiveness for the highest human values of its time and place.

It would be impossible in this meagre discourse to illustrate every such relationship. My purpose has been merely to suggest the fundamental importance of the point of view, and roughly lay the psychological foundation,—I leave it to you to build on it. However, by way of a very meagre illustration, I will briefly suggest some consequences of the method for one varied concept of religious philosophy : God or gods.

The gods are those objects, beings, or powers who *are* the greatest social values or ideals, or who protect or safe-guard them, or who symbolize them. How clearly their biographies emerge : human life and need gives them birth; geography and occupations fashion and nourish them; social organizations and patterns name them; social relationships, values, and ideals give them character and moral qualities; human disappointments and sorrows evoke comfort from their gods; human failures and weaknesses not deserve punishment, but also plead for strength and compensation. The gods of an agricultural people are gods of the earth, sun, rain, fertilizing animals, and even the grain and produce. For the Vedic Aryans as nomads the gods of light and sun were pre-eminent; for the Aryans tilling the parched soil of India's sun, Indra, the god of storm and rain, gained first place. For fighting peoples God is a conquering warrior. For Monarchic ages God is King. For modern democracies God is the " Ideal Socius," the " Spirit of the Beloved Community," the " Common Will." For normal, struggling, loving human beings and families, God is Mother and Father, God is Love. For the mystics God is Lover. For detached meditators God is pure essence, soul or spirit, " perfect existence, perfect knowledge, perfect bliss." You may urge that all this is mere symbolism. So it may have become for reflective views, but the psychology and history of religions amply testify that all such concepts are rooted in actual life, needs and social values. If we have now come to recognize many religious concepts as symbols, but also to see the values for which they stand, one great question which faces us is whether we should keep the symbols, or appeal zealously to the human values themselves. The test is functional or pragmatic. Certainly outgrown symbols must be dropped. If we continue to use God-symbols they must be in terms of the values and aspirations of our day,—scientific method and creativity,

democracy, rational solution of great economic and social problems, internationalism. For some consecrated philosophers of religion, symbols, too long associated with Absolutism and inertia, foster obscurantism, and lack challenge. They would rather lend every effort to the educational and emotional inculcation of great human values directly. One writes: "To trust to God or Providence or to cosmic evolution under some form of immanence is to remain children, or at best weaklings making our slow way upon crutches, when the need of the age is for strong disciplined men who will hew out of the crude, warring world of reality the Kingdom of the Ideal."—"If reality is such that man may, by his tools of science, directed by intelligence, build his ideals slowly but surely into the structure of existence, the old need of a guarantee is gone."—"And if a seer could lay his heart to the great heart of humanity, he might discover that this gospel of creative idealism of science is our deepest human need." (Haydon).

Where, then, has a functional psychology of religion, aided by scientific study of the history of religious meanings and values, led philosophy of religion? It has shown values to be empirical, rooted in life needs and vital interests; of these the highest and the most important socially, are religious. An adequate philosophy of religion will inculcate those of its own day, and find means of realising them. Let Dr. Haydon again put the challenge: "A philosophy which sees our achieved values as intrinsically rooted in the nature of the cosmos, which ventures to believe that the cosmic and human flux may be guided in the pathway of the heart's desire, which sees in the intellect a wonderful instrument for projecting ideals and controlling the environment for human service and development, which challenges the deeply entrenched forces of evil with an everlasting defiance, which refuses the absolutist anaesthetic and laughs at the club of fatalism, which dares to hope that human hands and hearts shall be able to build at last the democracy of social righteousness, which sees the possible application of the method of science in establishing an international ethic, such a philosophy ought to give light and leadership to religion in this modern age." (Haydon).

THE CONCEPTION OF GOD IN ALEXANDER

BY

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In present-day philosophy speculations with regard to God are rare and it is interesting to find Prof. Alexander, propounding a new theory of God. It is worth our while, therefore, to try to understand his view and estimate its worth. In order to understand his conception of God, some acquaintance with his metaphysical views is necessary at the outset. We shall briefly outline them here. Alexander is an empirical realist. By an analysis of experience, taken in its objective sense, he finds that space and time underlie or are presupposed by all experience. He holds that it is possible to abstract from all empirical qualities of objects but at last we are left with bare space and time which can never be conceived to be eliminated from them. On this ground, he holds space and time to be the ultimate stuff of which the whole universe is constituted. But they are not two independent realities for him. He shows that neither of them can be conceived to exist independently of the other. Thus, according to him, time without some spatial element in it would cease to be continuous and become merely successive and space without some temporal element in it would cease to have parts and become merely continuous. For our present purpose, it is not necessary to enter into his arguments in support of the interdependence of space and time. We shall content ourselves with stating that he considers space and time to be one fundamental stuff which he calls space-time of which space and time are but abstracted aspects.

Space-time, according to Alexander, is of the nature of motion. It consists of point-instants (or points of space in moments of time) which are constantly undergoing rearrangements under the influence of the temporal factor. The different objects that we see in the world are nothing but complexes of S-T (space-time),

differing only in their degrees of complexity and in the empirical qualities they come to possess. The qualities form a hierarchy in which the lower is succeeded by the higher according as the evolutes gain in their complexity. First in the order of the evolutes comes matter, then life and then mind with their respective qualities of materiality, vitality and consciousness. The distinctive quality in each is a new characteristic which is absent from the orders of existents just preceding it. Alexander does not seek to explain the abrupt appearance of a new quality which was wholly absent from its preceding complex. For him, it is sufficient that in experience this is found to be the case. It is, as he says, on account of an inherent restlessness in time that the evolution proceeds. Time has, so to say, an onward urge towards the production of something higher.

Now here, we find the clue which leads to the conception of Deity in Alexander's system. S-T being the matrix of all existents must be infinite both in extent and duration. So, the process of evolution which S-T undergoes must be an eternal process. Now, in the technical language of Alexander, the distinctive quality which comes after any level of beings in the evolutionary scale is called deity in relation to the beings of that level.

Thus deity for any being is the next empirical quality in front of it and every level of being has its deity. For instance, with respect to matter, life is the deity, with respect to life, mind and with respect to mind which is the last known empirical quality, deity will be some quality which is perhaps yet to come. Now, for Alexander, God in relation to any being, means the possessor of what stands to as deity. Experience shows that whenever a certain quality becomes actual, it comes to be realised by many finite individuals of a certain type. Hence our deity, in its turn, will come to be realised in a type of finite individuals who will be as gods to us. So apparently Alexander's theory leads us to polytheism. But polytheism does not satisfy the religious sentiment of a high order. Hence Alexander finds it necessary to see whether his metaphysics has room for a monotheistic God and he succeeds in finding that it has.

According to him, the world, at any time, has a tendency to realise deity or to evolve a quality higher than any that has already

how manage to get self-expression irrespective of the question whether or not the individual, in realising them, feels that he is creating 'goods' in the world or developing ethically. This is my fourth suggestion. The 'contents' of life—those things which make life worth living—shall develop even apart from morality, as, alas, they have been doing to a greater and greater extent in modern life. Our only concern should be to see that morality also develops *pari passu* with culture and civilisation. At present it is assumed, with a certain amount of naïveté, perhaps, that cultural development *means* moral progress. It is this fallacious track of thought that has been responsible for all the blunders in moral theory and practice, and against which I am mainly contending. A primitive tribe of people may be moral according to their own lights, just as a highly civilised nation is moral according to *its* lights. And it is possible that neither may be moral, for aught we know, in the given circumstances. Morality is not a necessary accompaniment of cultural advancement.

In short, morality is always in the nature of the form of life, the spirit of existence. It is, as I have put it, an attitude of mind, a mental concomitant of our actions, whose presence is not inevitable but depends on the character of a people's religious beliefs and the exigencies of their social circumstances. The contents of life are supplied by the various instincts, impulses, desires and feelings which together constitute the complex whole called human nature. These impulses, desires, etc., will find expression, nay, will force self-expression of their own accord. Otherwise individual existence would itself be annihilated. Even apart from morality, the "goods" of life are bound to be produced according to the life-impulses of each individual. Morality is only the form which these contents are to be enveloped, the spirit, the attitude of mind, which should accompany our actions tending to produce these "goods." It is clear therefore that while, from this new point of view, renunciation of the world is not a necessary condition of moral life, and—this is the fifth implication—moral life is compatible with a life 'full of the richest contents,' we can discard the suggestion of scientific and artistic and economic utilities as having a bearing on morality as such.

If morality is thus merely a formal, conditional element of life, what help, one may ask, does it render the individual in the matter of choice of actions? How is the individual to know what actions or kinds of actions he has to perform and what to avoid? To answer this question requires space far larger than I am at present able to devote in this short paper, but let me suggest (which is my sixth suggestion) here that the actions of the individual should always have a reference to two things: (1) the realisation of the nature and characteristics of self-hood; (2) the promotion of others' moral and material well-being. I must state here that while the first is purely metaphysical or religious in its nature, the second is directly dependent upon the first (in what sense I have no space to explain just now), in such wise that it disappears with the disappearance of the first. The objective standpoint of ethics is dependent upon the subjective which must necessarily be metaphysical or religious. So that ethics finds its completion, not in politics, as Aristotle said, but in religion or metaphysics. By itself a merely ethical life is an incomplete, imperfect life; a merely social ethics is only a half-truth. A great Bengalee thinker has expressed this truth in these forceful words: "The modern mind is just now the European mind, such as it has become after having abandoned not only the philosophic idealism of the highest Graeco-Roman culture from which it started, but the Christian devotionalism of the middle ages; there it has been replaced by... a practical idealism and social, patriotic, and philanthropic devotion. It has got rid of God...and erected in His place man as its deity and society as its visible idol. At its best it is practical, ethical, social, pragmatic, altruistic, humanitarian. Now all these things are good, are especially needed at the present day... But the point here is that the modern mind has exiled from its practical motive-power the two essential things, God or the Eternal and spirituality or the God-state. Our insistence on the human point of view in life, in literature, in science, in philosophy—in everything, our tender affection for human foibles and weaknesses more than for human virtues and strength, sadly betray the readiness with which we are prepared to barter our divine for our human heritage. When this divine heritage has been realised,

the qualification, which was in the first instance found to be indispensable for realising it, ceases to operate *as a qualification*, so that while the individual was, to begin with, non-moral, in this stage, he becomes super-moral; a state sometimes described as 'beyond good and evil.' ' This is another implication of the 'new point of view.'

From the point of view of morality, therefore, there is no such thing as an absolute good, there are no things which are intrinsically good or good-in-themselves, there is no distinction between good-as-means and good-as-end. Everything is good, *i.e.*, moral only as a means to an end external to itself and ultimately the only two ends that we should recognise as being the ends for (and not of) morality are religion and society.

The details of this scheme are to be worked out later on; for the present let me conclude, by anticipating two possible criticisms against the 'new ethic,' which I have been developing in these pages. Firstly, it may be said that the conception of morality here adumbrated is too narrow in scope, to which my reply is that the value of a conception is to be judged, not by narrowness or width, but by its ability to explain facts and seeming contradictions. Secondly, it may be objected that one can be moral without being metaphysical or religious: and I reply that one can be a good patriot or politician without having heard of any ethical or metaphysical theory of the state, one can be a good eater without knowing how dietary is connected with hygienics and physiology.

PLEASURE AS CONSTITUTIVE IN JUDGMENTS OF VALUE

Pleasure is the thing of absolute worth and everything else has value only so far as it conduces to pleasure. If there were no feelings of satisfaction and their opposites, there would be no distinction of value. Good and bad would be meaningless and we should never use them. Those actions that lead to pain are to be avoided by the wise and those that bring in happiness are to be served by the Pandits versed in the *Sāstras*.

दुःखदानि च कार्यानि त्वाण्यानि दूरतो वृषेः ।

सुखदानि च सेव्यानि शास्त्रतत्त्वविशारदः ॥—देवीभागवतम् ॥

Whatever is the object of appetite and desire is good and the object of hate and aversion, evil. That which is agreeable constitutes happiness and that which is disagreeable constitutes misery. All virtuous actions follow from the sentiments that by these I shall obtain happiness and keep off misery.

यद्यतिप्रियं यस्य सुखं तदाहुस्तदेव दुःखं प्रवदन्मनिष्ठम् ।

दृष्टञ्च मे सादितरञ्च न सादेतत्काले कर्मविधिः प्रवृत्तः ॥

शा. प. । २०१।१०॥

How can the assertion that pleasure is the thing of absolute worth be proved? Only by showing that human beings actually prize it such. Here the function of the moralist is that of an interpreter

of nature. And as a matter of fact all hedonists assert that all men invariably and universally strive after pleasure.

नाकामः कामवत्सर्वं नाकामो धर्ममिच्छति ।

नाकामः कामयानोऽस्ति तस्मात्कामो विशिष्यते ।

कामेन युक्ता ऋषयस्तपस्त्रेव समाहिताः ।

पलायफलमूलाद्या वायुभक्षाः सुसंयताः ॥

वेदोपवेदेष्टव्ये युक्ताः स्वाध्यायपारगाः ।

आद्ययज्ञक्रियायाश्च तथा दानप्रतिपद्ये ॥

वणिजः कर्षका गोपाः कारवः शिखिनस्तथा ।

देवकर्मज्ञतत्रैव युक्ताः कर्मैर्न कर्मसु ॥

समुद्रं वा विशन्त्यन्ये पराः कामेन संयुताः ।

कामो हि विविधाकारः सर्वं कामेन सन्ततम् ॥

नास्ति नासौक्याभविष्यद् भूतं कामात्मकात्परम् ।

एतस्मात् महाराज धर्मार्थावसंस्थितौ ॥

* * * * *

नाकामतो विविधा लोकचेष्टा तस्मात्कामः प्राक् त्रिवर्गस्य दृष्टः ॥

The aspirations of men are concerned with the acquisition of the agreeable, which bring misery. There is nothing more important than pleasure among the fruits or consequences of the triple aggregate. Pleasure is the only thing which is desired absolutely and all other things are desired not for their own sake, but as a means to the attainment of pleasure or freedom from pain. Both virtue and profit are sought for the sake of pleasure.

न ह्यतः परं त्रिवर्गफलं विशिष्टतरमस्ति

स एव काम्यो गुणविशेषो धर्मार्थगुणारम्भ-

स्तचेतुरस्रोत्पत्तिः सुखप्रयोजनार्थं प्रारम्भः ॥शा. प. ॥१८.१८॥

Pleasure may be regarded as a feeling of value, but it is not a measure or standard of value. Although it accompanies all experience of value it does not express their distinctive nature or enable

us to discriminate their differences. It attaches itself to value of every kind, instead of being one kind amongst others. Moral judgment is a discrimination between pleasure and pleasure. It is only a special kind of pleasure that can be identified with moral approval. Every pleasing sentiment has not the function or nature of moral approval. Pleasure is of three kinds

सुखं त्विदानीं त्रिविधं शृणु मे भरतर्षभ ॥ भौ. प. ॥४२॥३६॥

the sensual, the intellectual and the emotional. The satisfaction that arises from the attainment of appropriate objects of each of the five senses, of the intellect, and of the heart is called pleasure and is to be regarded as one of the best fruits of our actions.

इन्द्रियाणाञ्च पञ्चानां मनसो हृदयस्य च ।

विषये वर्तमानानां या प्रीतिरुपजायते ।

स काम इति मे बुद्धिः कर्मणां फलमुत्तमम् ॥ व. प. ॥३३॥३६॥

But how are we to determine the superiority of one pleasure over another? How are we to measure the validity of moral approval? How are we to measure or otherwise appraise it?

If there be a conflict between two pleasures then all we can do is to compare the two pleasures as pleasures and the only course would seem to be to give the preference to the stronger or greater. Pleasures may be compared and classified from different points of views, the principal of which are purity, nearness, certainty, duration, etc. :

यत्न दुःखेन सन्निवृत्तं न च यस्तमनन्तरम् ।

अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत्सुखं स्वःपदात्यदम् ॥ सांख्यतत्त्वबोमुदी ।

अस्ते चेन्माधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।

इष्टसार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान्प्रमाचरेत् ॥

सांख्यप्रवचनसूत्रम् ॥८॥ १८॥

यो भुवादि परित्यज्य भुवादि निषेवते ।

भुवादि तस्य नश्यन्ति भुवं नष्टमेव च ॥ गङ्गपुराणे ।

तत्सुखं द्विविधं प्रोक्तं नित्यानित्यप्रदीतः ।

नाशान्नकालं तत्त्वान्यं वेदशास्त्रार्थचिन्तकैः ॥

देवीभागवतम् । स्क. पु. । अ. १५ ॥

But this art is purely empirical and does not rise for an instant above the level of a merely subjective philosophy. A little consideration will show that these "dimensions" are open to the objection that what is enjoyable in the highest degree to one may not be at all so to another, nay, it may be a source of discomfort or positive injury to him.

सत्यत्वं विहारत्वश्चाप्यप्याप्तमपेक्षया ।

यत्तु सत्यमहं याचे परापेक्षं तु तद् बहु ॥

हृदयमयुराचम् । मध्यखण्डम् ।

And, again, the quantity of pleasure cannot supply the place of a standard, for, strength and value are opposed: the sensuous pleasure overpowers the spiritual, the immediate, the permanent, the selfish, the social. There is a distinction between lower and higher pleasure.....between bodily and mental pleasures.

तत्सुखं द्विविधं सुखसुखते शारीरं मानसञ्च ॥ शा. प. १२७।८॥

Human happiness is not of the same order as the happiness of the animals, because it is derived from more elevated faculties. But are not those objects of senses which men are concerned with the same with which other living creatures are concerned? Yet how vast is the difference that exists between man and other creatures on account of the fact that man is a rational being and has the knowledge of the soul whereas other creatures are irrational, are guided by feelings, and have no knowledge of the soul!

Whatever may be the nature of the moral quality, it is, however, accepted by all that the good admits of degrees—that we

draw a distinction between good, better and best—high, higher and highest. Thus we regard 'mind' as superior to the 'senses,' understanding to the 'mind,' 'Soul' to the 'understanding' and the 'supreme' or 'Great' to the 'Soul.' For the conduct of the affairs of the world, human acts also have been classified as superior in point of merit.

इन्द्रियेभ्यो मनः पूर्वं बुद्धिः परतरा ततः ।

बुद्धेः परतरं ज्ञानं ज्ञानात्परतरं महत् ॥ शा. प. १२०६॥

अपि ह्युक्तानि धर्माणि व्यवस्यन्त्युत्तरावरे ।

लोकयात्रार्थमेवेह धर्मस्य नियमः कृतः ॥ शा. प. १४२५८॥

There is thus a principle of appreciation apart from pleasure ; and things differ in excellence, even before they differ as to the pleasure which they cause us. Good is not then pleasure as such but pleasure in so far as it is noble or refined. The hedonist philosopher has commonly preferred the goods of the mind—not because he could prove them to be more pleasant but—because he held them to be more noble.

The admission of differences of quality among pleasures renders the hedonistic calculus hopelessly impossible. If it is asked : what is the test of the quality of pleasure the reply would be that it is decided by the verdict of the competent critics, the judgment of persons who have experienced the different kinds of pleasure and who give their decisions impartially. But it is really very difficult to get a competent critic who will be able to help us in deciding which pleasure is desirable and which is not. For even persons whom we regard as superior in all respects are found to give way to joy and indulge in grief as men like ourselves. Like other creatures the senses of such persons have their functions and objects.

नैव त्यागी न सन्तुष्टो नाशोको न निरामयः ।

नानिर्विधिक्षो नाहत्तो पापहत्तोऽस्ति कश्चन ॥

भवन्तोऽपि च हृष्यन्ति शोचन्ति चायथा वयम् ।

इन्द्रियार्थाश्च भवतां समानाः सर्वजन्तुषु ॥

शा. प. ॥२६८॥४६॥४८॥

It may, however, be pointed out that there are persons who after enjoying the subjects of the senses, set themselves to the practice of the austere penances, and even again withdraw themselves from such penances. But even such persons also cannot be regarded as competent critics. For, certainly it should be admitted on all hands that they cannot have experience of different kinds of pleasure under the same circumstances and during the same stage of their lives.

प्राप्नुयाद् विषयान् कञ्चित् पुनश्चोग्रं तपश्चरेत् ।

सन्तिर्पेच्च पुनस्तात सूर्यस्तेजोगुणानिव ॥ शा. प. ॥२७॥३००॥

Human nature is so constituted that a certain object tends persistently to call forth a feeling of approval whereas the contrary sort of thing calls upon a feeling of disapproval. This attitude of approval is really a state of feeling.

यस्मिन् कर्मण्यन्तरात्मा क्रियमाणे प्रमोदति ।

तदेव कर्म कर्त्तव्यं विपरीतं न च कचित् ॥ स्कन्दपुराणम् ॥

But the immediate sense of approval is no guarantee for the objectivity of the moral judgment, for, feeling is, after all, subjective. It is purely mental and never physical. It can be enjoyed but can never be seen.

द्रव्यार्थेस्पर्शयोगे या प्रीतिरुपजायते ।

सकामश्चित्तमंकल्प. शरीरं नास्य दृश्यते ॥ व. प. ॥२८॥३३॥

The objectivity of a moral judgment does not lie in the recognition that a feeling is but in the relation of an object to a feeling which it tends to evoke. Different kinds of objects tend to evoke different

kinds of feelings. Thus pleasure may arise from the knowledge of the self, from the contact of the senses, and from sleep, indolence, and stupidity.

- (i) आत्मबुद्धिप्रसादजम् । भौ. प. १४२।३७॥
- (ii) विषयेन्द्रियसंयोगात् । भौ. प. १४२।३८॥
- (iii) निद्रालस्यप्रसादोत्थम् । भौ. प. १४२।३८॥

The judgment that a thing is good pre-supposes that it will satisfy our desire, which rests not on my approval merely but on the nature of things as well. Food, for instance, will not give us pleasure unless we desire it and desire it we will not unless we feel hungry.

बुधस्य तस्य भुक्तेऽत्र तृप्तिर्ब्राह्मण जायते ।

न मे बुद्ध्याभवत्तृप्तिः कस्माच्चां परिपृच्छसि ॥

विष्णुपुराणम् । २५ अ० ॥

Thus approval is a peculiar kind of feeling- it is a sort of register of general consonance with the trend of our inclination and desires. Feeling, therefore, is a function of human constitution with all its settled characteristics. It is not a question what feelings we shall choose to prefer but it is a question what things our feelings will let us prefer. Thus we are not left with mere arbitrary feelings. Feelings of pleasure arise only on the presentation of suitable objects. When any of our six senses finds its appropriate object, a desire springs up in our mind to enjoy that object.

षडिन्द्रियाणि विषयं समागच्छन्ति वै यदा ।

तदा प्रादुर्भवत्येवं पूर्वसंकल्पजं मनः ॥ व. प. १२।१७॥

मनो यस्येन्द्रियस्येह विषयान् याति सेवितुम् ।

तस्यैतत्सुकं सम्भवति प्रवृत्तिश्चोपजायते ॥ व. प. १२।१८॥

This objective background acts as a steadier and corrector of opinion. Now " wherein lies the ethical danger of such an account

of the matter? ” “ Is it in the fact that an important aspect of the world is supposed to attach to the capacity in things for having an effect on human feelings? ” It is not an argument. but an assumption based on prejudice. We cannot minimise the importance of pleasure in human life, for

सुखन्तु जगतामिव काम्यं धर्मेण जायते ॥ इति न्यायमते ॥

What is true is this that there is nothing in feeling which gives infallibility to the ethical judgment, for, this infallibility we cannot find in objects, for the same object may give rise to different feelings to different persons and to the same person under different circumstances.

वस्त्रेकमेव दुःखाय सुखायैर्धीमवाय च ।

कोपाय च यतस्तस्माद् वस्तु वस्त्रात्मकं कुतः ॥

तदेव प्रीतये भूत्वा पुनर्दुःखाय जायते ।

तदेव कोपाय ततः प्रसादाय च जायते ॥

तस्माद्दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न च किञ्चित्सुखात्मकम् ।

मनसः परिणामोऽयं सुखदुःखादिसत्त्वः ॥

विष्णु पु. १२।४३-४५ ।

Therefore ethical judgment is bound to be vitiated by being tied up to feelings, for feelings are liable to change and therefore with them opinions as to what is good and bad. Evidently then the ideals become personal and the judgments are bound to be our judgments. Morality is thus rendered democratic and not an aristocratic or an autocratic concern. That which is agreeable to me constitutes my happiness and that which is disagreeable to me constitute my misery

यद्यत्प्रियं यस्य सुखस्तदादुःखदेव दुःखं प्रवदन्त्यनिष्टम् ॥ व. प. ॥

If a man finds his good in something which appeals to me as harmful and abhorrent, I may have a tendency to condemn this as immoral but am I justified in pronouncing the judgment “ he ought not to desire the thing he does not desire? ” It is unintelligible

to say that everybody ought to feel in the same way as I do. Men are differently constituted and consequently have got different capacities in them for feeling,

सर्वं रजस्तम इति गुणाः प्रकृतिसम्भवाः ॥ गीता ॥

and so notion of the good remains permanently discordant. But would not this be to deny universality, and leave moral judgments uncertain? In a sense it would. Yet even "when there is genuine disagreement there need not be hopeless disparity in our judgments of value. When an ascetic condemns all pleasures, he may do so, not because he takes them to be vile, but because, he regards them as dangerous or enervating or at least as never so good as other things which, as he thinks, should be chosen in place of them. This is not really to contradict his opponent, but to offer a further consideration also defended by a judgment of value."

रागद्वेषादिशुक्तानां न सुखं कुत्रचिद् द्विज ।
विचार्य खलु पश्यामि तत् सुखं यत्र निर्वृतिः ।
यत्र स्नेहो भयं तत्र स्नेहो दुःखस्य भाजनम् ।
स्नेहमूलानि दुःखानि तस्मिंस्त्यक्ते महत् सुखम् ॥

इति गारुडे । ११३ ।

And moreover there is a good deal in common to different men and therefore a good deal in common in what men want and in what they approve and condemn. What all men want without exception, we have already seen, is pleasure, and this is what constitutes a substantial identity of moral judgments. The generality of moral approval is a necessary characteristic of it. Our approval of an action is not our private feeling. It claims validity for any act similar to the one approved, and for *any* judge who is similarly constituted. Our constitution is such that most of us have them, and it should not be supposed that the effects of like causes on unlike persons must necessarily be the same. Knowledge, action,

and agent are each of three kinds according to the difference of qualities, and consequently pleasure also is of three kinds.

ज्ञानं कम च कर्त्ता च त्रिधैव गुणभेदतः ।

* * *

सुखं त्विदानीं त्रिविधं शृणु मे भरतर्षभ ॥ भा. प. । अ. ४२ ॥

Differences in nature impose different duties on different men, but behind these differences there is an identity in pleasure which takes different forms in different men

कामो हि विविधाकारः ॥ शा. प. । १६७.३७ ॥

These pleasures really seem to differ in quality, although all are pleasures. They seem to differ just as much as colours do ; and although red, green, etc., are certainly colours, they are just as certainly different. There is nothing illogical in maintaining that pleasure is the only good, but that some varieties of pleasures are preferable to others.

THE NEW ETHICS OF SELF-CREATION

BY

T. V. SESHAGIRI ROW NAIDU, M.A., ANANTAPUR.

On account of the contradictions involved in man's moral activity, man seems to be doomed from his cradle to hopeless disappointment and failure. The end must be capable of attainment in individual's life. And yet, as a moral being man can never exist without some unreachd ideal to serve as a spur to his activity.*

If we have Aristotle's ' blissful activity,'† transcending time and change, as our ideal, we find that in the first place it is an infinitely remote ideal; and secondly that even if it can be realised, our lot then is far from being satisfying. This motionless perfection of the Aristotelian ideal, as it is the " very haven of quietism," does not complete but stultifies the moral endeavour. When we take up the modern ideal of Nietzsche where man is considered as " something that must be overcome or as a bridge and path to the overman," we have for our object a perfect commonwealth.‡ Here too there is the anti-thesis between the desirable and the attainable. If the member of that commonwealth has an ethical end, then his ideal is never ultimately reached. If on the other hand he has no unsatisfied longings or unfulfilled ideals, then we must pronounce him not a man at all or if a man, an unhappy man.

Bradley points out that " individual perfection " is a contradiction in terms. " Nothing is ultimately perfect except the

* Compare F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of Sphinx*, pp. 120-122.

† Compare F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanism*, Essay XI on Activity and Substance.

‡ Compare F. C. S. Schiller's ideal of ' Perfect individuals in a Perfect Society,' *Riddles of Sphinx*, pp. 233-235.

universe of being as a whole, and you cannot therefore be perfect except in some sense in which you are more than a finite individual. So if moral experience is to be raised above the level of the anti-thesis and contradictions which beset it as mere morality, it needs to be transformed into religious experience, an experience of a type which transcends the temporal character of moral experience in virtue of which ideal and achievement inevitably fall apart. The ultimate satisfaction arises from the conviction that our lives are as functions of the universe already perfect and that we are ourselves in some implicit way the 'perfect universe.' (F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*.)

Principal Caird says that we are somehow already in "possession" of the infinite inheritance. And Professor Caird says that the moral ideal is "realised already." Thus both the Cairds try to maintain that moral experience is not swallowed up but is conserved in religious experience. But as Boyce Gibson points out in his "God with us," it is not easy to see how or under what forms the virtues of the moral life persist within the religious life of fruition. He further points out that the representation of either of the Cairds of the ideal involves the "stultification of our moral freedom" or "demoralisation." Hegel and Śāṅkara expressed the same thing as the Cairds when they say that the consummation of the infinite consists merely in removing the illusion (*mayā* or *avidyā*) which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. Thus these views reduce moral struggle to a struggle with illusion. And so the struggle in the religious sphere, where the illusion disappears, reduces itself to a struggle with nothing.

This is a real difficulty, and Boyce Gibson tries to meet it.* His conclusion is that realisation of fruition is not revelation of the external extinction of evil, but only a sacred intimacy between man and God, in which the worthlessness and vulnerability of all that is not of God is so impressed upon the soul that the conflict with evil becomes for the sincere a spiritual necessity, and the conquest of it an achievement of which he is always capable. Such

* Boyce Gibson, *God With Us*, pp. 81-202.

why so terrible a punishment was inflicted on a person who acted from no dishonest motive and insincere purpose? Likhita's conduct might not have injured others, might not have injured the person robbed, but assuredly it might have injured at least one person and that is the agent himself by polluting his character and do you think character as trivial? There is danger in excusing wrong actions in private life at least. Doing of wrong actions, though at first indifferent, soon becomes a habit of doing them independently of the original ends and thus a criminal disposition may be acquired. "Criminal means once tolerated are soon preferred, as presenting a shorter cut to the object than through the highway of moral virtues" (Burke). Cankha, has, therefore, rightly said धर्मो ह्येव्यतिक्रान्तस्ततो निष्कृतिः कृता.

Desire naturally arises from the perception of objects of senses such as from taste, scent, sound and touch. For the acquisition of what is disliked man strives and works and endeavours his best for repeatedly enjoying those which appear agreeable. Gradually, then, attachment and aversion, and greed and consequently error of judgment take possession of the mind; and it is a well-known fact that the mind of one smitten with grief and affected by attachment and overwhelmed by errors of judgment is never directed to virtue. He then begins to do acts that are good with hypocrisy; with hypocrisy then he seeks to acquire virtue and with hypocrisy he likes to acquire wealth, and thus when he meets with success on one or two occasions he sets his heart to such acquisition wholly. He then gradually takes courage and begins to commit sinful acts. The admonitions of well-wishers and the wise are of no avail. He makes an attempt to meet such admonitions with answers that are apparently consistent with reason and seemingly conformable to the injunctions of the scriptures. His sins, born of attachment and error now go on rapidly multiplying. He now thinks sinfully, speaks sinfully and acts sinfully. It is thus that one becomes sinful. No one becomes sinful with the object of becoming so (172. 4-11. Cānti Parva). Character, after, all, is not a trivial thing and 4-11. (Cānti Parva). Character, after, all, is not a trivial thing and

ततस्तदर्थं यतते कर्म चारभते मङ्गत् ।

रक्षणं रूपगन्धानामभ्यासश्च चिकीर्षति ॥

ततो रागः प्रभवति द्वेषश्च तदनन्तरम् ।
 ततो लोभः प्रभवति मोहश्च तदनन्तरम् ॥
 लोभमोहाभिभूतस्य रागद्वेषादितस्य च ।
 न धर्मो जायते बुद्धिं व्यजावर्ध्मं करोति च ॥
 व्याजेन चरते धर्ममर्थं व्याजेन चोरते ।
 व्याजेन सिद्धव्याजेन धनेषु कुरुनन्दन ॥
 तत्रैव कुरुते बुद्धिं ततः पापं चिकीर्षति ।
 सुहृद्भिर्वार्यमाणोऽपि पण्डितैश्चापि भारत ॥
 उत्तरं न्यायसम्बद्धं ब्रवीति विधिचोदितम् ।
 अधर्माच्चिविधस्तस्य वर्धते रागमोहजः ॥
 पापं चिन्तयते चैव प्रब्रवीति करोति च ।

.....

तस्याधर्माप्रवृत्तस्य दोषान् पश्यन्ति साधवः ॥

.....

एवं भवति पापात्मा... .. ॥

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PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW OF KARMA

BY

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I. Introduction :

Before proceeding to discuss the subject matter in view, we will, by way of introduction, briefly state the nature of the Law mostly in words of persons who have propounded it.

Action (work) is the literal translation of the word "Karma," and it is Karma which is the dominant factor, principle or law of life.

"By work (Karma) the world exists, by work mankind exists, beings are bound to work as the linch-pin of the rolling cart keeps the wheel on " [S.B.E. Vol. 10 (Dhammapada) 2 p. 117].

As long as action continues, life is bound to remain in one form or another; for if actions are good, their reward must be bestowed, and if bad, their undesirable consequences must be borne. No action is lost. Its effects may not begin to manifest themselves at once; but as action has been done, and has left behind an impression, whether good or bad, it will sometime, somehow, but quite inevitably, work itself out in the life of man.

"Even as a calf finds his mother among a thousand cows, an act formerly done is sure to find its perpetrator."

This law of Karma may be stated in the simple words of a common saying; "Jaisi Karni Waisi Bharni," which, when translated freely, runs as follows: As you sow, so shall you reap.

The hold of the Law on life, it is maintained, is unquestionable; for it not only determines birth, it keeps it up and causes the cycle of births.

"Those whose conduct has been good, will quickly attain some good birth, the birth of a Brahmin, or a Kshatriya or a Vaishya. But those whose conduct has been evil, will quickly attain an evil birth, the birth of a dog, or a hog, or a Chandala " (Chand. Up. 5.10.7).

Shankara and Ramanuja both declare it to be the originator of births. Shankara says: "Further we know that works

(Karma) constitute the efficient cause for the origination of a new body " (S.B.E. Vol. 38, p. 105 ; Vedanta Sutrās 3.1.2). Ramanuja's verdict is just as clear. " All souls are embodied owing to Karma " (S.B.E. Vol. 48, p. 313 ; Vedanta Sutrās 1.3.12).

There are numerous passages which illustrate the point, *e.g.*, consult Kausitaki Up. 1.2, Svet. Up. 5.7, Chand. Up. 5.10.5. These are enough to indicate the great influence of the Law of Karma upon life here and hereafter.

II. Some implications of the Law :

The Law of Karma may be examined from different points of view. But we will restrict ourselves to looking at the following four implications of the Law :—

It is maintained that :—

(1) It indicates that every man himself bears the consequences of his deeds.

(2) It works with an unfailing and uninterrupted rigidity, implying a total exclusion of arbitration on the part of any one else on behalf of any single person.

(3) It is an explanation of the continuity of life here and hereafter.

(4) It fully accounts for the inequalities in life, for it implies that the present life is an exact after-effect of the previous actions.

III. Philosophical reflections on the above implications :

Let us take each point by itself.

(1) *First implication : that each bears the fruit of his deeds himself.*

The Law of Karma is : As you sow, so shall you reap; or, negatively stated, no one reaps the fruit of another's good or evil deeds. Every man himself bears the consequences of his deeds.

As a general rule this Law holds good with all the force it implies. But the law of transference of Karma sometimes overrules it. This law is not denied by Shankara (S.B.E. Vol. 38, pp. 359 and 360 ; Vedanta Sutrās, 4.1.16.17). He is discussing the case of a man who has attained knowledge, and to whom this, that or other kind of works with their results do not cling. Two kinds of works are mentioned, namely, (1) works whose effects have not begun, and (2) works whose effects have begun. The former are destroyed at the attainment of knowledge (Vedanta Sutrās, 4.1.15); but of the latter, for some man has to live on so as

to bear the consequences, and some are transferred to his friends and enemies. His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends on his good works, his enemies upon his evil works.

Ramanuja throws a further light on this point. He says that the text " His sons enter upon his inheritance, his friends on his good work and his enemies upon his evil works " refers to those works of the man possessing knowledge, the results of which were somehow obstructed (and hence did not act themselves out during his life-time, so that on his death they may be transferred to others). (S.B.E. Vol. 48, p. 726 ; Vedanta Sutas 4.1.18.)

In this connection it is interesting to note the evidence of the Maharaja of Bobbili. Is a voluntary transfer of good Karma recognised? Yes, it will go to another when transferred. For the sick man we pray for recovery.....Hindus believe that Danawa (giving things away in charity) to Brahmins will relieve the suffering of the giver. (J.R.A.S. 1906, p. 400).

Our point in bringing out this idea of transference of Karma is to indicate that the mathematical exactness of the law is shaken. And if it is not so rigidly applicable as it is commonly assumed to be, a way is open to enquire whether it is plausible that such a law affects human life in the prescribed manner.

(2) *Second implication : that it works with an unfailing, uninterrupted rigidity.*

It is maintained that the Law of Karma works without fail, carrying out its consequences unchanged by any external influences—human or divine.

(a) That such is not the case with a man who has attained perfect knowledge is evident from the following passages :—

" Work does not cling to man, provided he has acquired the highest knowledge."

" As water does not cling to a lotus leaf, so no work clings to one who knows Brahman " (Chand. Up. IV. 13.2).

" Knowledge of Brahman destroys works—good or evil " (S. B. E. Vol. 48. p. 693; Vedanta Sutas III. 3.27).

(b) The doctrine of Prasada (grace) implies to a certain extent divine intervention in life. It is true that final release is dependent on the acquirement of knowledge, but there are clear indications in the commentaries both of Shankara and Ramanuja that knowledge and grace go together. " The meditating devotees

receives the reward of meditation, *i.e.*, release from that highest person only; and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed by the Veda—whether to be enjoyed in this life or the next world—come from the highest person only.....for action which is not intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result connected with a future time " (S. B. E. Vol. 48, p. 625; Vedanta Sūtras III. 2.37). Again Shankara writes : " We must therefore assume that final release also is effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the Lord " (S.B.E. Vol. 38, p. 59).

Deussen also supports the above view. According to him the individual soul is blind through ignorance. Lord, who is the cause of spirit, from him, *by his permission*, comes to the Sansara, consisting in the states of doing and enjoying and through *his grace* is caused knowledge, and through this, liberation, (see, the System of the Vedānta, p. 86).

Therefore in view of this doctrine of grace we deduce that the Law of Karma is not so arbitrary in its application as it is commonly held to be. Its so-called free play may be checked by human effort when it has resulted in the acquirement of perfect knowledge, and it is controlled by the grace of God.

(c) If we combine the first and the second implications of the Law, *i.e.*, if every one himself unfailingly bears the consequences of his deeds, and the influence of external agencies, whether human or divine, be denied, implying a total exclusion of mutual help and intercession on the part of anyone, will not such a position frustrate the will to serve? With what vigour and enthusiasm can the work of social reform be undertaken, carried out and completed?

An answer is given to this question in these words : " Each man is an agent of the Karma of others as well as an experiencer of his own. If we are able to help a man, it is a proof that the Karma under which you are suffering is exhausted and that we are the agents of his Karma in bringing him relief. If we refuse to carry the Karmic relief, we make bad Karmas for ourselves, shutting ourselves out from future help, and some one else will have the good Karma of carrying the relief and so ensuring for himself aid in a future difficulty " (Sanatan Dharma, p. 118, published by the Board of Trustees of the Central Hindu College, Benares). Do we not find in these words that the primary motive of service has a selfish tone about it? The help creates a good Karma for me

though the other may have been instrumentally helped. A simple question may be raised, what is the nature of service, to minister or to be ministered to? Draw your own conclusion.

(3) *Third implication : that it explains the continuity of life here and hereafter.*

It is said to be an explanation of the continuity of life here and hereafter. Can it be maintained so absolutely as it is intended in view of :—(1) “ Brahman is that from which the origin, subsistence and dissolution of this world proceed.” (Taitt. Up. III. 1; Vedanta Sutas, 1.1.2). And (2) “ Beings who have attained perfect knowledge, are retained in a body for some work.”? (Vedanta Sutas, III 3.32; S.B.E. Vol. 38, pages 235 to 238; S.B.E. Vol. 48, p. 651: Vedanta Sutas, III. 3.31 of Ramanuja).

(4) *Fourth implication : that it fully accounts for the inequalities in life.*

It accounts for the inequalities in life, for it implies that the present life is the exact after-effect of previous actions. Even if the law be taken for granted, it will serve, at its best, only as a hypothesis; but as recollections of previous deeds are altogether wanting, it fails to be entirely satisfactory for lack of proof.

The upholders of the Law relying upon the theory of pre-existence of the soul, perhaps, unaware of the doctrine of heredity, explain the present inequalities in life as being due to deeds done in a previous life. Nothing better and more satisfactory could have been thought out under such circumstances. But the doctrine of heredity has brought to light a sufficiently large number of facts which, when put together explains to a considerable extent, most of the drawbacks, handicaps, and inequalities of individual and society.

The theory, so far as can be said in the light of recent investigations, has given us some reasons to suppose that the properties of animals and plants depend upon the presence or absence of definite factors which in transmission follow definite and ascertained laws. These factors are, so far as we can see to-day, clear cut entities which the organism either has or has not. Its nature depends upon the nature of the factors which were in the two gametes (germ cells) that went to its making, and at the act of fertilisation are decided the attributes of the organism that subsequently develops.

Taking the case of a man born blind, an upholder of the law of Karma would say, this man is born blind because of his previous bad Karma; and since no deed goes unrewarded, he must bear the consequences. In ignorance of the force of heredity this explanation was tacitly accepted. But what does actually happen is this. The cause of blindness is an injury done to those minute particles of somatoplasm (body tissue) which go to form the centres of vision in the brain of the developing embryo. And the injury to these particles is the result of the definite persistent violation of the law of health governing sexual relations. Now when a person, having violated the laws of health governing sexual relations, and thereby having injured the said particles, brings into existence a child, the result is inevitable. The new born babe is a person born blind and as there is a definite cause for the effect of blindness at birth, so there is a definite and particular cause for defects which appear in any individual organism as he enters upon the stage of existence. Mental deformities and causes of like defects are mostly due to hereditary influences. With whatever tendencies those portions of the nucleus of the germ-cells called Chromatin (after Weismann) or Chromosomes (after Mandel) are produced within the organism of a person, with the same tendencies and their after-effects do they show forth either defects, deformities and drawbacks, or the means of progress and advancement. Therefore we deduce from these facts this influence that physical or mental defects which hinder the individual from a free, healthy and equal competition in life with other men are due not to his previous deeds, but are the results of the violation of certain laws of health by his parents. The responsibility is with the parents. We should never lose sight of this relation—the relation which a man has towards his parents—for in view of this relationship a good many inequalities are clearly explained which otherwise are only hypothetically accounted for by the Law of Karma.

The social inequalities offer another plausible defence of the Law of Karma. It is said that a man born in the house of a poor father of low class to life-long labour and servitude is so born because of a previous bad life which calls for his present humiliation and degradation; or man is born in the house of a king to luxury and enjoyment, to rule and conquest, only because performed meri-

torious deeds formerly. A causal glance at the affairs of life might lead one's thought along those lines. But a careful examination of facts brings to our notice other things.

In the first place, whatever inequalities there may be they are to a very large extent due, on the one hand, to the efforts of the individuals or communities to overcome circumstances, and, on the other hand, to the sloth of individuals or communities in being overcome by circumstances. Taking the case of twin brothers, if one of them attains great distinction and honour, and the other sinks below the level of an average uncultured man, the upholder of the Karma doctrine is apt to attribute the distinction of the one to his meritorious deeds in a former existence, and the degradation of the other to the evil deeds of a previous life, but if the life history of both the brothers be carefully analysed, it will be discovered that the rise of the one was due to his utilisation of opportunities by a careful selection of the best course at each stage of his life, and the retrogression of the other was due, in like manner, to his neglect of the opportunities which present themselves in every walk of life to every man, no matter what his station in life may be.

Secondly, an upholder of the Karma doctrine will say, very well, I admit to a certain extent the inequalities in life are dependent upon the activities of the individual, but how do you account for these social and moral drawbacks amongst which a new born babe is placed? We find one man starting his career with all the advantages of high class Brahman and the other under the depressing disadvantages of a Sudra (an out-cast). May we not say that a person is born in one or another sphere according to his actions in a previous life? The answer is that the responsibility for placing an individual in favourable or unfavourable circumstances lies, in the first place, with the parents, and in the second place, with the society to which he belongs. There are four aspects indicative of parental and communal responsibility in either gradually perpetuating or eliminating such social and moral inequalities.

(a) If the parents are dull, inactive, unwilling to make the best of their circumstances in life, and at the same time social laws of the community are cruel and oppressive, affording to its members no scope for development, the inequalities in life will grow,

and the burden of responsibility lies both upon the parents and with society.

(b) If the parents are living a happy-go-lucky life, following the line of least resistance, while, on the other hand, society is ready with all possible means for the improvement of its members, drawbacks will exist in the life of the offspring of such parents, but now the parents are wholly responsible for them.

(c) If the parents are striving their hardest to overcome the difficulties of life, but the social laws are such as to crush the rising spirit of the individual, the responsibility for the inequalities in which a man is placed at his birth will lie wholly with the makers and upholders of social laws and traditions.

(d) If the parents are mastering the circumstances by honest effort, and at the same time society is helping to remove obstacles and provides means of improvement, then whatever inequalities may have descended from former generations will be removed, or will not be felt as inequalities. But will be the means of healthy competition between the members of that community.

We maintain, therefore, that the inequalities of life are either the outcome of heredity, or the production of social laws and customs, or the joint result of parental and social influences. And these two influences, the parental and social, when carefully enquired into clearly explain to a great extent the present inequalities in the life of the individual.

IV. Conclusion :—

The Law of Karma relates to the invisible realm, hence can neither be directly proved, nor directly disproved. But (1) as its rigorous hold is shaken in view of the law of transference; (2) as its uninterrupted sway over life is set aside by the doctrine of Prasada (grace); (3) as it does not give a satisfactory explanation of the origin and continuity of life here and hereafter in view of Brahman as the origin, subsistence and dissolution of things; and (4) as, in view of the law of heredity, it is largely rendered unnecessary as an explanation of facts of life, we draw the conclusion that it cannot be readily accepted as a law satisfactorily explaining the facts of life.

THE SUMMUM BONUM (PARAMA PURUSHARTHA)

A STUDY IN ADWAITA PHILOSOPHY

BY

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The question of the Summum Bonum is one of the most important questions that have engaged the thought of philosophers through all ages. It is the principal question of Ethics, the science of moral judgments. In order to explain these judgments of value it is necessary to discover the standard of value and the only satisfactory standard is to be found in the End towards which all human actions are necessarily directed. Religion, as the art of human conduct, has to prescribe forms of good behaviour for those whose lives it is called upon to guide and organise and in doing this it has to keep clearly before itself the end the achievement of which makes human life a success. The inquiry is very important for Philosophy also, considered as the explanation of the universe as a whole, since the search for this explanation is an intellectual activity and hence must be regulated by the end to which all our activities are means. It is true that the process of acquiring knowledge is determined at every step by the ideal of unity of nature (or experience) but the attainment of this ideal gives the satisfaction it does (or has value) only because it contributes to the achievement of the highest purpose of life as a whole. All Indian systems of philosophy make this relation between philosophy and the Summum Bonum clear and avowedly undertake to lead their followers to the final goal of human life. With us, philosophy takes its rise not in wonder in general (as Plato and Aristotle say) but in the uneasiness of mind resulting from the presence of evil in the world. It is this which sets us thinking and allows us no rest till the problem is satisfactorily solved. It is of course possible for a system of philosophy to arrive at the conclu-

sion that, as the universe is constituted, this uneasiness is man's permanent lot but this disappointing result will not mark the end of our thinking and is sure to be followed by renewed efforts till we succeed in convincing ourselves that the attainment of the theoretical ideal coincides with that of the practical. A detailed discussion of this point however is beyond the scope of this paper. It is proposed here only to determine the ultimate aim of all our activities.

First a word or two as to the nature of this inquiry. The highest good or the standard of value is something which is ultimately desirable. There are things like health or wealth which are good or desirable only as means to some higher good. Indeed, our usual way of proving that any thing is desirable is by showing that it is a means to something more valuable. But this kind of proof would hold good only if there is something which is intrinsically good or desirable, not as a means to any thing else. This is called the highest good or good-in-itself and as all proof of value depends upon it is also called ultimate standard of value. Our question now is, How can we know what the ultimate good is and how can we prove its value? It is obviously not a matter of choice; for all choice must be guided by some standard and therefore presupposes it. So the ultimate standard must be fixed by our nature. In his proof of the utilitarian principle J. S. Mill says that just as if a thing is seen it must be visible, similarly if a thing is desired it must be desirable. This is clearly a mistake; for there are so many undesirable things which are actually desired by us. But when the question is "What is ultimately desirable?", the correct answer is "That which is ultimately desired." If there is any thing which man desires by his very nature as the final end of all his acts, then this cannot be undesirable for the simple reason that a thing is regarded as undesirable only when it prevents us from obtaining some higher object of desire but there is nothing higher than the ultimate object.

The standard of value or the "ultimately desirable" being thus necessarily the same as the end of our actions or the "ultimately desired," we have now to ask. What is this final aim of our lives? If it is some thing which we actually desire, how is it that there is such a difficulty about knowing it and how is it that differ-

ent persons give different answers when asked about it? Can we desire any thing without being conscious of it? In particular, is it possible that we should be pursuing an object every minute of our lives without knowing what it is? The difficulty will disappear when we bring to our mind the fact that for the occurrence of mental activity a vague awareness of the object to which it is directed is sufficient. A clear consciousness which will enable us to name and define the object is not necessary. The point may be illustrated by taking the example of the science of logic which is an attempt to make ourselves clearly conscious of those principles of correct thinking which all of us (including even children and savages) are actually employing in our ordinary and scientific thinking. It is only reflection on our thinking activity that leads to a clear knowledge of our own aims. The history of logic shows the difficulty of this reflective process and also how there can be differences of opinion and mistakes about what we are ourselves doing and seeking. There is thus nothing paradoxical in the question about the ultimate object of our desire. It is only by means of careful reflection that we can come to know it. Every person who wishes to regulate his life consciously so as to ensure success must discover the end which is already guiding his own mind and the mind of every one else.

But is it true to say that all men are pursuing the same end? A glance at the various tastes and pursuits of men is sufficient to throw doubt on the statement. "One man's meat is another man's poison" as the proverb says; some men are very fond of music, there are others who find no pleasure in it; some men are deeply interested in philosophy, others hate it. But on closer reflection it will appear that these differences are with regard to the subordinate ends or the means adopted for realising the final end. Every one of us pronounces judgments of right and wrong on the actions of others and we are sure that we are all using the words 'right' and 'wrong' with the same meaning, which implies that we are all applying the same standard. Even when we differ with regard to the moral quality of any act we do not attribute the difference to the existence of different standards but to the mistaken application by the other party of the same standard. We have already seen that the standard of value is

necessarily the same as the end of our lives. Hence in spite of the differences of ways and means there is no doubt that the end is the same for all men. This reminds us of the beautiful words of the well-known hymn "Thou art the one destination of men resorting to different paths, straight or crooked, according to their various tastes, even as the ocean is the destination of all waters."

(ब्रह्मोनां वैचित्र्याद्ब्रह्मकुटिलनानापथयन्नुषां नृषामेकोगम्यस्त्वमसि पयसामर्षवमिव).

Before we proceed to discover the end, we have to draw a certain distinction failure to notice which has caused much confusion in the discussion of the present problem. 'What do we desire ultimately' is a question distinct from whether it is attainable. It is true that before we can consciously *will* a course of action as means to any end we must believe that this end is realisable. We never attempt what we know to be impossible. But belief in the possibility of attainment is an indispensable condition of *will*, not of *desire*. We first form a desire and then consider the possibility of fulfilling it. If there is another and a conflicting desire in the mind at the same time, there is a struggle and the first desire may remain unfulfilled in case the object of the other appear to be more valuable. If the obstacle is presented not by another desire but by external difficulties (as in the case of a prisoner desiring escape) which are believed to be insurmountable, the result is disappointment which means not that the desire ceases to exist but only that it remains dormant. It forms what is called in modern psychology 'a complex' and then it requires much effort and skill on our part to discover it. Hence while asking ourselves about the object that we desire as the final end of our actions we must keep apart the question whether it is possible to realise it, as this properly arises after the first is answered. If on consideration of the constitution of the universe it appears that what we desire above every thing else is not within our reach we are landed in the pessimistic conclusion that man is doomed to failure. If on the other hand we reach the result that sooner or later, either in this life or another, we are bound to succeed, our entire outlook on life is brightened up and we can work with hope and energy. However that may be, both optimists and pessimists agree on the answer to the first question. This brings us to our main inquiry.

When we ask "What is it that all men are seeking during every hour of their lives"? The answer at first sight is very simple. It is agreed that all of us are in search of Happiness. In one sense this is true. Whenever any desire is fulfilled there is a sense of satisfaction and the object desired (whatever it is) may be said to be a means to this satisfaction. This accounts for the commonsense notion that every person does every thing ultimately for the sake of happiness. But a little reflection will show that this is not a satisfactory answer to our question. To desire an object is to expect satisfaction from it. As soon as we are convinced that a certain object is not likely to give us the expected satisfaction we give up the desire for it also. Hence the ultimate object of desire is that the possession of which will give us permanent satisfaction or happiness. Here we see that happiness is the sense of having accomplished the end, *i.e.*, the state which will be ours when we have realised the end of our lives which (end) must be different from it (happiness). To adopt a distinction made by Prof. G. F. Stout, happiness is the end-state but not the end. Our question therefore really is, "What is that which will give us happiness?" To say that this is happiness is to say that happiness will give us happiness and hence to say nothing.

We shall now consider some answers to the question thus stated that have been given by great thinkers of the past and present times.

The first that naturally suggests itself is "Pleasure." It has been said that success in life consists in enjoying the greatest amount of pleasure including under this term both sensual and mental pleasures. The plausibility of this theory is due to the confusion made by its advocates between pleasure and happiness and it appears in its true colours when we distinguish these. Pleasure is the agreeable feeling that arises when some need, bodily or mental, is *being* fulfilled and must be distinguished from the state of rest or the feeling of satisfaction which supervenes when the need is completely fulfilled so that it ceases to exist. Bodily, sensual and intellectual pleasures correspond to the needs of the body, the senses and the intellect respectively. These needs arise from capacities, and the corresponding pleasures last till these capaci-

ties are exhausted. Happiness, on the other hand, is the sense of the absence of all needs and involves no excitement. Is pleasure understood in this sense the ultimate object of desire the accomplishment of which will give a man supreme satisfaction, that is, will make him feel that his life has been a complete success and that there is nothing further for him to desire? Merely to ask this question is to answer it in the negative. Even taking the extreme case of an old man who has lived a life of continuous pleasure (which means an unbroken succession of pleasures), will such a man feel that he has attained complete success and that he is free from all want now? Our own experience of pleasures enables us to answer emphatically "No." There is really no completion of the process of enjoying pleasures. As *Manu* says "To fulfill a desire for an object of sense is like adding fuel to fire and enhancing it" (न जातु काम कामानामुपभोगेन शम्यति। इविषा-
क्षणावर्त्यैव भूय एवाभिवर्धते). Every pleasure is a temporary phenomenon and a past pleasure is no gain to us now. It only whets our appetite for future pleasure. Besides, it is not true to say that every desire is for pleasure inasmuch as pleasure results in the first instance when some desire or want is being fulfilled, which therefore, must be for something else. Moreover, for most pleasures we are dependent upon external objects and this sense of dependence involving an apprehension of their loss leads to an amount of disagreeable feeling which more than counter-balances the pleasure of enjoyment. We may go further and say that the very existence of desire on which pleasure is dependent involves a disagreeable feeling of restlessness.

This has led some others to believe that complete independence of external objects ought to be our ideal in life and for attaining it we have to suppress all our desires for them. This ascetic view of life also involves much confusion of thought. We have seen that success in life depends upon our obtaining what we really and ultimately desire. Can we say that, in every thing we do, independence is our one object of pursuit? Whenever we desire any object are we thinking of being free from desire for it? When we put the question in the latter form the contradiction becomes apparent. In one sense indeed desire or speaking generally,

harmonious with the laws and generalisations to which other sciences may lead. These laws or generalisations are what I have called the fruits of a science, and it is the business of Philosophy to bring these into harmony and consistency with one another. Philosophy, as the science of the whole, is a Synthetic study of the sciences seeking to build out of the sectional outline presented by each of the sciences an intelligible picture of the whole.

This programme of philosophy, it may be urged, theoretically excellent though it is, is practically impossible of execution. It may be urged that Reality is amenable to systematic study only in its partial aspects, and only on the basis of uncritical postulates. It is impossible, I may be told, to fashion a world-picture out of the fragmentary glimpses of Reality which each Science offers, and equally impossible to logically analyse and philosophically justify the uncritical postulates of science. That the programme of philosophy I have outlined is extremely difficult, that the critical analysis of the postulates of science may never be final and the synthesis of the fruits of science never complete, I am entirely willing to admit. The Philosopher who is imbued with the spirit of this modern age, lacks wholly the dogmatic assurance of the great system-makers of the past. He builds not from the inner necessity of his reason, but bit by bit, putting one part with another, like a child slowly solving out his jigsaw puzzle. Something of the sceptics' doubt and hesitation are part of his essential make-up. But I am not prepared to accept the dogmatic condemnation of his activity as wholly fruitless effort and as a blind striving after a fading will-o'-the-wisp. How far his aim is capable of realisation is something to be found only after an attempt has been made to realise it, and not dogmatically by laying down *a priori* limits to the human intellect.

The sphere of Philosophy, as I have defined it, is thus distinct from that of science, but though distinct, it is at the same time continuous with and intimately related with it. In a sense Philosophy is only to be defined by the limitations of science. If Philosophy is only the critical analysis and examination of the postulates of science, and the attempt to synthesise the conclusions of one Science with those of another, it is no longer possible to

philosophize independently of science. It is from the sciences that the philosopher must enquire what their postulates are, and what the great laws or generalisations to which scientific evidence points. The only philosophy of the future is scientific philosophy. Let me make my meaning clear by considering a concrete example. Philosophers are constantly formulating a general theory of physical Nature. In forming these theories they consider such problems as the nature of matter, of space and time, substance and property, cause and effect. Now my point is, that Philosophy can only analyse and criticise these conceptions by taking into account the latest Scientific conceptions of matter, space, time, cause and effect. It is no more possible to begin with abstract definitions of what matter is, or what cause is, by any *apriori* method. To know what matter is we must go to the Physicist and study the structure of the atom. To know what cause and effect are, we must examine the concrete causal laws which the Physicist actually formulates. Nothing is so utterly worthless as the speculative analysis of such conceptions as those of matter, space, or time, and causation, on the traditional method of rationalistic philosophy. To take an example, the Philosopher still takes his conception of matter from the mechanical Physics of Descartes' day. When he talks of matter as inert extension and speaks of it as real or illusory, he is talking a language utterly discredited in the Physicists' world. To the modern Physicist matter is no more the inert extended stuff of Descartes' day than it is the spiritual monads of Leibnitz's fertile imagination. The philosopher of Nature must, in my opinion, be in the most intimate contact with, and have inside knowledge of the postulates, and the general laws of the physical sciences. Natural Philosophy, though distinct from Natural science, is thus continuous with it, and cannot be carried on without an intimate knowledge of it.

My plea, thus, is that the philosopher of the future must also be a man of science, and to essay the task of synthesising all the different sciences into a philosophic system, must indeed possess an encyclopaedic knowledge of all the sciences. The metaphor of the spider spinning its own web will no longer suffice to describe his activity. He is more like the architect who designs the whole

mansion of knowledge, and understands not merely the structure and functions of any one of the materials to be employed in its construction, but the nature and functions of all alike and can fashion them into an organic whole.

The limitations of human intelligence and human industry, and the vastness of that body of knowledge, which we call science, and its daily and almost hourly growth, would of course make such an intimate knowledge of all the sciences practically impossible for any individual philosopher, however ~~great~~ great a genius he may be. Practically speaking, then, it is utterly impossible, or, at any rate, highly improbable, that a complete philosophy of the Universe as a whole can ever be developed by a single individual. But though the Philosopher may not possess an omnivorous knowledge of all individual sciences, it is at any rate imperative that he should possess an intimate knowledge of a certain group of sciences, or, at least, of one of them. If philosophy begins where science ends, it is at any rate necessary that in order to philosophise at all, the philosopher must know intimately and from the inside at least one of the sciences. In other words my plea is, that the philosopher must first be a man of science, before he can be a philosopher at all. In putting forward this plea I am not making any very extravagant proposition. I am making a proposition for which there is very good historical warrant. In the History of Modern Philosophy, with the exception of Spinoza and Hegel, all the philosophers of the first rank were also great men of science. The doctrine that philosophy can be carried on in exclusion from the sciences is in fact a heresy only of recent date, and I regard it as one of the worst legacies left behind to the philosophic world by Hegel.

To sum up, then, on the relation of science and philosophy, my view is that the sphere of each is distinct. Science is the systematic study of a selected group of facts, whereas philosophy is the systematic study of the ultimate nature of Reality as a whole. But though distinct from science, philosophy is, in a certain sense, continuous with and even posterior to science, in that the only Philosophy which in my opinion has a future is a Philosophy not carried on in abstraction from and independently of the sciences,

but is a Philosophy of any particular science or group of sciences, or of the whole body of scientific knowledge as such. Its function is two-fold, one, analytic, the other, synthetic. As analytical, Philosophy examines the postulates of any individual science and attempts to give a philosophic interpretation of them. As Synthetic, Philosophy attempts to bring into an organic unity of knowledge, the diverse and often conflicting generalizations about Reality in its partial aspects as examined by the several sciences

I am afraid most of you are under the impression that I have long forgotten the specific task I set myself at the beginning of this address, *viz.*, the discussion of the relation of Philosophy with Psychology. But I have, from my own point of view, not lost sight of it for a single moment, for my own view of the relation of Philosophy to Psychology is entirely derived from my views with regard to the relation of Philosophy with science. The relation of Philosophy with Psychology is in fact only one instance of the relation of Philosophy with science. Now, while many would be willing to accept my views on the general problem of the relation of Philosophy with science, most of them, I am afraid, will not be prepared to accept them with regard to the relation of Philosophy with Psychology. The grounds on which this discrimination will be based, will, I imagine, be two. The first ground that many would urge, will be that Psychology is not a science in the same sense, and to the same extent to which the Physical sciences are. Thus many would be inclined to reject the claims of Psychology to the status of a science. The second ground on which my view may be challenged by others would be, ~~that~~ it is true that Psychology is concerned with facts, and with facts of a particular order, but that these facts have some kind of peculiar connection with Philosophy, a kind of connection with it which Physical facts, and Biological facts do not possess. From both these points of view it may, therefore, be urged that the relation of Philosophy with Psychology is quite peculiar and far more intimate than its relation with any other science. Both these views appear to me entirely mistaken and beside the point, and I propose to demonstrate this with regard to each of them.

Let us first take the view that Psychology does not truly enjoy the status of a science, and therefore this pretended science is not a scientific discipline at all, but a philosophic one. I may be told, that surely no one to-day holds this view, and that in trying to discuss it seriously I am merely setting up a man of straw, and fantastically attempting to demolish him with mountain battery and long-range guns. But though seldom expressed in that bold and uncompromising manner in which I have stated it, I am inclined to think that by far the vast majority of Philosophers do in point of fact hold this view, and that it determines, though perhaps very largely unconsciously, their attitude towards Psychology. It is this view which often finds expression in the statement that Psychology is not an accomplished science, but rather the hope of a science of the future. It is this attitude which takes delight in pointing out the diversity of opinion on fundamental issues, the multitude of explanatory principles, and the paucity and vagueness of Psychological laws, which have created a chaotic disorder in the modern Psychologists' world. One Psychologist defines his science as the science of conscious states of experience, another confines his attention to behaviour, and others still more vaguely talk of the science of mental life. Some pursue the methods of introspective analysis, others of experimental and quantitative measurement, still others of statistical collection of data and so on. Some invoke the aid of teleology, others of mechanism. Some enumerate the Faculties of the Mind, others rely on the instincts, still others on conditioned reflexes, or semi-mysterious entities called patterns, or on unconscious sexuality, and so on and so forth.

But neither the lack of unanimity in the programme of Psychology, nor the multiplicity of principles of explanations, nor the lack of universally accepted and widely applicable laws within its sphere, in my opinion, affects in the very least the relation of Psychology with Philosophy. It does not justify the view that Philosophy is more intimately connected with Psychology than with any of the other sciences. I am perfectly willing to accept the view that Psychology is not a single science, but a whole group of sciences, the study of which has not yet sufficiently advanced

to constitute them into so many separate and distinct sciences. I am perfectly willing to concede that Psychology is not an accomplished science, but rather the hope or promise of a science of the future. But does this affect its relation with Philosophy? Why should it? Is a fully developed and highly organised science, because of its developed and organised character differently related to Philosophy, than a science which is less developed and not so fully organised? Will the organisation of Psychology into a single developed science, or its differentiation into well-marked groups of sciences, be in any measure furthered by a philosophic method of approach? I do not think so. For, after all, what can the philosopher do for the Psychologist? He can only analyse and examine the Postulates that the Psychologists assume, and he can only work out a rational synthesis of their principles of explanation, either within the sphere of Psychology itself, or on the wider sphere of Psychology on the one hand, and the remaining sciences on the other. It does appear to me to be true that in both these directions Psychology offers a wider field of activity to the Philosopher than the other sciences do. It does so because of its undeveloped character. Psychologists are inclined to adopt a larger number of fundamental ~~postulates~~ than the other more developed sciences. The same state of things leads to the diversity of the Psychologists' explanatory principles, which it may be possible for the philosopher by a logical analysis to reduce to a smaller number of more fundamental principles. Thus, though Psychology may provide a greater amount of work for the philosopher to do, it does not and cannot provide any different kind of work than the other sciences do.

To turn now to the other objection, *viz.*, that though Psychology is concerned with facts and a particular group or groups of facts, these facts are of such a kind that they require a philosophical rather than a scientific treatment, and by their very nature, bind Psychology more intimately to Philosophy than any of the other sciences. This view perhaps prevailed more widely when Psychology was purely introspective rather than now when it is adopting so many objective, and technical methods for the accumulation of its data and for the formulation of its general laws. But even if Psychology is confined to the introspective observation,

classification, and explanation of subjective facts of experience, I fail to see how this connects Psychology with Philosophy any more intimately than any of the other sciences whose data are objective or impersonal. That they appear to be so connected to many minds, is due to the mere accident that in the past the only individual who could be found to be sufficiently interested to engage themselves with these facts, happened also to be Philosophers. But a Ward or a William James when describing to us the events which occur in the flux of his consciousness as he gets angry with his cook for having spoilt his breakfast, or struggles with his "will" to induce him out of bed on a cold and wintry morning, is engaged upon a task utterly different from the one on which he is engaged when he sits down to write his "Realm of Ends," or to project his essays on "Radical Empiricism." The nature of the facts does not in the least affect our attitude of scientific enquiry about them. Thus neither the view that Psychology is an undeveloped science, nor the view that its facts are of a peculiar kind, affects in the least its relation with Philosophy. It is related to Philosophy in the same way in which the other Sciences are related to it.

Now the relation of Philosophy with science in the view which I have put before you, is in all conscience intimate enough. Thus I have maintained the view that Philosophy though distinct from Science is nevertheless continuous with it, and, in point of fact, can only be carried on in the most intimate relation with it. It is not that I have severed Psychology from Philosophy, but, on the contrary, I have attempted to bring Philosophy nearer to all the sciences. In a word the only Philosophy of the future, as I have said before is a Philosophy of science or of the sciences, but not a philosophy independent of the sciences.

Thus in the view which I am adopting, theoretically this Congress should have a section not only in the Philosophy of Psychology, but equally so in the Philosophy of Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Biology and all the other special Sciences. This does not in the least mean that we should arrogate to ourselves the functions of the Science Congress. For what I advocate are not Sections in the Sciences, but in the Philosophy of the

Science, which are altogether different things. But though theoretically desirable, we are unfortunately bereft of any hope of such expansion in the near future. We are so bereft, for none of our metaphysicians is equipped with the proper knowledge of Physics, or Chemistry, or Mathematics, or the other positive sciences so as to engage himself upon the Philosophical problems to which each of them severally, as well as in their mutual relations to one another give rise. The most constructive work in Philosophy which is being done in England to-day is being done by Mathematical Physicists who have turned philosophers. Equally important and suggestive is the work of such Philosophers as Lloyd Morgan and Alexander who have approached Philosophy from the humaner Sciences of Psychology and Ethics. When the complaint is made that India is producing so little in the way of original constructive work in Philosophy, this sterility to my mind is not due to the inebriating effect of modern culture but to the lack of proper scientific equipment on the part of Indian Philosophers.

Now it is in this hopeless *impasse*, due to the lack of scientific equipment on the part of the average philosopher, that his knowledge of Psychology may save him from despair. If he knows something of Psychology and of the social sciences, it is still possible for him to be a scientific philosopher instead of merely becoming a super-annuated oracle of ancient and effete learning. Thus the Psychological Section of this Congress, provided it does not arrogate to itself the functions of Scientific Psychology, is to my mind the one channel through which this Congress may help to furnish to a world weary of antiquated shibboleths, the solid substance of Scientific Philosophy.

PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLANATION

BY

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Psychology shares with other sciences the common task of explaining a series of natural events. Yet, Psychologists, even within their own ranks, are unanimous neither about the character of these 'natural events' nor about the method of explanation. In fact, the term 'psychological explanation' though very much in vogue in popular speech as well as in the forum of psychology, has hardly ever received more than a passing attention. The consequence is that to many, a psychological explanation is nothing more than an idle speculation. For, the multitude of meanings which psychologists have given to the term, and its wide popular use, have served alike to render the conception of psychological explanation exceedingly indefinite.

Psychology emerged from a mere descriptive stage when it began to avow its relation to physiology. Mental states, when taken by themselves, could only be described; their explanation could be found in their physiological correlates. Thus arose the idea that psychological explanation means a correlation of the mental with the physical.* At first this relation was regarded merely as an empirical fact; it was the only observable link that mental life had with the world. Thus, physiological explanation of mind came to be accepted because it was the only explanation that could be discovered. But gradually this method came to be viewed as logical necessity.† The mental states, it is argued, are dead as soon as they are born; they arise, change and pass away.

* Cf. Natorp, *Philosophie : ihrer Problem und Probleme*, Ch. V.

† Cf. Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, Ch. IV.

Hence, a mental fact cannot be explained by another mental fact which does not exist. The body subsists as a relatively durable substratum with a definite relation to the mind. We must, therefore, explain a mental event in terms of an antecedent or synchronous physiological state.

A second approach to the question was opened by Sensationalism in Epistemology. Since all mental states can be traced to sensations, the explanation of mental life would consist in its analysis into elementary constituents. Psychological explanation is in its essence a constitutive explanation rather than a casual one. This view had a set-back in the doctrines which emphasised the unity of mind and personality, notably, all purposive views of consciousness. But it was later revived, as we shall see, in the doctrines of structural Psychology.

A third mode of psychological explanation was adopted by the psycho-physics of Weber and Fechner. Psychological explanation is really a correlation of two variables, the stimulus and the psychosis. Since the stimulus is known with respect both to its quality and quantity, psychological explanation signifies the relation of mental states with their corresponding stimulus-values. This doctrine naturally led to the acceptance of a form of sensationalism or psychological atomism. For, stimuli can be definitely related only to sensory states. Hence, mental life, if it is to be explained in terms of stimuli, must necessarily be sensory at its basis. The doctrine of elements in vogue to-day, is really a type of sensationalism. For, even the affectional element is regarded by Münsterberg* and Stumpf† as 'feeling-sensations' and by Titchener as 'undeveloped sensation.'‡ All complex mental states arise only through the combination of elements. For the explanation of combinations, however, mere stimuli do not suffice. A central factor of some type, apperception, association, inhibition or active attitude, has to be assumed. Hence arises the need of a physiological explanation of the process of combination. But a

* Münsterberg, *Psychology, General and Applied*, p. 100ff.

† Stumpf, *Psychologie*.

‡ Titchener, *Psychology of Feelings and Attention*.

central physiology has necessarily to be prefaced by a peripheral physiology. Thus, the explanation of mental states means their correlation with the stimuli on the one hand and with their physiological basis, peripheral and central, on the other. This is the programme of structural Psychology, as we know it to-day. It adopts, therefore, a double method of explanation, constitutive and causal.

The fourth method of explanation which finds a place in the psychological thought of the day, is the purposive view in its various forms. All mental states are to be treated as indivisible wholes which fulfil certain antecedent purposes. These purposes are sometimes regarded as conscious in their character, as we find in desires and other forms of conation; they are also regarded as unconscious drives seeking realisation, as we find in the psycho-analytic theory and its different emendations; and purposes may be thought of as biological urges which do not arise on the psychic plane but effectively determine the course of psychic life.* Explanation in these instances signifies the discovery of the purpose and the way it unfolds itself.

Let us pass on to a critique of these methods of explanation. The constitutive explanation, if it survives the polemic of the *Gestalt* school, is possible only when mental states are observed with a 'process attitude' as distinct from the 'meaning attitude.' The validity of *constitutive explanation*, therefore, depends upon the validity of the process attitude; its value as a method also depends upon the possibility on the part of the observer to assume the process attitude. But even when all is said and done, this method leaves a large lacuna in the scheme of mental life. For, it fails to show how the part processes combine and how the character specific to the concrete and whole mental state, arises. Yet, the analysis of mental state into its possible constituents is a necessary step to scientific investigation. It would be an error to regard it in itself as a scheme of psychology; it is a prelude to

* Cf. Spencer's *Teleological Theory of Pleasure-Pain*.

causal explanation, that is to say, explanation in terms of invariably antecedent factors.

The different methods of such causal explanation which we have already discussed, fail to offer a satisfactory account of psychic phenomena. For, each of them works with variable factors far smaller in number than those which actually operate on the stream of consciousness. The physiological explanation of the older days invoked the aid of associative factors in the central nervous system which fell but little short of myths. Ziehen's doctrine of memory cells, the theory of neural habit, and that of anaphylaxis, Robertson's hypothesis of autocatalytic oxidation and Rignano's application of the conception of storage batteries for the explanation of the phenomenon of memory, testify to the fact that mere physiological hypotheses have proved to be of little value in this most important phase of psychic life. The same thing may be said of the doctrine of the *Mneme* which appears to be all the rage at the present moment. The mythical character of the physiological hypothesis concerning the space-configurations has been duly exposed by the energetic apostles of the Gestalt-school and they have set up their own myths in the place of the old ones. It is not necessary to adduce further illustrations. MacDougall has been striving for the last twenty years to this end and no one has met with greater success. And it is not necessarily a condemnation of the method of Physiological psychology. Still it shows the limitation of the method which has resulted in running away from one unsatisfactory theory to another formulated largely as speculative endeavours.

The same thing has to be said of the stimulus hypotheses. The simple stimuli of psycho-physics had to be soon replaced by the notion of stimulus-complexes and later on by that of *stimulus-situation*, as we find in the system of James and even of many behaviorists. Yet the idea of the *situation* inevitably leads us to the mental state. Moreover, the integrated series of stimuli can never successfully account for the phenomenon of psychic integration; for the inner connection of mental states is not merely the connection by way of spatial and temporal association as the

functional psychologists and all psychologists from the time of Wünderlich have felt.

The other mode of approach in terms of *Hermes*, conscious and unconscious (as represented by functional psychology, psychoanalysis and other systems), is logically bound to insist upon the greatest importance of the impulse and meaning factors to the detriment of the external stimuli, although some sort of place is usually found for them (*e.g.*, the stimuli are supposed to fulfil the inner drive). The sensory and perceptual states, the phenomena which depend upon the intensity of the stimuli, as also the eidetic imagery, the great importance of which has so vigorously been pressed by Janesch and others, demonstrate the impossibility of lightly passing over the factor of external stimuli. In the same way, the experiments of Mayer, Schmidt Triplett as also of Allport and others, have conclusively shown that the *social environment* as a causal determinant of the mental states must be seriously taken into account for any explanation of psychic life.

A more comprehensive scheme of psychological explanation must, thus, be formulated. I suggest that the older notion that there are two types of psychological explanation, causal and constitutive, should be accepted as a working programme. Whether one or the other is basal to psychology, would depend upon the general philosophical predilection of the psychologist. The nature of constituents may for the present be left in the same way; for, no one has yet come to the decision in regard to the status of such states as *Bewusstseinslage* or *Einstellung*. The empirical success of the analysis of mental states, however, entitles it to be recognised as a distinct mode of psychological explanation.

In regard to the causal explanation, I suggest that every mental state should be regarded as a function of four classes of variable factors. The first of these is the past history of the individual, conscious and unconscious; second, the bodily constitution; third, the physical stimulus; and lastly, the social environment. The last mentioned deserves a separate category in as much as it always presupposes some kind of *conscious representation* for its operation. Any mental state, therefore, would be said

to be explained only when it can be correlated with all of these four classes of variable factors.

We can see from this perspective the significance of the several approaches to psychological explanation. Psycho-analysis, functional psychology, and Hormic psychologies of all shades, are attempting an explanation in terms of the psychic antecedents, while physiological psychology as well as behaviorism, the correlation of mental states with bodily antecedents and concomitants. In the same manner, psycho-physics of Weber and Fechner explains mental life in terms of physical stimuli, while Social Psychology interprets it in terms of the group-factors. A question has been pointedly raised by Miss Calkins whether the self as a concrete experience-content should not be regarded as a special determinant of all mental states. The answer to this would depend upon the constitution of the self-experience. If we agree with James and others that self so far as it is experienced is a group of experiences on a par with other experiences, there is no particular point in setting it up as a special determinant. But if it is to be regarded as a unique experience, we should provide for five types of determinants of mental life instead of four as proposed above. The consequence of accepting the position will be that we shall have a number of special methods of approach to mental life. Mental life should, therefore, be explained in terms of constituents and in terms of their causal antecedents. The functional and the physiological systems, social Psychology and psycho-physics,—would all be co-ordinate modes of psychological explanation. At the same time, psychological questions would have their solutions only in experiments and observations.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF THE NIRVĀNA

BY

J. K. SARKAR, MUZZAFFARPUR.

Introduction.

The *Nirvāna* is the vehicle of sublimation or uplifting of the individual. There is no term so hopelessly misinterpreted, no notion so completely distorted as the *Nirvāna* is. The confused mass of misconceptions and ambiguities arises from various sources, *viz.*, the long litany of synonyms negative, contradictory and apparently inconceivable, indefinite definitions, etc. The confusion between "Nivṛti" and "Nirvāna," the two-fold meaning of the word "Nirvāna, *viz.*, cooling and extinguishing, are but the most prolific source of errors. To us the *Nirvāna* is shrouded in mystery and with regard to its meaning our imagination has its full play, as the reality is unknown. But inspite of its numberless negative contents and descriptions it has succeeded in attracting so many human beings during so many centuries and in so many climes. It has been the perennial source of hope and solace to the populations that have made out of it their spiritual food. What is done by the prophets in Judea, Lao-tse in China, the mystic religion in Greece, is also done by Buddhism or the birth of *Nirvāna* in India and in the greater part of Asia. Buddhism with its celebrated doctrine of the *Nirvāna* is, like all other higher religions, a sort of assurance against the death and the terrors and miseries following from it. So the *Nirvāna* can never be the annihilation in itself.

The negative contents of Nirvāna leading on to its positive significance.—*Buddhaghōṣa* remarks : " The Nirvāna is one, but its names founded on its contraries are numerous." The variants of these contraries or negatives are—cessation, destruction, detachment, the nothingness, the negation of the *Prapancha* or the *Samsāra* ; the end of desire, aversion and blindness ; the deliverance from suffering, birth, evil and death. The Nirvāna is destruction, the Buddha is the destructor. The *Samsāra* is *Vatta*, the turn of wheel, the Nirvāna is *Vivatta* and the Buddha is the *Venāyaka*. Verily the Tathāgata says, " I am the king of the world, born in the world in order to be the destructor of existence." In *Mahāvagga* (IV, 31, 4-7) the great teacher, while preaching to the Seeha the doctrine of abstinence from all evil actions of body, speech and thought, says that he wishes others to destroy desire, hatred and blindness. In fact, the cessation of *Samsāra* without, and of *tanhā* within, is made possible as much by the total annihilation as by one eternity of happy existence. The suppression of the individual existence and supreme felicity arising out of the appeasement of thirst (corresponding to the two imports of the Nirvāna, viz., extinction and cooling down)—the negative and positive bliss affirmed of the Nirvāna—do not exclude each other. On the other hand, the Nirvāna is positive bliss because it is annihilation. This can be easily inferred from the nature of the Nirvāna, from the teaching of the Buddha.

The nature of the Nirvāna and its different forms.—The Nirvāna is one. It does not admit of degrees. It is, or it is not, just as a flame, as much as it burns, is not extinguished. So Nirvāna could not be more or less complete. It is without relation to what may be other than itself. It receives nothing from some other cause. It is called the *Anupādeya-nirvāna* (*Mādhyamika Vṛtti*, XXV). It is above all time and space. There is no place where the Nirvāna is. And yet the Nirvāna is, and he who conducts his life properly, knows or realises it. It is like the fire : the fire is, and yet the fire is not in some part or position (*Milindā Panho*). The distinction between *Parinirvāna* and *Nirvāna* is emotive, and not logical. The Nirvāna is the concept, pure and simple, the idea of achievement that evokes *Parinirvāna* and calls

of our experience into different universes of discourse. Within each universe of discourse, our limited power of consciousness necessitate a form of negation which we call in ordinary logic as contrary negation. This form of negation presupposes a previous affirmative basis. For I cannot deny anything unless I know that thing will not be that what it is if the negative statement were true.

A negative attitude is therefore both the effect and the expression of our mental limitation. Because we are mentally limited we cannot affirm everything. We can neither affirm everything nor negate everything. Every attempt to comprehend something, would involve not only some affirmations, but some denials as well, to show clearly what a thing is and is not. But for a being whose powers of comprehension are not limited like ours, this work would be an open book and for him there will be pure affirmation. When Mephisto says that he is the spirit which eternally denies, he shows partly that he transcends the limited powers of comprehension of an average human being. But the sting of his remark is deeper. He is convinced of the intrinsic worthlessness of existence, and his whole energy therefore is directed to the destruction of all that is considered valuable. We find in the "Prologue to Heaven" when the Lord asks him whether he would only bring accusations against his creation, disapprove of everything, he says:—

"Nein Herr, ich find'es dort, wie immer, herzlich schlecht."
 "No Lord, I find things there as ever in sad plight." He says that he sees the worthlessness of existence, and so he prefers not-being to Being, for he says it is good to destroy. Mephisto's eternal negation is on a par with his preference for not-being. Since this existence is worthless, since the whole of creation is a mockery, it were better that nothing were. Hence he makes an attempt to deny everything. But psychologically Mephisto's remark is not a sound one. For every negation presupposes a positive ground on which this negation can be based. His remark only shows his intellectual conviction of the evil of existence and of the determined effort to deny and damn everything. And it is curious to see that he has no illusions about it, but sees the hopelessness of eternal denial.

Eternal denial is therefore impossible more impossible than eternal affirmation; for every negation presupposes a positive basis. And the very assertion of eternal negation is itself an exception to eternal negation.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADVERTISEMENT

BY

SUHRID CHANDRA SINHA.

Introduction—

Advertisement to-day plays a very important part in all business concerns and industrial ventures. The efficacy of advertisements, however, depends upon a large number of conditions. The mental make-up of the people whom the advertisement seeks to appeal is a very important factor in its success. It is the business of the psychologist to analyse the psychological conditions that increase the value of an advertisement. Many of the leading business firms in the West, seek the help of the psychologists in this matter. Very little has been done in this country in regard to the study of advertisement as a psychological problem.

The walls along the main thoroughfares of a city are lined with advertisements. How much of these do we remember? What kind of advertisements affects us most? Professors Hollingworth and Hotchkiss, and businessmen like Tipper and Parson say that the efficiency of an advertisement depends upon the instinct, and the corresponding emotions, like those of comfort, sex play, sociability and curiosity, that it evokes. It is such advertisements that affect us readily and leave a fairly vivid and lasting impression upon our mind.

Problem—

More than half of the pages in the periodicals are given to advertisements. The same commodity is advertised in many ways, with picture or without it, with plain statement or with free-coupons. The paper presents the data of a series of studies in regard to the effectiveness of some of these modes of advertising. I define 'effectiveness' as (I) perseveration and (II) comprehension. Every advertisement is made up of number of features, one of which is a reference to the commodity advertised. By 'perseveration' is meant the persistence of the memory of these fea-

tures. By comprehension is meant their relation to the commodity. The effectiveness of an advertisement would be the highest when all the features are remembered after the lapse of a given time and all of them lead to the central object. This ideal is hardly ever realised. So, an advertisement would be judged to be effective when any perceived feature leads to the idea of the commodity. When either an isolated feature or a bare idea of the commodity persists in consciousness, the particular advertisement is judged to be ineffective.

Method—

The materials of the experiment were culled from a number of well-known English and Bengali periodicals such as "Strand" "Royal," Pearson's," Prabāsi," Bhāratvarsa " and "Sisir." The selected advertisements were of the same size. They were presented upon a white background for about 62 seconds. Each series consisted of 6 advertisements in English or 8 in Bengali. The time was calculated with the help of a stop-watch. 75 students participated in the experiment.

At first I tried to present the sheets of advertisements serially. But it is found that even when the sheets are simultaneously given the subjects habitually concentrate upon one sheet and pass on to another when the first has been read through. The manner of presentation, thus, appears to me to be immaterial. I chose the method of simultaneous presentation, as being more economical. A reproduction was called for immediately after the presentation. The figures represent the score of the whole group of 75 students. The group was regarded as fairly homogeneous and the amount of individual difference was found to be small. Hence, the group rather than the individual was taken as the unit.

Scoring—

The successful reproduction of each individual represents his scores. Thus, if the central object, that is to say, the commodity advertised, be remembered along with one single feature, pictorial or descriptive, the score is $\frac{1}{2}$. If the object be recalled along with all the features the score is 1. If one or more of the features be recalled without any idea of the commodity, the score is 0. Simi-

larly a bare idea of the commodity has a 0 value. The score of an individual generally did not differ in a marked way, in regard to their ability to reproduce. Besides, the value of an advertisement lies in the appeal that it makes to a group. Hence, the score of all the individuals, under a particular head, were added up and averaged. This represents the score of the group under each head. (See Appendices—A & B.)

Results—

(1) From the study of the table it would be evident that the language of the advertisement has but little influence upon its effectiveness in the group of the subjects tested in the present instance.

TABLE I.

Expt. Series No.	12
Advt. Sheet No.	IX
<hr/>	
English	25 per cent.
.....
Bengali	25 per cent.

(2) The effectiveness of an advertisement seems to depend upon the kind of commodity advertised. The direction of the interest of the subjects is brought out by the fact that advertisement of some of the commodities receive greater notice. It seems strange in a group of college boys "ornaments" (80 per cent.) and "toilet articles" (69 per cent.) should have highest percentage of efficacy. But the explanation may also lie in the fact that these advertisements contain features which possess prepotent interest for young men. Thus, it was found that when the same commodity is advertised in different ways the advertisements containing a female figure has the greatest efficacy.

TABLE II.

English.

Expt. Series No	2	3	Total	Coloured 6
Advt. Sheet No	VI	IV		XII
	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.
Toilet articles	69	...	69	75
Patent medicines	42	72	56	50
Sweets	0	...	0	100
Books, etc.	...	40	40	...
Household-requirements	...	25	25	75
Ornaments	...	80	80	...
Clothes	100

TABLE III.

Bengali.

Expt. Series No	8	9	Total	Coloured 10
Advt. Sheet No	III	V		
	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.	per cent.
Toilet articles	63	52	58	73
Patent medicines	80	...	80	33
Sweets, etc.	40	46	43	...
Books, etc.	70	57	64	66
Household-requirements	60	...	60	...
Stationery	10	...	10	...
Luxury	...	82	82	...

The Table III, however, shows that "luxury articles" as advertised through the medium of Bengali language attracted the subjects' notice in the most effective way. This may be due to the fact that some of these articles are in common use among students.

(3) Colour enhances the effectiveness of advertisements. Thus about 55 per cent. of the coloured advertisements as against 30 per cent. of the uncoloured are retained. This is the case with the advertisement in Bengali language, where the use of colours is not so common. In the case of advertisements in the English periodicals the percentage of effectiveness of coloured advertisements is 83 as against 58 of the uncoloured ones.

TABLE IV.

	Engl.	Beng.
Expt. Series No.	7	11
Advt. Sheet No.	XI	VII
	per cent.	per cent.
Coloured	83	55
Uncoloured	58	30

(4) The love of gain is another incentive that leads to a better appreciation of advertisements. Thus it would appear that advertisements with ' free-coupon ' are more effective than plain advertisements.

TABLE V.

Expt. Series No.	4	5
Advt. Sheet No.	...	11
	per cent.	per cent.
With ' Free-coupon '	66	72
Without ' Free-coupon '	58	58

Conclusion—

I have attempted to analyse only some of the more obvious features of advertisements. The subject will repay a more thorough study and should be a great value not only to the psycho-

logists but also to businessmen and those interested in advertisement as an art, about which I have not tried to say any thing for the present.

The types of advertisements which appear in monthly and daily publications indicate the direction of the social life. The needs of the group can be estimated through the advertisements which propose to fulfil them. The commodities which are placed in the market indicate not only the moral character and the economic level of the group, they also exhibit the course of physical life of the community, its health and disease. The advertisements which stand for the goods serve the same purpose. A mental survey of the people with respect to the articles they would like to buy would similarly indicate the level of physical, mental and economic life. Thus a psychological test of advertisements like the one proposed here and a statistical study would be of interest not only to the Psychologists but also to the Sociologists.

Advertisements attract attention mainly because there is a pre-existing attraction for the goods advertised. The businessman exploits these emotional tendencies. But it very often happens that a new interest is created and a new need is produced through the propaganda and advertisements. Hence we must look upon this method of approaching the public as one that produces a marked influence upon the course of life in all its aspects. The question thus arises of decency and indecency of advertisements and of morality of propaganda.

A psychological study as proposed here would then be an effective method of diagnosing incipient social maladies. For the same reason such a study would enable us to estimate the specific effects of different kinds of injurious advertisements on different classes of population. It would be a valuable aid to the hands of the Legislators and of the Sociologists.

Advertisement again is a method of fighting rival business concerns. Each firm exaggerates the virtues of its own wares. Thus it can be employed as an agency for duping the credulous public. Herein lies the social danger. It is for this reason that the learned professions of medicine and law do not permit its members to advertise. The question then arises whether an analogous restraint should be placed upon all classes of advertisers. For all

exploit the credulity of the public. Lastly the frequent repetitions of advertisements that disfigure the city walls and public conveyances have a distracting and almost enervating effect upon the urban population. How far it influences the mental health can probably be experimentally determined. I raise these problems in this connection with the hope that they will receive adequate consideration in the hands of Psychologists and Sociologists.

APPENDIX A.

Date—13-9-27

Time—11 a.m.

Variety—English, Coloured.

Time allowed—62 sec.

Expt. Series No. 6

Advt. Sheet No. XII.

Subjects.	Sweets.	Patent Medicines.	Clothes.	Toilet Articles.	Household Requirements.
12	1	1	1	2	1
I	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
II	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	1
III	1	1	1	2	1
IV	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
V	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
VI	1	0	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
VII	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	1
VIII	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
IX	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
X	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	2	1
XI	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	1	$1\frac{1}{2}$	1
XII	1	$\frac{1}{2}$	0	$1\frac{1}{2}$	1
12	12	6	12	18	9 Total No. re-produced.
100	100	50	100	75	75 Percentaga.

APPENDIX B.

Date 16-9-26

Time—2 p.m.

Variety—Bengali, Uncoloured.

Time allowed—62 sec.

Expt. Series No. 9.

Advt. Sheet No. V.

Subjects.	Toilet Articles.	Books.	Sweets.	Luxury Articles.
7	3	1	1	3 Total No. Presented.
I	1½	½	1	3
II	2	½	1	2½
III	1½	½	½	2½
IV	1½	1	1	2½ Scores.
V	1½	½	1	2½
VI	1½	0	½	2
VII	1½	1	1	3
7	11	4	6	18 Total No. Reproduced.
100	52	57	46	82 Percentage.

THE NATURE AND STATUS OF SENSE-DATA

BY

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The current philosophical tendency is realistic and although modern realism has indeed lately developed into an ontological theory, it started as an epistemological reaction against the prevailing representative theory of perception and knowledge. It contends for epistemological monism and emphasises the immediacy and directness of knowledge. Now the advocates of the older representative school interpreted even the perceptual situation as constituted of a mediate process, and all knowledge, according to them, is self-transcendent. This the modern realists deny outright, holding fast to the opposite theory of immanence. The subject of perceptual knowledge thus becomes the fighting ground of a very heated controversy between the older and the new schools of epistemology and the problem of sense-data has become a vital and living problem in present day philosophical discussions.

But what is precisely the problem that is raised here? What do we exactly mean by the term "sense-data"? It must be at once admitted that there is some ambiguity in its meaning. It might mean either (1) what is *given* or *presented* to our sense-experience; or (2) what we are *immediately aware of* in our sense-experience; or (3) it might be used in both the above senses. But cannot they be regarded as identical? If we closely follow the very highly animating discussions on the subject at the present day, we find that some have indeed treated them as identical, while others seem inclined to draw some distinction between them. Hence we are struck with the glaring diversity in respect of its terminology. Thus we come across a whole host of technical names intended to signify the matter, such as 'sensation,' 'sensibilium,' 'sensible appearance,' 'sense-presentation,' 'sense-datum,' 'sensus,' etc. A close scrutiny into the elementary meanings of these terms would clearly indicate the ambiguity and that some have preferred one sense and some another. However, it is the object of

this paper to enter into a discussion of the problem of the nature and status of the sense-data practically in both the above senses, presumably regarding them as identical, especially with reference to some of the recent views on it, *viz.*, (1) the *sensum* theory of Dr. Broad in England and (2) the doctrine of 'essence' of the critical realists of America.' We thus propose to consider whether the sense-data are by their nature and status (i) physical, or (ii) mental or (iii) neither. When visually experiencing a red flower, for instance, is what is presented to us and what we are immediately aware of, the physical red flower, or a mere mental picture of it, *i.e.*, a mere visual apparition, or neither the one nor the other, but something midway between the two, if not altogether a separate entity, belonging to what has sometimes been called 'neutral' realm, more definitely characterised as *logical*. Let us discuss these alternatives one after another.

(A) Are the sense-data *physical* in nature and status? Is what is given and what we are immediately aware of in our sense-experience of the nature of physical object or quality? This is indeed the view not only of unreflective common sense but also of a class of modern critical philosophers. I intentionally use the term 'critical' to signify that it is the outcome of their deliberate and reflective thinking. Naive realism is unreflective, uncritical and therefore dogmatic. But modern new realism which agrees with common sense in this respect, accepts it as the result of critical reflection and systematic examination of the opposite view. In having a sensation or rather a sense-experience, say, of colour, we directly and immediately experience the physical sensible quality as it is actually inherent in the physical object, without the medium of any such thing as 'visual apparition' or 'sensible appearance,' etc. This at once disposes of the thorny question of the secondary qualities which are admitted to be as much inherent in the physical objects as their primary qualities. Among the contemporary British realists Alexander, Percy Nunn and Dawes Hicks could be cited as advocates of this view. 'The Six American realists' also uphold the same doctrine. Their position is very aptly characterised as 'epistemological monism,' as contrasted with the older theory of representative perception which is 'epistemological dualism,' admitting as it does a second factor.

viz., the mental apparition through the medium of which the physical object is apprehended. But these realistic philosophers are at once confronted with a very serious difficulty. If the sense-data are the real things and their qualities themselves, how to account for perceptual errors and illusions? How is it that a partially colour blind person sees nothing but green or at least something very much approaching green, where a normal person sees red? Can redness and greenness both inhere in the same object in the same place at one and the same time? Some realists in their utter helplessness with regard to this difficulty have even gone to the length of asserting this absurd proposition. How is it again that a straight stick immersed in water looks bent? Could it be straight and bent at the same time? The insane persons, again, hear sounds where as a matter of fact the normal persons hear none. Further a man in a "delirium tremens" sees pink rats which really have no existential status in the real space-time continuum. The problem of illusion and error has thus become a veritable living knotty problem with modern realism. And amongst the American realists Holt in his very life-struggle as it were to come out of the difficulty, had to find room for "illusory experiences in a realistic universe," admitting that contradictions are "objective and related after the manner of opposing forces" and that "these objective contradictions constitute the content of erroneous experience." Into a detailed statement and examination of this grossly absurd position I have no place to enter here. But the able handling of the problem by Alexander who attempts to solve it by drawing a distinction between "real appearance," "mere appearance" and "illusory appearance" seems to indicate the way in which the true solution may be found. But whatever might be the worth of these solutions, it is this very difficulty which weighs with others against the view that sense-data are physical and leads them to accept the contrary thesis that they are mental in their nature. Let us now proceed to consider this second alternative.

(B) Are the sense-data mental in their nature and status? Some indeed hold that when we see a red flower, for example, what we immediately apprehend is not the physical object, *viz.*, the red flower situated in a particular space and continuant in a series of time-moments, but simply the visual picture or apparition through

the medium of which we come to know the object as its *ground* or *source*. The visual picture which is the content of our sense-experience somehow represents or corresponds to the object. There are thus involved three elements in all knowledge, not excluding our sense-experience, *viz.*, the act, the content of the act and the object which the content refers to. The content of the process which is thus different from the object and of which we are immediately aware is what constitutes the *sense-datum* and it is through the medium of this that the object is known. This is the position of the theory of representative perception, more euphemistically called in modern times 'epistemological dualism.' Sense-data, according to this view, are mental in status, and it is through the medium of these mental pictures that we pass to the physical reality as their ground or source. Knowledge even at the sensational level thus involves an element of self-transcendence, *i.e.*, it implies a reference to something beyond itself. Now there is an important difference of opinion amongst the thinkers of this school about the nature of the process of this transition: some holding that it is inferential in nature, while others like Stout, maintaining that it is an immediate apprehension or knowing. Stout draws a distinction between 'immediate experience' and 'immediate cognition.' Sensations, he says, are immediate experience of the objective kind, as distinguished from such immediate experiences as of attending, recollecting, feeling, etc., which are of the subjective type. The objective character is best recognised by calling them 'presentations.' "Presentations are immediate experiences which present to us objects which are not themselves presentations." Obviously then, according to Stout, the objects themselves are not directly present to the mind but are presented to it through the medium of sensations, and as such they are not sense-data. But they are reached by an act of immediate apprehension of the meaning, both original and acquired, of the sensations considered as presentations. And it is these sense-presentations regarded as immediate experiences of the objective kind that constitute the sense-data according to Stout. And they are mental, not of course in the sense in which 'attending,' 'remembering,' 'judging,' 'believing' are mental, but in the sense in which 'presenta-

tions ' are mental. And Stout says, " sensations as immediate experiences are not only *before* the mind but they are *in* the mind." In support of his view Stout advances three arguments: (1) that they are not shared by all, although the object perceived may be the same, *i.e.*, they are *private*; (2) that " the existence of the sensation is capable of being continued independently of what may happen to the thing. " The sensations have a separate history of their own." They might be continued in the mental picture even after the object has ceased to exist; and (3) that " they are not merely facts apprehended by individual minds, but are facts forming part of the life history of the individual minds."

Now the question is, in what sense are sense-data regarded as mental? Not of course in the sense in which attending, imagining, willing, feeling, as processes of mind, are mental. Stout, we have seen, admits this, but still holds that they are mental in the sense of *presentations*. But it seems Stout's use of the term ' immediate experience ' in a double sense both subjective and objective, serves as a useful guise for smoothing over the difficulty. But is it thereby really smoothed over? In presentation we become no doubt immediately aware of what is presented or given. But does that really mean that what is presented or given is also mental, especially in sense-perception? May it not be that mind and matter being evolved as of ' a mutual fit,' there is at least a particular point at which mind immediately experiences and directly apprehends the physical reality without the medium of any mental picture or any such thing, although this direct and immediate apprehension is subject to some psycho-physical conditions? An older realist has truly observed, " the ego and the non-ego are given in an original antithesis." In sense-presentation we become immediately *aware* of what is presented to us, *i.e.*, the same data, as the outcome of the mental reaction consequent on sense stimulation and the corresponding cortical changes. And it is this awareness of the same data which is undoubtedly mental; and varying as it does under different conditions with different individuals, it might indeed be said to be *private*. But the awareness of the data is not the data. And the object no doubt becomes the datum only when presented to the mind and in this sense sense-datum may be said to be *dependent upon* mind for its very being

and status as sense-data; but that does not mean that it need be mental. An American critical realist rightly remarks, "The data no doubt are *given*; but the *givenness* of the data is not given." Hence sense-data need not be mental in status.

(C) But the difficulties involved in the above two theories have led others to hold that sense-data are neither physical nor mental, but belong to a mid-realm between the two, having a leg on each. Some others, again, in America have even gone to the length of asserting that they are neither physical nor mental but belong to a *neutral* realm better characterised as *logical*. The former is the 'Sensum' theory of Broad and the latter is the American Critical realist's doctrine of 'Essence.' The main features of the sensum theory as elaborated by Broad have been summed up by G. Dawes Hicks as follows: "In every perceptual situations there are involved, it is contented, states of mind which may be designated "sensation." By the term "sensation" when employed in this context, we are to understand a complex whole that is analysable into an act of sensing directed upon an object, which may here be called a *sensum*. The sensum is a particular *existent*, but a particular existent of a peculiar kind. It is not a physical existent; and there is no reason for supposing that it is a mental existent, in the sense of being either a state of mind or existentially dependent on it. It resembles physical entities, as ordinarily conceived, in having spatial and other characteristics usually ascribed to physical entities: it resembles mental entities in being private to the individual percipient. But, on the other hand, it is not in any plain straightforward sense, in the one "physical space" in which physical entities are supposed to be; and, on the other hand, although not existentially dependent on mind, it may, to some extent be qualitatively so dependent, and strong grounds can be furnished for taking it to be existentially partly dependent on the position, internal states and structure of the body. Furthermore, our apprehension of the *sensa* are intuitive, immediate, we may make judgments about them, but the act of sensing them is not an act of judging. And, finally, it is by the existence of the *sensa* and their presence to our minds in sensation that we are led to believe that physical objects exist and are present to our senses. Whatever properties we may ascribe

sophers also say that there is only Life and one consciousness, and that they are again one, the One Life only. The broken, the isolated, the temporal is alone mortal—i.e., really non-existent; the united, the continuous, the eternal is the Immortal. There cannot be a so-called pre-existent immortality as souls or spirits, since, if so, it should give the lie direct to the whole story of Evolution. We are to *become* souls, eternal or immortal by knowing that we are part and parcel of the Utterly One, as having evolved into individuality in that One,—since “outside” it is Death or non-existence. It may not be long in the history of modern Thought that Life and Energy are also found out as but one, and there is no place for any dualism. How are we to understand and correlate these two—Life and Energy? If we look at a certain school of Hindu Thought they speak of *Śakti* and *Śiva*, Energy and Life or *Jīva*, not as two but one, and the highest result of “mystic training” is to realise their Union in one’s self in ‘the 1000-petalled seat,’ the brain or ‘*Sahasrāra*.’ What else is this conception but the factualisation of the Unity of all in the Eternal two-in-one, the positive and the negative of being that are ever one. The individual is conceived as *Śakti* and the ultimate fundamental One, the parent-head, as *Śiva*, and when they meet and merge there is eternity, one-self becoming One-self—a conception analogous to the Christian mystic consummation of the Son becoming one with the Father. It is such consciousness realised as fact that is described as the Eternal or the Immortal existence; and whatever remains at the temporal or piecemeal level is but mortal. There may be ranges of existence in the realisation of this unity, like the stories of our hierarchies of Gods and angels; but the beginnings are to be established in the man-form which seems to be the culmination of the Evolution of Form—the meaning of God making man in His image. We are as it were, now merely as fleeting images of a dream, a subjective existence and are to become objective and real hereafter. Until then we have also no reason to call ourselves “souls.” Our present existence is like the intra-uterine existence in the great womb of Nature and only when we are born into reality in the fulness of time do our “souls” enter into us who are now mere tabernacles, with the

first breath that we take of the Real Life of the Real World—not a world that is somewhere far-off as a faint breath, a super-nirvanic state but the yet-to-become *physical* world of the Future, the original conception becoming the Great Fact. Each of us will be a “soul” there and then, since as a focal point he becomes conscious that he is one with the Great Life which is the only Eternal I for all.

WHAT PSYCHOLOGY IS

BY

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The question that has been seriously agitating the minds of psychologists and philosophers alike for sometime past is whether psychology should be completely severed from philosophy and treated as an independent natural science like physics or biology. It is perhaps something more than a matter of personal equation or individual temperament that among both psychologists and philosophers of a standing reputation there are some who would fain make a physical science of psychology, while others would condemn the attempt as overbold and reckless. In a conference of philosophers it was earnestly suggested by some important members to transfer psychology to the list of natural sciences like physics and chemistry, and have nothing to do with it under philosophy. That psychology is a science is not seriously disputed by anybody at the present day. But it is a veritable bone of contention among different sections of the philosophical world whether psychology as a science should be classed with the purely physical sciences or it should be kept distinct from them all as having a peculiar character of its own. It is the aim of this short paper to determine, as precisely as possible, the status of psychology. That is, we propose to consider the questions : In what sense psychology is a science? and, how far this science can be treated as a specimen of natural science?

The transition from a philosophical to a natural-scientific standpoint in psychology is very slow and gradual. Psychology

/ began as a science of the soul and played the second fiddle to philosophy all through its infancy. The concept of the soul was of course different in different metaphysics. In some it was vague, crude and materialistic, while in others it was more definite, refined and spiritualistic. But the metaphysical standpoint dominated psychological theories from the days of Empedocles down to the advent of the great German thinkers like Kant and Fichte, if not further still. It is more or less true of this school of psychology that all conscious phenomena were explained as the manifestations of a soul or as the modes of activity of a permanent self in the same way in which the physical sciences of the time treated physical phenomena as properties or manifestations of a permanent substance called matter. In this respect the Kantian 'unity of apperception' and the Fichtean 'ego' are epistemological versions of the more realistic conceptions of self as are illustrated by Plato's soul-substance, Augustine's incorporeal substance, Spinoza's substantial modes and Leibnitz's spiritual monads.

It was Descartes who gave a new turn to psychological studies by his epoch-making discovery of thought as the most fundamental facts of reality. Under the influence of the traditional philosophy, however, Descartes grafted, with questionable consistency, this fundamental fact on to the soul as owner or substance of the attribute of consciousness. But the effects of this discovery on the future course of psychology were as far-reaching as they were momentous. While the rationalistic school of psychology, represented by Wolff, Reid, Stewart, Royer-Collard, Jouffroy and others, continued the Cartesian idea of consciousness as the essential attribute of the soul, the empiricism of Locke and Hume was steadily making for a psychological study of thought or consciousness apart from any supposition of the 'I' or the 'ego' that is to think. With the further development of this line of study consciousness as a unified field of all experiences became the established subject-matter of psychology. The traditional view of psychology as the science of the soul was found unacceptable. Nor could the old concept of consciousness as an independent entity or essential property of a mystical soul-substance hold its own against the growing interest of the progressive sciences in actual facts of

experience. For all the illustrious representatives of the scientific spirit in modern psychology, such as Mill, Bain, Spencer, Sully, Wünder and James, consciousness is neither an entity nor the power of reflection upon our internal actions. It is only a collective term denoting all mental events or experiences. By consciousness is meant the totality of mental occurrences, such as sensations, perceptions, images, ideas, thoughts, feelings, emotions, desires and volitions. As Hugo Münsterberg very well puts it: "Consciousness is nothing which can be added to the existing mental facts, but it indicates just the existence of the psychical phenomena." Consciousness in this sense is the subject-matter of psychology. Henceforward psychology becomes the science of consciousness as an empirical concept.

Modern scientific psychology branches off into the two schools of structuralism and functionalism. The former concerns itself more with the static parts of consciousness, while the latter is solely interested in the transitive parts. The one looks to mental states or contents, the other to mental processes or functions. Hence while for both consciousness is the subject-matter of study, the structuralism of Wünder, Yerkes, Münsterberg and Titchener looks upon psychology as the science of mental states; and the functionalism of Angell, Judd and others defines psychology as the science of mental processes. In truth, however, structuralism and functionalism are complementary schools of psychology. States and processes, contents and functions are relative conceptions. When applied to mental life these denote respectively the relatively fixed and fluent parts of our conscious life, just as eddies and currents are parts of the same stream. A comprehensive science of mind cannot ignore either a study of its make-up and composition or an account of its working and functions.

In functionalism as a school of psychology we have the germs for the development of two great schools of contemporary psychology that differ markedly in their outlooks, methods and objectives. I mean the schools of self-psychology and behaviorism. For functionalism mental processes are forms of psycho-physical reaction to the environment. This view of mental function has, as

J. S. Moore points out, obvious affiliation with mentalism, on the one hand, and the biological sciences, on the other. It insists that mind does make a difference to the organic reactions which psychology is to describe and explain. Hence, while rejecting the concept of the self as wholly unscientific, functionalism recognises the fact of mentation or consciousness as influencing organic adjustments to the environment. The psycho-physical character of mental functions, however, admits of two opposed constructions through a difference in the distribution of emphasis. Self-psychology and Behaviorism are such developments of functionalism in opposite directions. In the self-psychology of Calkins, Ward, Stout, Royce and others, the inwardness of experience is emphasised and the reference of all psychoses to a conscious self is taken as the basal fact of psychology. Consciousness is awareness of something by some one, *i.e.*, by a self. Psychology as the study of consciousness is to be treated as the science of the self, because all consciousness is equivalent to self-consciousness. Thus while functionalism is limited to the study of bare experience as a system of psycho-physical reactions to the environment, self-psychology construes experience as self-experience and advances to the study of consciousness *cum* self. But the introduction of the self into the field of psychology is more a matter of philosophical interpretation than that of scientific study of observed facts. The self as the subject of experience may be a better interpretation of the unity and continuity of our experience than a finer atom or a spiritual substance. But they all represent different degrees of perfection of philosophical thought with regard to the same subject-matter. In this sense self-psychology is a development of functionalism in the direction of a metaphysical psychology.

Behaviorism is a parallel development from functionalism, but in the opposite direction. If self-psychology is indicative of the psychologist's leanings towards metaphysics, behaviorism professes to be a move towards the natural-scientific standpoint in psychology. It ignores or minimises the importance of the mental factor in organic reaction to the influences of the environment. The hypnotic spell of the biological sciences with their striking developments in the nineteenth century was felt no less in psycho-

logy than in any other humanistics. In their zeal to make psychology thoroughly scientific and provide it with a matter of biological standing and sanctity, behaviorists like Watson, Frost, Holt, Bode and others find mind or consciousness to be as badly suited to scientific study as the soul or the self. So also the method of introspection is judged utterly inadequate for purposes of a scientific psychology. Psychology thus becomes a science of animal behaviour. The methods of psychology like those of any other objective or physical science are observation and experiment, and the stimulus-response formula is taken as the magic key to all problems of psychology. Dr. Watson says: "Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective experimental branch of natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behaviour," without any reference to consciousness.

With behaviorism we reach the purely natural-scientific standpoint in psychology. It is by no means true to say that that standpoint is either a new discovery or a monopoly of the behaviorists. The mechanistic standpoint in psychology is as old as the materialism of Democritus and Epicurus. It has also its modern representatives in Hobbes, Gassendi, Büchner, Jäger and others. The tendency towards mechanisation and naturalistic explanation that is so marked a feature of the eighteenth century enlightenment modified the range and character of subsequent European thought almost in all its departments, although with varying success and different degrees of completeness. In the 19th century the material sciences like physics, chemistry, geology, biology, etc., are generally the most thorough-going and social sciences the least, in respect of the application of mechanistic principles to their respective data. In the field of psychology as a mental science the same principles now find growing recognition and a vigorous attempt is being made to naturalise psychology to the extent of physics and biology. The experimentalists join hands with the behaviorists and claim the proud title of 'science' exclusively for their laboratory psychology. For them it is scientific psychology when the data are objective and open to public observation, and when mental phenomena can be subjected to exact quantitative determination or rendered in terms of arithmetical

figures. Physiological psychologists do use the terms 'mind' and 'mental' to denote facts that are recognised to be different and distinct from physical as well as physiological processes. But a scientific psychology, they also will insist, is a description and explanation of psychoses in terms of neuroses. Behaviorists take a bold step in the same direction when they drop mind or consciousness and make psychology a purely objective study of physical facts, namely, behaviour, by means of the methods of external or public observation and laboratory experiments as approved by the physical sciences.

Now the question we propose to discuss here is this: Can psychology be legitimately treated as a natural science of the same order as physics and biology? An answer to this question requires an explanation of what science in general and natural science in particular mean. Science may be defined as an orderly and consistent account of an indefinite number of facts or experiences of the same order. The account of facts as given by any science is partly descriptive and partly explanatory. Description consists in analysis and enumeration of all of our experiences of an object. To describe a thing is to relate our experiences with regard to it and regarded as qualities of it. A physical thing is described when we depict its sensory qualities just as these are perceived by us and referred to the thing as its constituent parts or factors. To describe a feeling or a perception is to analyse it into its simpler constituent states and represent the form of their combination as an integral whole. As to scientific explanation, we are to say that it consists in general statements as *how* things come to be *what* they are. Such statements are universal propositions embodying the conditions under which, and the antecedents following which, the things to be explained uniformly appear. They are arrived at by observation and experiment as to the ways in which things of the same order are uniformly related to each other as antecedents and consequents. These propositions, when once established, become the laws according to which things and events are said to be caused or produced. Hence to explain anything scientifically is to state the cause or conditions which usher it into the order of actual existence. Causation being another name for

the uniformity and unconditionality of a thing's relation to certain antecedents, we may very well say that any scientific explanation consists in subsumption of a fact under a law or a general rule. A physical event like the eclipse of the sun or the moon is explained when we have a general statement about that relative position of planets which is uniformly followed by the phenomenon in question. Likewise a mental event, say a percept or an image, is explained when its uniform physical, physiological and psychical antecedents are stated.

By natural sciences I mean the physical sciences like physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, etc. A natural science has the following main characteristics. It deals with the objects of our common experience. There is no privacy with regard to the objects of a physical science. They may be observed in almost the same way by each of us. These are open to our 'public observation' and 'joint inspection.' In this sense the datum of physical science is objective. Secondly, physical science deals with material forces that are amenable to exact quantitative determination. We can measure them, *i.e.*, add and subtract, multiply and divide physical forces just as we please provided we have the necessary apparatus therefor. Hence experiments are most useful and successful in the field of the physical sciences. Experiment being a study of facts under conditions that can be controlled and prepared according to our needs and desires, without prejudice to the facts themselves, is the most fertile source of our knowledge of the physical world. Lastly, physical sciences lead to the control and prediction of physical events. This follows from the fact that physical forces can be measured and calculated. From the fall of an unsupported body to the eclipse of the sun, all physical events can be calculated with complete accuracy. Metabolic changes in a living body can be both controlled and premeditated if we have full knowledge of its chemical conditions. Given then physical forces as causes and the laws of their operation, certain events which are their effects must follow as a matter of necessity. Hence a natural science is an objective experimental study of facts that can be explained in terms of matter and motion, and can therefore be controlled and predicted with a high degree of certainty.

Those who propose to treat psychology as a natural science proceed either by identifying conscious processes with neural processes or by discarding the mind altogether and allowing the body completely to take its place. In their craze for naturalisation some have omitted the mental side of our life as it does not conveniently lend itself to a mechanistic treatment and restricted psychology to a study of behaviour, *i.e.*, of bodily reactions to external stimulations. These people forget that to exclude consciousness from the field of psychology in order to make it a branch of natural science is to naturalise it out of existence. "The science," says Alexander, "which systematises mental propositions is psychology." To define psychology therefore as the 'science of behaviour' is to transform its character beyond recognition. That definition may very well hold good of a natural science like physiology or praxiology, but not of psychology. Psychology as the science, not of mind, but of behaviour is like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet's part left out.

As for experiments and physiological studies in the domain of psychology, we are to say that within certain limits these are valuable assets for any school of psychology. The subject-matter of psychology is mental life in its actual concrete setting in a body. The basal fact for psychology is neither a bodiless mind nor a mindless body, but a body-mind or the 'psycho-somatic' organism. Hence a study of the bodily correlates of psychical functions or a system of psycho-physical experiments is rightly calculated to promote the understanding of mental life. So far we admit the importance of physiological and experimental psychology. But they are certainly in error who think that psychology can only be physiological or experimental. It should suffice here only to point out that both physiology and experiments are limited to the bodily side of that complex whole which is partly body and partly mind. Experimental psychology is in a sense physiology. Experiments on different psychoses,—thought, emotion, will, etc.—and the numerals attached to them are really conversant with the changes of nervous matter correlated to them. Consciousness can neither be measured by a tape nor weighed in a balance. "The phenomena of the mind," says Guido Villa, "form a group by them-

selves which cannot be reduced to the laws of quantity." To measure consciousness, if that is at all possible, is to have a particular kind of consciousness which is no measurement at all. If experiments in psychology throw any light on the working of the mind it is only in the light of some previous knowledge gained by immediate experience or introspection of it. Hence physiological and experimental studies are aids to psychology and not psychology itself just as a microscope is an aid to seeing and is not itself the act of seeing.

Finally, the natural scientific standpoint in psychology rests on certain unscientific assumptions regarding the mind. That there are mental facts in the world just as there are physical facts, that experiences and their objects are distinct units of reality and that 'cognising' and 'being cognised' are clearly different elements of experience must be admitted by all of us. The existence of mind or of mental acts is too hard a matter of fact to be easily suppressed or summarily dismissed. For each of us, such mental acts apprehended in immediate experience to which different writers give the different names of 'introspection,' 'reflection,' 'self-observation,' 'inspection' and 'enjoyment.' When the results of immediate experience of mental processes in each of us severally and all of us collectively are systematised, we have psychology as a science of mind. Psychology, then, is the science of immediate experience. The naturalistic standpoint in psychology is the result of a confusion between fact and theory. That the mind has no real existence or that consciousness is a quality of neural activity is not a fact of direct experience, but is the construction of experience in the direction of a philosophical theory. Consciousness is never perceived as a quality of any neural process in the same way in which the colour 'red' is perceived as a quality of the rose. To say that consciousness is a quality of the body is as much a matter of speculative theory as to say that it is an attribute of the soul-substance. Hence when the attempt is made to naturalise psychology by denying the reality of mind or by making it a quality of the body, what happens is that the scientific character of psychology is vitiated by its commixture with some sort of philosophy. It is indicative not so much of the scientists'

regard for actual facts of experience as of a bias for some particular science or system of philosophy. To be faithful to the facts of experience we conclude that psychology is an empirical science of immediate experience, which is alike different from metaphysics; on the one hand, and the natural sciences, on the other.

THE CONCEPT OF UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL PROCESSES

BY

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Though the concept of unconscious mental processes is not a new idea in Psychology, it has never been so extensively worked up as recently by Freud of Vienna. He claims that a scientific enquiry into certain mental disorders and, certain states like dream and hypnotism must necessarily lead to the supposition of unconscious mental processes. A belief in the existence of such processes is bound to be of far-reaching significance for Psychology as well as for Philosophy. It would affect not only our general view of life and morals but also the theory of knowledge. To General Psychology it offers a challenge to maintain its standpoint of mere structural analysis and neural explanation. On the other hand, it wants to widen the conception of mind and thereby to enlarge the scope of Psychology. General Psychologists, however, have not yet given that careful consideration to the concept which it seems to deserve. There are, of course, references to it in recent literature on general Psychology, but these are more like grudging concessions or uncritical rejections.

I would refer here to some of the reasons for this attitude of indifference on the part of General Psychologists.

(1) In the first place, the materials on which the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes is based are peculiar and unfamiliar to many of us. As we have no direct acquaintance with them we may not feel the same need for the concept as those constantly dealing with them do. We naïvely regard them as exceptional phenomena. Some of us even think that even if the concept of the unconscious be required for the explanation of such phenomena,

it is useless for understanding those of the normal mind with which General Psychology has to do. But it seems that such a position is untenable. A mind in disorder may be different from the mind in health, but it is mind all the same. And the principles that determine its disordered functions must be intimately related to the principles of the normal mind.

(2) In the second place, the terminology used by the Psychologists of the unconscious is not always unambiguous. Not only new terms have been coined but old terms have been used with new meanings, not always definitely enunciated. Perhaps this is partly unavoidable with the introduction of a new stand-point of analysis. Being primarily interested in the relief of human distress, the psycho-analysts had to draw freely from the common use of terms and to care more for vivid exposition suitable to the imagination of ordinary minds than for scientific precision.

(3) In the third place, Traditional Psychology has proceeded on the false assumption that since mental phenomena can be most conveniently observed in the self-conscious mind of adults it is the only mind that psychology need mainly care about. It has more or less neglected mental functions outside self-conscious experience. In the study of this experience, again, it has mainly stuck to the aim of phenomenological description, introspective discrimination being regarded as the sole method and main business of psychology. It has avoided the more important task of explanation, and when need for an explanation has arisen it has referred us to the mystery of neurology. For these reasons, a concept that presumes to explain in terms of mental processes outside the region of conscious experience has not received much consideration from Psychologists. But Psychology as a science should not only describe and analyse but also explain and if possible predict.

(4) In the fourth place, we should remember that like old customs, old ideas die hard. The concept of the unconscious coming from an alien source, appears to antagonise many of our long cherished beliefs about mind. Some of these beliefs, *e.g.*, Beliefs in Soul, Free will, etc., are not only very old but are deep-rooted in the universal and natural ego-centricism of the human mind. The resistance of these beliefs against the new concept

seems to have expressed itself in the form of apathy. But what is needed is that we should go to facts and judge in the light of the facts which of the rival ideas serve the purpose of explanation better.

Anyhow the present relation between General and Abnormal Psychology is not what it should be. They are in watertight compartments as it were. There is no mutual sympathy nor even an effort for mutual understanding. We seem to have lost sight of the evident truth that though some of us may be directly and primarily interested in the study of special kinds of mental functions, the science of Psychology is a unified and systematic view of mind as a whole and in all its aspects and that all of us as psychologists have ultimately the same ideal of understanding the working of the mind as developed and developing, as normal and abnormal.

I would next proceed to consider the objections that are usually advanced against the hypothesis of unconscious mental processes.

Existence of unconscious mental processes is inferred by an argument which, as Broad puts it, is "logically of the same type as those which led Adams and Leverrier to postulate the hitherto unperceived planet Neptune" (*Mind and its place in Nature*). Certain modifications and irregularities of behaviour and ideas can be explained if we assume certain unperceived desires and ideas conflicting with other desires and ideas which are perceived and are openly active. In some cases existence of these assumed mental processes can be verified by technical methods of analysis. One may hope that with a more suitable method similar verification may be obtained in other cases also. But as the unperceived conflicting processes are not conscious at the time they are active we should call them, according to psycho-analysts, unconscious mental processes.

A. The first objection against this argument is that unconscious mental processes are inconceivable. The hypothesis involves self-contradiction. We cannot think of processes—mental and unconscious at the same time. Consciousness, in other words, is the very essence of mind.

But are mental and conscious really identical? Can we not give instances of mental processes of which we are not conscious?

It is a well-known fact that the phenomenal description of a mental process varies to a great extent with the direction of attention and the general attitude in which the experimental situation is experienced.

As Broad says, it is only by parts that we are conscious of a total mass of admittedly conscious experiences. He takes the example of any prolonged conative activity and says that during the period of the activity our consciousness is occupied mostly with the means and yet no one can deny that the unperceived mental process of the desire itself remains the principal determinant of the whole train of activity. Psychiatric literature gives many examples of later recovery by hypnosis or Free Association of experiences unperceived at the time of their first occurrence. Thus we are led to think of mental processes which may have been acquired unperceived or unconsciously and which may also act unconsciously. It is possible to conceive that though some of these processes may be recovered in consciousness under suitable conditions, there may be others that cannot be so recovered under the known conditions of experience. I may also add, here, that just as in Physical sciences one must suppose, in the interests of explanation and necessary systematisation of knowledge, material structures and functions outside the range of perception, so also in Psychology the same need for explanation and systematisation may require suppositions of unperceived mental processes. To reject them only because they cannot be experienced would amount to reducing psychology to phenomenology in the most literal sense of the term.

Academic Psychology has not really been able to completely identify the mental and the conscious. For, it has felt the need of recognising a peculiar kind of mental processes, known as the subconscious. The subconscious is a quantitative idea and comprises all sub-threshold degrees of consciousness. We can think of mental processes ranging from 0 degree of excitation to the just sub-threshold degree of it. Now as regards the chance of recovery in consciousness, the processes with very low values of excitation are exactly like unconscious mental processes of the Psychoanalysts. The question then is, not whether unconscious mental processes are inadmissible, but whether there is any necessity

tion of the adult mind. Our cognitive activities are outgrowths from these primary dispositions. "Any such system of dispositions connected with a particular object or class of objects together with its co-operating and actuating primary disposition or dispositions" constitutes what is called in modern psychology a *sentiment* or *complex* (McDougall). Bernard Hart referring to any hobby, *e.g.*, that for photography, as an illustration of such a complex, defines it as a "system of connected ideas, with a strong emotional tone and a tendency to produce action of a certain definite character" (Hart, *Psychology of Insanity*). Obviously this definition smacks of the old intellectualistic bias, beginning as it does with the intellectual element, though Hart cannot be said to belong to that school. But many modern psychologists agree with McDougall and the Freudians in making the conative tendency the fundamental aspect of the complex. If any one feels interested in the controversy as to the precise psychological character of the complex, he is referred to the interesting symposium on the subject published in the *British Journal of Psychology* (November, 1922). Now such a complex may be relatively isolated from the rest of the structure of the mind. It then becomes 'complex' in the pathological sense of the word, and is at the root of such abnormal phenomena as 'dissociation,' 'multiple personality,' 'obsession,' etc. Now the instincts which are the foundations of the complexes may co-operate and work harmoniously; and upon this depends the possibility of character. But often they tend to conflict with one another. Freud ignores the possibility of conflict between the several instincts but "regards all internal conflicts as arising between only two groups," *viz.*, 'the sex instincts' and 'the ego instincts,'—the former connected with the preservation of the race, the latter with that of the individual. The 'ego instincts' are regarded as giving rise, under the guidance of the social ideals, to an 'ego-ideal' and works as 'censor' or guardian of the morals and proprieties of the subject. Now the sex-impulses (or 'libido' in the Freudian sense—it is to be remembered that Jung uses the term in an extended sense to cover all instinctive energies and not merely the sexual ones) come in conflict with the ego-impulse and are suppressed or rather 'repressed' by its censoring function. This process is constantly

going on in our mind, and when an impulse is thus 'repressed' it is not thereby lost but is thrown into the background, as it were, and remains latent there as an active force. Such repressed impulses go to constitute that group of complexes which is the main nucleus of what is called the 'Unconscious,' that is, that part of the mental structure which though apt to become active in various ways is prevented by the censor from directly expressing itself. Now during sleep when the censor is not so vigilant and its operation to a large extent relaxed, the repressed complexes tend to manifest themselves in the forms of dreams, attempting to *disguise* their true nature in order to avoid detection by the censor, thereby seeking some sort of satisfaction. Dreams, says Freud, are the expressions of suppressed wishes. This is in short the principle of Freud's theory of dreams. He has made laborious attempts to interpret various kinds of dreams, tracing them all ultimately to the repressed tendency of the 'libido,' and devising for the purpose a very complicated system of dream-interpreting symbols. "Symbolism is perhaps the most remarkable part of our theory of dreams," so writes Freud. In many cases his interpretation is obviously quite forced and it must be admitted to be a very curious aspect of his theory that all dreams are ultimately connected with some suppressed sex-impulse. Even Freud had to admit the failure of his conception in the case of fear dreams. Hence Jung, who enjoys an unquestionable reputation as an interpreter of dreams on Freudian principle, had to make an extensive application of the conception of 'libido' to cover all kinds of instinctive energy. He has also enlarged the realm of the 'unconscious' by including under that term, in addition to the repressed tendencies or complexes, "all the instinctive foundations of our mental life and also some vague innate capacities or tendencies of a more developed cognitive nature than instincts. To Jung we owe much for the introduction of what might be called 'Association method' of discovering the complex. A list of words is read out to the patient and in response to each he is required to give the first word that occurs to him. Now noting the 'reaction time' in each case, it will be possible to get an insight into the predominating complex of his mind. It will be noted that repressed complex tends to manifest itself not only in

dreams and somnambulism but also in various neurotic disorders, especially in hysteria, hypochondria and other types of mania. Freud along with Breuer approached the subject of morbid mental phenomena from the medical point of view and based a new method of treatment of these mental diseases on their great discoveries. This is the now famous 'psycho-analytical method' based upon 'psycho-analysis' of the condition of the patient. I shall return to this topic under 'applied psychology.'

VI.

But perhaps still more amazing are the conclusions arrived at by some recent investigators in the field of *Physiological Psychology*, when they have propounded the *theory of gland regulating personality*. Psychologists have long sought correlation between the nervous and the mental processes—the brain or rather the nervous system was considered to be 'the physical basis of mental life.' But recent investigations have shown that it is not merely the nervous system but even the lower vegetative functions also influence to some extent the activities of our mind. And the world has to-day received the latest discovery with almost a shocking amazement that the long neglected glandular system has also much to do with the determination of our personality. Dr. Lous Berman has now come forward not merely with a vague suggestion but with a definite, clear-cut and almost well-established theory that "the thyroid, and the pituitary, the adrenal glands, the gonads and the thymus, all have very important functions in determining the nature of our character, temperament, intelligence and the general outlook of our life." "Man is regulated by his glands of internal secretions," this, Berman says, is now "a far-reaching induction, but a valid induction supported by a multitude of detailed facts" based both upon observation and experiment. The thyroxin is thus found not only to regulate the differentiation of tissues and the general growth of the body but also influence the functioning of the intellect by preventing its cretinism. "Excision of the thyroid dulls the intelligence." Berman writes: "Without thyroid there can be no complexity of

thought, no learning, no education, no habit-formation,.....no reproduction of kind, with no sign of adolescence at the expected age and no exhibition of sex-tendencies thereafter." Again, when there is a deficiency of para-thyroidal secretion, that is followed by nervousness, restlessness, insomnia and tremor. The thyroid and the para-thyroid together are thus at the root of our thought and action. Again, "a cramped pituitary is responsible for a cramped intellect and will and is the mother of obsession, and compulsions and lack of moral control." Similarly the functioning of the adrenal glands influence our sex-characters and also the brain development and thereby our capacity of thought. That it also is vitally connected with our emotional life especially with fear and rage is proved by the experiments of Cannon. Further, the important function of the gonads, that is, the sex-glands, in connection with our secondary sex-character has been recently established by the rejuvenation experiments of Vernoff. And Mr. H. D. Bhattacharyya of our University, in his presidential address at the Psychology Section of the Science Congress year before the last, suggested a reason for "why social service work which requires a certain amount of detachment from the cares of family life, is mainly an affair of middle-aged women and not of young girls. It is not because the girls are lacking in kindness and altruistic impulses but because the energy for that kind of work is not available owing to the activity of other glands of reproduction. Widows, old maids, sterile women and women approaching the climacterium are the best social workers, not only because they have more time but also because they command the necessary energy for the purpose."

VII.

Knowledge, says Bacon, is power: and that is clearly seen in the application of the theoretical knowledge that we get with regard to any subject to the practical purposes of our life. Hence side by side with the growth of theoretical psychology we find also attempt to make it practically useful. And to-day "applied psychology" is quite a familiar thing. In the first place, I may just refer to what is called "Educational Psychology," a subject

the value and importance of which, I am sure, is most appreciated by all educationists. I will not dwell upon the theme at some length. Only I may be permitted to say that a true teacher is he who understands his work and does not merely follow a routine in a most mechanical way; and that is why the method of teaching is now-a-days grounded upon a psychological basis. The mind of the child the teacher deals with should be thoroughly known to him and hence the importance of *Child Psychology* in education. The method of 'kindergarten' is based upon the prevailing tendencies of the child's mind. But what is of recent growth in this connection is the rise of 'Individual Psychology,' which notes and studies individual differences in the minds of men. The work of Thorndike in this field is well known to all. Individuals tend to grow differently inspite of our best efforts to train them alike. Hence the facts of individual differences should be duly taken notice of, in all educational systems; and we find the importance of the new methods and devices for ascertaining them by means of the so-called 'intelligence tests' of Binet, Simon and others. The futility of what is known as 'mass lectures' for educational purposes, especially at the secondary and intermediate stages, has now been recognised, and even at the University where 'mass lecture' has its proper sphere, and has indeed its value and importance, this is being supplemented by what is called the 'tutorial system.' The principle is now recognised that "we must develop according to our own genius if we are to attain the full stature of our personality." Hence the new educational movements started by Froebel, Montessory and others, which have launched upon new systems of educational instructions in accordance with the principles of 'individual psychology.' Educational institutions are now expected to afford a full opportunity to each student "to develop himself as a living organism and not like a manufactured article."

To-day we find again in America the growth of a new branch of applied psychology in what has been called 'Industrial Psychology,' and devices have been invented for estimating the mental and physical capacity of individuals for different vocations of life. In the place of the narrower 'intelligence tests' we come across here the wider 'mental tests.' The phono-girls, for

instance, are employed after testing their discriminative power of sound. During the last great war new apparatus were invented for testing the manly qualities of bravery, hardihood and general fitness for active service either in the field or in the air. Nay, if you care to look through the first few volumes of the *Journal of Applied Psychology* you will be struck with the fact that "almost every capacity brought into play in our daily avocations has been tested and correlated with achievements." Again in the case of the mentally deficient devices have been made to test their capacity for specific types of vocational and industrial activity and to train them accordingly.

But applied psychology has been worked out in a more humanitarian direction in relieving the sufferings of the people, viz., by laying down practical devices for curing certain types of diseases which though manifesting some physical symptoms are not really physical disorders at all. 'Psycho-therapy' is now more or less a recognised practice. This art of healing mental disorders in some form or other has been indeed long in existence and is called 'psychiatry.' It works through 'suggestion' and 'hypnotism' and sometimes simply by what is known as 'talking over.' But what is of recent origin in this connection is due to the immortal works of Freud and his co-workers and goes by the name of 'psycho-analysis.' The former method consists in attempting to cure the patient, for instance when he is suffering from a very acute pain, by practically hypnotising him and giving him the 'suggestion' that so far as that part of his body is concerned where he feels the pain, there is no such thing; and the patient readily accepts the suggestion, and as a matter of fact feels no pain there. But the cure in such cases may not be permanent. It may last so long as the hypnotic influence continues, but the pain may revive again. The recent psycho-analytical method is decidedly an improvement and aims at curing the disease by laying axe at the very root of the matter. Freud's psychology and his doctrines of 'complex,' 'conflict,' 'repression' and the 'censor' have already been discussed and we have seen how according to him a 'repressed wish' or 'complex' may express itself either in dreams or in some forms of neurotic troubles, *e.g.*, hysteria. Now hysteria, for instance, is not a physical disorder. It has its origin

in some repressed wish or complex which lies in the unconscious and tends to manifest itself in such an unconscious way that the patient is not at all aware of it. The object of the 'psycho-analytical' method is to make the patient aware of the fact that such and such repressed complex is operating in him or her and is responsible for the symptom, under the idea that when the patient will come to know of it the symptom will cease. There are several ways of exploring the complex. One is by interpreting the dreams. Another is that advocated by Jung already referred to, *viz.*, by the association experiment. Much has been written about this 'psycho-analysis' and many have doubted its value as a method of curing disease. The difficulties of applying this method are, no doubt, immense. For it is a peculiar feature of this doctrine that the patient will never readily admit of the existence and operation of some such mysterious thing as a repressed complex. Moreover, the psycho-analysts will take an unbearingly long time to explore the relevant complex. Not that the psycho-analysts are not themselves aware of its limitations. I will conclude this part of our discourse with a quotation from Brill, an American Freudian, as to its value and limitations. "The underlying significance of all these conditions referring to the symptoms and their unconscious background, the nature of all these mechanisms, have not been understood before Freud; now-a-days we can always find the reason of all these phenomena and in this way cure most of the patients. By this of course I do not mean to imply that psycho-analysis is the panacea in all nervous and mental diseases, that every and any disease is amenable to the psycho-analytic therapy. I wish to say on the contrary, that this treatment, like every other, has its marked limitations. It is applicable to a limited number of diseases only; and furthermore, the person who is treated by this method must be an individual of the higher type, mentally, morally and in every other way. Every one can be psycho-analysed, but analysing and curing a patient are entirely two different matters; and the wise physician will not attempt to analyse one whom he does not think he can cure. There is, no doubt, however, that psycho-analysis can help us to understand problems in various fields of vital human interests that were formerly inscrutable to us. Furthermore, it enables us to see very

clearly the forces that tend to upset and unbalance the individual, and this is of invaluable service as prophylaxis."

VIII.

In conclusion I am only to say that in the course of this brief review of recent psychological developments I have not been able to touch upon some other very important branches such as 'Social Psychology,' 'Psychology of Group Mind'—'Psychology of the Crowd,' 'Folk Psychology' and also another very useful branch, *viz.*, 'Criminology,' that is psychology of the criminals upon which the recent attempts to improve the conditions of the prisons are based. It is a significant fact that in many western countries the jail is no longer called a prison but a 'reforming house.' Again, I desire to emphasise another outstanding feature of recent psychological theories, *viz.*, that the old barrier between mind and body has been gradually broken through, and the physical is no longer regarded as antagonistic to the mental, the body a mere 'prison house' of the soul, but the physiological processes, are found to be great determining factors of our mental life and personality; and the conception of human personality has been widened to include within it many elements which were formerly considered repugnant to it, thereby taking a more concrete, fuller and richer view of human life and existence. And Psychology to-day is not a speculative metaphysical study but claims its ranks amongst the natural sciences, and finds in Physiology, Biology, Anthropology, nay even in Chemistry and Physics, its very great allies. Further, when we feel almost bewildered in the presence of diverse branches of psychological studies, we need not be in despair about their future correlation and unification into a unitary and systematic science.

SECTION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

PHILOSOPHY OF BRADLEY

BY

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Popular estimate of Bradley.—When a student of Philosophy thinks of Bradley, he is reminded of his famous metaphysical essay 'Appearance and Reality' and there arises immediately in his mind the picture of a dialectician, who by his fascinating yet devastating logic, swept every thing from primary qualities up to the Soul—and from the soul to its ideals of truth, beauty and goodness into the limbo of appearance. In this picture, however, he is not altogether wrong, if we remember that almost all critics, who are opposed to the teaching of Bradley, characterize his philosophy as destructive of all that is valuable in human culture and civilisation. Thus Mr. Caird describes Bradley's intellect as "all blade and no handle," and Mr. Ward calls his dialectic subtle and subversive. It appears that much of the opposition to Bradley rests upon the tendency to judge a system of philosophy, not by its truth, but by its conformity with the prevailing moral and religious views. It is sometimes contended that the claim of morality and religion applies to the whole of life and therefore must hold good in the case of philosophy also. This claim, though well founded, is subject to certain limitations. Morality and religion may dictate the limits within which the philosopher may pursue his pursuit, but within these limits philosophy must reign supreme. Now if we once grant that philosophy has a right to understand religion and morality, then it is obviously unfair to hamper the philosophical activity by irrelevant appeals to practical results of philosophical speculation. It is interesting to note in this connection that the delegates of the Clarendon Press refused to be sponsors for 'Appearance and Reality' on account of its

anti-Christian bias. Is it not strange that the land of liberty should withhold intellectual freedom from her philosophers?

19th century movement of idealism in England.—But an unbiassed and sympathetic study of Bradley's philosophy as a whole clearly shows that such a criticism is one-sided and does not appear to do full justice to the spirit of Bradley's philosophical activity, which extended over a period of 50 years and which consisted largely in the constructive and critical application of a single fundamental principle to the different aspects of experience. To understand the full significance of this principle, it is necessary to refer briefly to the new movement of idealism which began in England in the sixties and the seventies of the last century. The aim of this movement was to call attention of the English-speaking people to the standpoint of Hegelian idealism, and in this way to place British thought again in the great line of the continental tradition from Plato to Hegel. The first to arouse interest in this great movement was Thomas Hill Green. Profoundly influenced by Wordsworth and Carlyle, Green developed a peculiar religious idealism, for the philosophical groundwork of which he was indebted to Kant and Hegel. Green exerted an extraordinary influence upon the young students of Oxford through the enthusiasm of his personality. The *Prolegomena to Ethics*, his monumental work, is based on the conviction that the moral life is a realisation of the Divine purpose and the spirit of God is present in all goodness wherever present. Bradley does not merely continue the work of his illustrious predecessors but has given a new direction to the idealistic movement.

The spirit of Bradley's writings.—In all his writings, whether ethical, logical or philosophical, his interest is purely theoretical. In this Bradley essentially differs from Green whose writings were a source of inspiration to students who seriously thought about moral and religious ideals. On the other hand, Bradley has no intention to set up either as a teacher or a preacher. He has no desire to found a school, but only to stimulate a few persons, with the ability and opportunities for the task, to take

metaphysics seriously and to think over its problems. It is true that Bradley's criticism of popular ideas of Ethics and Religion appear lofty and contemptuous. But no philosopher is more conscious than Bradley of the limitations of the human intellect. Nowhere in his writings he appears to wear "the airs of metaphysical omniscience." He says in the preface to one of his books, "We want no system-making or systems home-grown or imported. What we want at present is to clear the ground, so that English Philosophy if it rises, may not be choked by prejudice, and we may add by one-sided dogmatism also." In another place, Bradley has given a very interesting ground to justify his speculation. Every individual in his own way tries to feel the contact with a something that lies above and beyond the visible world. In various ways human beings discover a higher something which chastens and inspires us. For Bradley, the intellectual effort to understand reality was the most effective way to experience the Divine. But he is far from the opinion that the metaphysician is a person who is consecrated to 'some what' that is too high for the great mass of mankind. Genuine philosophy can never justify spiritual pride, however much the philosopher himself may be prone to it. Thus it is clear that a spirit of modesty pervades all the writings of Bradley. To quote Bradley again "We need not to cast about for arguments to disprove our omniscience, for at every turn through these pages (of Appearance and Reality) our weakness has been confessed." Though this is so, it is natural that the very high degree of intellectual sincerity, with which he criticises popular ideas of ethics and religion, should be irritating to those critics who value morality and religion more than philosophy. Then again his subtle dialectic and the excess of thought and experience which his writings contain either hypnotise the student or scare away the would-be critic who is unable to evolve for himself a system of definite conclusions out of his writings.

His fundamental assumption and its applications.—Having described the general spirit of his writings, let us now try to understand how Bradley has applied to various aspects of human experience the fundamental principle which he inherited from Hegel,

namely, the idea of a whole or organised system as the criterion of what we must hold to be true and good. He starts with the assumption of the reality of the Absolute as a single all-inclusive and perfectly harmonious experience which is victorious over all the difficulties which beset the human understanding and within which all the elements, found more or less in conflict in ordinary experience, so fall as to form a harmonious whole. To him the justification of this assumption lies in the fact that this principle alone is what would satisfy the human intellect. "The intellect if you please, is but a miserable fragment, but in the intellectual world, it must be supreme." And therefore, no intellectual activity is possible without the assumption of that which ultimately satisfies the intellect. In fact this is true of every kind of pursuit. Take any activity, you like, it stands on an absolute governing principle, with regard to which we tacitly or openly claim to be infallible. If this is admitted it becomes rational to assume the reality of that which is involved in the very possibility of philosophical activity. It is thus clear that the principle, which Bradley inherited from Hegel, constitutes the faith which underlies the whole of Bradleyan philosophy.

Application to Ethics and Religion.—The 'Ethical studies' is the first constructive application of this famous principle to ethical and religious experience. Many students of philosophy including Dr. Bosanquet, regarded the publication of this book as an epoch-making event in consequence of its far-reaching philosophical implications. But the fact that it soon passed out of print prevented this masterpiece of Bradley from exercising any considerable influence on contemporary ethical philosophy. This book does not aim at an exhaustive treatment of all ethical questions. It consists of only seven essays which are critical and stimulating discussions of some leading ethical problems. The gist of the book, however, is contained in the celebrated chapter "My station and its duties," and in the 'concluding remarks.' But these two chapters contain so much thought and experience that it is not possible to convey a clear idea of its teaching by a short summary. Hence it is necessary to refer in fuller details to the main ideas contained in these two brilliant chapters.

Bradley starts with the commonly accepted truth that morality—at all its levels, implies the distinction between the self as it happens to exist and finds itself here and there and the ideal self or the good will as the end which is superior to all individuals and which is capable of confronting the wandering desires of the struggling moral agents as a law or an ought (p. 145). It is true that the ideal of systematic life satisfies the normal, decent and serious man, when he has been long enough in the world to know what he wants. But we cannot ignore the impulse which continually urges us to widen our empire over the sensuous facts not only within us but without us as well. This is so, because we feel somehow that we are not mere finite individuals. Hence the ideal, which will be ultimately satisfactory, cannot be less than the Infinite Whole, harmonious and all-inclusive, which has not only no limit from outside, but outside which nothing really is. But morality is practical activity, and the moral ideal in order to be actually lived has to assume a concrete form. The importance of the chapter 'my station and its duties' lies in this that it helps us to develop the abstract conception of the moral law implied by the formula 'Duty for duty's sake' into a concrete ethical universal which is not only objective but leaves nothing of the individual outside it. The clue to this development lies in the psychological fact that an individual, though numerically separate, is continually passing beyond this separateness, because of his community with other selves. In short man is a social being; he is real only because he is social and can realise himself only because it is as social that he realises himself (p. 158). Then again it is also a fact of observation that the community into which a man is born has its laws and institutions which confront his "chance desires" with the fixed imperative of his station and duties. On the basis of these two facts, it becomes reasonable to regard the state with its institutions as the ethical concrete universal, in which in the main a man's station and duties fall, and which by its spirit gives him the life he does live and ought to live (p. 157). The state or the community as the concrete ethical universal has two sides (p. 160). There is an outside,—systems and institutions from the family to the nation. This may be called the body

of the moral world. But there must also be a soul. In the case of these institutions, the soul is the spirit of these institutions,—which is not something by itself, but lives in the will of the different members as the will of the whole. These two sides are absolutely necessary if the state with all its institutions is to be a concrete ethical universal; for, moral institutions are carcasses without personal morality and personal morality apart from moral institutions is a soul without a body (p. 161).

In his 'concluding remarks,' Bradley concludes his reflection on morality by saying that morality is an endless process and therefore is a self-contradiction. It is a demand for what cannot be. The limits, imposed upon the good will by our present imperfections, make moral life full of unrest and dissatisfaction. As a result of this we are driven beyond morality to find rest in religion. This does not mean, however, that morality fails altogether to realise the end. In our hearts and lives, the ideal self is actually carried out, our will is made one with it and does realise it, although the self never disappears and neither in us nor in the world, what ought to be is what is (p. 221).

To Bradley, religion is not the mere knowing or contemplating of any object however high. It is not mere philosophy nor art. Religion is essentially doing, and doing what is moral (p. 281). It implies a realising and a realising of the good self. The ideal self, which in morality is to be, is in religion the real ideal which truly is (285). The essence of religion implies a relation of our will to the real ideal self. We find ourselves as this will or that will against the object as the real ideal will, which is not ourselves, and which stands to us in such a way that though real, it is to be realised because it is all and the whole reality. The aim of our religious endeavour is to overcome the chasm between God as the ideal self and ourselves. To attain this aim it is necessary (p. 290) to resolve to give up our will, as the mere will of this man or that man, and we must put our whole self, our entire will into the will of the divine. We must believe that we are really one with the divine and must act as if we believe it. In short we must be justified not by works, but by faith. Justification by faith means that the identification of ourselves with the

object makes us feel in that identification, that we are already one with it, and are thus able to enjoy the bliss of being what we truly are (p. 293). Not only all falsehood is overcome, but the evil in the world and the evil incarnate in us through past acts fall into the unreal. We being one with the ideal, the evil is not ours, and so imputation of offences goes with the change (p. 293).

“ But religious faith is not the desperate leap of a moment ; in true religion there is no one washing which makes clean. In faith we do not rise by the intellect to an idea and leave our will somewhere else behind us. Where there is no will to realise the object, there is no faith, and where there are no works, there is no will ” (p. 294). What happens at the religious level is this. We leave the finite ethical world of ‘ my station and its duties ’ and enter the ‘ Kingdom of God,’ where we are able to overcome the difficulties which are in the way of actually becoming what we ought to be. The world we inhabit is no longer a place full of misery and evil, but a divine organism, which realises itself in its members, and also in those members, on the subjective side, wills and is conscious of itself, as they will and are conscious of themselves in it (p. 295). But this does not mean the absolute disappearance of morality ; because the content of morality and religion is the same. “ In order to be, religion must do. Its practice is the realisation of the ideal in me and in the world. Separate religion from the real world, and you will find it has nothing left it to do ; it becomes a form, and so ceases. The practical content which religion carries out comes from the state, society, art and science. But the whole of this sphere is the world of morality ” (p. 297). It, therefore, follows that the content of religion and morality is the same. “ But the importance for practice of the religious point of view is that what is to be done is approached, not with the knowledge of a doubtful success but with the forefelt certainty of already accomplished victory ” (p. 298).

Application to Logic.—The next important publication of Bradley is his “ Principles of Logic.” This does for Logic what the Ethical Studies did for Ethics. The book is at once critical

and constructive. It marks the end of an old and the beginning of a new period in logical study. It sounded the death-knell of the equational or substitutional logic of the syllogism, by the proof that the ground of inference is not an abstract identity but the relation of elements within a systematic whole. At the close of this book, Bradley's break with the idealistic position of Green and Hegel becomes explicit. He abandons the view, common to his predecessors, that thought and reality are identical. To Bradley the notion that existence could be the same as understanding strikes as being cold and ghost-like. "The unearthly ballet of bloodless categories no more make that whole which commands our devotion than some shredded dissection of human tatters is that warm and breathing beauty of flesh which our hearts find delightful." The Hegelian principle so interpreted is the key-note of Appearance and Reality—by far Bradley's most important book.

Application to Metaphysics.—This remarkable book has probably exerted more influence upon metaphysical thinking than any other book of the last forty years. In it the conceptions of popular thought and of metaphysics alike are subjected to detailed relentless criticism. The investigation is based on the recognition of reality as opposed to appearance and consists in the examination of the claims of the commonly recognised forms of reality to ultimate self-sustaining being, in the light of the criterion which helps us to distinguish between lower and higher grades of reality. The clue to the nature of the criterion is found in the unity of that immediate experience, sentence or feeling which discursive thought breaks into distinct subjects and objects. This lower or infra-relational unity of feeling suggests dimly to us the nature of the higher or supra-relational unity, in which the differences of the finite or phenomenal world are overcome and fused in a single and all-inclusive harmonious whole. Accordingly the criteria of reality are inclusiveness or expansion and harmony or self-consistency. The result of this investigation is to establish the ultimate inadequacy of all our so-called knowledge. This is inevitable, because every endeavour of thought to characterize reality results in contradictions. It fails to grasp fully the nature of reality as is experienced actually or (potentially). Our thought is always aspiring to

something more than personality and our morality to something higher than all morals. Thus Philosophy, according to Bradley, leads to a healthy scepticism. He lays more stress on the impossibility of a conclusion that on the possible closer determination of Reality. He, therefore, attaches too little positive importance to special or empirical sciences. But as Hoffding remarks, scepticism is hardly the correct expression for Bradley's point of view. He does not rest content with a cleft between Appearance and Reality. The highest is present at every step, and every step has its truth. There are many grades and stages; but all are indispensable. We can find no province of the world so important that the Absolute does not dwell therein. In the light of these statements, it becomes justifiable to call Bradley a mystic, and that he certainly is when his thought comes to rest.

Place of Bradley in Modern Philosophy.—We have so far tried to understand how the different writings of Bradley involve a critical and constructive application of the fundamental Hegelian principle to the different aspects of human experience. But it appears to us that this general survey would be incomplete without a discussion of the permanent value of Bradley's philosophy. Let us, therefore, by way of concluding remarks, indicate briefly its significance. The question, whether Bradley's philosophy marks a step of progress or of regress in the great argument we call modern philosophy, is indeed difficult to answer, especially on account of the fragmentary character of Bradley's writings. Nevertheless about one thing we are certain that Bradley has once more emphasised in clear terms, and with a dialectic irresistible to those who are willing to repeat Bradley's intellectual experiment with uncompromising thoroughness, the ancient truth that the Absolute or the Brahma—as the all-comprehensive concrete universal—is the presupposition and explanation of all that is and of all that is valuable in life, science, art, morality, religion and philosophy. This truth seems to have been forgotten by the modern ethical culture movement which has for its foundation the belief that man is the centre and the hero of the universe. Hence the 1st element of value in Bradley's Philosophy is its correction of this tendency. As a matter of fact Bradley never rated the

powers of human self very high. Thus to him, "The fact of appearance and the diversity of its particular spheres are inexplicable. Why there are appearances and why appearances of such various kinds are questions not to be answered. The nature of the Absolute whole lies beyond our knowledge (p. 511, *Appearance and Reality*). In this respect Bradley appears to differ from his predecessors who believed that thought itself would resolve the difficulties which thought itself had created. But to Bradley contradiction is inherent in the very nature of thought. Hence for him no thinking can, as such, reveal the nature of the real as it actually is. The nature of the Absolute reality can be found only in a higher form of experience called intuition, in which the work of thought is preserved. "In this experience the knower no longer regards himself a particular, but as the whole including himself." The point to be noted is that Bradley's intuition does not break with our ordinary thought. It is, as the poet Wordsworth says, reason in its most exalted mood. This does not mean, however, that Bradley has abandoned the central principle of the British idealistic movement. Both by reason of his clear conception of this famous principle and by his fruitful application of it to life and its problems, Bradley's place is secure in this great movement. Not only this, but his philosophy marks a step of advance over his predecessors. As Professor Muirhead says, the progress consists in this that he made the movement free from the last taint of intellectualism by conceiving of the Absolute in a more concrete way as the reality which the human mind, at one level, feels without knowing it, at another pressing on it with the force of the ideals which its own nature pledges it to reach after and so far as may be to realise in the actual world, at another still as that which it may apprehend (if only in rare moments) as an encompassing presence with which it feels itself at one.

The second valuable service of Bradley is his relentless attack on abstractionism which is the besetting sin of much of modern speculation. But unfortunately in this war Bradley has used language which creates the false impression that he attaches no reality whatever to things or experiences which we ordinarily regard as most real. It is interesting to find in this connection

that soon after the publication of 'Appearance and Reality,' it was renamed by a witty critic, 'The disappearance of reality' (p. 27 'Ultimate Value' by Mackenzie). Critics with a partiality for theistic pluralism make too much of phrases like 'suppressed,' 'swallowed up,' or 'blended and transformed' and thus tend to minimise the importance of Bradley's famous work on metaphysics.

With due deference to these able critics, we venture to differ from the opinion that Bradley himself became, in course of time, aware of this drawback and modified his main position in his later work "Essays on Truth and Reality." To us the aim of this book is merely to clear up the misunderstanding of his opponents, so far as it was due to the use of certain incautious phrases and false emphasis. Throughout his writings, with a rare single-mindedness, Bradley holds fast to two positions—one is that Reality does indeed, reveal itself in all the ideas which we employ in science, art, religion and philosophy—But the other is that these revelations (appearances) are inadequate, although they are real and valuable in their own places. Thus though the Absolute of Bradley reminds us of the absolute of Spinoza, they are not identical. This is so, because, the absolute of Bradley, as the concrete universal, does not destroy differences so as to make the diverse finite centres illusive.

The third and the last valuable service of his writings is that he has shown that the study of metaphysics is not the sovereign remedy for the ills of the soul. And at the end of 'Essays on Truth and Reality,' Bradley points out the necessity of a new religion which would justify in due proportion all human interests and at the same time to supply the intellect with that to which it can hold with confidence (p. 446). Bradley has shown that it is possible to experience the Divine by best logic. He tells us that his metaphysics inspired him with a higher and a wider confidence and a better grounded sympathy with all that is best in life. He, however, hints that this may not be the outcome for all who try to reach the Divine through metaphysics. For such person the way to Divine life is through the gate of the best life. And for such persons a religion, which metaphysics is able to justify in some sense, is most valuable. In the light of these facts, it becomes sheer misunderstanding of his writings to say that Bradley

was opposed to all religion. In these circumstances it appears reasonable to conclude that the merit of Bradley does not lie merely in the 'disciplinary uplift' which he gives. His writings are full of suggestions to those who would endeavour to solve the deepest problems of the reflective man. The courage and sincerity, with which he faced the ultimate problems of human life, entitle him to be called "a philosopher's philosopher."

SANKHYA REALISM : A COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL STUDY

BY

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Sankhya realism is a compromise between the Psychological Realism of Nyāya and the Transcendental Idealism of the Shankara Vedānta. Of special philosophical interest in the Sankhya theory is its method of approach to the knowledge-problem in which it differs alike from Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā. While both the latter prefer the way of psychology and rest the case for a realistic object on the actual report of consciousness, Sāṅkhya chooses the transcendental path interpreting the immediate deliverance of consciousness in terms of its metaphysical presuppositions.

For the Naiyāyika realist, cognition (Jñāna) is an inessential quality of the self, a quality which inheres in the self and reveals an object different from itself. It is thus a quality and not a relation. Further it is related both to the self and the object it reveals—to the former by the relation of inherence and to the latter by the relation of objectifying (Viślayata). This means that there can be no cognition which does not abide in some self and which does not reveal an object other than itself. It does not mean that the self cannot exist without cognition or that the object cannot be without a cognition of the object. In fact, the self is without cognition in the state of transcendental freedom (moksha) when it is free not only from pleasure and pain but also from Jñāna or knowing. The self also is free from cognition in states of suspended consciousness such as sleep or unconscious trance. Cognition is thus an adventitious quality of the self which the latter may be with or without. It is inseparable only from the supreme self (*paramātman*) whose cognition is timeless (*ajanya*). Similarly the atoms, etc., are eternal while cognitions are non-eternal

qualities of selves. Therefore objects which comprise the eternal atoms, etc., are only cognised and not constituted by cognitions in the strict sense.

Ramanujists also conceive cognition as an attribute of the self as a substance, but true to the idealism of the Vedānta they regard it as an essential and inseparable attribute of the self. Further, according to the Naiyāyika cognition reveals not itself but an object that is other than itself. But Ramanujists hold that cognition is self-revealing in the sense that it reveals itself to its own substrate by its own activity. A stone, *e.g.*, does not reveal itself to its own substrate, a past experience may reveal itself to its own substrate, the self, but it so reveals itself only through present mental activity and not of itself and through its own activity. But cognition or consciousness always reveals itself to its substrate, the self, *through its own activity*. In this sense, consciousness is intelligent (*ajada*) like its substrate, the self, and differs from other things which are non-intelligent (*jada*). Thus the self reveals itself to itself and as such is intelligent, and consciousness reveals itself to the self which is its substrate and as such is also intelligent like the self which is *for itself*; but things other than these are not self-revealing in either sense: they are not for themselves and therefore not intelligent in any sense. Further, since reality, according to Rāmānujists, is an Inclusive Self or omnipersonality, it is essentially self-revealing and intelligent and has consciousness as one of its essential characters.

Naiyāyikas as consistent realists do not admit consciousness as an essential quality of the self or the object. Further, according to them, consciousness does not reveal itself but only an object different from itself. It is aware of itself only in retrospection when the primary cognitive act (*vyavasāya*) becomes the object of a secondary cognition (*anuvyavasāya*). The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas here join issue with the Naiyāyikas. According to Prābhākaras, every cognitive act is both an awareness of an object and an awareness of the awareness. Prābhākaras expound their theory in connection with their doctrine of triune perception (*triputisamvitpratyaksha*). Every perceptive act, they contend, is a cognition of an object, a cognition of the cognition and a cognition of the cogniser. Each of these is cognised in its true form,

ON THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

BY

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In appearing in the rôle of a critic of the opener of the symposium on the concept of Progress I have had to enter the lists at a two-fold disadvantage. First, owing to some alteration in the Congress programme I have had to undo all that I had written out as my view on progress as the pre-arranged opener of the debate ; and secondly, I have had to make impromptu observations on what the actual opener has expressed as his own theory of progress. Reminding my audience of these two drawbacks in my position, I now enter upon my criticism of the opener's proposition.

But, before doing so it is of the utmost importance for me also to remind my hearers that a great many of our concepts have suffered from ambiguity resulting from confusion between a question of fact and a question of interpretation, between things and events in their nude actuality and the unbridled subjective colouring which is thrown over them by our habits of traditional thoughts, imagination and temperament. On the one side, there is the tendency of our mind to cling to our old and convenient ways of thinking and glibly to talk about things which require no serious searching into matters of fact ; on the other, there is a perceptible growth of an alleged sceptical survey of facts ready to face the unpleasantness against conservative ways of thinking. And thanks to the genius of William James who has, for the first time, successfully warned the philosophic world against those ' tender-minded ' absolutists who palm off the universe as a rounded whole, no matter whatever the glaring facts of the empirical world

reveal to the contrary. And such a warning has opened up an outlook, sceptical you may call it, but not without real philosophical importance.

A careful student of the modern currents of philosophy will observe that they can be broadly classed under two heads : some coming under the head of Scientific Philosophy, others under that of Religious Philosophy. Those philosophers may be said to belong to the School of Religious Philosophy who start with God, in some form or other, as the ultimate principle of the Universe, evolving, sustaining and developing everything from the minutest atom to the enormous mountain, every phenomenon natural, social and psychical with a purpose of his own, thus making up a system of the Universe where every thing and event is in its proper place and function. There are, however, others who belong to the school of Scientific Philosophy and emphasise, on the other side, the facts of the empirical world and endeavour to read them aright in their proper worth with a strictly scientific and logical outlook even at the risk of contradicting, or presenting a diametrically opposite picture to what the absolutists give of their ' block universe.' If one commits oneself to the Religious School of Philosophy, therefore, one is hypnotised into the belief that the whole system of things has been tending towards the fulfilment of the purpose of an intelligent divine principle which so shapes its contents and adjusts its movements as always to make a right move towards the progressive realisation of its own purpose. To him every thing would be in its proper place and function and an all-round progress a reality ; and if there were any thing evil it will be but a disguised good, for the ultimate principle to whose ever progressive life the whole system of things is thought to be tagged on, being in itself good, no evil can proceed from it ; evils are more apparent than real and the world of ours is the best of all possible worlds.

Apparently with predilections in favour of this Religious School of Philosophy outlined above, the opener of the debate has pinned his optimistic faith on the possibility of an all-round progress into which our world has so long run and will continue running for all time to come. His philosophy of progress is based

on the assumption of an ultimate reality which he calls spiritual and divine. Such a reality he describes as creative in the sense that every higher form is a creation by that reality of a situation out of the lower as compared with which it is new and different. He further makes his ultimate principle to be the synthesis of the values or ideals of truth, beauty and goodness, and states that the whole cosmic process is tending towards the realisation of these ideals ; and still further such an ultimate reality is a dynamic principle which renders progress an accomplished fact and but for which progress would have been a fiction. And he concludes that " to be is to live and to live is to progress," and supports his conclusion by his reference to alleged evidences of progress in nature, history and society.

Now one of the many questions which one is tempted to ask, is whether in handling the concept of progress we are to begin from the end, as the opener of the debate has done, or with the beginning ; whether we are to begin with the assumption of an ultimate dynamic spiritual principle and proceed deductively from this assumed principle to the conclusion that the world as a part and parcel of that supposed progressive being is making a steady and continuous advance towards the good, or we are to start with the facts of our experience and then rise inductively to the view whether progress has at all been a reality? If we pledge ourselves to what we have called religious philosophy and begin with a speculative bias in favour of an ultimately synthetic principle in which all things and events are to receive a convenient harmony and synthesis, every movement of things and events whether forward or retrograde is bound to be interpreted as progress. But does not this mean a rehabilitation, in a somewhat modern garb, of the old scholastic theosophy which smells of God in everything? Nor is there sufficient warrant for the assumption of the objective unity of the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness in this alleged spiritual principle towards which the whole system of things is supposed to be endlessly progressing. To speak of the values or the ideals of truth, beauty and goodness as objectively real is to make an equally metaphysical assumption for which there seems to be no plausible justification. The values or value-judgments

can have significance only when they affect us or have relations to human valuers, by way of facilitating the needs of their very being. To give an objective complexion to the values out of relation to humanistic ends is to make them, as it were, so many placards fixed on the firmament which have no concern for the individual beings of this world below, who, however, are the actual evaluators. Values to be of real value for human beings must be the subjective evolutes of the individual centres of consciousness in their transaction with physical and social environment affecting them either for better or for worse. And to think that, as Plato did unwarrantably, values are eternal realities enjoying a transcendent existence but at the same time having some unaccountable relation with the world of experience is simply to hypostatise abstractions. If objectivity in any sense can be attached to values, it can only be done by way of reference to the interests of the individual selves in their intersubjective intercourse in a social whole. What is emphasised here is this that values instead of being objective and eternal categories are the results of action and reaction between individual and social mind and the world outside, by way of the promotion of their psycho-physical needs and interests. "All valuation," says Prof. H. D. Bhattacharyya of Dacca University, "is factual in relation to the self as a state of pleasure or composure but is at the same time projected on to existence as a tertiary quality." (*The Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress, Bombay, p. 444*).

It appears then from our point of view that values by reference to which an advance in any department of the universe from one stage to another is to be adjudged a distinct stage in progress are not absolute but only relative, not objective but subjective, subject to change with the change in needs and interests of the psycho-physical life of the self in its relation to not-self. In the light of the above account of the values therefore it is hazardous to pledge that the whole course of the universe has had a smooth and uninterrupted approximation to absolute and universal values as the religious school of philosophy does. The moment one commits oneself to a religious philosophy one is bound hand and foot against combating even illusions and unwarrantable beliefs. To such a

one teleology becomes the spectacles through which one is forced to visualise things despite overwhelming evidences of dysteleology, facts are idealised, and nature deified. A *process* of nature or of mind is read a *progress*,—empirical facts or phenomena which need not have any colouring of human feelings, but which science impartially regards as neutral events of natural history, are supposed to reveal a law of development towards good underlying the universe. Even evolutionism which claims to be a rigidly scientific doctrine formulated as a challenge against theistic philosophy by the acutest votaries of science, has not been spared from being exploited either in its cosmic or biological or social aspect by the Religious School of Philosophy.

The contention that the ultimate principle of the universe is not only dynamic but also creative is but an extension of the same Religious and Mystical Philosophy only in the Bergsonian line of thought. To admit progress as a fact is to have an implicit faith in the dynamic character of the underlying principle of the universe which working out its own realisation effects progress indeed. But since such a faith has the implication of prediction of the goal so that a certain stage in the progress is only an old thing already anticipated, the concept of 'creativeness' has been introduced just in the line of Bergson to indicate that every higher stage in the cosmic process is a new situation, richer in content and greater in complexity than its predecessor so that the higher stage is something new and different from the lower; and it is held in this way that all possible stages of development through which the world of ours has come to be what it is, and those through which it is going to approximate its ever receding destiny, are all linked together into the synthesis or unity of the creative principle. Now it is apparent that in this conception of creative synthesis a compromise is attempted to be made between the absolute idea of Hegel and the *élan vital* of Bergson. But it needs hardly be pointed out that this unnecessary patch-work, this gratuitous introduction of the Bergsonian concept of 'creativeness' into the idea of the ultimate spiritual principle, stands self-condemned in view of the fact that Bergson is a pledged enemy of unity or synthesis, and of the attribute of intelligence in the

ultimate principle, which characterises the Absolute of Religious philosophy. Differentiation or disintegration and not synthesis or unity is, according to him, the law which guides the creative impulse of Duration, which is his ultimate reality. Besides, a careful sifting of facts and phenomena of the world would incline an impartial thinker not so much to the glib and cheap absolutism which presents an all-bright picture of the universe without any hitch or jar, retrogression or declivity, degeneration or pitfall, as to the view of a real throbbing world with all its good and evil, truth and falsity, advance and regress, lapse and regeneration, of a world as it factually is and not as ideally it is rounded to be. We do not, of course, encourage either the Bergsonian or the absolutist view of the universe ; what we encourage we shall try to formulate in the sequel.

In the meanwhile we must urge that the assumption of an absolute creative spiritual principle makes an easy room for its necessary corollary that progress is the very law of the universe. To admit *a priori* that the wheel of the cosmic process is the part of a supposed intelligent creative principle whose nature is progress, is but another way of assuming that progress is the law of the universe, and an attempt has been made to support this affirmation by adding that " if progress is not the law of the universe the concept of progress is simply a fiction with no objective basis," as if a disproof or inadequate proof of progress from facts of experience as far as attainable would be an end to all philosophic speculation, so that a pathetic appeal to the biased and the prejudiced in favour of progress remains to be the only makeshift to fall back upon. But if the basic principle has been found not to bear scrutiny its corollary is bound to meet the same fate. And we can, on this ground, pass over without bestowing much of our thought on it, the law of social progress formulated by Kant, Hegel, Comte and others as a purely mechanical formula for the description of a living, free process of social life which knows no stereotyped and inflexible course to follow. After all that has been said with regard to the general course of the cosmic process, there hardly remains any further necessity of showing that progress is not necessarily the law of life ; and the expression ' to be is to live

and to live is to progress ' sounds like a meaningless platitude without grounding in facts.

Our next point will be to show by reference to the stern facts of the world of science, history, politics, philosophy and religion that the idea of so-called progress, despite overwhelming evidences against it, has worked like a nightmare over the credulous minds of the modern age. Our main concern will be here to refer to those alleged instances of progress with a view to indicating that in themselves they are not sufficient to make one conclude that there has been an uninterrupted advancement, that progress is the very law of existence, that progress is not an accident but a necessity. There might be picked up stray instances here and there at random which might be interpreted from particular angles of vision as indications of progress, but a more careful observer who takes stock of the entire course of events will not be astonished to find that every apparent instance of alleged progress is yoked with a corresponding running down, or as Dr. Freeman puts it, " In history every step in advance has also been a step backwards," or in the language of Dean Inge, " the fruit of the tree of knowledge always draws man from some paradise or other." But the superstition of progress has had such a strong hold upon sophisticated minds that even the historian, the scientist, the philosopher, the political scientist and the theologian, who are expected to have an impartial regard for truth as revealed from the march of events, have all alike been unable to disabuse their minds of this nightmare. Open any authentic work of history written by the nineteenth century historian, and you will find that the burden of his story is that there has been a continuous flow of progress through the Dark Ages up to the present day. If a nation or a religion or a school of art dies, the historian exclaims, " why, it was not worthy to live." The political philosopher, obsessed with the bias for progress is found to declare invariably that what form of government is coming must be right. But every one knows how many forms of government came and went and with what tangible and lasting benefit to the governed except perhaps giving them jealousy, class-war and aggrandisement of the party in power for the time being. So

a student of history who is familiar with cyclical changes and long swings of pendulum will certainly be very cautious in his view of the present state of political affairs. In the language of Dean Inge, "the votaries of progress mistake the flowing tide for the river of eternity, and when the tide turns they are likely to be left stranded like the cork and scraps of sea-weed which mark the high waterline." And it is no wonder, therefore, that democracy which promised relief from autocracy has degenerated into ignorance, low taste and lack of discipline. And are not the nations really governed by some mysterious caucus rather than by the people themselves? Is Socialism, with all its promises for equidistribution of land and wealth, a sufficient improvement upon its rivals in the field of politics and society? Has it really been, and will it ever be, successful to equalise economic, intellectual and social disparities amongst the human kind? And thank God that it has not, to the utter disaster in the social, political and intellectual life of man by its encouragement of sloth, indifference and smothering of the genius, as its inevitable consequences! The economic situation of the present generation is the most appalling of all problems. The proportion between the income and expenditure of the modern man has become so alarmingly discrepant owing to a false standard of living that it has become almost impossible for the present-day middle class man to live a decent, healthy and respectable life with moderate livelihood. And the root of this economic stress is traceable to exploitation of labour by capitalists, monopoly of traders, competition amongst co-traders, foolish fascination for finery and a craze for false respectability of living even beyond means.

The influence of the superstition of progress on man's philosophical speculation is no less remarkable. The oracle of Hegel, that both the worlds of mind and reality proceed dialectically, so that in the world of thought and philosophy there has been, and will be a continuous synthesis or development as an approximation to, or a realisation of, an infinite self-conscious being, is no longer believed by the philosophic world, and his critics have accused him of teaching that his Absolute first attained full self-consciousness at Berlin in the nineteenth century. Comte with his curious theory

of "the three stages" failed to give us any tangible connexion of his philosophy with the real progress in the thought-world. Apart from this triviality of the Hegelian and Comtean theories of the progress of thought, one would pause to pass a verdict of advancement on the recent tendencies of philosophical speculation seeing that, while there has been a marked accuracy and refinement in the interpretation of the problems of the universe in terms of physics and mathematics and in the absorbing of materials obtained by empirical method, there has grown on the other side a distaste for all that is revealed by intuition. Further many of the most recent standpoints in philosophy are either rehabilitation or distortion of the old ways of thinking.

Nor is it easy to establish in any satisfactory way that there has been real progress in the religion of mankind. Are we prepared to admit that the religious views of the present-day Indians are decidedly superior to ancient types of religion, say, Vedic worship or ancient Buddhism or Jainism? Can we with our hands laid on our heart aver that in the matter of religious purity and sincerity we are a jot better than our so-called barbaric ancestors? Can any Christian or Mahomedan of the present day affirm on oath that he has really advanced in his religious life from the stage in which any of his sincere co-religionists of the past found himself? Coming to the bodily and mental sides of human existence the votaries of progress will find themselves worse off. A steady decline in the physical features, strength and longevity of man can be shown with mathematical exactitude to hold an inverse ratio with the march of time. Let Eugenics, though infant in its career yet bold in its clamours, fancy all possible vagaries of utopian regeneration of human type, but the hard facts of human degeneracy as compared with those of the past generation of human existence will unmistakably point rather to regress than to progress on the physical side. As Dean Inge puts it "On biological grounds there is no reason to expect it. No selection in favour of superior types is now going on; on the contrary civilisation tends now, as always, to weeding out of the best . . . the best hope of stopping this progressive degeneration is in the science of eugenics. But this science is still too

tentative to be made the basis of legislation and we are not yet agreed what we should breed for." The same remarks hold good of the intellectual side of man. Who can make bold to assert that the modern average man is superior to any of the bye-gone days in point of intensity or depth of comprehension, though of course it may be true that the present generation surpasses the past ones only in extensity or breadth of knowledge? Is there anybody amongst us of the present day prepared to assert that he is intellectually superior to Plato or Sankara except that he is only an heir to the heritage of accumulated knowledge of his predecessors? And the task of establishing uninterrupted progress seems far harder in the sphere of moral life. Here we can at once press the question whether the modern civilised man behaves better under the same circumstances than his so-called uncivilised ancestors. Was an Athenian of the Socratic ideal less moral than any modern civilised European? Or were the Buddha and his followers lower in the scale of moral rectitude than any person to-day? Sometimes absence of temptation in a particular generation may produce an idea in our mind that it is morally superior to its predecessors, but that only illustrates an old saying "that the devil has a clever trick of pretending to be dead." Think of the lowest depths of atrocities, bloodthirstiness and treachery to which the European nations stooped during the last World War, and consider the opinion of Lord Bryce's commission that the cruelties that the Germans perpetrated in Belgium and France have no counterpart in history within the past three hundred years; and to talk of the League of Nations as a sufficient guarantee against any re-enactment of the atrocious scenes in future is the height of folly, and betrays hopeless ignorance of the cannibalism which lies latent in the so-called civilised nations of the present-day Europe waiting for proper time and place for its hideous orgies.

The nineteenth century Europe marks indeed a marvellous period of scientific discovery and progress contributing to the material comforts of human existence especially by its mechanical inventions. But while, on the one hand, mechanical improvement replaced manual labour, economised time, and brought all possible material comforts within easy reach of man, it has not been without

its drawbacks which have far outbalanced its advantages. A man who would in the past fain undergo the fatigue of walking several miles, has grown in this mechanical age so loath to fatigue that he would even scramble into a tramcar to cover the distance of a mile. The twentieth century man is too impatient of the necessarily late output of manual labour to look into its consequential harms both to himself and to community. We cannot get a better picture of the evil effects of the present mechanical civilisation on man than what is portrayed by the following words of Dr. Freeman : " Mechanism by its reactions on man and his environment is antagonistic to human welfare. It has destroyed industry and replaced it by mere labour ; it has degraded and vulgarised the workshopman ; it has destroyed social unity and replaced it by social disintegration and class antagonism to an extent which directly threatens civilisation ; it has injuriously affected the structural type of society by developing its organisation at the expense of the individual ; it has endowed the inferior man with political power which he employs to the common disadvantage by creating political institutions of a socially destructive type ; and finally by its reactions on the activities of war it constitutes an agent for the wholesale physical destruction of man and his works and the extinction of human culture. It is thus strictly analogous to those anti-bodies by which the existence of aggregates of the lower organisms is brought to an end." And we supplement his remarks by adding that the worst consequences of mechanised life are that it has been giving us more emissaries of death than heralds of healthy regeneration, nurturing the germs of deadly diseases unknown to humanity and incurable by medical science, and creating unemployment, discontent and unrest to the extent of shaking the very foundation of modern civilisation. And this is perhaps the most intricate dilemma before the world to-day.

It has been claimed that progress always means development from the simpler to the more complex but it remains to be seen whether that is really the case. There are spheres of growth and development which mark decided improvement upon what has gone before, not due to complication but rather to simplification. The old Spencerian conception of evolution that it is always from



Homogeneity to heterogeneity has long been exploded by the researches of modern scholars. The truth seems to be that it is not so much complexity as simplicity that marks in most cases real evolution and development, and as Dr. Taylor puts it, in *'Evolution in the Light of Modern Knowledge,'* "irrelevant complexity is a mark of imperfect adaptation and its absence may be an indication of a relatively late stage in the evolutionary process." Thus complexity may be regarded as irrelevant and secondary in many cases. In the sphere of biology it is noticed that one of the regular characteristics of the adaptive process in the development of vertebrate skeleton is the reduction of complexity where the complexity would stand in the way of complete adaptation. As an illustration of this we might cite the way in which the original pattern of the five-toed foot has been reduced to greater simplicity in the case of the species like the horse, the ox, birds, etc., where the five-toed foot will be ill adapted to the creature's life. Many rudimentary vestiges of organs which still linger in the human frame indicate how they are on the way to falling off without prejudice to the more and more delicate adaptation of the human organism to the environment required by the ever-increasing needs of life. Social customs, religious rites, fashions of dress and forms of speech have tended more and more to simplification so as to be adapted to the changing waiks of civilised life. It needs no elaboration to indicate how the present-day man of society either in the East or in the West has outgrown the cumbrous and uncouth manners of greeting, conversation, etc. The Protestant Christian shrugs his shoulder at the elaborate paraphernalia of the Catholic mode of worship. The modern Hindu has long discarded the superannuated appendages of the old form of religious worship. The manner of dress of to-day shows how foolishly costly and superfluous the garments of the past had been, so that 'back to nature' has already been the cry of the fashionable world. The philologists will corroborate this 'evolution by degeneration' when they state that many of the modern languages of the civilised world are on the way to simplification; for it is held that complexity of language is more a hindrance than a help to the precise expression of thought. And

as a consequence there have been instituted in various parts of the world boards of experts to devise ways and means to effecting simplicity and rational pruning of much that is unnecessary either in spelling or in idioms or in inflexions with a view to increasing facility of retention, reproduction and creating more lasting phonetic effect. The modern English language has emerged from the inflexional Latin and Greek languages after purging of many of the appendages of its parent languages, and has a decided advantage over its cousin modern German which is encumbered with elaborate case system still retained for the noun. America has far out-distanced the United Kingdom in its elision of apparently superfluous letters from most English words. The Bengali language of to-day furnishes the brightest example of the principle of development by degeneration in the linguistic sphere. The recent attempts in Turkey not only to substitute Roman characters in place of her own but also to trim her native language to keep pace with the modern civilised languages in simplicity, supply another instance in point.

After all that we have already stated as to the metaphysical assumption underlying the theory of progress, and dogmatic deductions therefrom of the details, such as the problem of evil sublated in good, of the optimistic interpretation of all natural phenomena, of the objective existence of values and their unity and embodiment in the divine life which is creative and synthetic, drifting the whole universe along the path of continuous felicity; and also after all that we have stated by a disinterested appeal to facts of empirical existence which speak more cogently about the ethico-emotional neutrality of natural phenomena than of an all-round progressive world, we need hardly adduce any more elaborate grounds for the conviction of my audience as to what my opinion on the problem of progress will be. My method, I repeat, is empirical and inductive rising from particulars of empirical facts to an idea of progress, if it is at all attainable. Deduction in philosophy has done the worst of mischiefs not unknown to students of philosophy. If a logical and scientific approach is to be preferred to a blind, dogmatic one, Idealism or better Religious Idealism with its unwarrantable assumptions and utopian extravagances is but a delu-

sion of the mind which the mind may like to live in, but which runs every moment the risk of dispersion. Even within the fold of Religious Idealists who are professed Progressivists there has been a noticeable flutter of reactionary suspicion as to a universal progress; and Idealists like Pringle-Pattison rest contented with the view that progress is confined to the empirical and temporal world and has no significance as applied to the universe as a whole. He remarks, "From an ultimate metaphysical point of view, it appears to me, our conclusion must be that progress is predicable only of the part which can interact with other parts, and, in such interaction has the nature of the whole to draw upon. It is unintelligible as applied to the whole." (*Idea of God*, p. 383). Dean Inge who confesses that he is "unable to distinguish between philosophy and religion" has the frankness to admit that "the arrogance and absurdity of arguing from the historical progress of humanity—assuming that this can be proved—to progress as a law of the whole universe and of its Maker become more apparent the more we think about them." He goes on to suggest in the same strain the questions: "Is the idea of a *progressus ad infinitum* either thinkable or consoling? How can there be progress in an infinite whole?" "This bastard philosophy," he adds, "so naively anthropocentric and so incompatible with any scientific view of the universe, is intelligible as a by-product of what has been called the age of complacency." (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, pp. 199 to 200).

Now, from our impartial account of the facts of the world of experience and from our review of the Religious Idealism of the advocates of progress, not unrelieved by notes of dissent amongst even some of their own camp, we are in a position to formulate our own opinion on the problem of progress, though of course we are not unaware that progress is one of those ultimate problems in dealing with which one is in constant danger of falling into what Plato called "a bottomless pit of nonsense." A study of facts of our empirical world has sufficiently taught us that every step in advance in any department is counter-balanced by a retrograde step in another, that progress has never been continuous but only *per saltum*. It is not the law of existence either. To be able to

predicate the concept of progress of the universe as a whole presupposes infinity of knowledge on the part of man, which is impossible. Progress, therefore, can always mean an advancement in some spheres of existence with very great limitations. Further the application of the concept of progress within these limited spheres again involves evaluation by the individual or collective mind by its own standards or values which again are subject to constant revision. To take progress as the law of the universe or as rooted in it or as a necessary consequence of an assumed spiritual creative principle is evidently going beyond what human mind can claim to know, and we need hardly repeat that the facts of nature on which progress must be based, must be judged by human standards of value; but unfortunately a great majority of empirical facts do not lend themselves to an interpretation favouring progress. Hence by elimination we are left with an irreducible *minimum* which may be, and in fact is interpretable as evidences of a very limited progress. What we mean to emphasise is this that excepting in the matter of accumulating the intellectual bequests of our predecessors and of the implements and appliances conducive to the promotion of creature comforts, it will be foolhardiness to generalise that there has been a uniform progress. Besides as already pointed out, the standards or values by reference to which progress is to be judged are subject to constant change, being in themselves the emergents out of interaction between self-conscious centres and their external environment always tending to promote or hinder the psycho-physical needs and interests of man. So what might have appeared in some age as a distinct advance upon the other previous to it may be, and in fact has been, appraised as a miserable deterioration from the point of view of another generation with a different standard of judgment. In this way we find in history approbation and rejoice in one particular turn of events side by side with disapprobation and disappointment in another course of happenings. This, of course, should not give any tinge of pessimism to our view-point for we have no incurable bias against what is good and beautiful in nature and society; nor are we anxious to be accredited optimists, pledged to a rosy view of things. Our approach to the problem of progress,

based as it is on the hard facts of nature, has all through been kept clean from the contamination of feeling, as all scientific and philosophical study should be. And such an approach cannot but compel us to remain content with stating, in the light of facts, that there is the mental world and the world of extramental reality, each independent of the other but at the same time entering into a relation of reciprocity to each other so that the mental series goes on along with the extramental series, each having an empirically real relation of interaction with the other, and that the mental series in its interaction with the extramental, adjusts itself with the extramental according to its needs and interests which also emerge from such interaction. And those adjustments of the mental series with the extramental will be interpreted as progress which are most conducive to the promotion of the so emerging needs and interests of the self-conscious centres. To indulge in more than this would be to introduce mysticism whose aim is not to face facts in their true empirical light but always to project over them a supramundane halo too dazzling to the unbiased eye.

It is interesting to note that the trend along which the civilisation of the world has been moving, *viz.*, that it is precipitating from bad to worse conditions of life, replacing sincerity of purpose by sham and hypocrisy, undermining the old solidarity of social relations by engrafting those that are injurious to the social life as a whole, by reducing religion to a mere matter of personal idiosyncrasy, making material prosperity to be the criterion of real aristocracy—all this was anticipated by the Hindu sages in their conception of *Kaliyuga*. And the remedy proposed by them was the development of a cult of *Vakti to Krishna*, *i.e.*, the development of a Theistic Idealism which was expected by them to transform Indian life and to reconstruct the society and religion on a new basis. Such a pious hope has also been entertained by some of the Western Meliorists like William James, James Ward, Dean Inge and others. Dean Inge, for instance, after a note of despair as to the present state of civilisation, has thrown out to us a pious hope by adding that "the time seems ripe for a new birth of religious and spiritual life which may remould society as no less potent force would have the strength to do." (*Outspoken Essays*,

Second Series, p. 253). Professor Radhakrishnan in his latest work "*Kalki or the Future of Civilisation*" has re-echoed with his marvellous powers of expression and brilliancy of exposition the same melioristic strain and emphasised that "Religious Idealism seems to be the most hopeful political instrument for peace which the world has ever seen. We cannot reconcile men's conflicting interests and hopes so long as we take our stand on duties and rights." And he concludes that the present shortcomings will be removed by the process of increasing dominion of the spirit which has lost its hold upon human mind under the triumphs of scientific progress that has almost completely killed religion. All this is very good so far as it goes; hope is the only prop in the present state of our civilisation for the falling spirit of man. Hope endures life, and is the potent spur to action, and utter lack of hope is the spiritual ruin of man. And here lies the very cornerstone of optimistic Idealism. But even here will not one be allowed the freedom to think that in the last resort hope is but a will-o'-the-wisp receding as one approaches it? Was not this optimistic faith working all through the course of civilisation, and despite its hopeful beckonings has not the world tended to a steady regress until it has found itself in its present condition? Reminding once more my audience that I am no pledged pessimist I would like to add that let this hope in the religious reconstruction continue to be clung to, but perhaps without any tangible effect on that to which the world is really tending.

We cannot conclude our observations on progress without suggesting in more definite terms where the motive force of the limited progress we have spoken of lies. It lies not in immanent universal spiritual reality as the Religious Philosophy assumes but rather in the *human impulse* which goads him to activities favourable to his betterment and felicity. We can name that impulse as constructive in so far as it constructs or creates and does not stop before creating something which is promotive of the psycho-physical needs and interests of man either personal or social. The scientist, for example, confined within the four walls of his laboratory goes on from experiment to experiment even for his whole life with a view to discovering a new theory, not so much because he

consciously realises a full-fledged plan of his work, as because of a vague but constructive impulse of the nature of appetite which goads him to his pursuit which he cannot but make and the result of his constructive impulse is the wondrous discovery. Such has also been the motive force for the painter, for the discoverer of a new continent, for the scientific inventor, and for the religious reformer alike. This is true not only of the individual mind but equally of the group-mind. Not one man but many men at a time or even a race may dedicate their lives to this vague constructive impulse leading to something ameliorating not only to themselves but to the world at large. Such a race we call civilised or progressive. We are led to this view of the motive force of progress by a psychological analysis and not a mystical assumption in which every change or phenomenon is attempted to be explained by a principle of the unseen having no concern for humanity and the concrete everyday world of ours. It is thus the human effort or striving and not the divine intervention that is at the root of all advancement, and this is the psychology of progress. And the instances of human activities destructive of civilisation are also accountable by reference to the human impulse, not constructive or creative in this case, but only destructive. So it is man in his active relations to the world, either constructive or destructive, that has determined, and will determine the movement and direction of civilisation.

THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS.

BY

P. S. RAMANATHAN, AMRAOTI.

Progress, as ordinarily understood, means a change from the worse for the better. In other words, it is an advance in a desirable direction. Thus it presupposes change and there can be no change unless temporal process is real. Further the passage from the earlier to the later stages can be judged as progress only with reference to a standard. The advance consists in a greater approximation to some end or ideal taken as desirable. Therefore the Concept of Progress implies change and temporal process and also an end or ideal towards which the movement is directed.

A purely mechanical process cannot be conceived as progressing as the later stages are simply the necessary resultants of the earlier ones. There is no evolution of the higher from the lower. So anything that changes in a mechanical manner cannot be said to be progressing. Some kind of teleology or pursuit of an end is a necessary implication. Nothing is capable of progressing unless the different stages are determined with reference to the end that is to be achieved.

Further, progress is a progress for the thing that changes only if the end is desirable for itself. An organism that is not conscious of the end cannot be said to be aware of its progress, though to an onlooker who desires that it should reach a particular end, its march onwards, prompted by its unconscious impulse may seem to constitute progress. In other words, unless there is the consciousness of the end towards which the movement is directed there is no awareness of the fact of progress on the part of the organism which acts. Even an entity that is capable of anticipating ends and acting in pursuance of them cannot be said to progress in the true sense, if the end which it pursues, is not of its own choice, *i.e.*, regarded as desirable for itself. Thus a slave who may be doing the work imposed on him by compulsion does not feel that he is progressing towards the realisation of his end. Rather he

feels the bondage all the more in that he is made a tool for the satisfaction of others' ends. But sometimes he may feel that he is progressing even when he is doing what he is bidden to do by his master. In that case the end that he is thinking of is not the master's end, *viz.*, finishing the task, but the end of pleasing his master by carrying out his command. So the realisation of the master's end is not the realisation of the slave's own end, but the former is a means to the latter. This shows that in order that progress may be progress for oneself, the end sought must be one's own.

Therefore true progress is possible only for conscious beings, and even for them only when the ends pursued are of their own choice. It must also be noted that the realisation of the end must be, to some extent at least, by one's own efforts. If a child desires something, and some one else works for giving it the desired object, the process of achieving it does not mark any progress on the part of the child. In short, progress implies a conscious striving for an end that is self-chosen, and the degree of progress attained consists in the approximation towards the realisation of the end.

Progress may refer to the pursuit of an end involved in a particular act which may bring about its complete realisation or it may refer to the pursuit of an ideal which cannot be realised except through a series of acts and, even then, can never be realised completely. If it is of the former kind, the process ceases with the realisation of the end. In the latter case the progress consists in the gradual realisation of the ideal which can never be completely realised. But the two are not really different inasmuch as any concrete end which is capable of 'catastrophic' attainment may be shown to be valuable as an end only with reference to an ideal which can never be completely realised. If there are ideals which can be only progressively realised and never completely, progress is never-ending.

Thus a process can be described as progress only if there is an approximation to an end or ideal. Unless there is some kind of teleology involved in it, it is not progress at all. So a purely mechanical process determined by blind necessity and involving no evolution of the higher from the lower does not reveal progress.

Nor is there any genuine progress if there is no consciousness of the end and the end is not one's own. If the different stages are foreordained with reference to an end which is wholly external to the organisms that act, then also the acting organisms cannot be said to be progressing in the true sense of the word. Progress involves an evolution of the higher from the lower, a 'creative synthesis,' and it cannot be the outcome of physical factors alone.

In the light of the foregoing analysis let us see whether the Concept can be applied to Reality as a whole. The problem of progress as hitherto understood, has meant only social progress. Various attempts have been made in the past to determine whether there is social progress and if so what its nature and goal are. Some thinkers have also formulated certain laws of Social Progress. An historical survey of the same cannot be undertaken here owing to the exigencies of space and time, but I shall make a cursory examination of some of the attempts in order to bring out the fact that the problem of Social Progress cannot be solved without reference to metaphysical principles. The problem of social progress ultimately depends on the nature of Reality.

So long as man believed in 'a golden age' of the past and a subsequent degeneration, the idea of social progress could not dawn upon him. Nor is the idea reconcilable with a facile optimism which has been well expressed in the saying "God is in his heaven, all is right with the world." Only with the decline of the belief in an all-wise and all-powerful Providence which constantly interferes with the world, the conception of Social Progress came to have any significance. It is only with the advance in human knowledge that the larger question regarding the nature of social life engaged the minds of men in the past. As Dr. Bury says, "The spectacular results of the advance of science and mechanical technique brought home to the mind of the average man the conception of an indefinite increase of man's power over nature as his brain penetrated her secrets." This hope in an infinite progress in human knowledge gave rise to the idea of infinite progress in human life as a whole.

It took a long time before the problem of social progress began to engage the attention of thinkers, for social life or civilisation

was construed as entirely fore-ordained by an all-knowing Providence, or it was understood as following a line of periodic cycles. Thus Plato conceived the world as perfect when created by God and as susceptible to decay being mortal. The Greeks generally believed in an ideal state of absolute order brought into being by a deliberate and immediate act of the Deity rather than as attainable by gradual changes and adaptations and they held that once in 72,000 years God wound the world-clock and set it going. The theory of periodic cycles empties the world of its significance and value, for it implies a monotonous iteration rather than a gradual progress by man's efforts. In the Middle Ages the doctrine of Providence held complete sway over the minds of men. The belief in an original fall and the subsequent march towards the Kingdom of God aided by Divine Grace was not congenial to the recognition of progress by human efforts. But the Cartesian Philosophy hastened the dawn of the idea of progress in the minds of men. The names that deserve notice in this connection are Roger and Francis Bacon, Malebranche, Fontanelle and Targot. Voltaire sought the guarantee of progress in the nature of human reason. The French Encyclopædists laid down an *a priori* theory of progress which they said is possible through the indefinite mutability of human nature by education and institutions. The French economists believed in the future progress of humanity through increase of wealth which according to them depended on the growth of justice and liberty. On the other hand, Rousseau, though an optimist in regard to human nature, was a pessimist in regard to civilisation.

Amongst philosophers, Leibnitz deserves to be noticed. He realised that the present is pregnant with the future but his doctrine of Pre-established Harmony degrades cosmic process to a mechanism that simply unfolds what is already contained in it. There can be no evolution of the higher from the lower if all that is to be is already in that which is.

Among German thinkers, Herder emphasised the nature of history as continuous development and Lessing viewed the whole human history as the education of the Human Race and he regarded its goal as the full comprehension of God. Though these two

thinkers emphasised the progressive nature of history of the Human Race, they did not give any valid basis for the same. It was more a postulate rather than a reasoned theory with them. Kant regarded the moral amelioration of Man as the motive of civilisation, but his theory is vitiated by the assumption of an invariable law according to which the cosmic process is worked out. Further his theory of progress depends on the hypothesis of Final Causes. Thus it does not differ essentially from the Leibnitzian doctrine of Pre-established Harmony. Fichte had a great deal to say about Social Progress. He regarded full realisation of 'freedom,' which according to him always recedes, as the goal of progress. The progress of the world consisted in passing from blind instinct to self-conscious reason. Hegel's theory is only an *a priori* deduction from his own metaphysical principles. The whole universe is nothing but a dialectical evolution in which the Absolute explicates itself. But in so far as the actual development is a necessary sequence it does not differ from a mechanical process as there is no scope for human freedom and choice. Further he regards the goal as already attained in the Germanic state and in his own philosophy, as against Fichte's unattainable ideal. It will not be wrong to say that according to Hegel 'Whatever is, is right' in so far as the stages in the cosmic process are simply the unfoldment in a concrete form of the dialectical process.

With this brief survey of the German thinkers let us pass on to some others. Saint Simon said "that the Golden Age is not behind us, but in front of us" and he formulated the law of Progress saying that epochs of organisation or construction and epochs of criticism or revolution succeed each other alternately. He sought to find the goal in human happiness for the attainment of which the immediate step necessary was the amelioration of the working classes. Comte's Law of 'Three Stages' is too well-known to need any exposition here. Besides many errors in his interpretation of facts and neglect of several important epochs in human history, his theory also gives us only a closed system like Hegel's.

Herbert Spencer's view of progress as aiming at a final equilibration by adaptation to the environment makes the physical aspect of things the only fundamental and complete factor. He ignores

altogether the direction of the lower by the higher. Further development, according to him, obeys what he calls the law of beneficial necessity. The universe for him is, as some writer puts it, a vast egg which hatches out perfectly by virtue of its own inner necessity. Thus Herbert Spencer, though he may be called the philosopher of Evolution, regarded progress only as a closed system brought about by the inherent law of necessity. The economic determinism of Karl Marx overlooks the importance of the higher values of life and does not do full justice to the share of the mind of man in the progress of civilisation. The latest attempt is that of Ostwald Spengler who holds that there is no continuous progress, but only a series of cultures that succeed one after another.

This rapid survey of the views on the problem of social progress held by some of the important thinkers brings out the fact that neither *a priori* deduction from the logical categories as in Hegel, nor empirical generalisation from the facts of human history as in Saint Simon and Comte taken by itself is sufficient to establish the reality of progress and to determine its nature and goal. The sociologist is right in confining his attention to actual evidences furnished by the history of Man. But these evidences do not conclusively establish that the progress which we discern in history will be maintained throughout. Human history has progressed through so many vicissitudes that no one can say that the present state of society is necessarily progressive in all its aspects as compared with certain periods in the past. Periods of progress and regress have alternated. Empirical evidences relating to social life alone therefore cannot furnish an adequate ground for any categorical certainty about the future, and the utmost that the sociologist is warranted in doing is to express a pious hope that progress may continue. So an examination of the nature of the whole Reality is necessary to vindicate that progress is real and permanent.

But before we take up the question whether the nature of Reality discloses any valid ground for progress as an ultimate fact, let us note as to what constitutes Social Progress. Social Progress and civilisation are often taken as synonyms and various definitions

have been given of the same. Two important considerations emerge from these definitions. Progress is understood to consist in the increasing control on the part of Man over the forces of nature and in his advancement in various aspects of social life, such as moral, intellectual, æsthetic and spiritual. Ultimately we may define social progress as consisting in the acquisition of the highest values of life which may be expressed in three concepts—Truth, Beauty and Goodness. The degree of progress attained in a certain epoch may be said to depend upon the acquisition of these fundamental values. In order that Social endeavour to realise these ideals may be truly progress, these ideals must be valid in the ultimate scheme of Reality and that there may be the possibility of continued progress in the future, the nature of the environment in which social life is passed must be suitable to the pursuit of these ideals. So the concept of progress can be considered valid, only if values have an objective basis and if the nature of Reality permits the realisation of these. These we seek to establish by showing that the Reality is spiritual in its nature through and through.

If the mechanical principle of rigid determinism runs throughout, and if the whole universe is a machine which, according to certain fixed and uniform laws, goes on changing, then, there is no room for progress at all. If naturalism is true, if what we ordinarily understand as matter is the dominant factor then in the cosmic process there is neither ascent nor descent. It is simply changing. At the beginning of Modern Philosophy, as a result of the rapid advance of the science of mechanics and mathematics a mechanistic theory of the universe came to be formulated. The ideal of philosophical knowledge was conceived in the form of a certain set of axioms about Reality, from which by a strict logical process of reasoning the nature of everything in heaven and earth can be deduced and rationally demonstrated. But the very progress in scientific knowledge especially in the biological realm has undermined this view.

Even if matter and its changes could be explained in terms of mechanical causation still there are facts of experience which do not come under them. The nature of life and mind shows that

there is a different order of Reality in which purposive striving and consciousness are the chief characteristics to which there is nothing analogous in the physico-chemical world as the scientist understands it. So we are forced to recognise that there are two realms, the realm of Nature and the realm of Value.

But if we stop with showing that what we regard as the inorganic part of the world is not the whole of Reality and that there is also a world in which psychical factor rules supreme, it will not be enough to vindicate the reality of progress. Because, whatever may be the nature of the spirit that strives after Ideals, it is condemned to work in an environment which is indifferent to the Values of Life. The physical world "is to us both the environment, scene or stage upon which we act our lives" and "after all it depends upon the constitution of Nature what is the ultimate fate of all of our efforts, what is the fate of all these values the realisation of which alone makes life worth living" (Hoernlé, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, p. 50). That the danger from the environment taken as a realm which is entirely divorced from the realm of values is real is evident from the grim predictions of certain scientists that all this world will come to an end after a few millenniums when the Earth will cease to be fit for habitation of life. I would quote as an illustration what a philosopher himself says on this point. Lord Balfour says "after a period, the energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, lifeless and inert will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude" (*Foundations of Belief*, p. 33). Another writer does not go to that extent but draws hope from ignorance. He says, "What that residual cosmos which looms beyond the border of knowledge shall in time bring forth, no man that has yet been born can say. . . It is as consistent with rigorous thought to greet it as a promise of salvation, as to dread it as a portent of doom" (R. B. Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 347). Of course one may point out the incompleteness of data for the prediction of the extinction of the world and seek refuge in ignorance as the latter writer does. But disputing the evidence is at most only a negative defence. We want more than that, and so we should enquire

whether there is any positive assurance of the reality of progress. Does the nature of things themselves show that it is ultimately real? This is the question that confronts us.

If we posit two principles, one spiritual and the other material in the universe, then there cannot be any such positive assurance forthcoming unless we recognise the former as the more dominant one. To say that the spiritual principle is the master is to subordinate the other, and, even then, the question will arise as to why the spiritual principle should be hampered, though not absolutely, by a counter-principle. So rather than posit a Manichæan dualism it will be more satisfactory to think of one principle and reduce spirit and matter to merely different aspects of it. In contemporary science and philosophy there are ample signs of the recognition of such a unitary principle.

Before we pass on to the positive evidences of such a unitary principle let us turn to some of the objections that may be raised against it. First of all, it may be said that the principle of mechanism in Nature is inconsistent with the admission of a principle, one of whose aspects is spiritual, as the ruling factor in it. In other words, the age-long conflict between mechanism and teleology may be urged against it. But an analysis of the true meaning of causation will convince any one that mechanical causation is not self-explanatory. As W. Temple says "when in tracing any causal nexus we reach the activity of a will fulfilling a purpose with which we ourselves sympathise, we are in fact satisfied" (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, p. 415) and we add, not till then. Mechanism is not inconsistent with teleology. "Relations of cause and effect may also be interpreted as relations of means to ends." As Dr. Hoernlé puts it "teleology is compatible with. . . mechanism. Even the realm of Nature may be interpreted in such a way as to admit the teleological causation by which I do not imply that in the processes of Nature there is the activity of a scheming or designing intelligence. . . . A transition can be made from 'efficient' to 'final' causes by the simple reminder that a nexus of cause and effect can also be taken as a relation of means and end whenever the effect has value. . . . Whenever broadly speaking, the facts challenge us to say, not

merely that B is the effect of A but that B is the reason why, or that *for the sake of which*, A exists or occurs then we have the immanent purposiveness of living things. To introduce here the analogy of human purposes, *i.e.*, to suppose the existence of (physical conditions). . . to have been preceded by a desire for their existence or occurrence, or by a conscious design, plan, scheme, first thought out, and then realised by the manipulation of means would be misleading and 'irrelevant' (Hoernlé, *Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics*, pp. 158-9).

The physical laws that the scientist lays down do not negative the possibility of an immanent teleology even in inorganic Nature. For, these laws do not give the *Causa Essendi* of things but only describe the nature of things. They are descriptive rather than explanatory. The law that oxygen and hydrogen, combined in a due proportion, will result in what is known as water simply gives us the nature or 'what' rather than the 'why' of those things. The scientist is concerned only with the nature of the physical world, and so he is right in ignoring the teleological relation between the physical and organic worlds. But if he claims to have given a final explanation then we may reply that he has done nothing of the sort, and it is not his business to do so.

It may further be urged that physical laws in so far as they enable us to predict future events imply a uniformity in nature which will not be permissible if we take it as an aspect of a principle which is also spiritual.

This objection is grounded on a misinterpretation of the principle of uniformity in nature. A Law enables us to predict only that under identical conditions identical results will follow. But that identical conditions should prevail throughout, we have no ground to suppose, and from what we know of the history of the earth it is not true. If nature had gone on merely repeating itself then there could have been no cosmic genesis from the nebular state or chemical transmutation of substances. Of course conditions do recur but not always and not all of them. There can be genuine change even according to the laws themselves.

The hypothesis of a single principle which manifests itself both in the physical and the organic world may be questioned

because of the difficulty of conceiving interaction between matter and spirit. But, as Mr. Russell points out, matter has grown aggressively less material, while mind has grown progressively less mental. Professor Whitehead's book on the Concept of Nature proves that the old view of the physical system as consisting of separate substances has been as completely abandoned in physical science as in Idealistic philosophy. I crave your indulgence to quote some passages from the writings of the scientists of the day. Prof. J. A. Thompson observes as follows :—“ It must be noted that matter and mind are both abstract aspects of reality. (1) Matter is a fact caught in a net whose meshes are specially adjusted to let the mind slip through. (2) There is a long inclined plane in the expression of mind in the realm of organisms. (3) There is another very gradual expression in individual development. In man, how imperceptible—like the opening of a flower—is the entrance of mind from unrecognised implicitness! (4) Moreover if living organisms evolved from the non-living then there must have been in the not-living the promise and the potentiality of mind as well as life. The statement that all came from the electrons and protons that made the primitive nebulae must be supplemented by the older doctrine ‘in the beginning was mind’ ” (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, pp. 325-26). “ The empty shell of physics,” as Prof. Eddington calls it, “ concerns knowledge utmost of structural form while through all the physical world runs that unknown content which must really be the stuff of consciousness ” (*Space, Time, and Gravitation*, p. 163). Among the present-day philosophers the neo-realists show how the apparently mental and the apparently material could be regarded as different manifestations of the same stuff.

It is true that the homogeneous character of the world-principle is not a new discovery. The idealistic philosophers of the past as well as of the present have been emphasising the same point though on epistemological and *a priori* grounds. But, as one who believes in a Realistic theory of knowledge, I feel it necessary to take into account empirical facts of experience, and that is the reason why I have cited the views of scientists to bear out my point. If philosophy aims at a synoptic view of Reality it must

make use of facts furnished by different sciences rather than build up a theory solely on the basis of rationalism.

Scientific facts themselves, therefore, suggest that the difficulty in believing in an interaction between matter and mind is due to a dualistic theory of substances which has no warrant in reality. To the objection that the doctrine of the conservation of energy is inconsistent with the theory of interaction, it is enough to say "if we recognise that the doctrine simply means that there is a certain equivalence between the potentialities of movement at different times, there seems no reason why this equivalence should not be found in movements connected with conscious choice as well as those that belong only to the sphere of mechanical transformation" (J. S. Mackenzie, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 241).

Having answered some of the objections that might be urged against the view that the principle of the universe is a comprehensive one of which what we ordinarily call matter and mind are only different aspects, now let us pass on to consider whether the manifestations of such a principle in the past constitute progress and would continue to do so in the future. When we view the whole course of the world we find it epigenetic "*natura naturans*," further "creative synthesis" emerging from the *natura naturata* previously achieved. "We call this synthesis creative because the whole has now new qualities and relations, and is thus always more than the sum of its parts" (Ward, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 50). The history of the cosmic process as known to us shows clearly how inorganic matter tended to become suitable to organic life and how organic life tended to evolve mind in an explicit form and how in all these there has not been merely an unfoldment of what is already contained in the earlier stages, but a real evolution of the higher from the lower, *i.e.*, a creative synthesis. Though the physical events run in a four-dimensional space-time frame, there is absolute continuity between the organic and the inorganic world. Science has not been able to draw the dividing line between the two. As Lloyd Morgan says "there are no physical events that are not also psychical events and

integral psychical systems. 'There is one evolution in both attributes distinguishable but nowise separable. There is not some stage of physical evolution at which correlation begins; there is no stage of physical evolution at which correlation is absent. Hence there are not two worlds—a physical world and a psychical world—but one world, physico-psychical from top to bottom' (*Contemporary British Philosophy*, First Series, p. 278). If that be so, then the cosmic genesis and the subsequent changes become intelligible only when viewed as a preparation for life. That in the cosmic process the stages which follow the earlier ones have not been mere mechanical resultants, may be established by the evidences of contingency or novelty in Nature.

When we pass to organic evolution we find that here too there has not been mere unfoldment, *i.e.*, higher organisms evolving out of the lower by a rigid law of necessity. Darwin, the father of the theory of evolution could not explain the origin of 'variations' which have been responsible more than anything else for the march onwards. Neither heredity nor environment is sufficient to explain these. 'The shuffling of the hereditary cards. . . does not do justice to the creativeness that is characteristic of living organisms' (A. Thompson, p. 325). Mendel must be supplemented by Bergson. Variations may be looked upon as experiments in self-expression on the part of implicit organisms, the germ-cells. Thus there is something akin to voluntary activity involving choice and freedom even in the earlier stages, but instead of the term 'choice,' we may say that the method of trial and error has been operative. Thus the evolution of the higher from the lower that we discern may be described as emergent, and what we called 'creative synthesis' of 'correlation' may be viewed as corresponding to conscious choice on the part of man. We know how in the case of man's voluntary activity no knowledge of his nature, however thorough, can enable us to predict what he will do under particular circumstances. The motives may incline him to do an act but cannot absolutely determine his choice. So the freedom which is self-determination corresponds to the element of contingency in Nature and his act of choice may be looked upon as an act of creation. Thus we may say that the 'creative syn-

thesis ' that we find in organic life below man and in the inorganic world marks progress. " The term progress is no doubt bound up with man's ideals, but there is something analogous to it in organic evolution, something that must be called the advancement of life. There have been blind alleys, wanderings in a circle and actual retrogressions, but the large fact is something like 'progress' (J. A. Thomson, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 325). The manifestations of the world-principle thus disclose its progressive nature and so it will not be too much of a presumption on our part to believe that its nature is to progress. Nothing can counteract this tendency as there is nothing else but itself. If we posit a counter-principle then there will be room for conflict, but as there are no evidences to show that there is any such counter-principle we may lay it down as the nature of Reality to progress. That which is at the root of all existence is pregnant with life and consciousness in various forms. Though physico-psychical unity pervades all the cosmos, it is manifested in varying degrees. Nothing we know in nature as absolutely dead. Hence the world as a whole must be taken as living and as an inter-related system. Now " the living being is a structure whose parts so behave as to maintain the whole which sustains them " (L. T. Hobhouse, *Contemporary British Philosophy*, p. 170). Hence self-maintenance by constant correlations is the characteristic of life and reality must likewise be interpreted as self-sustaining. It goes on acting freely as there is nothing to check its onward flow except its own nature. Being free it does not obey any pre-established harmony, or is mechanised to fulfil any external end. The nature of unity that is implied I refrain from defining more precisely as I do not want to commit myself at this stage to any particular solution of the problem of the One and the Many. The whole may be conceived as a system of pluralism, if you like, but the many cannot co-exist without forming a unity and implying inter-relations. So I am content to leave it at that.

The world-principle is manifested in all forms of life, and a certain measure of freedom must be conceded to what we consider as finite individuals, as otherwise our highest experiences will lack significance and value. It may be said that it reveals itself

'Relation,' we seem to hear Saṅkara criticising the Vaiśeṣika notion of *samavāya* in the second chapter of his *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-Sūtras*.

But if their agreement is so close, how is it that the followers of Saṅkara repudiate the philosophy of Bradley and the admirers of Bradley do not take so kindly to the philosophy of Saṅkara? The reason is not far to seek. In spite of the formal resemblances, which we have pointed out above, there is some fundamental difference between the system of Bradley and that of Saṅkara.

In the first place, it appears that the agreement between Bradley and Saṅkara on the doctrine of the degrees of reality is rather superficial. In our opinion Saṅkara cannot really admit degrees in reality. His classification of reality into absolute (*pāramārthika*), practical (*vyavahārika*) and illusory (*prātibhāsika*) kinds does not really lend countenance to a theory which would find degrees in reality. This becomes clear when we once realise the significance of the words he uses in this connection, and also take into account his view of the nature of the ultimate reality. An illusory object is said to have some being. But what sort of being has it got? It has got the being of the illusory kind. But when we say that a thing has got a being of the illusory kind, we mean that its being is illusory, that is to say, is not real. An illusory object therefore has no real being. Similarly when we speak of practical reality (*vyavahārika-sattā*), we really mean that it is some thing which is taken to be real for practical purposes only but is not really so. The word 'practical' shows that it has no philosophical justification. So from the point of view of truth, it is as unreal as the being of an illusory kind. In Saṅkara's opinion there cannot be any metaphysical difference between the world of every-day experience and an illusory object. Reality in the true sense (*pāramārthika*) belongs only to the absolute, and of this there cannot be any variety or degree. When one speaks of *prātibhāsika*, *vyavahārika* and *pāramārthika-sattā*, we should not understand that three different sorts of reality present themselves to an angelic observer (in Alexander's sense) whose vision is true. They are not simultaneously present nor do they become successively real in the same sense. They repre-

sent only three different points of view or experiences which however are not equally valid. The deluded man takes an illusory object to be real when it is really not so. But the object is illusory only from the point of view of the practical man who is not, or is no longer, under any illusion. To the man under illusion the object is as real as anything else. Similarly the world of practical experience is real for us so long as we have not seen the truth. But to be real for a deluded man or for a practical man, is not to be real in itself. Just as the illusory object is not there from the point of view of the practical man, even though the deluded person may see it to be there, so is the world of practical experience not there, from the point of truth, even though we may see it to be there. If the real state of things, *i.e.*, reality as it is, is to be realised only when one has reached the absolute point of view, then neither the world nor illusory objects can be said to have any reality at all.

Moreover the ultimate reality for Śaṅkara is an undifferentiated unity which cannot suffer any division in itself. It is not possible, therefore, from his point of view, to speak of reality as being really divided into three kinds or as admitting of any difference in degree. Śaṅkara's speaking of *vyavahārika-sattā* was at best a concession to popular weakness.

Bradley too thinks that ultimate reality belongs to the absolute which is an all-inclusive, self-consistent system. But he also upholds the view that everything in the world is more or less real. There is an actual difference in degree between the realities of different things in the world. So according to Bradley reality can really admit of degrees whereas according to Śaṅkara there cannot be any such degrees in reality.

The difference between Śaṅkara and Bradley comes out in bold relief when we turn our attention to their respective views about the nature of the absolute and its relation to the world of appearance. According to Śaṅkara the absolute is a self-manifest principle of pure identity in which there is absolutely no difference, and in which therefore there is nothing but itself. We may speak of it as self-manifest, eternal, pure and free; but we

can never speak of it as a system or an all-inclusive whole. For these notions inevitably imply some internal diversity which is not accepted by Saṅkara for his absolute. Bradley, on the other hand, says that "The universe is one in this sense that its differences exist harmoniously within one whole beyond which there is nothing. Hence the absolute is so far an individual and a system" (p. 144). He cannot think of reality as separated from appearance. "And reality without appearances," says he, "would be nothing, for there is nothing outside appearances" (p. 487). So if there is nothing outside appearances, and if appearance without reality is impossible, as he says it is, the only possible way in which we can think of reality or the absolute is that it is a self-consistent whole of appearances. It is true that Bradley speaks of the transmutation of appearances in the absolute; but he is careful to point out that appearances are not lost but saved in the absolute. "Everything is essential and everything in some degree contains a vital function of perfection." We cannot but conclude, therefore, that everything must enter as a necessary element in the constitution of the absolute. The absolute of Saṅkara seems to exclude all appearances whereas the absolute of Bradley seems to include them all. The world of appearance, for Saṅkara, is an illusion and has, therefore, no metaphysical connection with the absolute reality. But from the point of Bradley we can think of an appearance as a part of the absolute, and of the whole world of appearances as constituting the absolute itself.

Some people think that when Saṅkara speaks of the world as *mithyā* (mithyā), he does not really mean that it is illusory. But we have very clear evidence in his own writings as well as in the writings of his followers that he really thinks of the world as an illusion. He certainly speaks of the world as a juggler's creation, which is nothing but illusion. And the constant reference to 'rope-snake' in explaining the nature of the world unmistakably shows that in the opinion of Saṅkara the character of the world cannot essentially differ from that of an illusory object.

Sometimes reference is made to Saṅkara's refutation of Buddhist idealism (*vijñānavāda*), in support of the proposition that Saṅkara believed in the reality of the world. But in refut-

ing the idealism of the Vijnānavādīns Śaṅkara was anxious only to maintain that the world is not mental. To say that the world is not mental is not certainly to say that it is real. An illusory object also is not mental, because its externality is inconsistent with the inwardness of mental objects. But this does not make the illusory object real.

If we are right in thus interpreting the meaning of Śaṅkara, then the difference between Śaṅkara and Bradley, as we have already shown, becomes very clear and definite.

We shall not consider here whether the philosophy of Śaṅkara gives us a satisfactory explanation of the facts of experience. Nor shall we examine whether Bradley was right, in every point, in criticising the various categories of thought, employed by common sense, to understand the world. But we shall enquire whether, after making a distinction between appearance and reality, and condemning our ordinary notions of the world to appearance, on account of their inconsistency, Bradley can really stop short of a position which is not very different from the position of Śaṅkara. We are persuaded that the principles of Bradley's philosophy, if rigorously followed, would require him to admit that appearances cannot be taken up into reality, that they are no better than illusions and cannot therefore be connected with reality, and, further, that reality or the absolute is nothing but a featureless, undifferentiated unity.

If the distinction between reality and appearance is a valid distinction, then we cannot say: "Appearances without reality would be impossible, for what then could appear?" Nor should we say that 'the presence of reality in all appearances is the last word of philosophy' (p. 551). For these statements will negate the very distinction we have accepted as valid. When we say that there is reality in appearances we can only mean that appearances are real. If there must be reality in a thing in order that it may appear, then from the fact that it does appear, we may safely conclude that it is real. What becomes, then, of the distinction between reality and appearance?

If you say there is a core of reality in every appearance, we have to ask whether the core itself is real and whether it is the

whole of appearance. Apparently the core is real and is not the whole of appearance. As the core is not the whole of appearance, there should be enough of appearance without any reality. And since the core is real and not an appearance, we find there is no reality in the appearance but only in the real.

A thing is called an appearance because it involves self-contradiction and cannot therefore stand the test of non-contradiction, which is the criterion of reality. If we really believe that non-contradiction is the test of reality, and if also we find that something does not satisfy this test, then the obvious conclusion for us to draw is that the thing in question is not real. If it still persists in appearing, then the only possible way, in which we can think of it, is that it is an illusion. For an illusion is only that which appears without being real.

An appearance therefore cannot enter as an element in the absolute. If an appearance as appearance is bodily taken up into the heart of the absolute, it will infect the absolute with its self-contradiction and thus degrade it to an appearance. Bradley himself speaks of appearances being changed and transmuted in the absolute. But if appearances, as such and always, have to be changed in order to become elements of the absolute, then it is clear that appearances as such have no place in the absolute. For so long as they are appearances they will have to change, and no further change will be necessary when and only when they have ceased to be appearances. Such being the case it is clear that appearances as such cannot be saved in the absolute. And when we speak of appearances we must understand them as appearances only and not as something else.

The world of our experience is necessarily grasped in those moulds of thought which have been found by Bradley to be infected with self-discrepancy. If we are to think away the character of substance and attribute, quality and relation, activity and causality, space and time, the world will be reduced to nothing. But conceived in terms of these notions the world is nothing but appearance, and as such cannot, and need not, be provided for in the absolute. The question "How do you explain the world" need not trouble us here. For even Bradley does not

explain why such appearances as we see, or any appearance at all, should be there when the absolute itself is not of the nature of an appearance.

When it is not necessary for the absolute to make any room for the world in it, we need not require for it any elemental diversity. We cannot think of it even as an all-inclusive whole or a system. For these inevitably suggest the idea of a manifold which must be related in order to maintain itself. And there can be no relations in the absolute. Differences must vanish from the absolute, for they cannot be conceived, as Bradley has taught us, without relation. Relationless diversity, which does not give rise to difference, can scarcely be understood. We can only say that the absolute is an undifferentiated unity.

When further we find that we cannot safely attribute any positive character to the absolute without bringing it down to the level of appearance, we are forced to the conclusion that the absolute is a featureless unity which is not subject to any qualification by thought. This seems also to be the conclusion of Sāṅkara's philosophy.

BRADLEY AND GENTILE ON REALITY*

BY

C. V. SRINIVASA MURTY.

I. Bradley and Gentile stand prominently in the forefront of speculative thought in England and Italy. Both of them have contributed very much towards the moulding of contemporary thought, each in his own distinctive way. The ancestry of both may be traced to Hegel. Hegel's philosophy is the Philosophy of the Absolute. The oneness, the richness and the immutability of the Spirit appeal to Bradley, while Gentile is moved by the activity and the richness of its manifestations. For Gentile, reality is nothing if it is not act, process, manifestation. The Idealism presented by Bradley is an original and vigorous form of Idealism. But for the challenging and thought-provoking statements of Bradley, specially in his famous book "*Appearance and Reality*," the various philosophies of the present day, Pragmatism and Humanism, and the different systems of Realism might have been nowhere; the neo-idealism of Italy would not have received the attention that it is receiving at the hands of the present-day philosophers. It is no exaggeration to say that all the movements of contemporary philosophic thought centre round the Bradleyan form of Idealism. What is the attitude of Neo-Idealism towards the orthodox Idealism of Bradley? The answer is not far to seek. While Pragmatism and Humanism, Realism, both 'New' and 'Critical,' take up an attitude of hostility against orthodox Idealism, coming as they do from different waters, Neo-Idealism is a child within the fold. It finds its father's home unclean and dirty, much in need of improvements. The line of progress does not take the line of destruction of the old building

* This essay owes a good deal to the discussions I had in and outside the classroom with my teacher, Prof. A. R. Wadia. But his views are greatly at variance with mine.

but only certain changes in its structure are effected. But this is not any the less important. The Bradleyan philosophy was a necessity because Idealism had to be presented in the form in which it would appeal to the Modern man and the Neo-Idealism has risen to perfect the old Idealism. It believes that the Bradleyan Idealism does not suit the man of the twentieth century and that it makes no room for evolution and progress. This paper attempts to estimate the orthodox Idealism presented by Bradley and the Neo-Idealism presented by Gentile and see which is a better explanation of the mystery of existence.

II. Let us consider the methods adopted by Bradley and Gentile. Bradley, coming as he does after the days of Kant and Hegel, displayed with great brilliance the effectiveness of the dialectical method in philosophy. Bradley starts with simple categories such as 'Space and Time,' 'Motion and Change,' finds each to be inadequate and contradictory when taken to be the final explanation of the whole and thus attempts to find out the nature of reality as it really is, even as Bhṛgu, son of Varuna, identifies the ultimate reality first with Matter or *Annam*, then with Life, and so on passing through the successive stages of *manas* and self-consciousness, ultimately attains to the highest conception of Bliss or *Ananda*. (Taittiriya Upaniṣad, Ch. III.) In Book II of his "*Appearance and Reality*," Bradley gives a description of ultimate reality, a reality which is comprehensive and self-consistent, a reality which includes all the varied wealth of experience, all the categories which were disposed of in Book I as one-sided appearances.

But the method of Gentile is quite different. His method is historical rather than dialectical, deductive rather than inductive. That aspect of Hegelianism which reveals the historical nature of reality appealed to him most. Criticizing the systems of Berkeley and Kant, and taking fruitful suggestions from both, Gentile develops the developing nature of reality as 'Mind' in act or process. Gentile is pleased with Berkeley for his expression of the spirituality of the real. It is Berkeley who dealt a deathblow to every form of Materialism by his vigorous criticism of the

concept of Matter. "The object even when thought of as outside every mind, is always mental" (Gentile's '*Theory of Mind as Pure Act*,' p. 2; hereafter referred to as '*Gentile*'). This is the point on which Gentile concentrates his attention. For him Berkeley's Idealism, though of the most thorough-going type, is still naturalistic in so far as it regards mind as static. "Human thought," according to Berkeley, "is only a ray of the divine thought, and therefore not something itself new" (Gentile, p. 4). Gentile finds a good corrective to Berkeley's view of reality as thought in the Kantian conception of the transcendental Ego. He rejects the 'noumenon' of Kant and declares that "This concept has really no ground once we have mastered the concept of thinking as transcendental thinking" (Gentile, p. 5). Gentile's concept of reality is a harmonious blending of Berkeley's view of the spiritual nature of reality with the concept of the activity of the transcendental Ego as conceived by Kant. Reality, for him, is "Our present actual thinking. It is, that is to say, the actualization of a power" (Gentile, p. 5). Having a firm grasp of the concept of mind as development or a constructive process, Gentile attempts to show its working in the world of nature, and in the soul of man. While Bradley starts from a lower category and works upwards, Gentile starts from the highest category and proceeds downwards. While the one follows the inductive method, the other follows the deductive method. Starting from different methods they arrive at the same goal, i.e., the goal of explanation. So much for method. We may proceed to a consideration of the chief concept, the concept of Reality, with a view to finding out how far the two systems satisfy the demand made upon them.

III. 'What is the nature of ultimate reality?' is the question of questions in metaphysics and philosophers have answered it in a variety of ways. Here we are concerned with the answer given by the two idealistic thinkers, Bradley and Gentile. As idealists both of them regard the ultimate reality to be of the nature of thought or spirit. The last sentence of Bradley's challenging book, "*Appearance and Reality*," closes with the significant statement, "Outside of spirit there is not, and there cannot be, any

reality, and, the more that anything is spiritual, so much the more is it veritably real " (p. 552). Gentile declares in the same strain, "The object, even when thought of as outside every mind is always mental." These statements express the fundamental tenet of all Idealism and both Bradley and Gentile strenuously maintain the oneness and the spirituality of the real. Let us pause a little and see in what way Bradley conceives the ultimate spirit.

We have seen Bradley's rejection of one category after another as appearance. The process of rejection is not arbitrary but based on a principle which is fundamental. "Whatever is contradictory cannot be real," is the criterion of Bradley, and it is a criterion which is absolute and supreme. The mark of reality is not a negative one. "Our standard denies inconsistency, and therefore affirms consistency," says Bradley (*Appearance and Reality*, p. 139. Hereafter referred to as A.R.). Consistency does not mean the bare exclusion of discord. What is meant here is, that reality must possess the character of internal coherence and all-expansiveness. It must include everything. There must be nothing beside or outside it. Reality is individual; it is not an abstract individual, not the 'dark abyss' of Spinoza from whose bourne no traveller ever returns, but it is an individual "in the sense that its positive character embraces all differences in an inclusive harmony" (A.R., p. 140). The many reals that we find in the world, the differences that we perceive, are not the adjectives of the one real. Plurality cannot have absolute independence. They are meaningless except within and on the basis of a whole. In the words of Bradley, "Plurality and relatedness are but features and aspects of a unity" (A.R., p. 142). The appearances that Bradley rejects are not rejected categorically. Space, for instance, is an appearance and contradicts itself only when it claims to be the whole of reality. To call it an appearance is not to banish it from the scheme of things. The appearances are only the appearances of the real.

What we have given so far is only a formal outline. The nature of reality is not exhausted by the statement that reality must not contradict itself. If we judge by means of this criterion

alone, we get an universe, which is "an unearthly ballot of bloodless categories." The Absolute is not an abstract system, but a concrete experience. "When we ask as to the matter which fills up the empty outline, we can reply in one word, that this matter is experience" (A.R., p. 144). 'Experience' does not mean the experience of any particular historical individual subject with an object standing against it. It is an experience which is free from barren discords and abstractions. There are no discrepancies in it. Bradley's statement is clear and emphatic. "What we discover rather is a whole in which distinctions can be made, but in which divisions do not exist. And this is the point on which I insist, and it is the very ground on which I stand when I urge that reality is sentient experience" (A.R., p. 146). "Our conclusion so far," says Bradley, "will be this, that the Absolute is one system, and that its contents are nothing but sentient experience. It will hence be a single and all-inclusive experience, which embraces every partial diversity in concord. For it cannot be less than appearance, and hence no feeling or thought of any kind, can fall outside its limits" (A.R., pp. 146-7). The various forms of the finite find their being and reality in the Absolute, in an experience which is immediate. The immediacy that is claimed is not the immediacy which is "at a level below distinction and relation. The Absolute is immediate as holding and transcending these differences" (A.R., p. 246). It is such a type of reality as is individual and perfect. Thus is conceived by Bradley, the nature of ultimate reality.

This theory of reality is found wanting. Bradley's view of reality has not achieved finality. The immaculate perfection of the Absolute is questioned. If the Absolute is eternal and immutable, if it has everything done and finished, it cannot take into itself the new facts disclosed by science. The doctrine of evolution stands knocking at the door of the Absolute. Such an attitude against orthodox Idealism finds classic expression in the creative evolutionism of Bergson. While Bradley declares that there cannot be change without something that changes, Bergson plants change at the heart of things. For Bradley, change is only an appearance; for Bergson, there is nothing apart from change. Bergson, who has more of the poet in him than the philosopher,

creates in motley imagery a pleasing sense of novelty. But we cannot follow him when he makes pure change, novelty, the ultimate reality. Pure change is an abstraction. Bergson exaggerates the defects of Absolutism and exaggeration is natural to poets and Bergson is one. The Neo-Idealism of Gentile, rising as an off-shoot of Hegelianism, takes note of Bergsonism, and attempts to improve the theory of reality as static, a view of reality propounded by Bradley. Let us see whether the change effected is a change for the better.

Gentile grasped that aspect of Hegelian philosophy, the aspect of movement, change and progress, and it is the very aspect not sufficiently recognised by Bradley. We owe the history of philosophy to Hegel. In working out the dialectic process, Hegel pointed to the inherence of change in every aspect of being. Gentile, in criticizing Hegelianism as naturalistic, as conceiving thought as static, simply points out a difference which does not exist, and is developing unconsciously the essential elements of the Hegelian philosophy. Gentile finds the philosophy of Absolutism not absolutistic enough. What is lacking to it is the principle of change in a sufficient degree. Bradley asserts, "The Absolute has no history of its own, though it contains histories without number" (A.R., p. 499). While Bradley emphasizes the former part of the statement, Gentile insists that the many histories must not be sundered from the One History which is an eternal act. The many histories are only the history in different forms. Reality is not thought, but thinking, not deed, but doing.

Gentile labels his Idealism "Actual Idealism." It is 'actual' in the sense that it deals with the concept of an eternal present. He lays special stress on the creative character and the concreteness of the spiritual activity, thus steering clear of the "pure change" of Bergson, which is an abstraction. He bids us "Look with steady gaze at the true and concrete reality of the thought in act" (Gentile, p. 56). Reality, according to Gentile, is not the antecedent of thought, but thinking itself. It is subject, not substance. The subjectivity of the real includes the object also. This idea is very well brought out by Gentile in the statement, "It is the 'I' which is the individual, but the individual

as subject with nothing to contrapose to itself. It is therefore the actual concrete universal. This 'I' which is the absolute, is in so far as it affirms itself. It is *causa sui* " (Gentile, p. 259). Gentile has no objection to the use of the word 'experience'—a word used by Bradley—to connote the idea of the ultimate. But he uses it with a difference. Though Bradley regards experience as an essential union of form and content, the emphasis is more on the static content than on the active form. But to Gentile what constitutes experience is the activity of mind, a mind which is self-created and self-creating. In Gentile's own words, " we can also say of our mind that it is our experience, so long as we do not fall into the common error, due to faulty interpretation, of meaning by experience, the content of experience " (Gentile, p. 20). While Bradley regards experience as a system, as a completed whole Gentile regards experience as a concrete dynamic activity. " By experience we must mean," says Gentile, " the act of experiencing, pure experience, that which is living and real " (Gentile, p. 20).

Such a view of the nature of ultimate reality appears to my mind to be a better explanation than that of Bradley. Since reality is process or activity, evolution and progress are assigned their due place in the scheme of things. Evolution and progress are aspects of reality. It may be urged that Bradley also allows evolution and progress in so far as he regards them as appearances which belong to reality. But this is irrelevant. The question is not whether appearances belong to reality but how is the reality affected by the appearances. Bradley's answer is clear and unequivocal. Whatever changes may happen to the appearances, reality remains unmoved. He asserts quite emphatically, " We cannot think that the whole either moves on or backwards " (A.R., p. 499). By making reality motionless, Bradley makes a separation between reality and appearance, however unwilling he may be to accept such a conclusion. There are two ways of getting rid of this impasse:—(i) To say that the Absolute itself evolves; (ii) To say that neither the Absolute nor the things by themselves evolve, but there is only one concrete activity of the spirit.

(i) The realists of the type of S. Alexander stand by the theory of an evolving Absolute and some of the Personal Idealists are driven to such an assumption. Prof. Alexander starts with the assumption that the spatio-temporal system provides an adequate basis for philosophical explanation. Within the all-embracing stuff of space-time there is a gradual emergence of new qualities. "The highest of these empirical qualities known to us is mind or consciousness. Deity is the next higher empirical quality to the highest we know" (*Space, Time and Deity*, p. 345). This Deity is a variable quality. It gathers into itself newer and newer qualities. It becomes richer and richer in the process of evolution. It is not the whole of Space-Time but only one of the qualities emerging from it. Mr. Mackenzie pays a very high compliment to Prof. Alexander that his "system as a whole is certainly one of the most striking contributions to philosophical thought that have been made in recent generation," and at the same time makes a few very pertinent criticisms. He observes that the general starting point of the system appears to be extremely formal since Space and Time are all that we have to begin with. "If we start from pure Space-Time it is hard to see where all the qualities of the universe are to come from. The conception of reality is that of an evolving reality. Mackenzie remarks, "It is difficult to see what is the *clan*, as Prof. Bergson calls it, by which we are led on from the lower to the higher qualities" (*Ultimate Values*, pp. 33-35).

In spite of its defects the conception of an evolving reality has found favour, consciously or unconsciously, with some of the Personal Idealists. They regard it as being at the basis of a satisfactory solution of the problem of Evil. Evil and suffering exist in the world, and they are explained by saying that ultimate reality itself is not free from evil. According to this, the ultimate reality becomes a fellow-sufferer, a partner in human joys and woes. Such an ultimate reality or God is one who, in the words of Pringle-Pattison, "lives in the perpetual giving of himself, who shares in the life of his finite creatures, bearing in and with them the whole burden of their finitude, their sinful wanderings and sorrows, and the sufferings without which they cannot be made perfect." However pleasant it may be to have a companion, the

solution is anything but logical. The ultimate reality is regarded as fulfilling a purpose, as evolving into something different from what it was. If it is yet to perfect itself, if it lacks a desirable feature, it cannot be called the ultimate reality, a reality which is at the same time the ground and the consequent. Human teleology is bodily transferred to the ultimate reality without change or variation. Thus the divine is brought to the level of the human. The Infinite is made finite. God is made man. The criticism of Bradley that the concept of Change contradicts itself if raised to the rank of the Absolute, is valid against such a conception of a finite ultimate. (N.B.—We have described the concept of an evolving Absolute in order to bring out by contrast the originality and the suggestive nature of Gentile's view of reality.)

(ii) We have mentioned another view which gets over the impasse created by the static view of reality. Such a view of ultimate reality is found in Gentile's concept of Mind as Pure Act. When Bosanquet says, that "the neo-idealist revival has adopted the same general attitude that is characteristic of the neo-realist and kindred movements" (Contemporary Philosophy, p. 120). we cannot but remark that in his enthusiasm to bring about a meeting of extremes, he has missed the differences, differences which are fundamental. Gentile may be taken to have admitted "time and change into core and basis of reality" (*Ibid*, p. 120). To assert this is not to accept the ultimate character of Time and Change. Time and Change are only the ways in which reality expresses itself. Without Time and Change, reality would be a bare abstraction. The very concept of Spirit is a dynamic concept. A reality which remains unexpressed is matter, not spirit. To admit such a reality is to make an end of Idealism. The conception of Evil assumes a new form in Gentile's philosophy. The ultimate Spirit is not conceived as being infected with evil, nor is evil annulled as non-existent. Evil exists; but it is gradually overcome. Evil exists only when it is known to be evil, and when it is known to be evil, it is rejected. If Mind is what ought to be, evil is what ought not to be. Evil is the arrest of the spiritual activity. The Spirit is active, not because of an extraneous

opposing element called evil, but because activity is the essence of Spirit. The moment it ceases to act, it ceases to be Spirit. Reality is a self-creating concept. In the words of Gentile "The true concept, that which alone has a right to be called *the* concept, is the self-concept (*Conceptus Sui*) (Gentile, p. 242).

Our discussion leads us to the following conclusion : The Neo-Idealistic philosophy in laying the necessary emphasis on the concept of Change, and at the same time in denying to it ultimate reality, has set a limit to the exaggerations of Realism and improved the orthodox Idealism of Bradley.

THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF THE SENSE IN DVAITA PHILOSOPHY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MODERN THOUGHT.

BY

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My purpose in this paper is to represent the Ontological status of the sense in Dvaita Philosophy with special reference to Modern Thought. By the term sense I mean the sensible qualities, colour, etc., that are given along with the outward objects. The arguments I employ are mostly taken from Dvaita Literature; and only once they are formed independently but consistently with the teaching of Dvaita.

(i) *The Sense are Independently Real. Arguments from the Side of Objects.*

(i) The sense are actually given. They are the real properties of the outward objects that exist independently of the perceiving mind.* Being much influenced by the scientific advancement of modern days, Prof. Norman Kemp Smith disputes that they are the real properties of the real things. Modern Science tells us that in reality things are not what they appear to be. A single drop of water seems to be whitish, continuous and quiescent; but in fact it is composed of millions of violently energetic discrete entities. Starting from this Norman Kemp Smith thinks that these entities may not have colour. His fundamental considerations which he offers as proof for his thesis are that nature is so complicated that the experience of it transcends the utmost capacities of all living creatures; that the features of things are numerous and they are irrelevant for our practical needs; and that an exhaustive experience of nature is not desirable because it would

* Nyāya-Sūdhā, 2, 1, 3.

bewilder the primary functions of mind, viz., initiating and directing the bodily movements. From these considerations he concludes that for practical purposes nature must adjust itself to the dimensions of our consciousness and this adjustment is fulfilled by its ingenious device of the secondary qualities like colour, etc.*

In criticising the above view in the light of the teaching of Dvaita we may note the following points. Of course the features of nature are innumerable, and we are not able to know all of them. But that is no reason why a detailed knowledge of things must hinder the effective functioning of consciousness. If we are endowed with the capacity to perceive all the details of an entity, we may perhaps at first sight be bewildered, and when we are accustomed to such an experience there can be no difficulty regarding the practical adaptations. If a scientist who is, at least theoretically, completely familiar with the fact that a single drop of water is composed of millions of violently energetic discrete entities, somehow happens to perceive the drops as described, he may not be bewildered like a layman who happens to see the same quite unexpectedly. Granting that our practical life does not require a detailed knowledge of things there is no reason why we should argue that a detailed knowledge makes the practical life impossible. So we need not assume that the so-called secondary qualities only help a successful practical life. If we still insist on the truth of this assumption we may do so without any implication that they are not the actual properties of the independently existing objects.

Taking up the scientific analysis of a drop of water we may note these points. Science is not sure that the discrete entities that compose a drop of water are devoid of colour. Nor does Norman Kemp Smith fully believe in it. We may tentatively assume that those entities are devoid of any colour, but such an assumption does not explain our actual experience of colour. In order to be experienced colour needs to be real somewhere and somehow. The same consideration applies to all the other secondary qualities.

Of course Norman Kemp Smith admits that the *sensa* are physical. But the real difficulty appears when he says that they

* Prolegomena to the Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, p. 10.

are also conditioned physiologically.* He states that the sense have developed in the phylogenetic process, i.e., they are conditioned by the inherited modifications in the structure and consequently in the functioning of the nervous system. From these considerations he finally arrives at the view that the sense are only private and they are not qualities of objects but events conditioned by and subsequent to processes partly outside the body and partly within the body. He does not, however, mean that the sense are subjective. He regards them as natural as any other events. His only point is that owing to the circumstances under which they arise they are accessible only to some observer.

In criticising this view we may note that the whole position is only a restatement of the old *Parināma-vāda* which is one of the interpretations of *Anyathākhyāti* held by the Naiyāyikas as an explanation of illusion. This theory supposes that the thing that is mistaken actually takes the form of that for which it is mistaken. As for instance, we may take the case of the redblind apprehending the red object as of some other colour. According to *Parināma-vāda* the explanation of such an experience is that owing to the peculiar circumstances of the observer the red object itself becomes of some other colour. This explanation is not correct. For, the only thing that we can offer as the cause of the change in the colour of the object is the redblindness of the percipient. But this is irrelevant. The defect is in the eye but the effect is to be produced in the object. Thus there is no relation whatever between the cause and the effect. If we still assume that such an outside cause as the visual defect can alter the nature of the outside things, there is no reason why we are not correct in assuming that the same defect can alter anything to any other thing.

Further granting that the red object becomes of some other colour we have to hold that in becoming so it either abandons its former colour or not. If it abandons its red colour then so far as the colour aspect of the thing is concerned the thing has entirely changed. If so it must be seen as not-red by even those that are not redblind. In this case we can never say that the colour

* Prolegomena to the Idealistic Theory of Knowledge, pp. 72-80.

is private. Taking up the second alternative that it retains its original colour, it is wrong to think that its colour changes. Moreover if the redblindness of the person is cured, then he only sees the thing as red but not as of some other colour. These considerations clearly show that what we see under abnormal conditions like illusion, is not real. This invalidates any form of *Pariṇāmavāda*.*

So we may conclude that to talk of the *sensa* as physiologically conditioned is not sound. What can be conditioned physiologically is only the judgment, and not its object.

Further the only conclusion from the position that things are physiologically conditioned is either that all judgments must be correct or all wrong. If the physiologically conditioned *sensa* really belong to the natural order as Norman Kemp Smith asserts, then all that appears must be real; and consequently the corresponding judgments also must be true. On the other hand if the physiologically conditioned *sensa* are unreal, as we have already noted, then the corresponding judgments must be false. Either alternative is contradicted by experience. Experience gives us judgments, some correct and some wrong. To deny this is to deny experience. The only view that can be taken consistently with experience is that if any judgment is correct then its object is real, *i.e.*, is not physiologically conditioned; and if any judgment is wrong then the object is not physical, *i.e.*, it is not real.

(ii) *Arguments from the side of Knowledge.*

Now we have to determine how a given judgment is right or wrong. To say that it is right when its object is real and it is wrong when its object is unreal is begging the question, for we do not always go to the object first and thereby by its reality or unreality decide the nature of knowledge. Knowledge itself must help us in determining its truth or falsity. If knowledge is true, it is so by its own nature. An apprehension grasps some red object as red. Here the function of the apprehension is quite straightforward. The object is really red and it is so grasped by the apprehension. There is the physical object on the one hand

* *Nyāya-Sūdhā*, 1, 1, 1. Under *Akhyāṭhi*.

and on the other there is the mental apprehension. To grasp is the very nature of the latter and to be grasped is the very nature of the former. If these two are present then there need be no third entity to help the knowing process. Knowledge does its function correctly when left to itself.*

If knowledge is conditioned by the third entity, *i.e.*, if it is physiologically conditioned then it becomes untrue. As for instance we may take the redblind apprehending the red object as white. Obviously it is not the normal percipient we have here ; but a percipient affected by redblindness. So the apprehension here is conditioned by redblindness, *i.e.*, the apprehension is physiologically conditioned. On account of this condition the apprehension is made wrong. So the apprehension does not give the corresponding object at all. Thus we may conclude that the object of a wrong apprehension is not. Of course a wrong apprehension may sometimes seem to be correct. But we can determine it to be wrong by the fact that it is contradicted by other true apprehensions. As for instance the shell-silver illusion seems to be correct so far as it continues. But ultimately it is proved to be false by the correct apprehension of the shell.

Merely because some cases of apprehension are wrong we cannot doubt the validity of all apprehensions. For apprehensions force us to believe in their validity. By touching the fire we have the burning sensation and we cannot doubt the validity of our feeling. When we are really happy or otherwise no doubt can make us the contrary. Besides to doubt the validity of all apprehensions is impossible ; because in the very act of doubting we are affirming that the doubt at least is a fact. So we can have an implicit faith in knowledge. When a doubt or contradiction occurs regarding the validity of the given case of knowledge we may either test the validity or determine the falsity of knowledge as the case may be.

So we may conclude that there are correct apprehensions and therefore there are real objects. But we must note that the reality of objects is not inferred by the fact that the corresponding apprehensions are valid. The objects are directly apprehended, as real

entities. This is why apprehension does not merely grasp the object as object but as "it is," and this *is* denotes that the object is real. So the objects that are given are intrinsically real, in the sense that they are quite independent of the apprehensions.*

The view of Dvaita may be further substantiated by the parallel thoughts of the modern thinkers. Moore says that we have a direct experience of the outside objects. "Blue is as much an object . . . when I perceive it as a most exalted and independent real thing of which I am ever aware. There is therefore no question of how we are to get outside the circle of our own ideas and sensations. Merely to have a sensation is already to be outside that circle" (Philosophical Studies, p. 27).

Further in criticising the subjectivistic position Norman Kemp Smith himself admits that on any theory the possibility of direct or immediate knowledge must be taken as granted.† He further asserts that it is the very purpose of knowledge to know and what it knows must be real in the sense of being actual. We differ from him only when he tries to determine the reality of the object in his own way, *i.e.*, as physiologically conditioned.

All these considerations show that the *sensa* are real and they are independent of the percipient. From this it follows that they are always public, and never private. Of course here and there a particular *sensum* may be apprehended by a single individual; but from this we must not conclude that it is quite incapable of being apprehended by others placed in the same situation.

(iii) *The question of reconciling Common Experience with Scientific thought.*

The peculiarity of the position of Norman Kemp Smith is mainly due to his attempt at reconciling the attitude of pure experience with the standpoint adopted in physical sciences. In connection with the question of reconciliation itself we have to note a few points. We need not effect the reconciliation at the cost of the independent existence of the objects. If the standpoint of physics is found to be correct then we may regard our

* *Tattvodyota-vikā.*

† *Prolegomena to the Idealistic Theory of Knowledge*, p. 62.

ordinary experience as false. Such a position as this never denies the independent reality of outside objects. As for instance taking the case of a drop of water, according to science, what really we have here are only the rapidly moving discrete entities. Taking this view to be true we may regard the common view of the drop of water as false. Or if we can show by scientific means alone that it is the very nature of the innumerable entities to look like a drop of water, without being physiologically conditioned, then we may regard our common experience also as correct. In any case we cannot disprove that there are independent objects with their real inherent qualities. None of them are conditioned by the brain processes. Of the innumerable features of a thing only some of them are selected by a perceiving mind.

Thus in the light of the Dvaita teaching we may conclude that the sense are real, public and independent of the perceiving mind.

SYMPOSIA

ON

(1) VALUES.

(2) THE PLACE OF PSYCHOLOGY IN PHILOSOPHY.

VALUES

BY

G. C. CHATTERJI.

The judgments "This is good," "This is what ought to be," "This is right" are all value judgments. They all assert a peculiar attribute of things which we agree to call value and which we contrast with such judgments as "This is a tree," "This is green," "I feel a pain," which we call existential or factual judgments. I propose to consider in this paper the nature of value judgments and particularly of the predicate value itself when assigned to certain things, to enquire in what way, if any, value judgments are connected with or different from factual or existential judgments, and whether there is any sense in which value may be regarded as an ultimate and objective character of certain things.

Several different types of value are generally recognised. Thus it is held that there are at least three specific types of value, *viz.*, value in terms of goodness, value in terms of beauty and value in terms of truth. Whether these specific types of value are again mutually related and whether or not they are reducible to some one ultimate type of value, are problems, on which there is no general agreement among those philosophers who admit value as an ultimate and irreducible category. For the purposes of this paper we shall confine our attention to moral value alone, and leave out of consideration such problems as those of the Plurality of Values and of their inter-relations. Thus in this paper wherever the term value occurs, it is intended to denote moral value alone.

It will be generally admitted that judgments of the type which I have appended in the opening paragraph of this paper are very frequently made. The question then is, what do such judgments assert, and whether what they assert can be reduced to a statement of the contrasted kind which I have called a *factual*

or existential judgment. My contention is that the judgments of the first kind are peculiar in that they make use of a predicate which is peculiar in character and unlike any predicate which asserts a natural quality or relation of things. That there is such a fundamental contrast between these two types of judgments appears to me self-evident. To say of a thing that "it is good" is to say something peculiar and ultimate with regard to it, which cannot be identical in meaning with any statement of fact with regard to it, as that it is red, or that it is pleasant, or that it is satisfying. All these last are statements of fact with regard to it, as that it is red, or that it is pleasant, or that it is satisfying. All these last are statements of fact, whereas the first is a statement with regard to its value.

That the value character of things is irreducible to any of their factual characteristics is a position which I regard as ultimate and which therefore does not admit of direct proof. But the validity of this position can be demonstrated by showing the falsehood of any view which rejects it and maintains the contrary. The controversy, in other words, is with regard to the definition of goodness or value. My contention is that goodness is only definable by goodness or some identical concept such as that "which ought to be," but that it cannot be defined in terms of any natural or factual concept such as that of pleasure or satisfaction or anything else. My position will perhaps become clearer if I actually examine some supposed definition of "goodness," in terms of a natural object such as that of pleasure. To maintain that goodness can be defined in terms of pleasure is to oppose my view that goodness is ultimate and indefinable. Let us then consider this definition of goodness and see whether any such definition can be justified.

Now to say that goodness is to be defined in terms of pleasure involves that the very meaning of the one concept is contained in the other. It would follow then that if this definition is true, we can, in any proposition in which the term goodness occurs, substitute the term pleasure without in any way altering the meaning of that proposition, since the one term defines the other. Now consider the proposition "Pleasure is good," and in this proposition for the term 'good,' substitute the term pleasure and

ask ourselves whether the proposition as now modified means the same as the original proposition did. Our two propositions are (1) Pleasure is good, (2) Pleasure is pleasure. Can any one reasonably maintain that these propositions are identical in meaning? The first is a significant proposition whereas the second is purely tautologous. The first may well be questioned, whereas only a lunatic would venture to doubt the second. Granted the truth of the second the truth of the first does not by any means follow. The same argument which I have just made use of can be easily extended to any other definition of goodness in terms of a factual entity other than pleasure. All such definitions involve the assertion that goodness or moral value is not an ultimate and unanalysable predicate and commit what Dr. Moore has called the Naturalistic Fallacy.

Value then is an ultimate and unanalysable predicate of certain things. But value judgments fall into two distinct classes which must be carefully distinguished from one another. Value judgments may assert that a thing possesses value in itself or intrinsically, or they may assert that value belongs to them only as a means to something else which in the final resort must possess intrinsic value. These two orders of value judgments are entirely different and I propose to call them judgments of Intrinsic Value and judgment of Instrumental Value.

When Intrinsic Value is assigned to anything the judgment is synthetic and *a priori*. What I mean by calling such judgments synthetic and *a priori* is that such judgments cannot be deduced from other more fundamental judgments, and their truth or falsehood is self-evident. I may also call such judgments intuitive. But value judgments of the second class that is Instrumental Value are causal and empiric. These can be proved, and their proof involves reference to some judgment or judgments of the first class, together with the evidence to show that the object or objects judged to be instrumentally good are causally connected with some object or objects intrinsically good.

The controversy between the objectivist and subjectivist view of goodness resolves itself to my mind to a consideration of whether any judgments of intrinsic value are true or not. To judge of a

thing that it is intrinsically good is to judge that it is good objectively and in itself. Thus if goodness is objective there must be some thing or things of which it is true to say that they are intrinsically good. Those who deny the objective character of value deny that anything is intrinsically good. They admit that things may be instrumentally good, but deny that anything can be intrinsically good. Such a procedure to my mind is wholly illogical, since the very conception of an instrumental good is derived from and dependent upon our conception of intrinsic goodness. If nothing is intrinsically good it follows logically that nothing can be instrumentally good. For an instrumental good is that which causes or is a means to what is intrinsically good, and if the latter does not and cannot exist, it follows that there are no means or instruments for bringing it about. Thus it appears to me that if anything is relatively or subjectively good, something must be intrinsically good, and the subjectivist contention itself involves the objectivist's conclusion.

But the matter is not always seen in its stark logicity and many would maintain the relative character of goodness without acknowledging that this itself implies a goodness which is objective and intrinsic. This illogical position is frequently due, I think, to a confusion being made between what is good in itself, and what is *known* or judged to be so good. It is held frequently that most of our judgments about intrinsic goodness are in point of fact false. That what is judged at one time to be intrinsically good is shown later to be only relatively or instrumentally so, and that what one judges to be good intrinsically another judges to be either not good at all, or good only relatively. Thus what is called the evolution of the moral judgment of mankind is said to cast a doubt upon the objective character of morality as such.

That the moral judgment of mankind undergoes development may well be admitted. But this does not cast any doubts upon the objective character of value as such. It may even be admitted that all judgments with regard to intrinsic value actually made of all such future judgments. But this does not invalidate the position which we are maintaining, *viz.*, that something must be intrinsically good. Our position would only be affected if we maintained that some things were *known* to be good intrinsically,

whereas our contention at present merely is that something must be good intrinsically.

But even the proposition that nothing is known to be intrinsically good is very hard to establish, and the subjectivist usually takes a different route. He frequently asks us what is that which we judge to be thus intrinsically good, and when he obtains the reply that knowledge or beauty or love are thus intrinsically good he chuckles to himself, for he thinks that we have landed ourselves in the pit which he had dug for our destruction. For he goes on to point out that it is not knowledge as such, as a brute existence somewhere out of human ken, not beauty which is neither contemplated nor enjoyed by any one, nor an ideal and eternal love which is not felt by any one, which can be thus judged to be intrinsically good. Your knowledge must be possessed by some one, and your love felt by some one, your beauty contemplated by some one, before they can be judged to be good. Thus whatsoever may be judged to be good can be so judged only in relation to some conscious being, and thus goodness is dependent upon and derived from consciousness. But the subjectivist is here again on a wrong track. For supposing for argument's sake we admit that nothing is judged to be good unless it is a state of consciousness or is related to some sentient being, would the subjectivity of goodness follow from this admission? By no means. It would follow from this admission that the sphere of goodness or the province within which goodness may be predicated of things is circumscribed, since it can no longer be assigned to things outside the sphere of sentience or consciousness. But it would not follow that within this sphere things may not be intrinsically and absolutely good. If I admit that nothing is good in itself except the possession of scientific knowledge, the appreciation of beauty and the enjoyment of personal affection, in what way am I admitting that goodness is not an objective and unanalysable and intrinsic character of certain things. I am simply specifying the particular things of which it is thus a character. For, mind you, I am not admitting that these things are good because they are forms of consciousness, or that their goodness is derived from their sentience. That indeed would dislodge me from my objectivist position, for that would involve the admission that good-

ness is definable in terms of sentience, which would be a fallacy of the type I have called the Naturalistic Fallacy. That goodness cannot be defined in terms of sentience would be clear as it will be generally admitted that some forms of sentience are certainly bad and others may be indifferent. By judging certain states of consciousness to be alone good, I am not making goodness in any way subservient to consciousness or taking away its objective character. Since in judging these things to be good I am assigning an independent and ultimate quality to them which is not identical with their sentient character or any other factual character which they may also possess.

I may perhaps add also that in judging certain things to be intrinsically good, I am maintaining that the truth of such judgments is universal. They are not true for the individual alone who makes them, but they are true *per se* or in themselves. The individual character of the judge does not in any way affect the truth of the judgment. If a thing is intrinsically good then it is so for all persons and in all times. This of course does not apply to judgments of instrumental value, since the instrumental value of goods depends upon their efficiency to produce what is intrinsically good, and this varies with different individuals and different times.

I may finally touch briefly upon the relation of Existence and Goodness. As indicated before I regard the two orders of judgments as entirely different and I hold that you cannot infer one order of propositions from the other order. Thus I cannot infer from goodness to existence or from existence to goodness. From the truth of the judgment that something is intrinsically and extremely good, I cannot infer that it must, therefore, exist, and from the judgment that something does certainly exist, I cannot infer that it must therefore be good. Goodness and Existence I regard as altogether distinct and independent attributes. If this view is correct it condemns as worthless a good deal of philosophical reasoning in which Philosophers have argued to the nature of existence from considerations of a moral character or what would be good to exist, and conversely from the nature of Ultimate Reality to the content of the Moral Ideal. I do not of course maintain that an Ethical or Value judgment may never be employed in an argument which attempts to establish a conclusion about the

nature of existence. But I do maintain that ethical premises by themselves can never yield an Existential or Factual conclusion, though they may do so conjointly with other Factual premises. Thus I consider Kant's argument for 'freedom' legitimate because it belongs to this mixed type rather than to a purely Ethical type. I would thus analyse Kant's argument :

(1) No action can be a duty unless it is true that there are some actions which I have the choice to do or not to do.

(2) I know that some actions are my duty, therefore, there are some actions which I have the choice to do or not to do.

It is sometimes said that in this argument Kant has deduced the fact of freedom from the very concept of the moral 'ought.' But this is by no means so. In the above argument which is an amplification of what Kant expresses epigrammatically in the formula "Thou oughtst means thou canst," the second premise, "I know that some actions are my duty," is absolutely necessary if the conclusion is to follow, and this premise is not a purely value judgment, but a factual judgment. It is not a judgment about value, but about the content or fact of knowledge. But such arguments as these which go under the name of the Moral argument for Immortality or the Moral argument for the existence of God, appear to me to argue purely from value judgments to existential conclusions and I, therefore, consider them illegitimate.

VALUES

BY

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The discussion about the nature of Values in Modern Philosophy is now a quarter of a century old and when it is remembered that some of the best minds of Europe and America have been engaged in almost continuous succession in attempting a solution of the problem it is only ignorance of their works or downright foolhardiness that leads one to hope that something very strikingly original can still be said on the subject. A list that includes, among others, the names of Lotze, Rickert, von Hartmann, Ehrenfels, Meinong, Windelband, Varisco, Ritschl Aliotta, Croce, Kreibitz, Eisler, Leibmann, Brentano and Hoffding on the Continent, of Sidgwick, Bosanquet, Rashdall, Russell, Moore, Shand, Sorley, Alexander, Pringle-Pattison, and Mackenzie in Great Britain and of Dewey, Perry, Urban, Munsterberg, Santayana, Picard, Prall and Kallen in America is a sufficient deterrent to all ambition that way and all that one can hope to do is to pick and choose materials out of their writings according to one's philosophical leanings or partisan spirit and to construct therewith a tolerably coherent scheme. The ramifications of the subject are so wide, involving as it does psychological, ethical, aesthetic, epistemological, metaphysical and religious issues, that it is no wonder that the subject should be viewed in widely diverse fashions and give rise to interminable debates about its exact significance and etiology.

But out of the general melée of discussions there emerges on close observation a grouping of the combatants into two radically opposite camps. One group finds in the concept of value something ultimate and unanalysable. A value is a quality intrinsic to certain facts and events and attributable more or less objectively to them. The other group finds the basis and meaning of value

in human feelings and desires. The former group has been obliged to lean towards intellectualism or intuitionism for the obvious reason that if values are apprehended and not imposed by the mind, they must be cognised in the ordinary intellectual or intuitional way. It must be noted, however, that how exact values inhere in things has been a matter of great dispute among the objectivistic intellectualists themselves. Some think of values as tertiary qualities of things and situations more or less on the same plane as the primary and secondary qualities; some again think of values as being generated by the compresence of mind and some undefinable properties of objective facts; others again think that values are objective in the sense of being conducive to the realisation of an objective ideal. It is natural, therefore, that when there is so much divergence as to the exact nature of their objectivity, there should be a dispute about the true relation of value and existence. One thinks that existence is itself a kind of value possibly in the sense that Truth is an additional qualification; another thinks that ideals lose their significance if they are mere ideals and not actuals somewhere and sometime; a third thinks that an assumption of existence is enough to satisfy the degree of demand made by values for reality; a fourth ascribes to value a reality akin to that belonging to primary and secondary qualities; a fifth believes that values emerge out of a potential capacity of reals when these come into relation with mind; a sixth thinks of ultimate values as intrinsic (but not necessarily objective) in the sense of being fixed in the nature of the things concerned irrespective of the time of recurrence, the apprehending personality and repetition through identical kinds. There is again the question whether finite values can at all be ultimate. The uncompromising monist admits degrees of value and reality in relation to the Absolute whose function the finite is supposed to fulfil, and is prepared to give some value to everything in existence because it has its place in the scheme of the whole but no absolute value to anything but the Absolute itself. The ordinary thinkers have no objection to ascribing values to finite things although they too are divided in their opinion as to whether values emerge in course of time in pursuance of an objective plan or simply by the struggle for existence and the ultimate survival of the fittest or whether

they inhere in the finite without any such reference at all. There is again the question of the interrelation of values as to whether the Beautiful is ultimately a form of the Good or whether the Good is a kind of Beauty or whether and in what sense both of them partake of the nature of the Truth, *i.e.*, are only factual in character.

Then there is the other group of thinkers who disbelieve in the objective character of values and base them upon some mode of subjectivity. They are not against the retention of objectivistic terminology so long as it is not forgotten that it is only for convenience that such mode of speech is used. They form a far more coherent group than the other one although they themselves fall into two distinguishable subdivisions. Some of them are for defining the valuable in terms of the pleasant and are therefore in favour of an affective origin of valuation. The process of valuing is inextricably linked up with the feeling of pleasure and the valuation-judgment is a secondary phenomenon that has no significance apart from the primary fact of an immediate experience of value through an agreeable feeling. According to them the only ultimately valuable thing is pleasurable experience and everything else is valuable only in so far as it is conducive to this experience. The only criterion of value is whether the thing, act or event does or does not, and if so, in what degree, produce a pleasurable experience. The other subgroup comprises those who are not against feeling as a criterion of value but who point out at the same time that pleasurable feeling comes as a consequence of the fulfilment of interest, desire or conative attitude. Now even if it so happens that the conative element is not satisfied and no resultant pleasure ensues, the mere fact that there was an antecedent desire for or interest in the object will be sufficient to produce a consciousness of value. Mere intellection or intuition gives us facts but leaves us cold: the halo of value is contributed by the conative factor.

I am personally in agreement with this last standpoint and think that a value is inconceivable without some reference to a being whose need an object fulfils or who is interested in it. And when I talk of need I include within it not only conscious desire but also subconscious impulse and even unconscious physiological

requirement. I believe that a good that is good to nobody in particular but is a mere attribute of some objective thing, fact or event may be a permissible metaphorical extension of the primary meaning of satisfyingness or interestingness but does not represent any intelligible characteristic when completely divorced from its original significance. This is why even on realistic assumption values have been assigned a character totally distinguishable from that of primary and secondary qualities. These two are supposed to have physical counterparts that may be conceived to exist apart from thought; but realists themselves have felt shy to declare that corresponding to values, whether of Beauty or of Truth or of Goodness, there exists objectively symmetry or proportion which produces in all minds alike the corresponding feeling of value. The question of its relation to existence has been mostly dodged by objectivistic speculations. To say that it emerges into being in relation to certain types of mind, *e.g.*, as Beauty to an artist (but not to an obtuse nature) or as Goodness to a moral man (but not to an unconscientious fellow), does not come into any conflict whatsoever with the position that the artistic and moral temper imposes the form of the good and does not find it already existent. If the civilised man finds in the world more valuable things than a savage does, it is a perfectly legitimate position that this is due to the increased needs and aspirations which the growth of intelligence brings about. Even artificial needs will create artificial values and temporary needs temporary ones. Things are absolutely indifferent in their own character and are stowed away till wanted when they assume the value according to the need, whether that be the value of existence as the subject of a judgment or of beauty as the subject of appreciation or of goodness as the subject of approval.

An oft-repeated but flimsy objection against this position is that we know a thing to be good and then desire it and not that we desire a thing and forthwith it becomes a good. A desirable thing is not a thing desired but worthy of being desired. The value or worth of the thing, it is said, must first be independently perceived and then and then only can it be the object of a legitimate desire. If to desire were to make a thing valuable, then all distinction between real and false value would disappear and there

would be no sense in correcting our first imperfect and even false valuations. Thus the argument from evolution of moral ideas cuts both ways. If it throws doubt upon the objectivity of values, it at the same time makes it impossible to admit the possibility of originating value out of any and every chance desire. The fulfilment of a desire may be a pleasure but it need not necessarily be a good, just as every frustration of desire is not necessarily an evil. The attribute of goodness is to be synthetically added on to pleasure arising out of the fulfilment of desire and is not a part of its connotation.

Let us take for granted that our first valuations are subject to revision and also that they may ultimately turn out to be false. Does this invalidate the position that there is no value that is not correlated to some conscious desire, subconscious craving or physiological need? In this connection we shall have to draw a distinction between immediate value and mediate value. One thing alone is immediately valuable and that is agreeable feeling. There can be no doubt that where secondary considerations do not complicate matters an agreeable feeling is always preferred to one that is disagreeable and a greater quantity of the former is valued more than a lesser quantity. Subject to reservations that do not affect matters at all, pleasure is an index of vital satisfaction and if any thing has absolute value (we shall see that in a sense nothing has) it is life itself for the very simple reason that it alone is the object of universal desire. A thing becomes valuable only when it satisfies one or other aspect of life and may cease to be so or suffer a diminution in value when deeper insight reveals a view of life which is more desired because of its greater satisfyingness. Because the moon dims them and the sun makes them invisible the stars do not yet cease to be; during the total eclipse of either they again come out. Similar is the case with our attenuated and suppressed personal values; they emerge into view as soon as purely personal considerations of the moment become released from the control of extra-personal considerations.

What generally happens, however, is that in estimating the nature of human desires we are apt to forget that man is incapable of considering himself or of being considered as being totally out

of relation to temporal and social life. If life were an instantaneous event, then there would have been no dispute about the identification of value with satisfaction of desire. But it so happens that life runs through a temporal course and what gives pleasure at the moment may in the long run prove injurious to life, as, for example, lead acetate may be sweet to the taste and deadly at the end or, conversely, a thing like quinine may prove bad to the taste and yet conducive to health in the end. In such cases our first valuations are modified or reversed in the light of further experience. But does this constitute a valid objection to the voluntaristic position? All that this proves is that man, constituted as he is, is more interested in longevity than in momentary gratification and as such considers ultimately life-prolonging stimuli as more valuable though less pleasurable than life-injuring stimuli of a pleasant type. Similar is the case with anti-social pleasures. As productive of enjoyment they have a value which no casuistry can explain away; but that value suffers a change into its opposite when man is viewed not as an instantaneous unit but as a being who wishes to continue in life beyond the present moment. Similarly, it is only when man begins to view his own conduct with the eye of society and not from his isolated standpoint that anti-social pleasures cease to be satisfying and begin to be regarded as unvalues. Morality becomes a value only when it is backed by a desire to live in society, and this desire may be due either to unconscious instinct or to calculated self-interest. Because in the long run it is far more pleasurable to be at peace with society than to be at war with it, therefore morality is more valuable than a momentary personal gratification. If an action is judged to be good now without ascribing to it any tendency towards the fulfilment of anybody's desire, it is because the ordinary moral acts that keep up social solidarity have long ceased to be the objects of elaborate conscious judgment and are now accepted as almost true *a priori* whereas the truth is that all of them are good only because they fulfil the condition of social life which is an object of universal desire. Let any unusual situation arise and then the obviousness of valuation disappears. Is it good to go to war with another nation? Is it good to exploit the weakness of the coloured races? Is it justifiable to inflict capital punishment on

rebellious idealists? A jingo and a pacifist will put different valuations on the same fact and so also the tough-minded and the tender-hearted. The desire for national independence will make war a moral good and rebellion a holy mission. The anxiety for the spiritual and material welfare of backward races (backed by a subconscious desire to make an economic exploitation of their natural resources) will sanctify all imperialistic designs. Conversely, a desire for international amity will outlaw war and a policy of 'live and let live' will make non-interference in other nations' affairs a national obligation of the highest type of morality.

It has been frequently asserted that even though individual valuations may all turn out to be erroneous, still the moral ideal possesses a reality which is independent of individual caprices and variations in course of time. Many have again professed to see in history not the triumph of force but of righteousness. It has also been asserted that man's moral sense is apprehending truths that escaped the vision of his ancestors. It is also claimed that the good possesses a universality which is incompatible with its subjectivity. To me it seems that all these assertions are based on a gross underestimate of what enlightened interest can achieve. If man is organic to the whole of creation and if his original constitution as a living, thinking, social being and his acquired habits as engendered by the circumstances of his training and environmental conditions together determine the nature of his desires and supply the bases of his valuations, it is evident that the greater the number of factors that enter into his calculations the more satisfactory will his valuations be. It is the same self whose interests serve as the basis of valuation, but then this self may only look to its vital interests or it may extend its horizon to include social interests, national interests and humanitarian interests of the present and of the future. Why man should not confine himself to his personal needs only is an irrelevant question, for man has an instinct for gregariousness as for self-preservation even though ultimately both serve the same purpose, *viz.*, to keep the self in being. Even the empirical and temporal zone of interests may be transcended and transcendental, eternal and superhuman considerations may complicate our valuations so radically that all earth-

ly interests may be decried and genuine values shoved on to the side of the unseen. But even then it is the interest of the spiritual self that supplies this new element of value. Social valuations are transfigured by the introduction of God and immortality as factors. The world's history is the world's verdict only when the self distrusts its immediate valuations in favour of a valuation in terms of an Absolute which co-ordinates the activities of all beings of all times. Psychologically it is a process of rationalisation and metaphysically it is viewing all things *sub specie aeternitatis* to justify such immediate evils as Gothic conquest of Rome, the disappearance of Buddhism from India, the iconoclasm of Islam in India, the recent European war and such other events of doubtful validity. When man feels that none of his own interests or of those of his fellowmen are being satisfied by any particular event, he consoles himself with the thought that from the standpoint of the whole, which he cannot clearly see, that event was probably justified and that if to the present generation fall all the trials and the troubles, yet an unborn generation would probably reap an unalloyed benefit. In this way, when private interests are transcended by thought, even immediate evil ceases to be an un-value and becomes a good. But let this consciousness of racial solidarity disappear and the nature of the immediate evil remains absolutely unmitigated to the experiencing self.

The why and how of this self-transcendence are irrelevant. A process analogous to that of intersubjective intercourse whereby we create transsubjective objects of cognition is at work in the creation of over-personal values. Not only when in society but also when alone we are dominated by a sense of social co-operation and we check our personal valuations by constant reference to other minds. We set up a standard of moral ideal as a counterpart to the balance of mutual interests and the more the vision is extended over space and time the more liberal the ideal becomes. Without an imaginative capacity, therefore, our own narrow interests supply the only standard of goodness and where the social instinct and the power of calculating remote interests of the self are lacking, unmitigated selfishness provides the only basis of valuation. The impartial spectator in us is our own 'social self' and the overpersonal or objective good is the content of a standard

mind which ignores the fluctuations of time, place and personality. Of morality, as of truth, we may say that objectivity is universal validity and both are engendered by the need of co-operation among social components. Morality is socially coherent action just as truth is socially coherent knowledge. Neither in the one case nor in the other is it profitable to refer to anything objective which, by definition, is in nobody's consciousness. Values are not only in consciousness in the sense of being cognised but also generated by the organism to signify its willing or unwilling acceptance of a situation or event. If I may be permitted to use the expression I should say that values are the categories of will—the modes in which the organism whose needs are concerned, views the objects which fulfil or oppose its needs. Without the assumption of an antecedent purpose (whether as instinct, impulse, interest or intention) values are meaningless, and without the postulation of common interest universality is without any sense. So insidious is the latter habit of looking to others that even purely personal values, such as the appreciation of beauty in nature, art and literature, are supposed to belong to all alike even though experience shows how widely individuals and races differ in their conception of beauty. The perception of beauty is undoubtedly due to our anatomical and physiological organisation which finds only in symmetry and regularity what would satisfy its needs. If however we dare not raise our voice in protest when personal valuation fails to support the social standard, it is because we value social opinion much more and would rather ignore our own aesthetic valuation than be put down as a crank. So also in social manners and religious practices the values are prescribed by social convention and it is only the man of insight who looks beyond his time and place and considers the interests of untold generations yet to come that can rebel against fixed social habits and established religious creeds.

In the long run, therefore, a thing that ought to be is a thing that makes for fuller life a life whose vital interests are preserved, whose intellectual needs are satisfied, and whose social relations are rendered harmonious. The never-to-be-achieved character of the ideal is due to the fact that human intellect is never perfect and human will is never satisfied. It is only in a community of om-

niscient minds and uniform wills that valuation can reach its finality. But so long as we do not reach the ideal society of Hindu Yogis, Buddhist Arhats and Jaina Siddhas we must be prepared to change our valuations as new needs emerge into life and mind and new factors are introduced into our consciousness. The construction of the ideal is a function of the Freudian wish—the greater the difference between desire and achievement, the greater the place of the ideal in imagination. But actual valuation comes with repose, whether that is provided by beautiful art or coherent thought or harmonious conduct. All valuation is factual in relation to the self as a state of pleasure or composure but is at the same time projected on to existence as a tertiary quality. If in many speculations of the East and the West the highest value has been ascribed to the eternal, immutable Substance the reason thereof is to be found in the fact that it alone makes the rise of the new impossible and corresponds to a composed intellect.

Let us now sum up. We affirm first of all that as the basis of a perceptual judgment is a sensation, so the basis of a valuation-judgment is a feeling of pleasure or unpleasure. We affirm further also that it is only when the process of subjective feeling of agreeableness or otherwise is transcended by a judgment of value that the attribute of 'valuable' gets attached to the thing in respect of which the dumb feeling is now replaced by intellectual assent. We assert further that the judgment upon the feeling itself, *i.e.*, whether it is worthy or not, is a secondary judgment which emerges into view when we try to arrange objects of value in a hierarchy and take into account the varied aspects of the valuing Self. We think that it is impossible to discuss the value of human feelings without taking into consideration their origin out of human needs and desires. We believe that if there is any difference between a cold intellectual judgment, such as 'the sun is hot' or 'ice is hard' and a judgment of the type 'this scenery is beautiful' or 'this conduct is good,' it must be sought in the additional factor of 'satisfactoriness' which is present in the second case and absent in the first. We are further of opinion that 'satisfactoriness' or its opposite can come only as an agreement or disagreement of our physiological needs, instinctive impulses, subconscious interests or deliberate intentions with what is per-

ceived or conceived to be the environment with which an understanding is necessary in the interests of our life. These interests again may reciprocally influence one another, as when man's vital needs require a development of intellect and his intellectual needs require in their turn good health. They are again widened with our capacity to conceive ourselves as members of a greater society than our immediate neighbourhood, and the transcendence of our first valuations and immediate personal interests is only possible to those who have imagination and who find greater pleasure in the fulfilment of the interests of their social self than in their own narrow self-interest. The distinction between personal liking and objective valuation lies in the element of social reference present in the latter which is a product of social co-operation based on the balancing of mutual interests. Objective valuation is a standardised social judgment upon things, processes and events that have some bearing or other on human needs and desires. Its want of finality is due to the limitation of human knowledge about the sentient factors to be considered which extend over all place and time (and according to theistic beliefs, also beyond them both). The only intelligible position about valuation is that it is capable of explanation in terms of subjective factors and hence values are ultimately subjective not only in the sense of their being apprehended by the mind but also because they fulfil subjective needs, whether personal or social. They are the categories under which all objects that satisfy needs and purposes must be viewed to be properly apprehended by a sentient being whose mental endowment includes, in addition to intellect, affective and volitional factors.

THEORY OF VALUES

BY

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Value is *par excellence* a human conception. It is confined to human experience alone. It is human beings only who can value, appreciate and prize. The implications of value are found in judgments of a certain type. We are quite familiar with them in Economics. Apart from economic values, the chief applications of the judgments of value are found in morals. Moral judgments are judgments of value. They involve a comparison with some standard or ideal of excellence. Unless we are very much obsessed with the utilitarian's calculus of felt experience which is not calculable at all, the standard of worth in ethics must be regarded as an ideal something as distinguished from the economist's material standard of gold or silver or some such object of exchange. Utility is not, however, the only value and utilitarianism is not the only theory of ethics. 'Good' or 'evil' refuses to be resolved into any simpler notions of value. However much we may try to press these concepts into such notions as self-interest, or public utility or justice or even piety, they stand out as unique concepts of the mind, unresolvable into any of them. After all that has to be said has been said, we are left wondering why we call that which is good good and that which is bad bad. Opinions may differ in respect of individual cases, but the moral categories are there and neither social vote nor the magic principle of heredity can explain them away. They hang by the breadth of a hair and the moment you cut it, those categories roll down the whole flight of steps from top to bottom and fail to secure a lodgment anywhere on the way.

The point I am seeking to make is that good and evil, right and wrong in human conduct expresses a peculiar kind of human values which cannot but be regarded as fundamental. But judgments are the product of reflexion and moral judgments are no less

so. Like all judgments, judgments of value are also open to criticism. Ethics therefore is a critique of moral values.

From this it is clear that all our judgments are not judgments of value. It is those judgments only which express a particular attitude of the mind in which we are said to cherish and prize, appreciate and esteem, respect and admire, criticise and deliberate upon a thing or act. To a large extent it is an attitude of feeling or in other words a matter of taste. It is exhibited in our likes and dislikes. These like and dislike judgments are also unique in a certain sense. There is no disputing about tastes, we say. But is there, then, no ideal of beauty? no objective standard of beauty? Are our aesthetic judgments purely individual and subjective? Like all value judgments, aesthetic judgments also imply a standard. That there is a universal and objective standard of value in Aesthetics is what makes that study a science. In Kant's critique of judgment which is much less popular than his other critiques, the possibility of such objective and universal judgments has been very clearly established. It is the subjective-objective character of beauty as a value that makes aesthetic judgments unique. From mere likes and dislikes which are subjective and arbitrary in the extreme, they run through the whole gamut of our experience till they rise to a self-contained objectivity and universality of their own. A thing of beauty is joy for ever. Why? because it is an ultimate and unique value and is recognised by all as such. The conception of values is no doubt connected with our happiness. A thing is often regarded as a value when it directly or indirectly contributes to human happiness. Happiness is one of those universal values which are indefinable for their vagueness. That utility is a category of value has been hinted at already, although from an economic point of view it is always risky to include vague utilities under values. Happiness in the highest sense is universally acknowledged to be a general value, so much so that Kant could not help dovetailing happiness with virtue by a divine dispensation. When is man known not to care for happiness? Self-preservation and race-preservation on which the evolutionist stakes his theory appear to men's minds in the shape of happiness to be pursued. Even in the animal kingdom these instincts come in the form of a blind pursuit of pleasure. Happiness therefore may be taken

generally as a large and important source of values. Some things do not constitute happiness in themselves, but are as means to that end. In such cases, they may be said to possess instrumental values or contributory values. Their character as values depends on the measure in which they succeed in producing some beneficial result. Happiness has been called a universal value, but the mind is not satisfied with such a vague, limitless generality. It seeks to fasten on some concrete ends realisable by various activities such as art, play, liberty, etc. Whether an object has any intrinsic worth or not, when it is sought after, it must appear to have an intrinsic worth or at any rate to be closely connected with such worth, i.e., it must be interesting. Hence I remarked before that value implies a particular attitude of the mind. This attitude is both a feeling attitude—for it is connected with interest and an active attitude—having an effect on our will. Hence it is sometimes said that values are affecto-motor attitudes. To some Beauty appears on this ground to be the highest category of value. That beauty is one of the highest or ultimate values nobody can dispute. The aesthetic sense in its highest manifestation merges into the ethical and the distinction between the good and the beautiful fades away in an indissoluble unity. But that is in the final stage. In the beginning we see the reign of conflict. Art openly defies morality and the ideal of beauty is supposed to be quite independent of the ideal of conduct. Thus art-creations are sometimes found to pander to the grossest forms of sensuality and to scatter all ideas of decency to the wind. Art rises from the sensuous and passes on to the ideal. Even the most realistic in Art contains an element of idealism. It is only where Realism is divorced from Idealism that art loses its value and lives by playing on the baser elements of human nature.

I have so far dealt with non-intellectual values. But there are intellectual values too. If the good and the beautiful are ideals, the true is no less so. The highest metaphysical values are expressed by such terms as Reality, Truth, Entity, Substantiality, etc. But the search for reality or truth is no less dominated by interest than the pursuit of beauty. The good, the true and the beautiful express in their totality the sum of human values. Human life in its concrete expression is distinctly a universal

value. Many of the objects of this world appear valuable to us, because they stand in a certain relation to life, quite apart from their moral or aesthetic worth. Those who have lost all confidence in the supreme value or values of life are tempted to commit suicide. But why is life valuable? Is it because the sumtotal of pleasure on the whole is greater than the sumtotal of pain? Is it a matter of calculation merely? The hedonist makes a double mistake when he thinks that pleasures can be summed up or counted like your chickens; and also when he advises that each individual is to count for one and not for more than one. To look upon one's self as equal to any other self is not a means to morality, but is about the last word of ethics. Normally and as a matter of fact every one is for himself first and foremost. Reason forbids, you say, to think in that way? But so long as pleasure will remain a value of such considerable dimensions, Sidgwick's principle of distributive justice will remain a copybook maxim and Kant's conception of kingdom of ends a dream.

All our values are relative; relative to our subjective attitude and relative to each other. A great determinant of value is activity. A sportsman will find many things attractive which to a non-sportsman are matters of no concern. A man of morbid imagination will invest various things with artificial importance. Men under a sense of imaginary wrong have been known to commit various crimes which under normal circumstances they cannot but repent. Contributory or instrumental values are all relative to the end for which they are prized.

All values are relative to finite minds. Human will is finite and our ends also are finite. Even the ethical values express the continual struggle which is required to realise the ideal. Our sense of duty is borne down under the weight of maladjustment. 'Strait and narrow is the gate of heaven.' All our social values depend upon the relation between finite mind and finite mind. If a man can be conceived who has had at no stage of his life anything to do with society, many of the social and moral values will disappear for him. The pursuit of truth implies that truth has always to be pursued and never attained. So here also the finitude of the mind comes up. Is the ideal of beauty free from these limitations? No; the sense of beauty that is in us is weighed down with

a sense of imperfection. Some ray of the beautiful or the sublime, to use a Platonic metaphor, strikes upon our mortal being at some point and kindles our whole being into a flame. That is all. Just as in the intellectual sphere the vision of truth comes to us in a manner which forcibly reminds us of our own imperfection. Truth is only truth in relation to the untrue or false. So in the case of aesthetic appreciation, we admire the Beautiful in proportion as it is removed from "the sphere of our sorrow." Admiration implies comparison and comparison indicates an ineradicable correlation between perfection and deficiency. Value always has reference to dysvalue. The highest reality is that which is incomprehensible and inaccessible.

यतोवाचो निवर्तन्ते चमत्प्रमनसा सह

That from which speech returns with the mind baffled in its efforts to reach it.

The moral ideal has however one advantage over the intellectual and it is this that whereas the intellectual ideal baffles comprehension, the moral ideal whispers a word of hope. The ideal of the good has to be *realised* in conduct and however remote the goal may be, its least practical realisation requires as a *sine qua non* some very *real* conditions. So that which remains unknown and unknowable to intellect, becomes an indispensable postulate for moral consciousness. Hence the primacy of the will over intellect. Moral values are far more realistic than intellectual values. Hence value is realised in *practice* or activity. You may call it a pragmatic view of truth, if you like. But the relation of will or activity to value is a very intimate one. Desire implies value. Both the feeling and the active elements in desire contribute towards the creation of values for us. When more than one value acts upon our will, deliberation becomes necessary. Psychologically the importance of value is nowhere so obvious as in deliberation. Deliberation may be defined as the process of determining relative values for the will. According to this view, the strongest motive theory must be discarded once for all as a forlorn creed. If values depend upon so many conditions, they must be regarded as hypothetical and relative and subject to all the contingencies of experience. Is there no absolute value? Those who

have dealt with the metaphysics of value are not clear about this point. Evolution implies a standard. In morals, evaluation is absolutely imperative. No moral philosophy is possible without the recognition of value. The fair amount of unanimity among mankind with regard to the fundamental questions of good and evil leads inevitably to the position that there is a universal, necessary and objective standard. If value is to be treated as a pre-eminently moral category, we cannot escape from the conclusion that there is in the conception of value something definite and objective which can serve as a standard of comparison between different ethical values. But is it capable of a definite statement? Is it logically definable? Appreciation, admiration, reverence and dignity there certainly is, but as soon as we try to definitely formulate the ground of such admiration and devotion, we find that it is elusive. There is such a vague and misty fringe round about it that we cannot make a precise or definite predication without straining beyond the limits of clear thought and language.

Both biologically and ethically life is a great value or rather a system of values. Pleasure or happiness also is a system of values. Life's value is sometimes expressed in terms of pleasure or interest. But interest does not exhaust all its contents. In life, there are certain things whose value cannot be expressed in terms of mere pleasure or utility. We call them invaluable. Character is an invaluable thing in the world. Its worth cannot be computed by any known value. The sacrifice of the martyr, the fidelity of a wife, the affection of a mother, the sublimity of the starry sky, the beauty of a waterfall in a moonlit night are such invaluable goods. The value which they express each in its own way is regarded as the highest value.

But metaphysically all these values may be said to be subordinate in their turn to the conception of the soul. The soul is the highest value. Different things of the universe appear to our eyes differently coloured, but it is the ray of the sun which like a consummate artist paints them in all the unspeakable wealth of their tints. Similarly it is the soul, the light that shines within every one, that gives to each thing its value. यस्मिन् प्राप्ते सर्वमेव प्राप्तं भवति । यं सर्वज्ञा चापरं ज्ञातं मन्यते नाधिकं ततः । That benefit which

being attained pulls all other benefits into significance. The absolute value, therefore, may be said to belong to the soul which is the fountain head of all values.

न कश्चित् कस्यचित् कामाय प्रियं भवति
आत्मनस्तु कामाय प्रियं भवति ।

Everything becomes an object of desire to us and is valued on that account for the sake of the soul. The soul is loved and desired not for the sake of anything else but for its own sake.

निष्पाधि प्रेमात्मदत्तं आत्मत्वं ।

But this view obviously depends upon a conception of the self which obliterates the distinction between the individual and the universal soul. The universal is the real and the real is the rational. Thus the controversy between thought and reality, between subject and object, is set at rest for ever and the struggle of the finite mind to reach its ideal vanishes in a sweet repose in which all conflict is hushed into silence. Religion accordingly is supposed by some to express the highest social value. The ideal of religion gives the ultimate explanation of all values. Those who are believers in religion do not find it difficult at all to understand how human values are finite and relative and hypothetical. We run after this thing and that in the hope of securing happiness, but true happiness or true value is not to be found in anything mundane. The mundane values are not all illusions; they are valuable only in so far as they give a foretaste of the ultimate value that transcends all values. This is the transvaluation of all values and beyond good and evil in a real sense.

अनपेक्षः शुचिर्दक्षः उदासीनो गतव्ययः ।
सर्व्वारक्षपरित्यागो यो मङ्गलः स मे प्रियः ॥
यो न हृष्यति न द्वेष्टि न शोचति न काङ्क्षति ।
शुभाशुभ परित्यागौ भक्तिमान् यः स मे प्रियः ॥

If morality is merely a social distinction, you can certainly transcend it by disregarding it, as an Eastern despot would have placed himself by sheer brute force above all law and constitution. But

the transcending of values becomes possible in the only real sense, when one can transcend the limitations of his own being and attune himself with the infinite. Infinite is the fountain head from which all the ultimate values such as the true, the good and the beautiful spring. The religious ideal is the light which is not on sea or land

न तदभासयति सूर्या न ग्रथाद्गो न पावकः ।

यद्गत्वा न निवर्त्तते तन्नाम परमं मम ॥—गोवा १५७

But religion is ceasing more and more to be an inspiration and the fact cannot be disputed now-a-days that the present-day world is drifting further and further away from religion. The spiritual is now confounded with the mystical and obscure, and religious values have come to be regarded with suspicion.

The reason is not far to seek. With the ever increasing complexities of life and the struggle for existence which is felt more and more acutely every day, otherworldliness is vanishing further and further away. When the actual is of such absorbing interest, where is the time to turn to the rational or the ideal?

But those who persist in the effort to realise the highest values, are the people who can give us the correct interpretation of values. For it is the pursuit of values that make values intelligible. This is quite within our ordinary and normal experience. If we always prefer to sit in our arm-chairs and meditate upon an ideal constitution for India, the result is the weaving of a cobweb of facts and fancies incoherently pieced together having no practical bearing on experience. Those who are actually pursuing the end and actively participating in the regeneration of the country are the men most competent to see ahead and decide upon a practical scheme. Similarly the highest values are within the comprehension of those only who are actively trying to realise them. The horizon is lifted for those who have actually set the sail to their boats; not to those who keep looking on from the shore.

This unique relation of activity to values may lead to the idea that the values will cease to be values when they are consummated. But ideal values can never be consummated. They can never be exhausted. On the contrary active realisation invests them more

and more with enlarged scope and wealth of details. To my mind, this idea of development solves many of the questions which trouble our minds. The values must not be held to be static or stationary. If so, they are values in a limited sense. Life is likened to a flowing, bubbling, surging stream. With the growth and expansion of life, values increase in richness and range. Happiness, beauty, good, truth are all growing. Happiness does not mean the same thing for all of us and at all stages of life. In the Bhagavat Gitā, you will find three meanings of happiness, Sātwik, Rajasik and Tāmasik. So with regard to beauty and truth. As we get further scenes are revealed to our wondering gaze.





